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PREFACE
On November 2,8, 1964, Mariner 1V was successfully launched on a
trajectory that would take it within 150,000 miles of Mars. On
December 5, 1964, the spacecraft performed a successful midcourse
maneuver, altering its flight path so that it would pass within
6118 miles of the planet. The flight took approximately 71/_ months,
during which time a great deal of scientific information was gathered
concerning the near-Earth environment and interplanetary space. On
July 14, 1965, Mariner IV photographed the surface of Mars, and
telemetered to Earth the most advanced scientific and technical data
regarding the planet yet recorded.
This volume of the Mariner Mars 1964 Project Report describes the
system- and subsystem-level performance of the Mariner IV spacecraft
from the November 28, 1964 launch through the end of Mission Phase I
on October 1, 1965, and includes discussions of operations planning
and problem investigations performed in support of the Mariner IV
mission.
The Mariner Mars 1964 mission required the use of a great many
new techniques in designing, building, and operating unmanned space-
craft. The success of Mariner IV has made these techniques significant,
particularly in the light of future space programs. It is hoped that the
operations and results documented in this volume will be a useful
reference for those planning future space missions.
W. H. Pickering, Director
D. Schneiderman, Project Manager
Mariner Mars 1964
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h INTRODUCTION
This Report describes Mariner IV spacecraft per-
formance during Mission Phase 1, November 28, 1964
through October 1, 1965. The Report was prepared by
members of the Spacecraft Performance Analysis and
Command Group (SPAC).
SPAC was one of three analysis and command groups
in the Mariner IV space flight organization. SPAC areas
of responsibility included: 1) the determination of space-
craft performance by the analysis of telemetry data;
2) the recommendation of command sequences for the
correction of nonstandard performance or the optimiza-
tion of spacecraft performance; 3) the analysis of flight
spacecraft problems through suitable ground tests of
nonflight spacecraft; and 4) the training of operations
personnel for key events in the spacecraft flight sequence
through problem simulation using nonflight spacecraft
test models.
Two types of information are presented in this docu-
ment: spacecraft-related, and SPAC-related. Sections II
and III deal with spacecraft performance from the
system and subsystem points of view. Sections IV and V
describe SPAC organization and planning.
Mariner IV performance is reviewed from the stand-
point of overall system behavior in Section II. Particular
emphasis is placed on the effects of individual sub-
system behavior on overall spacecraft performance, e.g.,
the relationship of attitude control subsystem pitch- and
yaw-axis limit cycles on spacecraft radio-received signal
strength.
In Section III, spacecraft performance is analyzed on
an individual subsystem basis. Each subsystem is de-
scribed in sufficient detail that subsystem performance
data can be easily interpreted. All inflight perfor-
mance anomalies and failures are described in detail.
Finally, recommendations are presented for improvement
in spacecraft equipment and space flight operations
techniques.
SPAC organization and function is described in Sec-
tion IV. SPAC line and flight organizations, operations
philosophy, and interfaces with other organizations
involved in Mariner IV flight support are discussed. An
evaluation of SPAC performance during the mission
presents specific recommendations for increasing SPAC
effectiveness.
Section V presents the planning methods used by
SPAC in preparation for key flight sequence events
such as launch, trajectory-correction maneuver, and
encounter with Mars. The various command sequences
i,
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and spacecraft operating modes proposed during the
flight are discussed in detail and the reasons for selec-
tion or rejection are presented.
Appendixes include: 1) a detailed chronology of sig-
nificant events during Mission Phase 1; 2) graphs of
engineering data received via telemetry; 3) problems
and failures of spacecraft equipment during the mission;
4) detailed descriptions of the mechanization of each of
the commands that could be transmitted to the space-
craft; 5) the test plan used by SPAC in preparation for
Mars encounter; 6) a chart for the conversion of mission
day, day of year, and day of month; and 7) a list of
personnel participating in SPAC activities.
II. SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE
A. Mar/mr IV Description
Mariner IV was one of two spacecraft launched dur-
ing the Mariner Mars 1964 Project. It was one of the
Mariner Mars 1964 design series developed specifically
to provide a Mars flyby mission capability during the
1964 opportunity.
The primary objective of the Mariner 1964 mission
was to conduct close up scientific observations of the
planet Mars and to transmit the results of these obser-
vations back to Earth. Secondary objectives were to
perform certain field and particle measurements in
interplanetary space and in the vicinity of Mars, and
to provide experience and knowledge about the per-
formance of the basic engineering equipment of an
attitude-stabilized spacecraft during a long duration
interplanetary flight farther from the Sun than Earth
orbit.
The Mariner Mars 1964 design (Fig. 1) represented an
extension of the Mariner R (1962 Venus flyby) design
modified to permit flyby missions to Mars and to accom-
modate a complement of scientific instruments appro-
priate to the mission. The Mars flight plan included:
1. Launch by an Atlas/Agena
9.. Establishment of a cruise mode
3. Performance of a trajectory-correction maneuver
early in flight, if necessary
4. Gathering of interplanetary data
5. Start of planetary experiments and the gathering of
data about the planet Mars
6. Playback of data acquired during Mars encounter.
Major differences from the Mariner R design reflected
the longer flight time to Mars, a trajectory away from
the Sun, and the steadily decreasing solar energy input
to the spacecraft.
The spacecraft, fully stabilized in attitude, used the
Sun and the star Canopus as references. Cold-gas jets
pointed the spacecraft in all three axes, and external
torques were counteracted in two axes by changing the
aspect of movable solar pressure vanes to the Sun.
Gyroscopes were available for initial Sun and Canopus
acquisition and for inertial control during trajectory
corrections.
The Mariner power subsystem used photovoltaic cells
arranged on panels with a body-fixed orientation for
cruise operations and a rechargeable battery for launch,
trajectory-correction maneuvers, and backup. Power-
conversion equipment delivered regulated, 2.4-ke square
wave, 400-cps ac, and unregulated de electricity for dis-
tribution to the spacecraft subsystems. A central com-
puter and sequencer (CC&S) provided synchronizing
signals for frequency regulation, and performed the se-
quencing of onboard switching.
The spacecraft guidance subsystem permitted
trajectory-correction maneuvers and the postinjection
propulsion subsystem (PIPS) was capable of executing
two such corrections.
A two-way S-band radio subsystem carried telemetry to
Earth, commands to the spacecraft, and angle-tracking,
doppler and ranging information for orbit determination.
There were two antennas: a low-gain and a fixed, high-
gain; either could be used to transmit or receive. Switch-
ing between antennas could be performed by onboard
2
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logic or by ground command. The command subsystem
detected and decoded incoming command messages and
passed them to the various onboard equipment.
Two types of commands were used: 1) Direct Com-
mands (DCs), which resulted in direct action by the
receiving subsystem; and 2) Quantitative Commands
(QCs), which were transferred to the CC&S and stored
for later use. A data encoder subsystem formatted, se-
quenced, and when needed, provided analog-to-digital
conversion of the telemetry data.
The spacecraft carried a number of scientific instru-
ments to measure fields and particles between Earth and
Mars and in the vicinity of Mars; they included:
1. Cosmic ray telescope
2. Cosmic dust detector
3. Trapped radiation detector
4. Ionization chamber
5. Plasma probe
6. Magnetometer
A data automation subsystem (DAS) furnished control
and synchronization, performed necessary data conver-
sions and encoding functions, and buffered the science
data, transmitting it to the data encoder at the various
appropriate rates and times.
For the planetary encounter the spacecraft was
equipped with: 1) a television camera, Fig. 2; 2) a scan
platform to properly orient the camera; 3) a video stor-
age subsystem; and 4) nonreal time (NRT) data-handling
electronics for the television data.
B. Nominal Flight Sequence
One of the most significant features of the Mariner
Mars 1964 spacecraft design was the concept of a space-
craft which, although fully commandable from the
ground, could complete its entire mission from launch
to end of mission without ground-based intervention or
support (except for the trajectory-correction maneuver).
This design feature allowed avoidance of complete de-
pendency on the command link but, at the same time,
provided the capability to control the mission and alter
the nominal flight sequence by ground-command action,
if necessary.
3
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Table 1 provides the nominal flight sequence adopted
for Mariner IV before its launch. In general, the flight
sequence adopted before launch was followed; however,
many of the onboard encounter events were preempted
by ground command to allow the CC&S- or the sensor-
initiated events to serve as backup functions.
C. Mariner IV Performance
The Mariner IV spacecraft was launched from the Air
Force Eastern Test Range (AFETR) at Cape Kennedy,
Florida, on November 28, 1964 (the 333d day of the yr);
it was the second of two spacecraft scheduled by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
for the 1964-65 Mars opportunity. From launch until the
nominal end of mission on October 1, 1965, the perfor-
mance of the spacecraft was excellent. The interplanetary
cruise portion of the mission yielded a vast amount of
useful scientific and engineering data, and during the
planetary encounter phase, all primary mission objectives
were met successfully. On October 1, 1965, the space-
craft was still performing well after more than 7300 hr
of flight. At this time, the combination of high-gain
antenna pointing errors and excessive Earth-probe range
exceeded the limits required for obtaining useful teleme-
try data, so the spacecraft transmitter was commanded to
switch from the high-gain antenna to the low-gain an-
tenna. This configuration permitted the Deep Space Net-
work (DSN) to track the spacecraft signals periodically,
and should permit the reacquisition of telemetry data ff
the spacecraft is still operating when the Earth-probe
range has again diminished to an acceptable value. This
possibility is enhanced by the fact that throughout mission
Phase I, all engineering subsystems operated normally,
without any discernible degradation in performance.
The nominal flight sequence of events for the Mariner
spacecraft was designed to be totally automatic, requir-
ing no action from the ground for a normal flight. Such
a design relieved the mission from any dependence upon
the ground-to-spacecraft communication link (uplink)
provided that the CC&S operated correctly. The ground
command function would be necessary to the success of
the mission only if the CC&S were to fail. This was the
cornerstone of the functional redundancy philosophy
employed in the Mariner design which provided for
independent and physically different means of perform-
ing all critical functions. When both means are available,
as was the case in the Mariner IV mission, a strict reli-
ance upon the onboard functional branch may lead to a
flight sequence which is less than optimum. This proved
true in a number of cases during the flight, with the
result that the nominal sequence was preempted or
modified at those times when it was advantageous to do-
so. The major departures from the nominal sequence of
events are shown in Table 2.
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Table 1. Flight sequence adopted before launch
No.
1
10
11
12
13
14
Event
Verify number of encounter update
pulses to be inserted at T -- 7 man
Switch to internal power
Clear counters and insert encounter
update pulses
Release LCE relay hold
Switch video storage to launch mode
Release CC&S real-time inhibit
Clear relay release
Lift-off
Spacecraft injection
Spacecraft separation
e. Radio power up end turn on cruise
science
b. Remove relay hold and enable CC&S
c. End video storage subsystem launch
mode
d. Remove plasma 10-kv inhibit
e. Arm pyrotechnics
f. Agena isolation amplifier turned off
g. Turn on attitude control subsystem
h. Separation-initiated timer activated
Arm pyrotechnics
Deploy solar panels and solar pressure
vanes. Unlatch scan platform.
Deploy solar panels and solar pressure
vanes. Unlatch scan platform,
Turn on attitude control subsystem
"nttle
T -- 15 man
T -- 7 mln
T -- 7 man
T -- 5 min
T -- 4 min
T -- 3 man
Event 6 + 120 sec
T=0
I (T -t- 29.2 to 48.0
min)
5 = I "t- 2.6 man
S + 0 to 5 min
S -t" 30 ----- 20 sec
Event 11 -F 160 ± 80
sac •
T -I" 53 min
T + 57 man
SOtlll_Q
Launch complex
equipment (LCE)
LCE
LCE
LCE
LCE
LCE
Event
Event--Agena D
Agena D--timer
Infllght disconnect
connector
Infllght disconnect
connector
Infllght disconnect
connector
Inflight disconnect
connector
Pyrotechnics arming
switch (PAS)
PAS
PAS
SIT
SIT
CC&S L-1
CC&S L-2
Destination
CC&$
Power
CC&S
CC&S
Video storage
CC&S
Power
CC&S
Videostorage
Plasma probe
Pyrotechnics
Data encoder
Attitude control
Pyrotechnics
Attitude control
Commn_
Number of pulses inserted determines
time from launch to CC&S command
MT-7, which must vary with trajectory
flight time.
Monitor data encoder Channel 221
(maneuver booster-regulator output
current) to determine if the video
storage subsystem is in the launch mode
Provided Event 7 occurs within
tolerance relative to Event 6.
This signal is NAND with the first
end-of-tape signal after separation and
switches the video storage tape recordel
motor to 400-cps, single-phase power
for the rest of the flight.
This will allow the plasma probe to
supply 10 kv to its sensor.
This switch wired in parallel with
separation-initiated timer (SIT) for
redundancy.
Initiate Sun acquisition. Roll spacecraft
to calibrate magnetometer.
See comment 10 e, above.
Backup to Event 12.
Backup to Event 10 g. Backup: DC-13.
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Table 1. Flight sequence adopted before launch (cont'd)
No.
lS
Event Time Source Destination Comments
Sun acquisition complete
16 Turn on sollr pressure vanes and Canopus
sensor. Initiate roll search about the
spacecraft Z axis.
17 Cenopus acquisition complete
18 Pitch turn duration and polarity
19 Roll turn duration polarity
20 PIPS burn duration
21 Arm first treiectory-correction maneuver
22 Remove propulsion inhibit
23 Initiate maneuver sequence
24 Maneuver sequence start
e. Turn on gym cones for warmup
b. Switch to Date Mode 1
25 Begin maneuver
a. Spacecraft to inertial control (all axes).
Autopilot on. Canopus sensor off.
b. Set turn polarity
26
c. Start pitch turn
a. Stop pitch turn
b. Reset turn polarity
27 a. Set turn polarity
b. Start roll turn
28 a. Stop roll turn
b. Reset turn polarity
29 Ignite PiPS motor
30 5top PIPS motor
Event 12 or 13 4- 0
to 20 rain
T + 997 rain
Event 16 -t- 0 to 60
rain
T + 2to 10 days
T "t" 2 to 10 days
T "t" 2 to 10 days
M -- 10 mln
M -- 5 rain
M
M+0
M "t" S9 to 60 rain
Event 25 -t- 1 to 1319
sec (1-sec resolution)
Event 25 -t- 22 rain
Event 27 -F 1 to 1319
sac (1-sec resolution)
Event 25 "t" 44 min
Event 28 4- 0,080 to
102,360 sac (0.040-
to 0.0E0-sec resolu-
tion)
CC&5 L-3
QC-I-1
QC-1-2
QC-1-3
DC.29
DC-14
DC-27
CC&S M-1
Attitude control
CC&S M-2
CC&S M-3 or M-3"
CC&S M-4
CC&S M-4
CC&S M-4
w
CC&S M-3
CC&S M-3 or
CC&S M-5
CC&S M-5
CC&S M-3
CC&S M-6
CC&5 M-7
Attitude control
CC&S
CC&S
CC&S
PyroMchnla
Pyrotechnics
CC&S
Attitude control
Data encoder
Attitude control
Pyrotechnics
Pyrotechnics
If DC-13 was used to turn on attitude
control, Canopus acquisition will begin
at Event lS.
Backup: DC-13. Inhibit magnetometer
calibration roll signal,
(This is at 0.1 dog/see).
This will ensure that the PIPS transfer
relays are in the proper state for first
maneuver.
This will ensure that the pyrotechnic
relays are not inhibited.
Backup: DC-1.
Magnitude inserted by QC-I-1 prior to
maneuver start. (1000 sac equals 180-dog
turn).
Magnitude inserted by QC-1-2 prior to
maneuver start. (1000 sac equals 180 deg
turn).
Relay pulsed.
Relay pulsed. Magnitude inserted by
QC-1-3 prior to maneuver start.
IBar over symbol Is convention indicating opposite fundlon.
6
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No.
31
Table 1. Flight sequence adopted before launch (cont'd)
Event Time Source
Event 25 "t" 50 raina. Commence automatic reecquisition of
references
b. Switch to Data Mode 2
32 Sun acquisition complete
33 Canopus acquisition complete
34 Turn off maneuver counter
35
36
37
Complete tracking and send trajectory
commands for second trajectory-
correctlon maneuver
Perform Events 18, 19, end 20
Arm second maneuver
38 Perform Events 22 through 34
39 Switch bit rate to 8_ bits/see
40 Set Canopus sensor cone angle No. 1
41 Transmit via high-gain antenna; receive
via low-gain antenna.
42 Set Canopus sensor cone angle No. 2
43 Set Canopus sensor cone angle No. 3
44 Set Canopus sensor cone angle No. 4
Begin encounter sequence
45 Turn on encounter science
46
Science instrument cover removed
a. Turn off battery charger
b. Turn on video storage
Wide-angle acquisition (WAA)
Event 31 -t- 0 to 20
min
Event 32 "t- 0 to 60
rain
Event 25 "t- 139 rain
M -- 10 mln
E -- 192 days
E -- 137 days
E -- 131 days
E -- 103 days
E -- 68 days
E -- 30 days
E -- 6% hr (nominal)
E -- 4 hr (approx)
CC&S M-I and
CC&S M-2
Attitude control
CC&S
DC-23
CC&S MT_
CC&S MT-I
CC&S MT_
CC&S MT-2
CC&5 MT_
CC&S MT_
CC&S
Power
Power
Scan
Destination Comments
Affitude control
Data encoder
CC&S
Pyrotechnics
Data encoder
Aflitude control
Radio
Attitude control
Power
Pyrotechnics
Power
Video storage
DAS
If CC&S L-3 has failed to operate in
Event 15, the Canopus sensor and solar
pressure vanes will be turned off by thi,.
signal. This condition can be corrected
by sending DC-13.
Backup: DC-2.
Internal function to CC&S which
permits subsequent maneuver to be
executed.
If a second trajectory-correction
maneuver is required.
This will ensure that the PIPS transfer
relays are in the proper state for second
maneuver.
Backup: DC-5.
Backup: DC-17.
Backup: DC-10.
Backup: DC-17.
Backup: DC-17.
Backup: DC-17.
Backup: DC-25.
The Television subsystem (TV),
nonreal time (NRT) DAS, scan
subsystem, and video storage subsystem
receive power and cyclic encounter
science sequencing begins. The record-
ing sequence is inhibited. The scan
subsystem begins rotating the platform
from limit to limit. Actual time of this
event will be between E -- 6.% and
E --r 10hr.
The scan subsystem acquires the planet
and begins tracking.
7
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Table1. Flightsequenceadoptedbeforelaunch(cont'd)
No. Event Time Source Destination Comments
Switch to Data Mode 3 DAS Data encoder
47 Narrow-angle acquisition (NAA)
48
Inhibit scan platform motion
Begin recording
Start video storage tape recorder
49 End of tape in the video storage
50 Closest approach to Mars
a. Switch to Data Mode 2
b. Inhibit further start tape commands
to video storage
51 Mariner occulafion by Mars
52 Radio signal reacqolred
53
54
Switch off encounter science
Begin video storage playback
a. Switch to Data Mode 4
b. Switch off cruise science instruments
E -- 80 to E -- 35
man
Event 47 + 60 to 204
see
Event 48 + 22.8 man
E=0
E'I" 1 to4hr
Event 51 + 0,5 to2
hr
Event 45 + 13_ hr
Event 53 + 6_ hr
TV and/or narrow
angle Mars gate
DAS
DAS
Video storage
Trajectory
Video storage
DAS
DAS
I Trajectory
Trajectory
CC&S MT-8
CC&S MT-9
Data encoder
DAS
Video storage
Video storage
DAS
Data encoder
DAS
Power
Date encoder
Power
Backup: DC-3.
After Data Mode 3 is established scan
subsystem, TV and DAS engineering
data and additional cruise science data
are transmitted in real time. No data are
recorded at this time.
Backup: DC-16.
Signals from the TV and/or narrow-
angle Mars gate (NAMG) indicate
when their view is on the planet.
Removes 400-cps power from scan
actuator.
Emergency Backup: DC-24.
In addition to TV pictures, all real-
time data are recorded.
Video storage start delayed until TV is
prepared to take picture.
Video storage will stop itself and
inhibit further start commands from
the DAS.
Indicates when the video storage tape is
full.
Backup: a. DC-2.
b. Internal signal at Event
48 + 25.2 man.
The DAS star/tape commands to video
storage are permanently inhibited after
the first end-of-Mpa signal to DAS
signal which follows the initiation of
Picture 18. An internal DAS function
inhibits further DAS start tape com-
mands after Pidore 22 (Event 48
+2,5,2 man). This is a backup to first
part of Event 49 performed in video
storage.
During the lest few minutes preceed;ng
the occulation, the radio signals trans-
miffed between the spacecraft and
DSIF will refract through the atmos-
phere of Mars.
Spacecraft emerges from behind Mars.
Backup: DC-26.
Backup: DC-4.
8
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Table 1. Flight sequence adopted before launch (cant'd)
Event
Video storage switch from the first track
to the second track
56 Switch to Data Mode 2
Turn on cruise science instruments
Time
Event 54 plus 112 ±
3 hr
Source Destination Comments
End of tape loop in
video storage
DC-2
Video storage
Data encoder
Power
Backup: DC-22.
Optional after receiving all the
recorded data desired.
Table 2. Major deviations from the nominal
flight sequence
NO. Deviation
The spacecraft transmitter was switched vie ground command
from the triode cavity amplifier used at launch to the traveling-
wave tube (TWT) amplifier to avoid transmitter degradation
problems inherent in the cavity amplifier.
The Canopus sensor brightness gate logic was disabled via ground
command to eliminate spurious gate violations thought to result
from illuminated dust particles in the sensor field of view.
An early encounter sequence was commanded during cruise to
deploy the science instrument cover in order to remove depen-
dence upon ground commands at encounter end to position
the scan platform to the optimum position as a protection
against failure.
The planetary encounter sequence was modified by ground
command to provide the maximum in backup capability for all
critical functions.
A second encounter sequence was commanded in order to obtain
calibration data for the television electronics.
Maneuver-lnhiblt commands were inserted into the spacecraft
after encounter as a means of providing protection against an
inadvertent trajectory-correction maneuver.
The spacecraft receiver was maintained on the low-gain antenna
for the entire mission after it was verified that command capa.
bility via the Iow-galn antenna existed for nearly all of the
mission due to an interferometer effect between the two
antennas.
Table 3 provides a chronological sequence of events
during the Mariner IV mission, starting with liftoff and
concluding with the transfer of the spacecraft transmit-
ter to the low-gain antenna on October 1, 1965.
Although spacecraft performance was generally excel-
lent, the Mariner IV mission was not without incident.
Several design deficiencies became apparent, unexpected
environmental effects invalidated the automatic reacqui-
sition features in the Canopus sensor logic, and a
number of spacecraft performance characteristics were
Table 3. Mariner IV sequence of events
Date
November 28, 1964
Time, GMT Event
_V
29
30
December 4
5
I
_r
14:22:01
15:07:09
15:07:10
15:10:10
15:15:00
15:19:00
15:30:57
06:59:00
11:02:47
14:35:00
14:47:31
14:25:00
16:09:11
16:58:19
Liftoff.
RF power up, cruise science on, plasma
probe high-voltage on, video storage
launch mode off, CC&S relay hold off,
Agena Channel F telemetry off.
Pyrotechnics armed, separation-
initiated timer (SIT) started, isolation
amplifier for Agena Channel F telem-
etry disabled, attitude control on.
Solar panels deployed and scan plat-
form unlatched via SIT.
CC&S L-1 event (deploy solar panels);
no action, preempted by SIT.
CC&S L-2 event (turn on attitude
control); no action, preempted by PAS.
Sun acquisition complete, start of
magnetometer calibrate roll.
CC&S L-3 event (transfer solar pressure
vanes from erect to operate and turn
on Canopus sensor); spacecraft into
roll search.
Gyroscopes off, spacecraft roll
acquired the star Canopus after three
roll override commands (DC-21).
Trajectory-correction maneuver
initiated (DC-27).
DC-13 (inhibit maneuver) transmitted
: following loss of roll acquisition.
Maneuver attempt cancelled. Roll
override commands were transmitted
later and Canopus reacquired.
Traiectory-correctlon maneuver
initiated (DC-27).
Start of PIPS motor burn.
Reacquisltion of Sun and Canopus
complete. One roll override command
(DC-21) required.
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Date Time, GMT
December 6, 1964 00:00
7 12:29:41
13 14:09:00
17 16:06:22
17:30:00
January 3, 1965 16:59:54
February 11 06:54:43
February 27 17:02:19
March 5 13:12:37
April 2 14:25:15
May 7 17:27:25
June14,1965 15:51:45
July 14
I
14:27:55
15:41:49I
I ! 17:10:18
Table 3. Mariner IV sequence of events (cont'd)
Event
Plasma probe experiment began to
return abnormal data.
Canopus acquisition lost, spacecraft in
roll search until acquisition of star
"), Velorum.
DC-7 (switch power amplifiers)
transmitted. TWT into 90 sec warmup;
then standard mode at 40.2 dbm
output.
Canopus reacquired. One roll override
(DC-21) required.
DC-15 (Canopus gate override)
transmitted.
CC&S MT-6 (switch bit rates)
transferred telemetry rate to
8_ bits/sac.
DC-25 (encounter science on)
transmitted. Spacecraft encounter
science on, science instrument cover
deployed, scan platform started, baffery
charger off, boost mode enabled. Sub-
sequent commands turned encounter
science off and reconfigured the space-
craft to cruise with science instrument
cover deployed, battery charger off,
and boost mode enabled.
CC&S MT-1 (Canopus sensor cone-
angle update) switched the sensor cone
angle from 100.2 des to 95.7 deg.
CC&S MT-5 (transfer spacecraft trans-
mitter to hlgh-gain antenna).
CC&S MT-2 (Canopus sensor cone-
angle update) switched the sensor cone
angle from 95.7 deg to 91.1 des.
CC&S MT-3 (Canopus sensor cone-
angle update) switched the sensor cone
angle from 91.1 des to 86.5 deg.
CC&5 MT-4 (Canopus sensor cone-
angle update) switched the sensor cone
angle from 86.5 des to 82 deg.
DC-25 (encounter science on) trans-
mitted. Encounter science turned on
and scan platform started upon
command receipt at spacecraft.
CC&5 MT-7; no action, preempted by
DC-25.
DC-24 (inhibit scan) transmitted. Scan
platform stopped with television
camera at 178.45-deg clock angle upon
recelpt at spacecraft.
Date
July 14, 1965
15
August 3
26
27
30
31
September !
October 1
Time, GMT
22:10:29
23:42:00
00:17:21
00:31:42
05:01:49
11:41:50
03:20:33
21:06:52
i 9:40:00
20:30:00
23:35:26
01:25:00
06:29:00
21:30:17
Event
DC-3 (transfer data encoder to Mode 3)
transmiffed.
WAA at spacecraft. No action,
preempted by DC-24, DC-3.
NAA at spacecraft. Television
recording sequence started.
DC-26 (all science off) transmitted. All
science was switched off upon com-
mand receipt at the spacecraft.
A subsequent DC-2 command turned
cruise science on again.
CC&S MT-8; no action, preempted by
DC-26.
CC&S MT-9; cruise science turned off,
video storage in playback mode, and
data encoder transferred to Mode 4.
DC-2 (transfer data encoder to Mode 2
and turn on cruise science) transmitted.
Previous commands turned off video
storage playback power and turned off
the battery charger.
DC-13 (inhibit maneuver) transmitted.
Minimum turn and motor burn dura-
tion commands also sent to provide
maximum failure protection.
DC-17 (Canopus sensor cone-angle
update) transmitted. Switched the
sensor cone angle from 82 deg to
77.7 deg.
DC-25 (encounter science on) trans-
mitted. Encounter science turned on,
scan platform started upon receipt of
command at spacecraft.
DC.16 (NAA) transmitted. Started
television recording sequence for haze
calibration.
DC_4 (all science off, transfer data
encoder to Mode 4) transmitted. Video
storage playback of haze calibration
data started.
DC-2 (cruise science on, transfer data
encoder to Mode 2) transmitted.
Previous commands turned off video
storage playback power and turned off
the battery charger.
DC-12 (switch receiver and transmitter
to low-gain antenna) transmitted.
End of Mission Phase I.
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discovered in flight which had not been observed in
prelaunch testing. In addition, failures occurred in two
of the scientific instruments carried aboard Mariner IV.
One of these, traced to the failure of an incorrectly-
mounted resistor, caused a partial loss of useful data
from the plasma probe. The other, involving the unex-
plained failure of the Geiger-Miiller (GM) tube asso-
ciated with the ion-chamber experiment, eventually led
to the short circuiting of a power supply and the loss of
all ion-chamber data. Table 4 presents a summary of the
problems and unexpected performance characteristics
which were encountered during the mission. A Problem/
Table 4. Spacecraft problems during mission
No. Problem
The solar pressure vanes failed to deploy to the proper positions.
10
11
12
13
An electrical lockout caused one set of solar pressure vanes to fall
in the adaptive mode.
Periodic violations of the Canopus sensor brightness gates,
possibly by illuminated dust particles in the sensor field of view,
caused losses of roll acquisition in the standard, automatic roll
control mode.
A calibration error in prelaunch space-slmulator testing resulted
in spacecraft temperatures which were generally lower than
expected.
Failure of a bleeder resistor in the plasma probe experiment
caused a partial loss of data for the major part of the mission.
Failure of a GM tube induced a power supply failure in the ion
chamber experiment, causing the loss of all data from that
experiment.
A larger than anticipated radio-frequency (RF) interference effect
between the high-gain and low-gain antennas was experienced
during the later portions of the mission.
Transient effects in the operation of the attitude control gas
valves resulted in minimum impulses in excess of design values.
Large, unexpected variations were present from time to time in
the radio TWT helix current.
Voltage supply loading changes associated with the antenna
switching logic produced spacecraft transmitter frequency
changes.
Battery voltage exceeded design limits.
During the planetary encounter, it was discovered that an
unexpected logic state during the recording of television
Picture 22 prevented the automatic transfer of the data encoder
to Mode 2 upon receipt of the second end-of-tape signal.
During postencounter cruise, the cosmlc-dust detector
instrument began exhibiting anomalous behavior.
Failure Report (P/FR) was initiated for each problem
that was observed. 1
These problems and performance characteristics were
primarily concerned with individual subsystems, and are
described in detail in the subsystem sections of this
Report. Many of them during the flight had a pro-
nounced effect upon the systems aspect of the flight
operation, and caused some modification to the flight op-
erations philosophy. The following material is presented
in an attempt to provide some perspective into the
Mariner IV mission from an overall systems point of view.
1. Launch-to-Canopus Acquisition
Launch was accomplished on November 28, 1964, at
14:22:01 GMT after a flawless countdown. Both Atlas
and Agena performed well, injecting the spacecraft on a
trajectory well within launch tolerances. The Deep Space
Instrumentation Facility (DSIF) at Cape Kennedy,
Florida (DSIF 71), was able to track the spacecraft until
approximately launch plus 7 rain. At the nominal time
for shroud ejection, the received carrier power from the
spacecraft increased by about 15 db, indicating shroud
ejection. Shortly afterward, the spacecraft telemetry con-
firmed that the solar panels were reacting to sunlight.
When DSIF 41 (Woomera, Australia) acquired the
spacecraft, the data encoder event channels had changed
from a reading (octal) of 6 3 1 1 to 0 4 4 3, indicating
that all separation functions had occurred normally; i.e.,
pyrotechnics was armed, pyrotechnics current flowed in
A and B channels, the planetary scan platform was un-
latched, all four solar panels were deployed, cruise
science was turned on, and the radio power was switched
to the high-power mode.
At 15:15:05 GMT, telemetry showed an event counter
reading of 1 5 5 3, indicating that CC&S event L-1 had
occurred on time. In addition to the Counter 2 event
expected at L-l, events were also observed in Counters 1
and 3. Inasmuch as the number of event-register
changes prior to L-1 indicated the proper deploy-
ment of the solar panels, it was concluded that the
extra events were the result of pyrotechnics current in
both channels A and B. This would be possible if the
solar panel pinpullers had shorted after they were fired,
a distinct possibility confirmed both by ground tests and
by Mariner Ill flight data (where one extra pyrotechnics
current event was observed). The CC&S L-2 event
occurred normally, backing up the already completed
Agena separation function of turning on the attitude
1Alsosee Appendix C.
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control Sun sensors and acquisition iogic. Sun acquisi-
tion was completed at 15:31:04 GMT, and the spacecraft
went into a programmed roll to furnish calibration data
for the magnetometer.
The first data samples of the solar pressure vane posi-
tion telemetry after solar panel deployment indicated that
all four vanes had been deployed successfully, but that all
four vanes had traveled so far past the nominal angle
that they were much nearer than expected to the plane
of the solar panels. Despite the overshoot upon deploy-
ment, the center of pressure of the spacecraft remained
behind the center of gravity. Thus the effect of the solar
pressure vanes upon the control of spacecraft attitude
was stable, rather than regeneratively unstable. While
such an effect was of second order, the tendency was to
conserve attitude control gas rather than to increase its
expenditure.
At about 1659 GMT the first of a number of data
encoder position skips and deck resets in the telemetry
commutation cycle was observed. Abnormal indications
from the plasma probe and the cosmic-dust detector
coincided with the skips. The plasma probe failed to
receive some of its normal stepping pulses, and the
cosmic-dust detector showed spurious hit indications,
both of which are phenomena associated in prelaunch
testing with electrical transients on board the spacecraft.
The anomalies continued for 23 min, after which the
spacecraft returned to normal operation. Subsequent
analysis of the spacecraft telemetry data showed no
evidence of any performance degradation of the data
encoder, the plasma probe, or the cosmic-dust detector
which could be attributable to, or be the cause of this
transient behavior. Although an acceptable hypothesis
had been advanced, the phenomenon remains unex-
plained because verification was not possible. A second
period of commutator position skipping, deck resets,
anomalous plasma probe readings and cosmic-dust de-
tector data occurred on December 6, 1964, when the
plasma probe began to show a degradation in perfor-
mance. This period also indicated symptoms of abnor-
mal electrical transients on board the spacecraft, but,
beyond this similarity, there was no correlation between
the two events. It has since been established that the
second period of transient activity was the direct result
of a gradual piece-part failure in the plasma probe, and
that once the part had completely failed, no further
effect was observable in the remainder of the spacecraft.
On November 29, 1964, at 06:59:03 GMT, the CC&S
L-3 event was observed in the data. The Canopus sensor
telemetry confirmed that it was powered, and the space-
craft went into a normal roll search. Before launch a
standard sequence of events during Canopus acquisition
had been formulated, because it was anticipated that
star identification might pose a serious problem, and
because the celestial geometry near launch made it prob-
able that the first star acquired would not be Canopus.
The sequence adopted involved allowing the spacecraft
to acquire any object that fulfilled the Canopus sensor
brightness logic intensity requirements and to become
roll stabilized to that star. All data which might provide
evidence as to the roll orientation of the spacecraft
would then be gathered and evaluated. Based on this
evaluation, a recommendation for any command action
would be formulated, and then implemented during the
next DSIF 11 (Pioneer site, Goldstone, Calff) pass.
An acquirable object entered the Canopus sensor field
of view after approximately 60.5 deg of roll search, was
acquired, and the gyros were turned off by the acquisi-
tion logic. A review of the telemetry immediately indi-
cated that the star acquired was not Canopus. Although
tentatively identified as the star Markab, later analysis
showed that the sensor actually had made a false acqui-
sition on Earthlight reflected into the sensor optics. Re-
view of the telemetered light intensity data from the
sensor showed that the background intensity due to
Earthlight was much higher than anticipated, leading to
the possibility that a relatively dim star, normally much
below the sensor acquisition level might, in fact, ride high
enough above the background to become acquirable. As
a result, the recommendation for command action was
postponed until early in the next DSIF 11 pass when:
1) a more complete analysis of the data would be avail-
able, and 2) increasing Earth range reduced the Earth-
light background.
Later, on November 29, 1964, at 13:12:57 GMT, data
indicated that the gyros had turned on and the space-
craft was in roll search in its automatic reacquisition
mode. At approximately 1326 GMT, an acquirable object
entered the Canopus sensor field of view and the gyros
were automatically turned off at 13:29:15 GMT. Teleme-
try indicated that the star acquired was approximately
one-quarter of the expected Canopus brightness. A re-
view of all data gathered from the L-3 event to this
acquisition showed that the star intensity map obtained
during the automatic reacquisition did not correlate with
that expected for a search beginning at Markab, and that
the roll-axis control during the first acquisition appeared
much noisier than during the second. These facts led
to the hypothesis that the first object acquired was a
cluster of stars whose brightness was augmented by the
12
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laigh background light from the Earth, and that the space-
craft had actually been drifting in roll in response to a
very noisy input illumination to the sensor.
At this point it was decided to proceed with the
Canopus acquisition via ground command from DSIF 11.
The first roll override command (DC-21) was transmit-
ted to the spacecraft and verified in the telemetry at
09:14:13 GMT on November 30, 1964. The gyros turned
on and the spacecraft went into a normal roll search.
After nearly 60 deg of roll, another star was acquired.
An examination of the star intensity map for this search
showed an almost absolute correlation with the a priori
map of the sector between the star Regulus and the
star Naos. With this first positive indication of the space-
craft roll orientation, the decision was made to continue
with Canopus acquisition. A second DC-21 moved the
roll reference to the star _, Velorum. The final DC-21
resulted in Canopus acquisition and the initiation of the
pretrajectory correction cruise phase of the mission.
2. Pretrajectory-Correction Cruise
For the most part, this portion of the early flight was
without incident, except for two roll-control transients,
one of which caused a momentary loss of Canopus acqui-
sition. The first transient occurred on November 30, at
1341 GMT, when the telemetry indicated an abrupt
change in the roll error signal followed by a rapid
excursion from one side of the roll deadband to the
other. Some effect in the pitch and yaw axes was also
noted. Examination of the telemetry data yielded no
correlation with any spacecraft function or event and
the transient was attributed to either noise within the
attitude control subsystem or to some causal agency
external to the spacecraft. The second roll transient,
which occurred on December 2, 1964, at 10:09:00 GMT,
was the first one which demonstrated all of the charac-
teristics which later became associated with a specific
type of repeated roll transient. Canopus brightness had
been consistently indicating 100% of the expected
Canopus intensity. Suddenly, for one sample, the bright-
ness went to 130% of expected intensity, and, in the
same frame of data, a roll error signal significantly less
than the error corresponding to the lower edge of the
roll deadband was observed. In the next engineering
data frame, 12.6 see later, Canopus brightness had
dropped to 50% of the expected intensity, the roll error
signal was larger than the high edge of the roll dead-
band, and the gyros had turned on. Reacquisition oc-
curred almost immediately, and the gyros turned off
after a total on time of 207.5 ± 3.4 sec. Analysis of the
data indicated that all of the roll-position errors ob-
served could not be valid, inasmuch as the spacecraft
dynamic response would not be fast enough to provide
either the initial large negative error or the subsequent
recovery. The problem, at that time, remained unex-
plained, although all indications were that the spacecraft
had tracked a very bright object which had passed
through the field of view of the sensor.
As the spacecraft temperatures began to stabilize after
Canopus acquisition, it began to appear that the stabili-
zation point would be from 6*F to 10*F colder than the
nominal temperatures predicted for the near-Earth por-
tion of the flight. However, spacecraft temperatures
were within the preflight estimated tolerances. A review
of the thermal control activities prior to launch indicated
that a possible source of error in the final determination
of spacecraft thermal properties was the calibration of
the solar simulator during Mariner tests in the 25-ft
space simulator. Investigation showed that the calibra-
tion was incorrect, but that the error was linear in
nature, so that while the percentage error would remain
constant with decreasing solar input to the spacecraft
as it approached Mars, the absolute error would de-
crease, causing actual temperatures to converge with the
prelaunch predictions. As predicted, spacecraft thermal
control remained very good throughout the flight.
Midway through November 30, 1964, the Earth de-
tector output became unsaturated somewhat earlier than
expected. Because of the additional confidence in the
determination of roll orientation afforded by the Earth
detector, it was recommended that the trajectory-
correction maneuver be performed as early as possible,
all other things being equal. A thorough evaluation of
the information at hand indicated that the optimum date
for the first trajectory correction attempt would be on
December 4, 1964 during the DSIF 11 pass, with Decem-
ber 5 and 6 as alternates.
3. Trajectory-Correction Maneuver
On December 4, 1964 an attempt to correct the tra-
jectory of the spacecraft was initiated. The maneuver
sequence was terminated before the trajectory correction
was accomplished because of an unexpected loss of roll
attitude shortly after maneuver sequence initiation. On
the following day, December 5, another maneuver was
attempted and successfully completed.
About 50 sec after the first maneuver sequence was
initiated on the spacecraft, the spacecraft dropped lock
on Canopus and went into a roll-search mode, searching
for another acquirable object. A DC-13 was transmitted
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to the spacecraft to abort the maneuver because it had
been determined that there was insufficient time to re-
acquire Canopus with successive DC-21s before the
CC&S initiated the pitch-turn maneuver. After maneu-
ver abortion, the spacecraft maneuver clock responded
properly to the quantitative commands that had been
stored in the onboard logic, demonstrating that the
affected subsystems would respond properly during
the next maneuver attempt.
The second maneuver attempt was performed on
December 5, 1964 after a satisfactory sequence of events
and procedures, that would prevent a recurrence of roll
search during the maneuver, was developed. The plan
that was adopted used a spacecraft design feature that
allowed the stopping of spacecraft roll search and the
reestablishment of the correct roll attitude without roll-
ing the spacecraft through almost 360 deg of arc. The
spacecraft roll gyro would be placed in the inertial (rate-
integrating) mode via DC-18 to freeze its position in
inertial space, and then the spacecraft would be backed
up with successive DC-18s until the Canopus sensor
plane was properly oriented. Roll attitude would then
be referenced to Canopus again using a DC-19.
Table 5 lists the DC-18 maneuver sequence available
for use during the second midcourse maneuver attempt.
The sequence incorporated Space Flight Operations
Table 5. Tentative DC-18 trajectory-correction
maneuver sequence
Time Event
M -- 5 rain
M=O
M "t" 1 min
M "t" 36.5 min
M + 37 min
M "t- 54 min
DC-27 execution and time of execution is requested.
The DC-27 time of execution is to be based on an
estimated zero.roll error crossing at 1435 GMT -+- 15
rain. The preferred slope of the error-signal-vs-time
plot is negative, i.e., the direction of roll should be
away from the limit at which spacecraft roll attitude
was lost during the first maneuver attempt.
DC-27 executed by spacecraft.
Automatically load DC-18 into ground command
operational support equipment (OSE).
Latest time that an indicated roll search can be
corrected.
Latest time that DC-18 No. 1 can be transmitted from
DSlF 11. If no DC-18's have been transmitted by this
time, remove DC-18 from ground command OSE and
insert DC-13.
Latest time for Canopus ecquisition/reacquisition
confirmation. Load DC-13 into ground command OSE.
(SFO)-based constraints needed because of the special
sequence execution conditions. 2
The second midcourse maneuver was initiated at
1425 GMT and successfully completed. Canopus acqui-
sition was maintained until the inertial control mode was
established at M + 60 min, making the use of DC-18 or
DC-13 unnecessary. The roll position error signal and
the roll rate were approximately zero when DC-27 was
sent, providing optimum initial conditions for the roll
channel at the start of the maneuver.
Telemetry during the maneuver sequence verified that
all turns were correct and that the PIPS motor burn ap-
peared normal. Some of the pressure data for the motor
differed from those obtained in ground tests, but the
differences were attributable to the problems inherent
in dynamic testing in a simulated space environment.
Tracking data indicated that the doppler change at PIPS
motor burn was nominal, and subsequent trajectory com-
putations verified that the new aiming point was well
within all tolerances. The maneuver moved the trajectory
from a 151,000-mi miss distance on the wrong side of the
planet to a 6000-mi miss on the side of the planet that
satisfied all science and engineering constraints.
The return of the spacecraft to a cruise configuration
after the trajectory correction was uneventful. Sun
reacquisition required less than 5 min, roll search
was initiated normally, and on December 5, 1964 at
16:47:56 GMT, acquisition of the first acquirable star
that passed into the Canopus sensor field of view was
complete. One roll override command (DC-21) was suf-
ficient to reorient the spacecraft to the star Canopus.
4. Interplanetary Cruise
Following the reestablishment of cruise mode opera-
tions after the trajectory correction, the spacecraft en-
tered a phase of the mission (the interplanetary cruise)
which lasted, with one brief exception, until the start
of the planetary encounter on July 14, 1965. The one
exception was the science cover deployment exercise on
February 11, 1965. During this exercise, encounter
science was cycled via ground command. Included in
the final portion of the cover deployment exercise was a
command sequence that modified the cruise configura-
tion somewhat, turning off the battery charger and en-
abling the battery charger boost mode.
ZThe actual sequence performed is listed in the Chronology,
Appendix A.
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_The interplanetary cruise portion of the mission in-
cluded the execution of six CC&S master timer (MT) com-
mands, the transmission and execution of two ground
commands to modify the cruise configuration of the
spacecraft, and two failures in the cruise science instru-
ments. The first of these failures resulted in a degrada-
tion in the performance of the plasma probe, and the
second led to the catastrophic failure of the ion cham-
ber. The two ground commands were transmitted to
place the spacecraft in an alternate roll control mode in
order to prevent losses of the roll reference and to
switch the spacecraft transmitter from the triode cavity
power amplifier to the traveling-wave tube (TWT) power
amplifier in order to maximize the probability of mission
SUCCESS.
a. Plasma probe failure. At approximately 0000 GMT
on December 6, 1964, the first indications of a failure on
board the spacecraft were noted. Science data analysis
reported that the plasma probe voltage did not appear
to be stepping properly. Two hr later a deck skip was
noted in the engineering telemetry coincident with
plasma probe and cosmic-dust detector data anomalies.
For the next 23 hr, data eneoder, plasma probe, and
cosmic-dust detector anomalies occurred intermittently.
Subsequent analysis of plasma probe data showed a
steady degradation in quality until the data reached
a point where it was undecipherable by conventional
means. Throughout the 23-hr period, the engineering
data remained normal, with only the abnormalities in
the commutation cycle to indicate any spacecraft mal-
function. From the time that the plasma probe data
reached a level from which there was no further degra-
dation through the end of Phase I of the mission, there
were no deck skips or resets observed in the data
which were not correlated with onboard switching func-
tions. All indications were that an isolated piece-part
failure in the plasma probe resulted in sporadic genera-
tion of radio-frequency (RF) noise for the duration of
the propagation of the failure, and that when the part
had failed completely, the removal of the noise source
precluded any further interaction with the rest of the
spacecraft. Further analysis confirmed the failure mecha-
nism, and led also to the development of a data-processing
technique which allowed the recovery of a significant
portion of the plasma data by the experimenter.
b. Ion chamber failure. After a Class 2 solar flare on
February 5, 1965, the ion chamber GM 10311 tube
began to count at an excessive rate. None of the other
radiation instruments on the spacecraft showed any evi-
dence of abnormal radiation levels; it was felt, therefore,
that a failure may have occurred in the tube itself since
the ion chamber instrument with which the GM 10311
tube was associated showed no degradation in perfor-
mance. This hypothesis was substantiated by a duplica-
tion of the flight data by the life-test unit after being
exposed to radiation levels corresponding to those ex-
perienced by Mariner IV. A careful review of the space-
craft telemetry data yielded no correlation between the
GM 10311 tube performance and any function or condi-
tion occurring elsewhere in the spacecraft.
On March 17, 1965, during the telemetry blackout over
DSIF 51 (Johannesburg, South Africa), which was sup-
porting the Ranger Project, a second, related failure
occurred, and when the spacecraft was acquired by
DSIF 11 the telemetry data showed that the GM tube
counting rate had dropped to zero and the ion chamber
was returning no data at all. Analysis indicated that
the second failure could be attributed to a failure of the
power supply common to both the ion chamber and
the GM tube indicated by a short circuit in the tube
itself.
c. Power amplifier switching by command. Early in
the Mariner,,IV flight, a formal recommendation was
made to SPAC by telecommunications personnel to
switch the radio to the TWT amplifier via ground com-
mand action. This action represented the implementation
of a radio flight plan formulated prior to the launch.
The recommendation was approved by SPAC, the Space
Flight Operations Director (SFOD), and the Project
Manager. Command action (DC-7) was initiated on
December 13, 1964, and the transfer from the cavity
amplifier to the TWT amplifier was successfully com-
pleted.
This decision, based upon an evaluation of the charac-
teristics of the two different amplifiers, revolved around
the following arguments. The TWT had a predicted
lifetime far in excess of the minimum Mariner mission
requirements and its known failure modes led to im-
mediate, catastrophic failure. The cavity amplifier, on
the other hand, was known to show definite aging effects
which limited its useful lifetime to approximately the
length of the Mariner mission. It was necessary to launch
using the cavity amplifier because the TWT did not
have the low-power mode required for the launch phase,
but if the cavity were employed throughout the flight it
was probable that aging would degrade its performance
to the point where it would not be capable of returning
useful data to Earth at the planetary encounter. As a
result, operation of both the cavity and the TWT would
be required for a successful mission. However, if the
TWT were employed from some early point in the mis-
sion, it would be capable of serving for the entire
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mission, barring catastrophic failure. In the event of
TWT failure at some later time during the mission, the
cavity amplifier would be available, undegraded by ex-
cessive use, for the balance of the flight. Thus, the mis-
sion could be successfully completed if either the TWT,
or a combination of the TWT and cavity were capable
of operation. The additional backup capability afforded
by the latter mode of operation led to its adoption for
the flight.
Another factor that contributed to the decision to
transfer to the TWT by ground command was that the
spacecraft was designed with the capability to auto-
matically transfer from one power amplifier to the other
if the amplifier output were to drop below a fixed point.
Since the most likely failure mode of the TWT was
catastrophic failure, automatic switching to the cavity
amplifier would take place if the Tw'r failed. However,
the most likely failure mode of the cavity was gradual
degradation, therefore if command capability were lost,
the spacecraft could reach a state in which the cavity
amplifier output was so degraded that useful data could
not be returned, and yet not degraded enough to cause
automatic switching to the TWT.
Following the power amplifier switch via DC-7, the
TWT operated as expected with one exception. Begin-
ning on December 22, 1964 and continuing through
December 31, 1964 telemetered data indicated that the
TWT helix current was varying more than anticipated,
and was generally tending to increase. It finally stabi-
lized about 0.4 ma higher than the initial value. Discus-
sions with the manufacturer subsequently established
that helix-current variation was a known characteristic
of TWTs used in space applications and should be con-
sidered normal.
d. Canopus sensor gate inhibit, Before the first trajec-
tory correction attempt, two roll transients occurred,
one of which caused the loss of Canopus, although it
was subsequently reacquired without incident. When
the first attempt failed due to a loss of roll acquisition,
there was enough available evidence to question the
capability of the spacecraft to remain attitude stabilized
in normal roll control. All remaining doubt was removed
when on December 7, 1964 at 12:29:41 GMT the space-
craft again lost Canopus acquisition and went into roll
search, reacquiring finally on the star _ Velorum. Since
roll orientation was critical during the cruise phase only
when the spacecraft was transmitting or receiving via the
high-gain antenna, it was decided to allow the Canopus
sensor to remain acquired to _, Velorum until a plan of
action could be formulated.
The plan submitted by SPAC and approved by tlae
Project Manager involved reacquiring Canopus, and then
sending a ground command to disable the Canopus
sensor brightness gate logic (DC-15). The necessity for
command action was emphasized by four roll transients,
each of which caused momentary loss of acquisition
during the next 10 days. Several models were proposed
to explain the transients, but the one which appeared to
best fit the data in all cases attributed the transients
to dust particles illuminated by the Sun. This theory
accounted for the large error signals observed, which
could not be explained in terms of normal spacecraft
motion, and it delineated the mechanism by which
acquisition was lost, i.e., the high brightness of the near-
by particles would produce violations of the high-
intensity gate logic, thus placing the spacecraft into an
automatic override mode. Examination of the telemetry
data indicated numerous brightness transients during
the early flight, in addition to those severe enough to
cause gate violations. The conclusion was that the space-
craft would continue to suffer periodic losses of roll
acquisition throughout the mission if it were allowed to
continue in the normal, roll control mode.
At that time, since the spacecraft was both transmit-
ting and receiving via the low-gain antenna, the only
consequences of the normal roll control mode were the
transients injected into the spacecraft when the gyros
and the maneuver booster-regulator were turned on and
off. Although this was undesirable, in tests on the proof
test model (PTM) spacecraft the gyros had been cycled
many hundreds of times without any apparent degrada-
tion. For a spacecraft transmitting on the high-gain an-
tenna, however, the loss of Canopus acquisition would
be accompanied by a loss of downlink communication
from the spacecraft. During the period of the mission
when a large number of stars was acquirable, this im-
plied a requirement for blind transmission of commands
in order to recover both Canopus acquisition and te-
lemetry data. If the command capability were lost alto-
gether, estimates by guidance and control personnel
were that the high-gain antenna would be available for
less than 10% of the time during cruise, and that the
probability of being Canopus-aequired during encounter
would be less than 0.10.
Transmission of a DC-15 command to the spacecraft
would have removed the Canopus sensor brightness
gates which were used for acquisition and prevented the
initiation of roll search due to the observed high bright-
ness gate violations. Since the spacecraft response would
be slow compared with the speed of the violations, the
sensor would remain oriented properly toward Canopus
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regardless of the transient brightness sensed. The only
remaining mechanism for this type of loss of acquisition
with the gates removed was that the sensor could follow
another object instead of Canopus ff the object both
were brighter than the star and moved slowly enough
through the sensor field of view to allow spacecraft
roll response.
The major drawback to the use of DC-15 was that the
gyro cofitrol unit was controlled through the gate logic,
so that with the gates disabled there could be no gyro
turn-on except by ground command in the event that
Canopus acquisition was lost. The Mariner design not
only used the gyro turn-on under these conditions for
the automatic reacquisition, but also was able to ensure
that the receiver was accepting signals from the low-
gain antenna so that command capability would exist
for all roll attitudes. With DC-15 in effect and the space-
craft receiving via the high-gain antenna, a loss of
Canopus acquisition could not be corrected for from
66z_ hr to 1331/3 hr, the time required for the onboard
logic to automatically switch the receiver back to the
low-gain antenna, thus restoring command capability.
The problem became most severe ff the spacecraft were
perturbed in such a manner as to cause the loss of both
Sun and Canopus acquisition. Without the gyros there
was a possibility that Sun reacquisition within the re-
quired time would not be possible. The probability that
the spacecraft would experience a disturbance large
enough to knock it significantly off of the Sun line was
estimated to be quite low (about 10 -4 to 10-6); hence, the
risk of this failttre mode was accepted.
The DC-15 command action was initiated on Decem-
ber 17, 1964. A single roll override command (DC-21)
was sufficient to return the spacecraft roll orientation
to the star Canopus. DC-15 was then transmitted, and
all indications were normal. Throughout the balance of
the mission, although a significant number of roll tran-
sients were observed in the telemetry, roll acquisition to
the star Canopus was maintained without any problem.
One of the hypotheses offered to explain the roll tran-
sients observed early in the flight was that microme-
teoroids impinging on the spacecraft either knocked
loose dust held to the spacecraft electrostaticaUy or pro-
duced spalling, possibly of thermal control paint, and
that these secondary particles passing through the view
of the Canopus sensor were responsible for the sensor
brightness gate violations. The latter portion of the
interplanetary cruise, however, indicated no correlation
between micrometeoroid activity as reported by the
cosmic-dust detector experimenter and the occurrence
of roll transients.
Prior to the time for the CC&S to command the switch
from transmit via low-gain antenna to transmit via high-
gain antenna, the DC-15 decision was reviewed, since
the loss of Canopus acquisition in this condition would
automatically produce a loss of telemetry. In view of the
continuing occurrence of roll transients, it was decided
to remain in the DC-15 condition. A more severe prob-
lem was presented by the apparent requirement to
switch the receiver to high-gain antenna several weeks
later. Analysis of the spacecraft RF characteristics in the
transmit via high-gain antenna and receive via low-gain
antenna mode showed, however, that an RF interference
effect between the signals from two antennas into the
receiver produced an unexpected ability to maintain
command capability from the three prime tracking sta-
tions assigned to Mariner for all but a relatively brief
period throughout the remainder of the mission. This
removed the last major disadvantage associated with
DC-15, that of not being able to take immediate com-
mand action to turn on the gyros in case of a loss of
attitude stabilization ff the spacecraft were receiving via
the high-gain antenna, and led to the decision to main-
tain a DC-15 condition throughout the entire mission.
e. Interferometer e_ect. Within a few days of the
CC&S command MT-5 antenna switch, sufficient infor-
mation became available to show that both the spacecraft-
received signal strength and the ground-received signal
strength were varying in a manner which indicated
that some amount of RF interference was being expe-
rienced. That this was a potential problem had been
recognized long before launch; however, for the nominal
characteristics of the communications subsystem it was
felt to present a problem only when the Earth was nearly
aligned with the boresight of the high-gain, directional
antenna and the spacecraft was either transmitting or
receiving via the low-gain omniantenna. At the boresight
of the high-gain antenna, the increase in antenna gain
above that of the low-gain antenna was very nearly equal
to the isolation between the two antennas. As a result,
RF leakage via the high-gain antenna was approximately
the same order of magnitude as the normal signal via the
low-gain antenna. The path length from the ground
receiving antenna to each of the spacecraft antennas then
determined the phase relationship of the two interfering
signals, causing either constructive (additive) or destruc-
tive (subtractive) interference.
The fact that interference between the spacecraft an-
tennas was present as early in flight as February 22, 1965
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on the spacecraft-to-Earth link (downlink) and Febru-
ary 18 on the Earth-to-spacecraft link (uplink) was unex-
pected and indicated that the exact RF configuration of
the spacecraft was not well understood. The signal
strengths at all of the DSIF stations began to drop rap-
idly on February 22 and 23, causing SPAC to review the
possibility of recommending an early switch of the trans-
mitter to the high-gain antenna. Analysis by telecom-
munications personnel of the signal characteristics of
Mariner IV and of the data gathered in prelaunch an-
tenna tests resulted in a set of predicted values of signal
level as a function of spacecraft aspect angle (which was
a function of mission time), that showed that the first
null in the interference pattern would still yield signal
strengths above the absolute telemetry threshold. Thus,
although a relatively large number of bit errors might
be expected, the telemetry data received would still be
of sufficient quality to allow normal spacecraft data
analysis by SPAC. It was predicted that the null would
last for 3 to 5 days, and then the received signal strength
from the spacecraft would begin to increase as the
changing relative path length from the two antennas to
the Earth reached a point where the interfering signals
began to come into phase with each other. The CC&S-
controlled switch of the spacecraft to the high-gain
antenna was scheduled for just after the time of this
predicted peak signal strength. On the basis of this infor-
mation SPAC recommended to the Mariner Project that
no command action be taken to effect an early antenna
switch.
The interferometer pattern calculated from the signal
strengths reported by the DSIF in the succeeding few
days matched very closely with the predictions, and,
although a bit-error rate as high as 3% was sometimes
observed, it proved quite feasible to provide continuous
analysis of the spacecraft data until the antennas were
switched by the CC&S.
The CC&S-controlled transfer of the spacecraft trans-
mitter to the high-gain antenna (MT-5 event) occurred
as expected on March 5 at 13:02:37 GMT. The increase
in signal strength at DSIF 42 (Tidbinbilla, Australia)
matched the predicted change very closely and all te-
lemetry indications verified a normal transfer. It was
noted that coincident with the switch of the transmitter
to the high-gain antenna there was a 14-db increase in
the spacecraft-received signal strength. Subsequent
analysis indicated that the change of state of the circu-
lator switch which controlled the antenna switching also
changed the phase relationship of the interfering signals
on the Earth-to-spacecraft link, effectively changing
position of the interferometer pattern, so that the uplink
signal was near a peak rather than a null. An effort was
initiated to gather sufficient data after MT-5 to allow
remapping of the uplink interferometer pattern.
Originally it had been predicted that command capa-
bility via the low-gain antenna could be maintained
through April 8, 1965. The predictions based on space-
craft automatic gain control (AGC) readings after MT-5,
however, included a very deep null in the interference
pattern which would have precluded command action
using the DSIF 10-kw transmitters for the period from
March 24 through April 1, and from the DSIF 13 (Venus
site, Goldstone, California) 100-kw transmitter from
March 26 through March 30. The alternative action of
allowing or commanding the spacecraft receiver to trans-
fer to the high-gain antenna necessitated a review of the
attitude control mode of operation of the spacecraft as
well as the telecommunications configuration. With
DC-15 in effect, the automatic star reacquisition feature
of the Mariner Mars 1964 design is not available in the
event that Canopus acquisition is lost, so that proper re-
acquisition of Canopus requires ground command action.
Except for the command blackout period during the
predicted null, command action would be possible from
the Venus site 100-kw transmitter through the posten-
counter period. The maximum loss of both uplink and
downlink communications, then, would be the period
between Goldstone tracking passes. If the spacecraft
were allowed to transfer to receive via the high-gain
antenna, however, a loss of roll orientation could result
in a command blackout of up to 1331/3 hr, the maximum
time until the spacecraft automatically switched its re-
ceiver back to the low-gain in the event of a loss of
uplink communications.
After extended discussion, it was decided to configure
the spacecraft in such a manner that the transfer of the
spacecraft receiver to the high-gain antenna would take
place automatically on March 26 at 09:03:54 GMT. In
order to accomplish this it was required that the DSIF
refrain from establishing uplink RF lock with the space-
craft until two consecutive CC&S cyclic pulses (CY-1)
occurred. At the second CY-1, the receiver would trans-
fer from one antenna to the other, and at each subse-
quent CY-1 would transfer again as long as the uplink
RF lock was withheld. CC&S CY-1 No. 42 was allowed
to occur on March 23 at 14:24:24 GMT while DSIF 11
was in one-way RF lock (ground transmitter off), and
no further two-way RF lock passes (ground transmitter
operating and spacecraft phase-locked loop in-lock) were
scheduled. This method of effecting the antenna trans-
fer had the additional advantage over ground command
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that the transfer could be aborted by resuming the nor-
mal two-way lock schedule. This advantage was em-
ployed when, just before CY-1 No. 43 (which would
have caused the transfer) it became apparent that the
decrease in signal strength received by the spacecraft
was less than predicted. As additional telemetry became
available the interference pattern predictions were re-
vised, finally indicating that the null would probably
still leave a substantial command margin for even the
10-kw transmitters. As soon as sufficient confidence
was generated in this new value, the DSIF schedule was
amended to include a two-way pass prior to CY-1 No. 43,
thus inhibiting the transfer of the spacecraft receiver to
the high-gain antenna.
Analysis of the revised pattern indicated that the error
in prediction of the spacecraft received signal strength
was due to a difference in the isolation characteristics
of the circulator switch that controlled the antenna from
the nominal values which had been assumed. Predictions
of the command margin throughout the remainder of the
mission showed a positive margin for all but a brief
period during May and June, when command capability
could still be maintained from the DSIF 13 100-kw trans-
mitter. In view of this it was decided to remain in the
receive via low-gain antenna configuration throughout
the mission, pending a final review as the 10-kw com-
mand blackout approached in May.
As expected, the spacecraft-received carrier-power for
transmission from 10-kw transmitters at the prime DSIF
stations dropped below -139 dbm, the worst-case com-
mand threshold on May 3. It rose above - 139 dbm again
on June 22. During most of this period command capa-
bility from the 10-kw transmitters was doubtful and, for
some 27 days in the middle of the period, impossible. As
a result of an SPAC review of the command situation,
it was recommended that the spacecraft receiver remain
switched to the low-gain antenna because: 1) few fail-
ures could be hypothesized that were correctable by
ground command action, but that could not wait until
the 100-kw transmitter at DSIF 13 could be used; and
2) a significant risk of losing roll attitude and therefore
all command capability, existed in the receive via the
high-gain antenna configuration. Throughout the period
of doubtful or impossible 10-kw command capability,
the 100-kw transmitter at the Goldstone Venus site was
kept ready for command transmission on short notice.
Since both the normal encounter sequence plan and
any possible emergency procedures involved the com-
mand subsystem, it was recommended by SPAC that a
series of periodic command-loop lockups be undertaken
to:
1. Provide data on the behavior of the command sub-
system
2. Verify optimum command-loop lookup procedures
3. Assure the maintenance of a high degree of readi-
ness of DSIF equipment and operators
Command-loop lockups were accomplished from
DSIF 13 with the 100-kw transmitter on April 9 and
again on April 13, from DSIF 11 and 51 on April 28,
and from DSIF 42 on April 30. The second DSIF lockup
(April 13) was performed after the 10-kw command
blackout had begun. All exercises of the command sub-
system were accomplished normally. Throughout the
10-kw command blackout, DSIF 13 continued to per-
form periodic command-loop loekups with the 100-kw
transmitter. On June 28, command-loop lockups from
the 10-kw sites were resumed and continued on a regu-
lar basis through encounter.
J. CC&S MT events. Six CC&S MT events occurred
during the interplanetary cruise phase of the Mariner IV
mission. Although all of the commands issued by the
CC&S were correctly transferred to the appropriate sub-
systems on the spacecraft, several of them were accom-
panied by anomalous indications in the telemetry or in
the ground-received signal characteristics. However, a
thorough analysis of the telemetry data produced no
indication of anything other than normal performance
by the spacecraft.
The first MT command issued was the bit-rate switch
event (MT-6) which occurred on January 3, 1965 at
16:59:54 GMT, as expected. The data encoder responded
normally, switching from a rate of 33% bits/see (bps) to
a rate of 8% bps. Coincident with the MT-6 event,
DSIF 41 (Woomera, Australia) reported a decrease of
about 1 db in the received carrier power as indicated by
the station AGC monitor. Throughout the balance of the
mission the ground-received carrier power agreed with
predicted values well within the calibration tolerances
of the AGC monitors, indicating normal performance by
the spacecraft. To this time ,the cause of the apparent
decrease at MT-6 remains unexplained.
The first Canopus sensor cone-angle update (MT-1)
was issued by the CC&S on February 27 at 17:02:03
GMT. The event appeared normal in every respect so
far as the data were concerned, and it was subsequently
verified by telemetry that the cone angle had changed
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from the preset position of 100.2 deg to the MT-1 posi-
tion of 95.7 deg. Analysis of the data, however, showed
that a skip in the data encoder commutation cycle had
occurred at the time of the event. The commutator, at
low deck positions 308, 419, and 439 was apparently
subjected to a transient which resulted in a reset of the
synchronizer before receipt of its normal stepping pulse.
As a result, the next readout of the low decks was for
measurements 301, 401, 421. While it was known that
the Mariner synchronizers were susceptible to transients,
all of the prelaunch test experience indicated that power
transients or high-level hardline-carried broad-spectrum
noise (e.g., electrical arcing), were necessary to cause
deck skips or resets. Either this conclusion was errone-
ous, or there was some type of power transient or noise
burst on the spacecraft coincident with the MT-1 event.
If the latter were the case, there was no doubt that there
was a malfunction of undetermined nature coincident
with MT-1. In this light several possible failure modes
were proposed and tested on the proof test model space-
craft, but all test results were negative. At the end of
the mission the deck skip remained unexplained.
The second Canopus sensor cone-angle update (MT-2)
was observed in the telemetry data on April 2 at 14:25:15
GMT, as expected. Although the update appeared nor-
mal and the new cone angle of 91.1 deg was verified in
the data, analysis of the tracking reports from the DSIF
subsequent to the MT-2 event indicated an apparent
decrease in the average ground-received carrier power
of about 1.5 db. The decrease was confirmed by all three
tracking stations over the next two weeks. A review of
the detailed records from DSIF 51 showed no abrupt
change in receiver AGC at or near the time of MT-2.
Instead it appeared that the ground-received carrier
strength decreased gradually from March 31 to April 3
by about 1 db more than would be expected from
nominal antenna gain and range loss considerations.
From April 3 to 9 the ground-received carrier strength
decreased more slowly than predicted so that at the end
of this time, some of the earlier loss had been recovered.
This anomalous behavior is still unexplained, although
there is now considerable doubt that it was in any way
connected with the MT-2 event. Instead it is felt that
the AGC calibration procedures at the DSIF stations
were responsible.
The third Canopus sensor cone-angle update (MT-3)
was received in the data on May 7 at 14:28:15 GMT. In
view of the anomalous data encoder deck skip at MT-1
and the received signal strength decrease possibly asso-
ciated with MT-2, a thorough analysis of the data was
performed at MT-3. All data indicated a cone-angle up-
date to 86.5 deg that was normal in every respect.
The fourth Canopus sensor cone-angle update from
86.5 deg to 82 deg by CC&S command MT-4 occurred
at 15:51:45 GMT on June 14. The event was normal in
every respect.
g. Frequency shift at CY.1. A momentary loss of sig-
nal strength was noted by personnel at DSIF 42 coinci-
dent with the first CC&S cyclic pulse after MT-1 (CY-1
No. 34). The decrease in signal strength was great
enough to cause both receivers at the station to give an
out-of-lock indication, although the duration was so
short that the telemetry demodulator remained in lock.
The subsequent recovery was very rapid and all indica-
tions were that the spacecraft was functioning normally.
Very careful observation was maintained during the
next CC&S cyclic pulse, CY-1 No. 35, which occurred
on March 4 at 03:42:23 GMT while DSIF 11 was track-
ing. There was an apparent 2-db decrease in signal
strength for about 5 sec coincident with the CY-1. One
receiver at DSIF 11 gave an out-of-lock indication mo-
mentarily, the other remained in lock throughout cyclic
period.
The only characteristic of the two cyclics, which ap-
peared significantly different from the previous cyclics
for which no signal dropouts had been noted, was the
fact that both occurred while the station was in one-way
lock with the spacecraft. Most of the previous cyclics
had occurred while the station was tracking in two-way
lock. An investigation of the DSIF records showed mo-
mentary dropouts of the spacecraft signal coincident
with all cyclics that had occurred in one-way lock, and
no dropouts for any cyclics that had occurred during
two-way tracking. This piece of information led to the
investigation of the doppler data taken during the time
of the dropouts, which showed that during the dropouts
the spacecraft transmitted frequency increased by an
average of 27.3 cps. This frequency shift explained the
signal strength decreases at the DSIF stations, because
the ground receiver was unable to track the carrier fre-
quency with infinite speed. Ground tests were then per-
formed on the proof-test model spacecraft, and it was
determined that the frequency shift was a normal char-
aeteristic of the Mariner Mars 1964 radio subsystem
during cyclic pulses in one-way lock, although the rela-
tively poor resolution of the instrumentation used in
ground testing precluded its discovery in the course of
normal prelaunch tests. The shift was actually produced
by a slight loading of the auxiliary oscillator supply
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voltage by logic circuitry whose state was controlled by
the CC&S CY-1.
The logic circuitry in question was that which con-
trolled the switching of the receiver between the two
antennas if two-way RF lock was not obtained, at least
periodically. If a CC&S CY-1 pulse were issued when
the spacecraft was not in lock with a DSIF transmitted
signal, then a logic gate was set which would allow the
antenna transfer to take place when the next CY-1 pulse
was issued. Lookup before the next CY-1 pulse would
reset the logic gate again. It was the setting of the logic
gate that loaded the auxiliary oscillator power supply,
thus changing slightly the transmitted frequency. Reset-
ting the logic had no effect upon the spacecraft trans-
mitted frequency, since the reset occurred only when
the spacecraft was locked to the ground signal so
that the spacecraft transmitted frequency was derived
from the ground frequency.
After the discovery that the frequency shift was a
design characteristic of the spacecraft, it became appar-
ent that the only disadvantage associated with allowing
it to occur was the possible loss of some small portion
of the telemetry as the result of ground receiver losses of
lock. Scheduling the DSIF to track two-way during all
cyclic pulses, however, also had associated with it a dis-
advantage: should it have become necessary to allow the
receiver to transfer to high-gain antenna in order to
command the spacecraft during the command blackout
period, the time of automatic transfer would have been
dependent upon the time of the last two-way period. If
a CY-1 pulse occurred while the DSIF was tracking two-
way, the earliest automatic transfer to high-gain antenna
would be two eyclies later (1331/z hr). If on the other
hand two way tracking had been terminated just before
the CY-1, then the earliest automatic transfer would be
one cyclic later (66z/a hr) if there were no subsequent
lockups. As a result of these factors SPAC recommended
that all pulse times be covered two-way during the por-
tions of the flight where command capability existed
via the low-gain antenna from 10-kw transmitters in
order to avoid any data loss, and that the spacecraft be
tracked two-way only just prior to CY-1 times during
any periods where the command capability from 10-kw
transmitters was marginal, to prevent any avoidable
extended loss of command capability.
h. Best-lock lrequency. As the flight progressed dur-
ing the cruise phase, the DSIF experienced increased
difficulty in obtaining two-way lock with the spacecraft
during normal operations. Problems were encountered
even when the received carrier power at the spacecraft
was relatively strong. Investigation showed that when
two-way lock was finally achieved, the transmitted fre-
quency used by the station was significantly different
from the predicted frequency. The prelaunch calibra-
tions for the Mariner IV radio subsystem were consulted
and it was suggested by the cognizant personnel that, for
the ambient radio temperatures, the minimum-lockup-
time frequency had shifted by over 2 kc. When this new
frequency was tried the DSIF was unable to lock up at
all, indicating a probable shift in the characteristics of
the transponder. Since almost immediate lockup is man-
datory in the event of any spacecraft emergency, an
intensive investigation was initiated to find some way
of providing an inflight calibration of the radio subsys-
tem frequency characteristics. Several operational proce-
dures were suggested for DSIF use that would provide
the maximum amount of useful information for this
recalibration in the course of normal DSIF operation.
The procedures were approved and put into use on a
regularly scheduled basis. The information resulting
allowed radio subsystem cognizant personnel to reeali-
brate the transponder and to provide a continuing
monitor on any further shifts. With the revised minimum-
lockup-time frequency that this effort provided,
DSIF lockup times were reduced to several seconds on
the average.
i. Battery voltage. A possibly serious anomaly, first
noticed iust after the science cover deployment exercise
and continuing throughout the mission, was the increas-
ing battery voltage. Before the cover-deployment se-
quence, the battery charger was on and trickle-charged
the battery at less than 10 ma. Battery voltage had risen
to 34.4 v, indicating a full charge on the battery. At
the end of the science cover deployment sequence, the
spacecraft was reconfigured to a battery-charger-oft,
boost-mode-enabled state. For a brief time, the battery
voltage dropped and then began a gradual rise that
brought the voltage to 35.0 v. Initially it had been felt
that a voltage of 35.0 v would indicate a possible battery
failure. As a result of the Mariner IV battery behavior, a
review was made of the principal parameters affecting
battery voltage and it was discovered that the original
estimate was somewhat low.
Two hypotheses concerning the state of the Mariner IV
battery were put forward:
1. The battery voltage increase was a normal conse-
quence of the 0-g gravitational field, temperature
effects, and the small charge-current produced by
the battery voltage transducer. In this case, no bat-
tery failure would be expected because the pressure
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required to crack the cell ease is approximately 20
times that generated in a heavily charged battery
(about 5 psi).
The battery case was already cracked and the elec-
trolyte (45% KOH) was slowly leaking out of one
cell. The resulting decrease in conductivity of
that cell would be interpreted by the battery volt-
age transducer as a higher battery voltage. If this
were the case, battery failure would have to be
expected ff any power demands were made upon it.
The personnel responsible for the battery operation
indicated that there was no positive support for the latter
hypothesis, and that it should not be assumed to be the
case unless the battery voltage reached 38.0 v. It re-
mained, however, a possibility and as a result, SPAC
recommended that no action be taken that could increase
spacecraft power loads to the point that any battery
drain would be required, unless it was judged necessary
to the success of the mission.
Although the battery voltage continued to rise through-
out the flight, the rate of increase leveled off as aphelion
was approached. At the end of the mission on October 1,
1965 the battery voltage appeared constant at 37.2 v.
i. Solar pressure vane performance. The first activity
of the solar pressure vanes was observed on December 2
and 3, 1964 when the +X and -X vanes (located on
solar panels 4A1 and 4A5) moved in the proper direc-
tion to reduce the external torques about the spacecraft
yaw axis. Performance analysis showed that the X-axis
vanes had considerable effect in compensating for torque
imbalances during the mission; however, their effective-
ness was hampered by the fact that the variation of torque
imbalance as a function of time was much higher than
anticipated, although it was within design tolerances.
During portions of the mission the X-axis vanes were
able to reduce the torque imbalances in the yaw axis to
values on the order of 1-4 dyne-cm. During the remain-
der of the mission, the torque imbalances were some-
what larger due to the slow response time of the vanes
in adapting to any step change in imbalance, but on the
whole the X-axis vanes verified the feasibility of using
solar pressure vanes in an adaptive mode to maintain
the mean attitude at the center of the spacecraft system
dead band.
The +Y and -Y solar pressure vanes (located on solar
panels 4A3 and 4A7) did not move at all during the mis-
sion, except for some mechanical slippage apparently
coincident with postinjection propulsion motor burn. It
was probable that they failed as a result of electrical
lockup. A characteristic of the solar pressure vane step-
ping motor was that if an attitude-control gas valve were
fired within 30 msec of stepping motor activation, the
solar pressure vane actuators would be permanently
locked up. Data indicated that, within the time resolu-
tion of the telemetry, a gas valve had fired coincident
with solar pressure vane electronics turn-on at CC&S
command L-3. The possibility of loekup was expected,
since the mode of spacecraft roll control changes at
L-3 when the solar pressure vanes are turned on.
The failure of the Y-axis solar pressure vanes to oper-
ate in the adaptive mode was considered a design fail-
ure. The possibility of solar pressure vane loekup was
recognized during the system test program before
launch. Some modifications of the hardware were made,
but there was insufficient time to make all the required
design changes and to perform flight-acceptance testing
to completely correct the situation before launch.
Throughout the mission, there was no evidence that
the vanes were able to produce any effect in the damp-
hag mode by means of position changes in response to
thermal input changes to the bimetal mounting arms.
Torque variations were of such magnitude compared
with damping mode restoring torques, that if such an
effect did exist, it was masked completely.
k. PIPS bladder incompatibility. On February 3, 1965,
an increase of about 4 psi in PIPS fuel tank pressure
was observed in the data. This measurement had pre-
viously shown no change after the midcourse maneuver.
Tests conducted by propulsion subsystem cognizant
personnel indicated that the increase was probably
caused by an incompatibility between the fuel tank
bladder material and the hydrazine fuel, a problem
that had been noted on most previous propulsion sub-
systems. Although estimates were made which indicated,
based upon telemetry, that the worst-case pressure rise
by the time of Mars encounter might be 40 psi (still
well within tolerance) no further increase was observed
during the balance of the mission.
L Science cover deployment exercise. During the pe-
riod from launch until planetary encounter the only
noneruise activity of the spacecraft was the ground-
command-initiated seience cover deployment exercise,
Fig. 3, performed on February 11. The objective of this
exercise was threefold: 1) to deploy the science cover,
2) to pre-position the scan platform to the optimum
encounter position, and 3) to turn off the battery
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charger and enable the boost mode. The exercise was
carried out over the DSIF 11 tracking station. A total
of 12 ground commands were transmitted to the space-
craft. All were received and executed normally. All
objectives of the exercise were fully achieved, and the
spacecraft was returned to the cruise state without
difficulty.
Throughout the entire exercise, only one anomaly
was observed. After an apparently normal command
lockup, a loss of command lock occurred. About 6 min
later, command lock was regained; there was no ex-
planation for the loss. The balance of the sequence
went smoothly; telemetry confirmed that the science
cover was deployed, the scan platform was pre-positioned
to within 0.7 deg of the optimum position, and all
systems functioned without any apparent degradation
throughout the entire sequence. Only about 44 min
of cruise science data were lost during the periods that
cruise science was turned off.
A nonreal time analysis of the cover deployment
operation on February 11 revealed a severe roll transient
had occurred that was completely unnoticed during the
actual operation because of noise in the data. As one
of the objectives of the early deployment of the science
cover was to preclude the possibility of particles dis-
lodged by a science cover deployment at encounter from
causing a loss of Canopus acquisition, the exercise must
be considered highly successful.
5. Planetary Encounter
The basic design of the Mariner Mars 1964 spacecraft
provided for a completely automatic planetary encounter
sequence without any ground action required. Because
the ground command option was available, however,
there existed a number of possible backups to the onboard
functions, and in addition, there existed a number of
alternate modes which might have been superior in any
given situation to the normal mode of operation. In order
to provide the best possible sequence of events for the
encounter, the Encounter Planning Working Group
(EPWG) was formed in January 1965 to operate in
parallel with SPAC for the purpose of investigating all
spacecraft encounter-related operations and modes, and
recommending to the Mariner Project Manager a de-
tailed encounter sequence of events. The EPWG was
composed of appropriate SPAC, division, and sub-
system representatives, and was chaired by the Mariner
Spacecraft Project Engineer. Also formed was the
Occultation Working Group for the purpose of recom-
mending the configuration of the Space Flight Opera-
tions Facility (SFOF), the DSIF stations, and the
spacecraft during occultation of the spacecraft by Mars
to provide the most meaningful occultation data.
It was at the recommendation of the EPWG that the
science cover deployment exercise was performed on
February 11, 1965 to configure the spacecraft for
encounter. At that time, the science cover was deployed
and the scan platform was positioned to an angle that
would permit useful television data in the event that a
scan platform failure was experienced before the actual
encounter.
The fourfold objective, to which the EPWG worked,
was to:
. Develop an encounter sequence that provided the
maximum assurance of obtaining useful television
and oceultation data.
. Determine the operational mode providing the
greatest assurance of maintaining attitude stabiliza-
tion throughout encounter, thereby assuring real-
time planetary field and particles data and
occultation data.
3. Provide for full utilization of backup methods for
all critical functions.
4. Select appropriate alternate modes for any func-
tions both functionally-critical and time-critical.
A recommended encounter sequence of events, Fig. 4,
was formulated by the SPAC Director based upon the
findings of the EPWG and was approved by the
Mariner Project Manager.
While minor departures from the nominal sequence
were made, none affected the logic of the sequence or
its operation on the encounter day.
The major problem in encounter operations was the
transmission delay between Earth and the spacecraft.
Approximately 13 min were required from data trans-
mission at the spacecraft until data presentation in
SPAC; over 121/_ min were required from command
initiation at a DSIF station until command execution
at the spacecraft. Thus, immediate response to anoma-
lous indications in the data could only reduce the
effective reaction time in an emergency to something
over 25 min. Conversely, normal command action as a
part of the sequence of events could be taken only if it
was assumed that nothing abnormal had occurred in the
13 min prior to command initiation, and that nothing
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abnormal would occur during the 12½ min before com-
mand execution. Since most of the commands to be
transmitted during the planetary encounter were time-
critical or functionally-critical, it was most important to
prevent accidental losses of command lock and, in the
event that any occurred, to provide for minimum-time
reacquisition of the command loop. Only the DSIF
station personnel could act on the former, but the latter
was achieved by maintaining the command subcarrier
at the slightly offset, minimum-lookup-time frequency
normally used for initial lockup, but not for command
transmission. This offset was not large enough to sig-
nificantly increase the probability of dropping lock at
encounter signal levels, yet it offered a reasonably small
time between pseudonoise code coincidences for a com-
mand loop out-of-lock. While this minimum lockup time
provision was never required during the subsequent
planetary encounter sequence, the flawless operation of
the command detector and decoder in accepting and
executing all commands verified the practicability of
this approach for critical operations in the blind or with
very long delays.
a. Planetary acquisition and record sequence. The
encounter sequence was initiated with the transmission
of DC-25 from DSIF 51 on July 14 at 14:27:55 GMT.
This time was selected on the basis of the latest flyby
trajectory information to initiate scan search at such a
time that, given nominal performance, the scan platform
would be pointing at the planet at the nominal narrow-
angle acquisition time if the scan platform failed to
inhibit either via ground command or internal logic. The
command was verified in the data at 14:52:32.3 GMT.
A low-rate deck skip was observed coincident with
the command execution. Deck 400 was reset after read-
ing out channel 409, but prior to being stepped to
the next position, so that the next reading of that deck
was position 401. While data encoder deck skips are
not totally unexpected with a DC-25, they are not usual
if the battery charger is off, so that its state is not
changed by the command. Spacecraft response to the
command was normal; NRT power was turned on, video
storage subsystem 2.4-kc power was turned on, the scan
platform went into a normal search, and power levels
and temperatures increased as predicted.
The CC&S MT-7 event was observed in the telemetry
data at 15:53:48.6 GMT, but inasmuch as it had been
preempted by DC-25, it had no effect upon spacecraft
performance.
Prior to the planetary encounter a determination was
made by the television experiment personnel that a
scan position of 180 deg would yield the best television
data. This then was selected as the nominal position
at which to inhibit the scan platform. An inhibit com-
mand (DC-24) time was predicted by the Space Science
Analysis and Command Group (SSAC) scan analyst
based upon scan platform performance data during
scan search. The DC-24 was initiated at DSIF 51 at
17:10:18 GMT for a predicted scan platform position of
179.9 deg. Command execution was verified in the data
at 17:34:55 GMT with the scan platform positioned to
178,45 deg, well within the tolerances. Based upon this
position, wide-angle acquisition (0.7 probability) was
predicted for 2355 GMT, with less than 0.01 probability
of it occurring prior to 2324 GMT.
A normal two-way RF transfer was made from
DSIF 51 to DSIF 11 at 2010 GMT. The ground trans-
mitter frequency was set to a value which would permit
transmission to the spacecraft through entrance of the
occultation region without a frequency adjustment, and
command modulation was reapplied at the nominal off-
set frequency at 21:00:30 GMT. Command-loop lookup
was observed in the data at 21:54:19 GMT, indicating
a lockup time just under 30 min, a normal time for the
low uplink carrier power level at the spacecraft.
Beginning just prior to 2000 GMT and continuing
through the encounter, anomalous indications were
noted in the magnetometer X-axis data which appeared
to be cyclic with a period of approximately 16 rain.
Although unexplained to date, the period corresponded
to coincidences between the real time (RT) and NRT
portions of the DAS, which count at different rates. The
anomaly had no effect upon the quality of planetary
data gathered.
Had the scan platform been allowed to search for and
track the planet automatically, acquisition of the planet
by the scan sensor would have initiated a switch to
Mode 3 data (all science data) several hours before the
recording sequence. With the scan platform pre-
positioned, however, the expected time of wide-angle
acquisition (WAA) was so near the beginning of the tele-
vision record sequence that insufficient time was avail-
able for television performance analysis prior to the latest
time to transmit commands. As a result, a commanded
switch to all science data (DC-3) was included in the
encounter sequence. The DC-3 was transmitted from
DSIF 11 at 22:10:29 GMT, was received by the space-
craft at 22:23:07 GMT, and was observed in the data
at 22:35:08 GMT. Subsequent analysis by the television
and NRT DAS cognizant personnel indicated that tele-
vision sequencing was normal.
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"WAA occurred at the spacecraft at 23:42:00 GMT on
July 14. No effect was noted, other than the indication in
the science telemetry data, because the scan platform had
been inhibited by DC-24 and the switch to Mode 3 data
had been accomplished by DC-3. The backup command
(DC-16) for the initiation of the recording sequence was
transmitted on July 15, 1965, at 00:11:57 GMT. It was
anticipated that this command would arrive at the space-
craft after two pictures had been recorded by the video
storage subsystem if normal narrow-angle acquisition by
the onboard sensors had initiated the sequence.
On the basis of the latest trajectory information and
the DC-16 transmission time, SSAC recommended that
the latest time for transmission of the DC-26 command
to back up the termination of the recording sequence
should be 00:36:20 GMT. The actual time for DC-26
transmission was to be determined from the narrow-
angle acquisition (NAA) indication in the data, if NAA
acquisition was observed earlier than 00:34:40 GMT.
In order to provide the necessary real time data analysis,
a ground telemetry analyst (GTA) was stationed at
DSIF 11 to report the data by voice line to SSAC. The
Goldstone GTA reported NAA in the data at 00:29:59
GMT and confirmed it on the next data frame. The
DC-26 was initiated, upon SSAC's request for immedi-
ate transmission, at 00:31:42 GMT. A DC-2 command to
turn cruise science back on followed at 00:32:40 GMT,
and it was followed by more DC-2 transmissions begin-
ning at 00:37:00 GMT and continuing every 5 rain until
a total of six DC-2 commands had been transmitted to
the spacecraft.
Although the recording sequence appeared to start
normally, anomalous indications of status were observed
in the science data which could not be interpreted until
after the video data playback was completed on July 24.
The first anomaly was observed at 00:34:57 GMT and
appeared to be an end-of-tape (EOT) event, although
none was expected until approximately 00:42:30 GMT.
One of the postulated failure modes for the record se-
quence involved the failure of the DAS to send, or the
video storage subsystem to receive, tape stop commands,
with the result that the video storage subsystem would
have recorded continuously. Given this failure mode,
the first EOT event would have been expected at
about 00:35:30 GMT. If it were assumed that the tape
was improperly positioned past the EOT foil, then
the observed event would correlate with expected
telemetry indications for this failure mode. If so, a
second event would have been expected at approx-
imately 00:40:08 GMT. A second end-of-tape event was
observed in the data at 00:40:50 GMT. Since the un-
certainty in time of occurrence of an event based upon
the time of first observation in the data is +0.0 and
-50.4 see, this time also correlated with the postulated
failure mode. With the possibility that the failure mode
existed clearly established, it was expected either that
no further EOT events would occur, or that they would
occur each 309 sec. This was not the case, because a third
EOT event was observed in the data at 00:43:20 GMT,
the proper time for track change in a nominal sequence.
In the next data frame the false shutter event (distin-
guishable from EOT events only by its timing) was
observed. This also would be expected in a nominal se-
quence. No further events were observed in the science
data.
The contradictory indications in the data made it im-
possible to determine what had taken place until it was
determined during video playback what data, ff any,
were stored upon the tape. It was expected, however,
that if the sequence were in fact normal, the second
true EOT would occur during the recorder runup
prior to Picture 22 and would immediately switch the
data encoder to Mode 2 data. The mode switch would
be observed in the data at about 00:55:24 GMT. The
actual switch to Mode 2 data was not observed until
00:55:46.6 GMT, coincident with the end of Picture 22,
indicating that the data mode switch was initiated by
the DAS rather than the video storage subsystem. This
tended to lend support to the hypothesis that the video
storage subsystem was not running during the latter
portion of the recording sequence. The engineering data
upon return to Mode 2, however, indicated the correct
number of event-register changes for a nominal record-
ing sequence.
After the planetary encounter, investigation showed
that the Mariner IV spacecraft had demonstrated a
tendency toward spurious EOT events in the Mode 3
science data although the previous occurrences had been
associated with some ground action such as boost mode
inhibit off or narrow-angle Mars gate stimulus on off.
Thus, the two anomalous EOT events could have been
triggered by noise in the system, or were the result of
some normal transient in the television sequencing.
That the recording sequence was, in fact, normal
throughout was verified during the playback of the
stored data. All of the postulated potential failures
would have resulted in less than 21 pictures, while only
the normal sequence would have yielded the 21 pie-
tures plus 21 lines of Picture 22 which were found to be
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present on the tape. Some additional light was thrown
on the events at encounter when laboratory testing
showed that the switch to Mode 2 data at the end of
Picture 22 was normal. The mode switch could have
occurred immediately upon an EOT signal during
Pictures 19 through 21, but was inhibited after the start
of Picture 22. If the end-of-tape occurred during Picture
22 (as it did at encounter) the video storage subsystem
would stop recording and reject any further start com-
mands, but the DAS would not issue the mode switch
command to the data eneoder until the Picture 22 stop
command was issued to the video storage subsystem.
This fact had not been uncovered before launch
because none of the Mariner tape machines had a tape
of the precise length required to place the second
end-of-tape in the period of actual data transfer for
Picture 22. During prelaunch testing, the Mariner IV
second end-of-tape occurred during the runup for
Picture 22, but before the start of video data,. The
Mariner III end-of-tape events occurred during the
rundown from Picture 21, and MC-1 (the PTM) had an
extra-long tape, so that the DAS always initiated the
mode switch after 22 pictures.
The DC-26 command (all science off) was observed
in the telemetry data on July 15 at 00:56:23.0 GMT
and SPAC confirmed all-zeros science data. The first
DC-2 command (cruise science on) followed at
00:57:20 GMT. After confirming that cruise was on
and appeared normal, the DSIF was requested to cease
transmission of DC-2 commands. Event register changes
confirming the reception of the remaining five DC-2
commands by the spacecraft were subsequently received
at the expected times. Further analysis of the telemetry
indicated that all engineering and science subsystems
were performing the same as before encounter, and that
the spacecraft had returned to a normal cruise state.
The remaining encounter event, MT-8, occurred several
hours later, appearing in the data at 05:14:39 GMT. This
event, a CC&S command to turn off encounter science,
had been preempted by ground command and did not
affect the state of the spacecraft.
b. Occultation. The spacecraft RF signal was lost at
the DSIF on July 15 at 02:31:12 GMT as Mariner IV
entered the Earth-occultation region of Mars. Four
stations were tracking: DSIF 11 and DSIF 42 as prime
stations and DSIF 12 (Echo site, Goldstone, California)
and DSIF 41 as backup. All stations were able to obtain
useable data. The occultation occurred about 8 min
later than the time estimated prior to closest approach.
While this is presently unexplained, an error analysis is
being performed on the trajectory program and its
inputs by the cognizant Flight Path Analysis and Com-
mand Group (FPAC) personnel to determine the source
of the error in the estimate of closest approach distance
and the subsequent flight path.
After spacecraft entrance into the occultation region,
the 100-kw transmitter at DSIF 13 was turned on in an
attempt to obtain two-way tracking upon spacecraft
exit from the occultation region. The spacecraft RF
signal was reacquired by DSIF 42 at 03:25:06 GMT and
by DSIF 41 shortly thereafter. Useful data were ob-
tained by both sites and by the wideband, open-loop
receivers at DSIF 11 and DSIF 12. Analysis of the te-
lemetry by SPAC subsequent to the exit indicated that
no apparent changes in the state of the spacecraft had
taken place during the occultation and that performance
was normal.
6. Playback
Video data playback was initiated by the CC&S MT-9
event on July 15 at 11:41:49.8 GMT. The event was
observed on Earth at 11:53:53.3 GMT, and the expected
switch to Mode 4/1 data was confirmed. An anomaly
was noted at MT-9 when two Register 2 events were
received rather than the expected one. CC&S CY-1
No. 83 was coincident with MT-9. Since the relays in-
volved are driven from two separate points in the
sequencing chain, it was believed that the two events
were sufficiently separated in time that each caused the
event register to increment, where normally the register
input would not have recovered sufficiently from the
first input to accept the second.
After approximately 68 min of engineering data, the
first Mode 4 (picture) data were observed in telemetry
at 13:01:58 GMT. From this point the playback pro-
ceeded in an entirely normal manner through the
termination of the record playback on August 3. During
this period, the data from each of the pictures were
transmitted to Earth twice, with the exception of the
last few lines of Picture 22. The data recovery rate was
quite high, and the performance of the spacecraft was
normal throughout.
In view of the uncertainty associated with the re-
cording sequence as to the EOT events, it was
decided that command alerts should be called for each
of the suspect periods during playback. After the end
of Picture 4, DSIF 42 locked up with the spacecraft
command detector and maintained lock until after
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Picture 5 had been identified in the data and it was
verified that video data had been recorded on the day
of encounter. Similarly, DSIF 11 locked up with the
command detector after the end of Picture 8, and
maintained lock until Picture 9 could be verified.
DSIF 51 loeked up with the command detector and
maintained lock until after the time required to reach
the point on the tape where the tape rundown after
Picture 9 had stopped. Thus, during all of the periods
which could have coincided with the spurious events
received on July 15 a minimum-reaction-time command
capability was provided to ensure that corrective action
could be taken, if necessary, to obtain the most useful
data from the playback. During all three command
alerts, all spacecraft data indicated that performance,
both in playback and at encounter, was normal.
An additional alert was called at the time of the
expected video storage subsystem track change, although
the command detector was not locked up. The alert was
called because it was possible, due to the low speed with
which the EOT foil passed the EOT sensor during
playback, to obtain multiple track changes. The track
change occurred without incident, but an interesting
sidelight took place which provided the answer to
the question of how many pictures had been recorded
on the tape. Because of the physical geometry of the
EOT sensor and the playback and record heads in
the video storage subsystem, the playback head will
play, upon track change, a number of seconds of data
recorded prior to the EOT. It was expected that this
portion of the tape would be for the start-up for
Picture 22 based upon prelaunch testing, and thus in
the absence of video data, engineering data would be
transmitted to Earth. Instead, the data received were
video data, and upon decoding it, it was determined
that it was Mars data from the 21st and 22nd lines of
Picture 22, thus verifying that 21 complete pictures and
a portion of the 22nd had been successfully recorded.
The first complete transmission of the stored data
ended on July 24 at 19:26:33 GMT and a second trans-
mission began automatically. This second playback was
necessary to ensure that any data missing from the first
transmission of the pictures might be recovered and to
provide duplication of the remainder of the data for
comparison purposes. Spot checks of the data from both
transmissions confirmed that the data were repeatable,
so it was planned to return the spacecraft to the cruise
mode at the end of the second playback.
One anomaly occurred during the second playback of
the video data. At the first EOT signal, two events
were recorded in data encoder Register 3. The track
change was normal, however, and the extra EOT event
was attributed to dirt or foreign material on the foil.
Based upon prelaunch test data, this extra event was
not unexpected.
Shortly before the playback phase of the mission was
terminated, SSAC and the television experimenters
recommended to the Mariner Project Office that a
second recording sequence be considered. Such a se-
quence could provide information on the behavior of
the television electronics for uniformly black pictures
at each of the various gain settings. With this possibility
in mind, the video storage subsystem representative and
SPAC recommended that playback be terminated in
such a manner that some portion of the Mars data
would not be erased in the event that another recording
sequence were performed. By stopping the tape at some
position other than the EOT foil, from 1 to 101/e pictures
could be protected, since in a recording sequence the
tape would run only until the EOT foil had been crossed
twice.
This recommendation was accepted, and the playback
was terminated in Line 18 of Picture 22, thus protecting
all of the complete pictures on the second track. The
playback could have been terminated and cruise mode
restored by transmission of a DC-2, which would in-
hibit the playback motor, switch to Mode 2 data, and
turn on cruise science, but it would have allowed the
2.4-kc power to the video storage subsystem to remain on.
Since this was an unfused power supply, a line-to-line
short would have resulted in a catastrophic failure of
the spacecraft power subsystem. For this reason, it was
decided to include a DC-28 command to turn off the
2.4-kc power to the video storage subsystem. This com-
mand also disabled the boost-mode and turned on the
battery charger, so it had to be followed by a DC-26
command to turn off the battery charger again and
reenable the boost mode. Finally, a DC-2 could be
used to switch to Mode 2 data and turn on the cruise
science.
The DC-28 was transmitted on August 3 at
03:08:33 GMT, the DC-26 at 03:14:33 GMT, and the
DC-2 at 03:20:33 GMT. Telemetry verified that video
storage 2.4-ke power turned off, battery charger turned
on, and Mode 1 data (indicating video data not present)
received at 03:22:37 GMT. The DC-26 command event
and battery charger off were observed in the data at
03:28:37 GMT, and coincident with it, the expected
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data encoder medium-rate reset which generally ac-
companies large power transients. DC-2 was verified in
the data at 03:48:02 GMT as the data encoder switched
to Mode 2 data and cruise science came on. All cruise
science instruments were verified to be operating as
before encounter, and all engineering subsystem per-
formance was verified as normal.
7. Postencounter Cruise
The spacecraft continued to perform well throughout
the final 8 wk of Phase I of the Mariner IV mission to
Mars. One spacecraft anomaly was noted when the
cosmic-dust detector instrument sporadically began to
return apparently abnormal data. Problems occurred
which caused the postponement of command sequences
twice, but investigation verified that in each case the
problems were groundbased at the DSIF rather than
associated with the spacecraft itself.
Prior to the planetary encounter, proposals had been
made to the Project Manager as to the operational
procedures to be implemented after the completion of
the video data playback. Each of the interested groups
was encouraged to propose tests or operations which
would lead to the optimum recovery of science and
engineering data. After reviewing the proposals the
Project Manager laid down four basic guidelines to
govern postencounter operations and testing:
, No test or operation should be undertaken that
would interfere significantly with the gathering of
cruise science data unless it was necessary to
mission success.
. All tests and operations should be nondestructive
and carry minimum risk to the continuous opera-
tion of the spacecraft.
.
,
Postencounter activities should enhance the possi-
bilities of reacquiring an active spacecraft at next
closest approach to Earth in 1967.
Subsystem performance verification tests would
not be considered to be of extremely high scien-
tific or engineering value.
These guidelines led to the approval of a series of
tests and operations to be conducted during the re-
mainder of the portion of the postencounter cruise in
which it would be possible to maintain continuous
telemetry coverage. The majority of the tests were
passive in nature, involving DSIF tracking techniques
and equipment. Active tests included inflight calibra-
tions of the Mariner IV radio and command subsystems
and a dark encounter sequence to provide television
calibration data. The radio and command subsystem
tests were considered necessary to any attempt to re-
acquire the spacecraft in 1967, and the television cali-
bration was requested by the television experimenters
as necessary to provide an insight into the possible
fogging of the Mars pictures resulting from some un-
known phenomenon in the television electronics. Three
flight operations were also approved: 1) updating of the
Canopus sensor cone-angle, which was necessary to
maintain telemetry and therefore cruise science data as
long as possible; 2) the insertion of the maneuver-
inhibit and minimum turn and burn duration commands
as protection against a failure-induced, inadvertent
trajectory-correction maneuver before the 1967 reacqui-
sition period; and 3) the transfer of the spacecraft trans-
mitter to the low-gain antenna, which is the reacquisition
configuration for 1967.
a. Television haze calibration sequence. The initial
attempt to perform the television haze calibration se-
quence, Fig. 5, on August 21 was cancelled after DSIF
problems occurred which posed a threat to the ability
to react via ground command to any nonstandard oc-
currence onboard the spacecraft. A second attempt was
successful on August 30.
The first attempt was scheduled on August 21 be-
cause the star Altair, with an apparent -t-0.8 magnitude,
would be at the proper cone angle to be photographed.
While such a small light source would not be resolved
by the Mariner television subsystem, the effects of the
light source should be apparent in the pictures, thus
providing calibration data for the television optics as
well as the electronics. The planned command sequence
followed closely the planetary encounter sequence of
events, without, of course, the onboard events.
The sequence was to be performed from DSIF 13
using the 100-kw transmitter. The spacecraft radio sub-
system was locked up normally, and then command
modulation was applied. Shortly afterward, one of the
safety interlocks at the station tripped and the trans-
mitter automatically shut off. After an investigation by
station personnel indicated that the transmitter had been
operating normally, the transmitter was turned on again
and command modulation was reapplied. Again an inter-
lock tripped, shutting off the transmitter. A brief analysis-
by the station personnel indicated a probable failure of
the interlock circuitry.
30
Ni
6
Z
_z
0
a.
.I
<
O
N
Z
"l-
U
i.
I-
.I
IL
,-j
_Zo
o o
_._ _
_ _
o o _
, _ o_
w
e-
g-
e,
o
°_
,e,,
p
._
3
1'4
0
0
°_
°i
I"
°_
,4
Q
JPL TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 32-882
"Since sueh a failure would not permit the mainte-
nance of continuous command capability, it was decided
that the operation could not be conducted from DSIF 13.
The received carrier power at the spacecraft had risen
to the marginal command capability level for 10-kw
transmitters during the preceding few days, so the
SPAC telecommunications representative recommended
having DSIF 12 transmit to the spacecraft. Two-way
RF lock was established normally with the spacecraft,
then command modulation was applied and the com-
mand detector locked up. All telemetry indications were
normal, so the first command in the sequence, encounter
science on (DC-25), was transmitted at 22:22:00 GMT.
Shortly after transmission, the telemetry indicated that
the carrier power at the spacecraft was fluctuating
severely. Several samples of the command-deteetor
monitor telemetry channel indicated momentary drops
of lock by the command detector as the carrier level at
the spacecraft dropped below threshold. Since these
momentary out-of-lock indications appeared to signal
either a DSIF failure or a spacecraft failure, a decision
was made to terminate the attempted haze calibrate
sequence. If the DC-25 was not received by the space-
craft, no further action would be required. If, on the
other hand, the DC-25 command to turn on encounter
science was executed, an emergency command sequence
would be employed to return the spacecraft to a cruise
condition.
At 22:52:04 GMT the data indicated the receipt and
execution of the DC-25 command. After verification that
the spacecraft was responding normally to the com-
mand, the emergency sequence, Table 6, was initiated.
The redundant commands in the sequence listed in
Table 6 were designed to avoid the possibility that
one of the momentary command dropouts would fall
just before or during the receipt of any of the com-
mands, thus inhibiting execution of the command.
During the actual emergency return-to-cruise-state se-
quence, however, none of the redundancy was actually
required, each command being executed normally on
the first transmission. A total of seven DC-2 commands
were transmitted before verifieation of the first one in
the data was possible. An intensive investigation of the
telemetry data showed that the spacecraft was in a
normal cruise condition with no anomalies apparent in
the data. Although the following day was also acceptable
for obtaining television data using the star Altair as a
light source, no exercise could be scheduled for August 22
without the complete assurance that: 1) there had
been no failure or problem in the spacecraft radio or
Table 6. Emergency command sequence for return to
cruise configuration
Time Command Remarks
T = 0 DC-28
T + 2 min
T + 8 min
T "t- 10 rain
T "t- 12 min
T + 14 rain
T -I- 19 rain
and each
5 rain
thereafter
DC-28
DC-26
DC-26
DC-2
DCo2
DC-2
Turn off video storage 2.4-kc power and turn
on battery charger.
Redundant command.
Turn off battery charger end all science.
T = 0 is chosen so that this command will
arrive at the spacecraft when the scan plat-
form is at the desired clock angle. The 8 rain
delay between the first DC-28 and DC-26 is
designed to allow verification via telemetry
of the DC-28 execution.
Redundant command.
Turn on cruise science.
Redundant command.
Additional redundant commands. DC-2
commands are sent each 5 rain until telem-
etry has verified a normal return-to-cruise
state.
command equipment, and 2) all problems at DSIF 12
and DSIF 13 had been discovered and corrected. Since
no such assurance could be given in the less than 24 hr
available, the Project Manager decided to forego photo-
graphing Altair and that reseheduling of the haze-
calibration sequence would be delayed until a full
analysis could be made of spacecraft and DSIF
performance.
Early in the week following the unsuccessful attempt
to perform the haze-calibration sequence it was verified
that the problems encountered were station problems.
At DSIF 13 the interlock circuitry had failed, and in-
vestigations at DSIF 12 uncovered a degraded frequeney
synthesizer. After both sites had been reported oper-
ationally ready the haze calibration sequence was re-
seheduled for August 26 after the maneuver inhibit
command sequence on August 25. The maneuver inhibit
exercise on August 25 was postponed, however, after it
was determined that DSIF 13 had further interlock
problems that would require 24 hr to correct. DSIF 12
was considered for use in sending commands, but no
firm commitment from the DSN office as to its opera-
tional status could be obtained on such a short time
scale. The Project Manager directed that the maneuver
inhibit sequence be rescheduled for August 25 contingent
upon the correction of the DSIF 13 interlock problems,
and that the haze calibration sequence be rescheduled
for August 30 at the earliest.
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The second attempt to perform the television haze
calibration exercise took place on August 30 and was
successful. The exercise differed from the first attempt
only in that no star of sufficient magnitude was avail-
able as a light source. As a result the data gathered in
the sequence applied only to the television electronics,
rather than to both electronics and optics. The sequence
was performed using DSIF 12 and a 10-kw transmitter
because it was felt that the operational status of DSIF 12
more than compensated for the additional transmitter
power available at DSIF 13, a research and development
site not designed specifically for flight operations. This
use of the smaller transmitter was possible only during
the few days that the RF interferometer effect aided,
rather than degraded, communication ability.
The sequence was initiated with a DC-25 command
at 20:30:00 GMT on August 30. The sequence proceeded
without incident as each command was received and
executed in a normal manner. The command to initiate
the television recording sequence (DC-16) arrived at the
spacecraft at 23:51:22 GMT. It had been anticipated
that the apparently erroneous EOT indications in the
science data during the planetary encounter on July 15
might be repeatable, and that some indication of their
source might be obtained during this recording sequence.
No erroneous EOT indications were observed, however.
The DC-16 was observed in the data on August 31 at
00:06:52 GMT and the EOT events were observed in
the data at 00:08:19 GMT and 00:20:15 GMT, as ex-
pected. The nonstandard time to first EOT was due to
the tape position at the start of the haze-calibrate se-
quence; the playback of the encounter data had been
terminated just prior to the foil on the tape which
signals the EOT. This allowed a calibrate sequence that
would record-over only half of the planetary data, the
video storage subsystem automatically inhibiting after
the foil had been passed twice. Under these conditions
the transfer back to Mode 2 data was initiated by the
DAS at the end of 11 NRT frames (22 television pictures).
The balance of the sequence proceeded as planned,
with playback data appearing in the telemetry at
01:56:16 GMT (Mode 1 data) and the first picture
beginning at 02:00:46 GMT. The stored data were played
back until the first five pictures, which included all of
the television gain settings, had been completed (Sep-
tember 2 at 04:39:23 GMT). One hour later the DSIF 41
10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft com-
mand detector and the sequence to return the spacecraft
to cruise configuration was begun. The first command
(DC-28) was transmitted at 06:17:00 GMT, and the fir'st
Mode 2 data, indicating the completion of the haze
calibration sequence, were observed on Earth at
07:00:32 GMT. Analysis of the engineering and science
telemetry indicated that all subsystems were performing
as they had prior to the initiation of the sequence.
b. Maneuver inhibit commands. On August 26, four
ground commands were transmitted to the spacecraft in
order to protect against failures which might cause an
inadvertent trajectory-correction maneuver to start. Dis-
cussions as to the desirability of inserting a DC-13
(maneuver inhibit) into the spacecraft had been held
prior to the planetary encounter, but the recommenda-
tion of the EPWG and of SPAC had been against the
maneuver inhibit because:
1. The risk was relatively small that such a failure
would occur prior to encounter.
2. Multiple failures would be required to actually
cause a motor start.
3. Without the motor burning, a trajectory-correction
sequence would not be catastrophic.
4. With nearly continuous command capability and
continuous telemetry monitoring, an inadvertent
maneuver could be aborted via ground command.
After the planetary encounter, however, the fact that a
major portion of the mission objectives had been com-
pleted and the addition of a new objective, the enhance-
ment of the probability of a 1967 reaequisition, dictated
that a review of the maneuver inhibit proposal be made.
The SPAC representatives recommended without
question that the maneuver inhibit command be trans-
mitted and a DC-13 transmission was scheduled for
August 12 during the regular DSIF 13 tracking period.
Additional analysis was performed to determine the
desirability of also inserting minimum turn and burn
duration QC, with the result that just prior to the sched-
uled DC-13 transmission an informal recommendation
to transmit all four commands was presented to the
Project Manager. In view of the proposed change,
the Proiect Manager postponed any command action
until a more formal review and recommendation could
be made.
A recommendation to transmit both DC-13 and min-
imum value QC was presented to the Project Manager
and approved by him on August 23, 1965. The maneuver-
inhibit command exercise, including all four commands,
34
' JPL TECHNICAL REPORT NO, 32-882
was scheduled for August 25. Shortly before the trans-
mission of the first command, problems were encoun-
tered in the operation of the DSIF 13 transmitter which
forced the postponement of the exercise for 24 hr. The
following day the DSN office reported that the 10-kw
transmitter at DSIF 12 had been returned to a state of
operational readiness. The SPAC telecommunications
representative recommended to the SPAC Director that
since DSIF 12 was prepared to transmit commands, it
should be used rather than DSIF 13, which was subject
to interlock problems because of its safety problems and
its developmental, rather than operational, nature. This
recommendation was accepted, and on August 26 at
21:06:52 GMT, DC-13, the first command of the se-
quence, was transmitted to the spacecraft. The three QCs
followed approximately on 8-min centers. Telemetry from
the spacecraft indicated that all commands were success-
fully received.
c. Canopus sensor cone-angle update. On August 27,
1965, a ground command was transmitted to the space-
craft to update the Canopus sensor cone angle to the
first optional position. All previous cone-angle updates
had been commanded automatically by the onboard
CC&S, but no master-timer event was provided in the
Mariner design for more than the four updates required
through the playback phase of the mission. Thus any
updates beyond the MT-4 event had to be commanded
from the ground. Analysis indicated that while the
nominal day for loss of Canopus due to exceeding
the limits of the field of view of the sensor was Sep-
tember 7, adverse tolerances could combine to cause
loss of acquisition as early as August 27.
The update command, DC-17, was transmitted from
DSIF 12 at 19:40:00 GMT and was verified in the
telemetry at 20:11:01 GMT. The telemetry data verified
the new cone angle setting of 77.8 deg.
d. Communications capability. When playback ended
on August 3, 1965, the spacecraft-received carrier power
with command modulation applied was below
-139 dbm, the worst-case command threshold for the
10-kw transmitters at the prime DSIF stations. The
capability to command the spacecraft from prime sta-
tions was regained, as predicted, on August 21 when
the received-carrier level rose above -139 dbm. The
received-carrier level again dropped below the worst-
case threshold on September 3 and remained at low
levels for the balance of the period.
For a significant portion of the period after September
7, the received-carrier power without command modula-
tion applied was sufficiently close to absolute RF
threshold that the resulting low signal-to-noise ratio
produced a large frequency jitter which was translated
into the telemetry carrier. Each time the spacecraft was
locked up, two-way ground-received carrier power
dropped below the absolute telemetry threshold, causing
a loss of all data. To prevent this, two-way tracking was
forgone, and the spacecraft was locked-up only periodi-
cally for short durations to prevent the spacecraft from
transfering to the receive-via-the-high-gain-antenna
mode.
The average ground-received carrier power reached
the worst case telemetry threshold of -159.6 dbm, about
September 3. From that point, until October 1, 1965,
the ground-received carrier power dropped steadily
as the spacecraft high-gain antenna pointing error in-
creased. On October 1, as predicted, the carrier level
was fast approaching absolute telemetry threshold. At
21:30:17 GMT, a DC-12 command (transmit and re-
ceive via low-gain antenna) was transmitted from the
100-kw transmitter at DSIF 13. Telemetry was lost
at 22:05:07 GMT, marking the end of the nominal
mission. The transfer to low-gain antenna precluded the
cycling of the receiver between the antennas by
the radio subsystem logic circuitry, thus permitting
access from the 100-kw transmitter as desired. In addi-
tion, the transfer of the transmitter to the low-gain
antenna placed the spacecraft in the proper configura-
tion for the proiected attempt to reacquire the spacecraft
in 1967.
During the 308 days of flight through the termination
of telemetry, the Mariner IV radio subsystem returned
well over 50 million measurements to the Earth. A total
of 85 commands were transmitted to the spacecraft and
all were received and executed normally. The last
command, DC-12, was accepted by the spacecraft at a
distance of more than 191 million mi from Earth.
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III. SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
A. Structure and Mechanisms
1. Description
The spacecraft subsystem is structurally integrated
into a rigidly supported functional spacecraft. The major
requirements on the structure occur during all prelaunch
phases of the operation and during the boost phase and
trajectory-correction maneuvers. The cruise portion of
the flight requires that the structure maintain the me-
chanical alignments and that the spacecraft not fall
apart. The Mariner IV structure was composed of the
octagon structure, superstructure, and science platform
structure.
The spacecraft mechanisms consist of those items that
were required to actively function during the mission:
1. The boost dampers reduced the vibration inputs to
the solar panels and the low-gain antenna during
boost. They also statically positioned these items.
2. The SIT and PAS initiated onboard commands and
applied power to the pyrotechnics subsystem at
spacecraft/booster separation.
3. The solar panel deployment spring deployed the
solar panels to the cruise position. Switches near
the panel hinges gave telemetry indications that
each panel opened.
4. The cruise dampers positioned the panels in the
deployed position and damped solar panel excur-
sions during propulsion maneuvers. Latches on the
dampers engaged the panel to prevent subsequent
separation.
5. The scan actuator rotated the science platform and
instruments to search for and point to the Mars
surface. The total scan amplitude was 180 deg. The
actuator was controlled by the scan subsystem
electronics.
6. The scan inhibit switch inhibited power to the scan
actuator until the pin-puller, which torsionally re-
strained the platform, was fired. It also gave a
telemetry indication that the pin-puller had re-
leased the platform.
7. The science instrument cover protected the planet-
oriented instruments and sensors from sunlight and
cosmic dust. It could be unlatched by either a
solenoid or by a lanyard which was released at the
start of platform scanning motion. The cover was
deployed by two clock springs. A change in the
spacecraft identification telemetry channel data
number (DN) indicated the cover was deployed.
2. Performance
Because the function of all the structural and many of
the mechanical items was passive after launch, little
telemetry was transmitted about the performance of
these items. As a result, the inflight performance of these
components can only be deduced from other flight infor-
mation. This is also true in the case of the electronic
packaging design and the electronic cable harnessing.
All information gained during the flight indicated
that the structure, electronic cabling, mechanical devices,
and the electronic packaging design performed as de-
signed. Telemetry was recovered in flight on the perfor-
mance of the following mechanical devices:
a. Separation-initiated timer and pyrotechnics arming
switch. Telemetry event indications verified that either
the PAS or the SIT energized the pyrotechnics control
assembly (PCA). The PAS closure arming the PCA was
designed to occur at spacecraft/Agena separation; the
SIT switch closure was a backup designed to occur
about 40 see after separation. It was not determined
whether the PAS or the SIT energized the PCA, because
telemetry data covering spacecraft separation were not
available.
The first available data encoder event counter indica-
tions were received about 3 rain after separation. The
telemetry indicated a normal SIT-actuated solar panel
deployment and unlatch of the planetary scan platform.
b. Solar panel deployment. Telemetry indications
from the solar-panel deploy-switches, through the data
encoder event counters, indicated that each of the four
panels had been released by the pyrotechnic pin-pullers
and had been deployed by the panel deployment springs
to within 20 deg of the fully open position. Temperature
and power measurements later confirmed panel deploy-
ment.
c. Cruise dampers and latches. Based on the success-
ful trajectory-correction maneuver, it was deduced that
the panels did deploy and latch in the fully open posi-
tion and that any panel excursions during the PIPS
motor firing were adequately damped. Had the dampers
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and latches failed to perform as designed, the center-of-
gravity shifts caused by misaligned or excessively vibrat-
ing panels would have degraded the accuracy of the
maneuver.
d. Scan actuator. The scan actuator was operated
during the science cover deployment exercise for approx-
imately 11 scan cycles. During the scanning period of
127 rain in which the actuator functioned normally, the
average scan cycle was 11 min 52.9 see.
At encounter the actuator again operated within the
design limits. During the 108 min of operation, the aver-
age scan cycle time was 11 min 53.2 see. An analysis of
the scan reversal points verified that the actuator re-
versed at the first set of limit switches. During the
aborted television haze calibration sequence the actu-
ator operated successfully for 66 min with an average
scan cycle period of 11 min 53.8 see. During the 139-min
operating period of the completed sequence, the scan
cycle was 11 min 53.5 see,
The scan actuator was pressurized to 30 psia when it
was assembled. At launch the pressure was 29,5 psia.
During the science cover deployment, during encounter
and during the television haze calibration sequence, the
pressure was 28.8, 26.6, and 25.5 psi respectively. This
decrease in pressure was attributed to seal leakage and
porosity in the magnesium actuator cover.
e. Scan inhibit switch. The data encoder event regis-
ter indicated that the scan inhibit switch functioned as
designed when the pin-puller, which latched the science
platform, was fired at spacecraft injection. The subse-
quent successful operation of the scan actuator verified
this conclusion.
f. Science cover. On February 11, 1965, the single-
shot science cover solenoid, initiated from the PCA,
successfully unlatched the science cover. The proper
deployment of the cover was verified by a change in
the spacecraft identity Telemetry Channel 414 data num-
ber, and by a decrease in the platform temperatures.
Temperature change on the scan platform caused two
data number changes in the Channel 414 resistance mea-
surement at other times during flight.
3. Recommendations
Based on the flight performance of the structures and
mechanical devices, it is recommended that although
the scan actuator components were designed to rune-
tion normally in hard vacuum, additional effort be di-
rected toward finding improved methods for sealing
actuators.
B. Telecommunications
1. General
The Mariner IV telecommunications system was de-
signed to perform three functions:
1. Track the angular position, radial velocity and
range of the spacecraft to enable the FPAC and
tracking data analysis areas of the SFOF to com-
pute the parameters of the spacecraft trajectory.
2. Provide engineering telemetry data from the space-
craft to evaluate spacecraft performance. Provide
scientific telemetry data from the spacecraft to per-
mit scientific evaluation of the mission and to trans-
mit stored television pictures of the planet Mars.
3. Provide ground command capability to the space-
craft as required.
These functions must be performed from launch to at
least encounter plus 20 days, including a trajectory-
correction maneuver, providing the trajectory and ma-
neuver meet the constraints set forth in the functional
specification.
2. Telecommunications System Fedormance
A review of flight data indicates that all functional
requirements have been met, such as:
a. Tracking. Tracking data were received by the
DSIF 24 hr a day after Mariner IV launch in either the
one-way or two-way mode, except for short periods
when Ranger tracking requirements took precedence
over Mariner requirements. Using doppler and angle-
tracking data from DSIF stations, FPAC personnel were
able to determine the course of the spacecraft and con-
tinually monitor the spacecraft trajectory to verify and
improve their trajectory predictions. Initial tracking data
after iniection were used to determine the distance and
time by which the spacecraft would miss the nominal
aiming point, and to define a traiectory correction for
their error. Following the trajectory-correction maneu-
ver, tracking data were used to verify that the maneuver
had occurred as planned and that the spacecraft was
indeed on course.
An additional task was performed in support of the
tracking function during the occultation experiment,
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which was designed to gather information on the Mar-
tian atmosphere by monitoring changes in radio signals
from the spacecraft as it passed behind the planet.
b. Telemetry. During all periods when the spacecraft
was being tracked, telemetry data were received from
the spacecraft. Analysis of received signal level data
from DSIF indicated that the telemetry threshold re-
quirement of less than 1 bit error in 200 bits was met.
Indeed, during the picture playback the theoretical bit
error rate was estimated to be less than 10 -5. Although
the telemetry link bit-error rate during the picture
playback could not be experimentally evaluated, the
extremely clean picture data were evidence of superior
performance. During the mission, over 350 × 10_ bits
of data were sent to Earth by Mariner IV and these
data were relayed to the SFOF for evaluation, logging,
and further processing.
c. Command. From two days after launch, when the
first command was sent to the spacecraft, until the end
of the TV picture playback, a total of 56 commands were
sent to Mariner IV. In addition, 19 more commands
were sent during the posteneounter phase, bringing the
total to 85 by the end of Phase I of the mission. All of
these commands were successfully received and exe-
cuted by the subsystems to which they were directed.
Analysis of spacecraft received signal level telemetry at
the time of command transmission indicates that the
command threshold bit error rate of 10 -5 was met for
all commands. Since all commands were correctly re-
ceived and executed, it can be inferred that no bit
errors occurred.
During operational planning for the encounter phase,
it became obvious that extremely accurate command
timing would greatly enhance the value of encounter
sequence commands. By utilizing the timed start mode
of the ground command subsystem it was possible to
accurately time the initiation of commands and hence
their arrival and execution times on the spacecraft. The
accurate positioning of the scan platform for the TV
picture-taking sequence was evidence of the success of
this technique.
d. Communications capability. Theoretical perfor-
mance predictions were made for the Mariner IV mis-
sion using a summation of all known gains and losses
between transmitters and receivers to generate curves
of predicted received-power levels at the spacecraft and
at the ground stations. By comparing predicted signal
levels at any time during the flight with system thresh-
olds, it was possible to define a performance margin as
the amount by which the predicted nominal exceeded
threshold. In order to reasonably assure that the tele-
communications system performance would not decrease
below the threshold during the mission, the design cri-
terion was such that the performance margin must ex-
ceed the linear sum (in db) of the known system adverse
tolerances. This criterion was met for all required phases
of the mission for the command function, and for all
phases except a short transition period between low-
and high-gain antenna coverage for telemetry.
It should be noted that even during the period when
the telemetry system adverse tolerances were not
covered, the performance margin never went below
nominal threshold. Thus in this region the telemetry
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system performance would be marginal, depending on
the way in which the tolerances break. This was a
result of an antenna position compromise that had to be
made between midflight performance and encounter
performance, sacrificing a short period in midflight to
more adequately cover the encounter.
Uplink performance. During the Mariner IV mission,
all signals transmitted from Earth to the spacecraft were
received via the spacecraft low-gain antenna. Theoretical
received signal level predictions are shown in Fig. 6
and 7 for the Earth to spacecraft link. Figure 6 shows
predicted signal levels and the associated tolerances
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during the portion of the flight when the spacecraft-to- _ -_3o
Earth vector fell on the low-gain antenna alone. Figure 7 _.
shows the same predictions during the period when the _ -14o
spacecraft-to-Earth vector intersected both the low- and
high-gain antennas, and shows the resulting radio- -- -150
t.,,,..
frequency interference pattern. For comparison with
predictions, received carrier power data have been taken o(3 -160UJ
using a calibrated AGe voltage on the spacecraft. >_
laJ
Figures 6 and 7 show the recorded signal level data on
curves of predicted data. The agreement is quite good "o -,zo
for all phases of the flight, z
O
,'_ -180
(3
Data points as shown on Fig. 6 and 7 are based on
spacecraft AGe averages over a long period of time, since
the instantaneous value at any given time may be subject
to several possible perturbations. Most significant among
possible perturbations is the variation in the exact point
on the antenna pattern seen by the Earth due to attitude
control limit cycles. Since the slope of the antenna-gain-
vs-look-angle curve is very steep for many places on the
antenna pattern, small variations in look angle can be
translated into significant variations in spacecraft
received-signal level, Fig. 8. Other items contributing
to instantaneous variations in AGe telemetry were
noise on the AGe telemetry, variations in DSIF trans-
mitter power output, and variations in DSIF transmitter
frequency.
Downlink performance. During the first 96 days of
the Mariner IV mission, spacecraft-to-Earth communi-
cations were via the spacecraft low-gain antenna. A
switch was made to the high-gain antenna on March 5,
1965, and the spacecraft continued to transmit via the
high-gain antenna until October 1, 1965, when it was
commanded back to the low-gain antenna as a condition
for the cruise around the Sun. The spacecraft trans-
mitted via a cavity amplifier for the launch and for the
first 15 days of the mission. On December 13, 1964, a
commanded switch to the TWT amplifier was made.
Figure 9 shows predicted received signal levels for the
spacecraft-to-Earth link for the Mariner IV mission.
Also shown in Fig. 9 is DSIF-received carrier-power
data taken during the mission. These data points repre-
sent averages, over several station passes, of AGe data
taken at DSIF 11. It should be noted that the data
points shown in Fig. 9 may not, in many cases, cor-
respond to signal levels reported by the station during
the flight. The station-reported signal strengths have
been corrected for known calibration errors in order to
present a true picture of downlink performance.
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e. Summary. Performance of both the uplink and
downlink averaged near nominal predicted values
and within the assigned tolerance limits. Telecommuni-
cation system design criteria for the Mariner mission
were thus met, with the conclusion that all parameters
significantly affecting the Mariner IV telecommunica-
tions system had been considered, and the functional
requirements as defined for the Mariner IV telecom-
munications system had been fulfilled.
3. Radio Subsystem
a. Description. The radio subsystem for the
Mariner IV spacecraft was required to receive either a
modulated or an unmodulated RF carrier transmitted
from ground stations of the DSN, demodulate command
and ranging signals if present, coherently translate the
frequency and phase of the RF carrier, modulate the
translated carrier with telemetry and ranging signals,
and retransmit it back to Earth. Figure 10 is a block
diagram of the spacecraft radio subsystem.
The received signal was a 2116 Mc carrier that could
be modulated by a composite command signal and/or a
coded ranging signal. This signal was demodulated by
the automatic phase control (APe) receiver, which
tracked the carrier signal in a phase-locked loop. If com-
mand or ranging modulation were present, it was sent to
the command detector or the ranging channel, respec-
tively. When the receiver was phase locked to the re-
ceiver carrier, it generated a filtered phase reference for
the transmitter exciter which was coherent with the re-
ceived carrier. The phase of the transmitted signal was
thus related to the phase of the received signal by
the constant ratio of 240/221. The signal generated by the
4O
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transmitter exciter was phase modulated continuously
by a composite telemetry signal and by a ranging signal
if ranging was turned on.
When the ground stations were not transmitting to
the spacecraft, the spacecraft transmitter exciter was
controlled by an auxiliary crystal oscillator. This pro-
vided a capability for noncoherent one-way tracking of
the spacecraft and ensured that spacecraft telemetry
would be available even when the ground stations were
not in uplink lock with the spacecraft.
To provide high reliability, redundant exciters, power
amplifiers, and power supplies were incorporated into
the transmitter. Either exciter could be used with either
power amplifier through a circulator switching network.
Similarly, either power amplifier could be used for
transmitting through either antenna within the restric-
tions of the spacecraft logic. The control of switching
between power amplifiers and exciters was provided by
either ground command or on-board failure detection
logic. For ground command control, the receipt of the
appropriate direct command caused the control unit to
transfer power from the active to the inactive element
and to reverse all necessary input-output functions. In the
case of switching by onboard failure detection, power
monitors sampled the level of both the exciter and
power amplifier RF power outputs. If the output power
dropped below a preset level, the next cyclic pulse
30" 0 ° 330"
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90 •
120"
270 •
240 •
150" 180" 210"
Fig. 11. Spacecra_to-Earth vector diagram
(CY-1) from the spacecraft CC&S caused the control
unit to switch the offending element.
The Mariner IV RF power amplifiers formed a hybrid
configuration consisting of one cavity amplifier and one
TWT amplifier. This configuration was chosen as the
best system to fulfill mission objectives with available
hardware and technology. The cavity amplifier was used
during the launch phase in a low-voltage mode to prevent
arcing when the spacecraft pressure passed through the
critical region as the spacecraft evacuated in the vacuum
of space. As the spacecraft separated from the Agena
stage of the launch vehicle, the cavity amplifier power
supply was switched to the high-voltage mode, and the
cavity amplifier began transmitting at full power. It
was not possible to use the TWT amplifier during this
period since it had no low-voltage mode and was not
packaged to operate in a partial vacuum. Several days
after launch, a switch to the TWT amplifier was
directed by ground command and this configuration
was maintained throughout the balance of the mission.
With two antennas and the associated circulator
switches, three transmitting and receiving modes are
available:
1. Transmit low-gain, receive low-gain
2. Transmit high-gain, receive high-gain.
3. Transmit high-gain, receive low-gain
These modes provided the required coverage during all
phases of the mission. Selection of the proper mode for
a given time in flight was by CC&S command with
ground command backup. Failure mode switching was
also available to switch the spacecraft receiver to the
low gain antenna should an automatic roll reacquisition
be necessary and between the two antennas in the event
of uplink communications failure.
By designing antenna pattern coverage to take ad-
vantage of the unique characteristics of the Mars 1964
minimum energy trajectories, considerable savings in
spacecraft weight and complexity were realized.
Figure 11 shows a plot of the spacecraft-to-Earth vector
for a typical trajectory across the spacecraft coordinate
system. During the latter portion of the flight, when it
was necessary to use a high-gain antenna to communi-
cate over the long ranges involved, the angular variation
of the Earth track was small. This permitted the use
of a fixed, high-gain antenna and enabled spacecraft
designers to eliminate the heavy and complex antenna
pointing equipment required to steer a moveable
antenna.
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b. Performance. The radio subsystem aboard the
Mariner IV spacecraft operated continuously with no
evidence of any malfunction or degradation of perfor-
mance from time of launch to completion of the mission.
The anomalies that were observed were well under-
stood and are reported in the order that they were
recorded.
Traveling-wave tube helix current variation. Fol-
lowing the switch to the TWT amplifier by ground
command on December 13, 1964, the TWT operated as
expected with one exception. Beginning December 31,
telemetry indicated that the TWT helix current was
varying more than anticipated, and was generally tend-
ing to increase. It finally stabilized about 0.4 ma higher
than the initial value. Discussions with the manufacturer
indicated that helix current variation was a known
characteristic of TWTs and should be considered normal.
Subsequent tests conducted at JPL with two TWTs from
the same lot that Mariner IV used confirmed this.
Continued observation of helix current after its stabi-
lization value (about 7.7 ma) was reached has shown no
further variations, except those attributable to decreas-
ing spacecraft temperature.
Interferometer effect. The Mariner IV radio sub-
system was so designed that the transmitter or receiver
could be switched to operate with the high-gain an-
tenna or the low-gain antenna on the spacecraft. The
switching operation was done with circulator switches.
Because the effective isolation provided by the circula-
tor switches was finite, more than one path was possi-
ble for transmission of RF energy through the subsystem.
The net result of the finite isolation was that trans-
mission or reception of the same signal over both
antennas on the spacecraft was possible. At a given
nonlinear element, constructive or destructive inter-
ference occurred depending upon the relative ampli-
tudes and phases of the interfering signals. Because
the two antennas were many wavelengths apart, the
relative phase between each antenna signal, and there-
fore the relative amplitude of the composite signal,
varied with look angle to the spacecraft. The resulting
amplitude variation with spacecraft cone and clock
angle produced the interferometer pattern shown earlier
in Fig. 7.
The leakage mechanism in the RF circuits was a
combination of actual circulator isolation and circulator
termination mismatch return loss. That is, an unwanted
RF signal may wind up at a circulator port via wrong-
way circulation and via reflection from a mismatched
termination with right-way circulation. The aetual un-
wanted signal magnitude at the port in question was
then dependent upon the relative magnitudes and phase
difference between the signals via the two paths. Hence,
the leakage was a function of circulator isolation, termi-
nation mismatch, and interconnecting line lengths.
Early in the Mariner radio subsystem design, the
problem of circulator switch leakage was recognized,
but the decision was made to continue the design. For
the planned portion of the flight where the interfer-
ometer pattern occurred- over the solid angle of the
high-gain main beam-the spacecraft could have
the transmitter and receiver connected to the high-gain
antenna. The large gain, coupled with normal isolation
to the low-gain antenna, would make the intefferom-
eter effect for this mode negligible.
Mariner IV left Earth in the transmit low-gain, receive
low-gain mode. Prelaunch predictions based on an
assumed isolation of 25 db indicated that -1-7 db to
-11 db maximum variations from the nominal low-
gain patterns could exist over that portion of the low-gain
pattern encompassing the high-gain antenna main beam
(around 38-deg cone angle). Until the time that the
transfer from low-gain transmitting to high-gain trans-
mitting occurred (MT-5, 28-deg cone angle), the max-
imum variations encountered were approximately ±4 db
from nominal for the uplink signal and approximately
±3 db for the downlink signal.
After the mode switching occurred, the interferometer
effect ceased to exist on the downlink because, for the
new antenna configuration, the interfering signal was
negligible compared with the primary, high-gain an-
tenna signal. In uplink communications, however, the
interferometer effect remained quite pronounced, as
expected, since the spacecraft receiver antenna con-
figuration had not changed, although the phase and
amplitude relationships of the interfering signals did
change. Subsequent mapping of the antenna gains
allowed the received carrier power data and the space-
craft signal (2116 Mc) to be fitted to analytical inter-
ferometer patterns, yielding uplink communications
predictions for the balance of the mission and indicating
that the effective isolation from the high-gain antenna
to the receiver was on the order of 12.5 db for the
transmit high-gain, receive low-gain mode.
The interference effect upon the uplink could have
been avoided entirely by transferring the receiver to
the high-gain antenna at this point. It was desirable,
however, to remain on the low-gain antenna as long as
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possible to permit command capability in the event that
roll orientation was lost. The logic which would normally
command a transfer of the receiver to the low-gain
antenna if roll acquisition were lost was disabled when
DC-15 was in effect.
Fortunately, the interferometer pattern was so dis-
posed about the spacecraft that a pattern maximum
occurred during encounter. At look angles other than
over the high-gain antenna main beam, the normal
low-gain antenna pattern still existed. Thus, the inter-
ferometer pattern provided higher gain than normal for
the critical portion of the mission and yet had wide
coverage for command reception capability in the event
the spacecraft lost attitude control.
Frequency shifts at CY-1 events. Both receivers at
DSIF 42 dropped lock momentarily coincident with the
CC&S cyclic command (CY-1) on February 27, 1965.
Analysis of the data showed that these transients were
present every time a CY-1 occurred while the radio
subsystem was in one-way lock. A series of tests on
the Mariner proof-test model spacecraft provided the
explanation.
The first CY-1 after a two-way tracking period
changed the state of a flip-flop in the radio control
circuitry. The flip-flop, which derives its power in
common with the auxiliary oscillator, draws more cur-
rent in one state than in the other. The de power-supply
voltage, in turn, is slightly current dependent, so that
a change of state of the flip-flop results in a slight
change of voltage to the auxiliary oscillator, causing a
shift in spacecraft transmitted frequency. Ground test-
ing indicated that a change of approximately 10 mv in
the power-supply voltage was to be expected, so that
the frequency shift at S-band would be about 30 cps.
When the spacecraft is in two-way lock, the radio
operates from the voltage controlled oscillator (VCO)
which does not have a de power supply in common with
the current unbalanced flip-flop. Thus, the slight shift
in frequency is not observed when in two-way lock. It
was not observed during prelaunch system testing be-
cause sufficiently sensitive instrumentation to measure
such small frequency change is not part of a normal test
configuration.
Best lock frequency investigation. The best lock
frequency is the frequency onto which the spacecraft
receiver APC loop will lock in minimum time. It also
corresponds to the average frequency at which the re-
ceiver VCO operates when out of lock. If this frequency
is known closely enough, the average time to acquire
two-way lock can be minimized.
Due to aging and temperature differences, the best
lock frequency may change from the prelaunch value.
For this reason, two methods were proposed and were
used to continuously update the estimate of the best
lock frequency.
The first method involved the direct measurement by
DSIF of the frequency giving the shortest lock-up time,
and the only requirement was that the DSIF stations
modify slightly the procedures for acquiring two-way
lock. The second method consisted of recording space-
craft static phase error (SPE) telemetry values when
out of lock and then averaging the spacecraft SPE
readings over a sufficiently long period of receiver
out-of-lock conditions. The average telemetry value was
then converted to spacecraft VCO frequency from the
appropriate calibration table. Using the updated best
lock frequencies, ground stations repeatedly obtained
two-way lock with the spacecraft within a few seconds
after the signal arrived at the spacecraft. Prior to
obtaining these data it occasionally took more than an
hour to obtain two-way lock.
4. Data Encoder Subsystem
a. Description. The Mariner IV data encoder sub-
system accepted engineering data from 90 analog
channels, time multiplexed it into a predetermined
sequence, and converted it into 7-bit binary words. It
also accepted digital data from science, video storage,
and command subsystems and time multiplexed (corn-
mutated) this with the engineering data. The data
encoder subsystem generated a cumulative count of
specific spacecraft events, and a cyclic, binary, pseudo-
random code from which bit and word sync were
obtained. A composite telemetry signal consisting of
telemetry data bi-phase modulated on a square wave
subcarrier and linearly added a synchronization sub-
carrier was generated and sent to the RF phase modu-
lator. Two data rates were provided in order to take
advantage of the higher signal strengths available during
the early part of the flight to support a higher bit rate.
The lower rate was used after the Earth to spacecraft
range was so large that ground received signal level
decreased to the point where excessive bit errors were
introduced at the higher bit rate.
Figure 12, a block diagram of the Mariner IV data
encoder, shows the main functional elements. Analog
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data from telemetry transducers in the various space-
craft subsystems arrives at the solid state commutator
where it was time multiplexed into a predetermined
sequence and converted to a pulse-amplitude-modulated
(PAM) signal for presentation to the analog-to-digital
converter (ADC). The commutator also provided unique
words of frame synchronization information for the
ground decommutators to use to identify the various
data words.
In the ADC the sequenced PAM data from the
commutator was converted into 7-bit binary words
which in turn went to the data selector for insertion into
the data stream.
To obtain bit and word syne for telemetry, a cyclic
63-bit pseudorandom code was used. This code was
generated by a pseudorandom code generator which
was driven by the sync subcarrier frequency of 2f_,
and was synchronized with data and sync subcarriers.
Bit and word sync were derived through a series of gates
which generated pulses that synchronized the commu-
tator, the ADC, and all digital data inputs.
To provide bit and word sync information to the
ground equipment, the pseudorandom code was phase-
shift key (PSK) modulated onto a sync subcarrier. The
ground demodulator generates a local pseudorandom
code identical to the code received from the spacecraft
and steps the two codes past each other until they are in
phase. Word gates like those on the spacecraft then de-
rive accurate word and bit sync pulses.
To obtain the 2fa and 4f, frequencies used for sync
and data subcarriers and to provide basic subsystem
timing, the spacecraft 2400-cps power is divided down
via a digital counter chain in the frequency divider.
Data bit rate is also determined in the frequency
divider by switching in additional counters to obtain
the lower bit rate. This switching function was con-
trolled' by a CC&S command with ground command
backup. At launch the data rate was 33½ bps, with the
CC&S commanding a switch to 8% bps on January
3, 1965.
In case of catastrophic failure of an ADC or pseudo-
random code generator, a redundant ADC/pseudorandom
code generator chain was available. The redundant
combination could have been activated by a ground
command which removes power from the failed unit
and applies power to the standby unit.
In addition to the processing of analog data, several
digital data inputs were accepted by the data encoder.
The spacecraft command system provided an input from
the command detector indicating whether or not the
command detector was in lock and the frequency of
the command detector VCO. Event registers that main-
tained a cumulative count of spacecraft events provided
a 7-bit digital output which was commutated together
with the engineering data words. The science subsystem
provided a digital input consisting of data from the
scientific instruments on board the spacecraft, and tele-
vision picture data from the video storage subsystem
were input during the post encounter period when
pictures were being played back.
Four data modes were available, either by CC&S
command or ground command. They were: 1) engineer-
ing data only, 2) engineering and science data, 3) science
data only, and 4) stored video and science data with
short blocks of engineering data every 9 hr. Mode 1
was used during checkout of the spacecraft and critical
maneuvers where engineering data are of primary interest.
Mode 2 was used during the cruise phase where both
science and engineering data were required. Mode 3
was used during planetary encounter to obtain maximum
real time scientific data and Mode 4 was used during
the post encounter playback of stored data.
b. Performance. The data encoder subsystem operated
normally throughout the flight. As predicted before
launch several data encoder deck skips occurred coinci-
dentally with changes in the spacecraft power profile.
These skips were due to the susceptibility of the com-
mutator to electrical transients, and had no effect on the
mission other than a change of reference times for sci-
ence frame count and deck sync.
Shortly after launch, while the spacecraft was passing
through the Van Allen radiation belt, there were several
deck skips that are as yet unexplained. However, after
that time, all deck skips were associated with changes
of spacecraft power or other electrical transients.
Deck skips and resets. Deck skipping is described as
a skipping of some channels by the commutator. Specif-
ically, the effect was observed at frequent intervals
between L + 157 min and L + 180 min on Mariner IV
and at L + 207 min on Mariner III. Commutator skip-
ping at these times was not fully explained, although
several theories were advanced, e.g., radiation effects,
outgassing effects, and plasma probe high-voltage arc-
ing. Since these specific times, occasional skips have
been noted on Mariner IV which have been correlated
with arcing of the plasma probe on the spacecraft or
with changes in the spacecraft power profile. Table 7
46
JPL TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 32-882
Date
November 1, 1964
I
i
I
!
!
I
'r
Time, GMT
16:59:00
17:00:28
17:00:40
17:00:53
17:04:00
17:04:13
17:04:25
17:04:37
17:04:50
17:05:15
17:05:27
17:06:05
17:06:17
17:06:42
17:07:18
17:07:43
17:07:55
17:09:28
17:11:21
17:15:33
17:16:36
Table 7. Data encoder deck skips and resets
Event
Rate 3/4 skipped 409, 410, then reset
and advanced one count.
Rate 1 skipped at word 119 which
made science PN code start one word
only.
Rate 2 reset from 208, skipping word
209.
Rate 3/4 skipped from word 411 to 400.
Rate 2 skipped position 206 and 207.
Rate 2 reset to 200 from 207, skipping
208 and 209.
Rate 3/4 reset to 400 from 201, skipping
402 through 419.
Rate ! sync occurred one word early.
100 deck reset at one of the two 8
positions in the science deck. Rate 2
reset to 200 from 201, skipping 202
through 209.
Rate 3/4 reset to 410 from 400, skipping
401 through 409.
Rate 1 sync occurred one word early.
Again a 100 deck reset at position 8.
Rate 2 reset to 200.
Rate 3/4 reset to 400.
Rate i sync occurred one word early.
100 deck reset at position 8.
Rate 2 reset to 200 from 203, skipping
204 through 209.
Rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
Rate 1 sync occurred one word early.
100 deck reset at position 8. Rate 2 reset
to 200 from 202, skipping 203 through
209.
Rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
Rate 1 sync occurred one word early.
Probably 100 deck reset at position 8.
Rate 3/4 reset to 400 position.
Rate 2 skipped 208, going from 207 to
209. Rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
Rate 2 skipped 208, going from 207 to
209. Rate 3/4 reset to 400 position.
Rate 2 reset to 200 from 208, skipping
209.
Rate 2 skipped 205, going from 204 to
206. Rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
Date Time, GMT
November 1, 1964 17:18:29
17:19:20
i 7:19:33
17:19:45
17:19:58
17:20:11
17:20:23
17:20:35
17:21:26
I 17:22:28
December 6 02:03:04
06:21:34
09:02:14
13:29:46
I 13:42:10
7 03:41:08
06:48:36
February 11, 1965 03:53:15
06:54:43
I r 10:27:08
Event
Rate 2 reset to 200 during first 9 words
of engineering frame since 205 okay
but 220 occurred during 225 time
indicating a reset from position 5 to 0
on rate 2. Rate 3/4 reset to 400 position.
Rate 2 skipped position 204 but not
214 and 224. It read out 205, 214, 224.
Indicates three rate 2 decks out of step.
Rate 2 read out 206, 215, 224. Indicates
three rate 2 decks out of step.
Rate 2 read out 207, 216, 226. Indicates
three rate 2 decks out of step.
Rate 2 read out 208, 217, 227. Indicates
three rate 2 decks out of step.
Rate 2 reset to 200, skipping 209.
Rate 2 reset to 200; i.e., 200 deck sync
again.
Rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
Rate 2 skipped position 205 and
succeeding channels were incorrect
until the deck was reset at Channel
209. Channels 219 and 229 were
skipped as a result of the reset.
Rate 3/4 reset, 410 skipped.
Rate 2 reset, skipped 209; 400 deck not
affected.
Rate 3/4 reset, skipping from 416 to 401.
Implied reset before 06:21:22 GMT.
Rate 2 skipped 207, read out 208, 217,
227; 400 deck reset. Next reading
201 = 90. Skipped 418, 419, and 400.
Rate 3/4 reset, skipped 408, 409, and
410.
Rate 3/4 and rate 2 reset, skipped 209.
Rate 1 reset, skipped 119 and 206.
Rate 3/4 reset.
Rate 2 reset to 200 from 206 and Rate
3/,4 reset to 400 from 416
(DC-26 battery charger off transient).
Rate 1 reset, Rate 2 reset to 200 from
203, and Rate 3/4 reset to 410 and 407
(DC-25 encounter science on translent).
Rates 1, 2, and 3/4 reset
(DC-26 baffery charger off transient).
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Table 7. Data encoder deck skips and resets (cont'd)
Date Time, GMT ] Event
February 11, 1965 17:02:05
June 10 14:40:32.8
June 30 03:28:37
September 2 06:54:32
Rates 3 and 4 reset coincident with
CC&S event MT-1.
Data encoder rate 3/4 skipped from
409 to 401.
Data encoder rate 2 skipped from 209
to 200, then reset to 201. Rate 3/4
skipped from 408 to 410 and 308 to
300.
Rate 1, 2, and 4 decks skipped coinci-
dent with battery charger turn off.
Table 8. Deck skips and resets during SAF testing
Date, 1964 Spacecraft
MC-1February
March 17
April 22
April 23
May 2
18
25
I 26
_r
MC-2
MC-I
lists the deck skips and resets observed during the
mission.
The commutator is composed of semiconductor
switches arranged in groups of 10, called decks. The
decks are grouped to form frames, and each frame is
sampled at a different sampling rate. As an example,
the fast frame is composed of two decks which are
sequenced in parallel. The outputs are switched alter-
nately, so that a length-20 frame is formed. Each deck
is sequenced by a sequencer, which turns each switch
on and off in order. These sequencers are essentially
free-running, but must run in synchronism. To ensure
that the sequencers stay synehronized, a synchronizer is
used. The output of the last position of each sequencer
is connected to the synchronizer. The synchronizer pro-
duces an output pulse whenever it receives an input
pulse from either of the two sequencers. Thus, if one
sequencer gets ahead of the other, it will reach the last
position, thereby regaining synchronism.
In most cases, the deck skip had been caused by pre-
mature triggering of the synchronizer, which in turn had
reset the sequencers to the first position. The result was
the skipping of the remaining measurements on the
deck, depending on where the reset had occurred. A
few of the deck skips had been caused by the actual
skipping of the sequencer from the first to the second
or third position in a sampling sequence. This had been
due to transients on the sequencer clock line.
This anomaly had been observed occasionally since
February, 1964, when the first deck skip was observed in
the Spacecraft Assembly Facility (SAF) on MC-1 PTM.
Table 8 lists the deck skips and resets observed in SAF
system testing.
Analysis of these anomalies showed that in every case
a deck skip was correlated with a fairly severe space-
craft power transient, e.g., switching gyros on and off,
boost-share power mode, science on and off, and high-
voltage arcing in the science instruments. Further lab
testing showed that the data encoder synchronizer gave
an output pulse with either a 0.7-v, 2-sec pulse on the
input, or a 6-v pulse on the + 6-v power or ground lines.
It became obvious, then, that a deck skip was caused
by the spacecraft inducing noise pulses into the data
encoder of such magnitude as to produce transients on
the synchronizer lines. This may be attributed in part,
to the fact that as a telemetry processor, the data encoder
is the center of the spacecraft signal ground tree and
that it has approximately 150 signal connections routed
via the upper ring harness.
Extra events. An extra event was observed in data
encoder, Register 2, instead of the single event normally
associated with CC&S command MT-9. The anomalous
indication is believed due to the nonsimultaneous closure
of the two relays associated with MT-9.
No further anomalous indications have been observed
from the spacecraft data encoder during the flight. All
encoder functions such as bit rate changes and mode
switches have occurred as planned including the
Mode 1/Mode 4 switching during picture playback.
5. Command Subsystem
a. Description. The spacecraft command subsystem is
required to detect and decode any of 29 DC or three
QC that may be sent to the spacecraft by the DSN
ground stations. If the command received is a DC, a
logical output must be provided to the appropriate sub-
system for execution of the command. If the command
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received is a quantitative command, the magnitude and
polarity information it contains are stored by the CC&S
for use during the execution of a maneuver. When a
command word is received, the command detector must
be in lock or the command will be inhibited. The
command words are designed in such a way that at
least two bit errors must have occurred in order for a
wrong command to be executed. Telemetry information
is provided to the data encoder including: 1) command
detector in lock or out of lock, 2) command detector
VCO frequency, and 3) event pulse indication of com-
mand reception.
The command subsystem consists of two major
functional units: the command detector and the com-
mand decoder. Also included is a transformer rectifier
unit which converts the spacecraft 2.4-kc voltage into
the ae and dc voltages required by the subsystem.
A simplified block diagram of the detector is given
in Fig. 13. The detector receives the composite command
signal subcarrier from the radio subsystem. The sub-
carrier contains the command word information (a
sequence of binary digits) in the form of a biphase si-
nusoidal signal added to a synchronization (sync) signal.
The sync signal is composed of a pseudonoise (PN)
sequence Modulo 2 added to a square-wave signal at a
clock frequency defined as the 2Is frequency. The si-
nusoidal signal is also at 2[_ frequency.
The detector consists of two major channels where
synchronization and command word detector functions
are accomplished. The detector sync channel effectively
correlates the incoming syuc signal with a detector-
generated PN sequence Modulo 2 added to a square-
wave signal at [_ frequency. The correlation of the two PN
signals results in the error signal in the detector phase
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Fig. 13. Command subsystem command detector block diagram
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lock loop (PLL) which drives the indicated VCO. To ac-
complish phase lock, a frequency offset is set between the
transmitted and the detector 2[, frequencies, which causes
a continually changing phase shift between the two PN
signals until correlation occurs. When the transmitted and
the detector-generated PN sequences are in correlation,
the null point of the error curve is achieved and the
output of the VCO is in phase and frequency coherence
with the transmitted signals. Any reasonable phase
transient will now be tracked by the PLL which is in
lock with the command signal.
The detector command channel filters the command
word information signal from the composite commanded
signal and recovers the command word bits by multiply-
ing the signal with a phase reference from the detector
sync channel. The multiplied signal is then applied to
a matched filter (an effective integrator over the bit
time) which optimally detects the transmitted bit level.
The command signal is corrupted by noise assumed to
be gaussian with a fiat spectral density over the noise
bandwidth of the matched filter. Threshold for the
detector is defined at a bit error rate of 1 × 10 -5, and
occurs at a composite command signal-to-noise ratio of
19.5 ± 1 db in a 1-cycle noise bandwidth. The recoh-
structed bits and bit sync pulses, emanating from the
detector PN generator (PNG) each cycle of the PN
sequence, are directed to the command decoder.
A lock signal is generated by the detector which
effectively measures at each bit sync time the correlation
between the transmitted and detector-generated PN
sequences, compares the correlation output to a thresh-
old bias signal, and makes a decision as to whether or
not the subsystem was in lock over the preceding bit
time interval. The detector lock signal is directed to the
decoder and inhibits its function when an out-of-lock
indication occurs.
A simplified block diagram of the command decoder
is given in Fig. 14. Upon recognition of the decoder start
bits, the decoder sequences a binary counter with the
detector bit sync pulses. At the correct bit sync pulse,
the decoder matrix is interrogated. Depending on the
address bits stored in the decoder address storage flip-
flops, one of the NAND gates is gated to close an output
isolation switch (or switches) in the case of a DC. For
a QC, the interrogation permits the QC bits to be
FROM
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Fig. 14. Command subsystem command decoder block diagram
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directed to the spacecraft CC&S subsystem along with
QC bit sync pulses. When no QC bits are transmitted
to CC&S, alert pulses are directed, one per second, to
the subsystem to clear the QC storage registers.
If an out-of-lock indication occursduring decoder
function, the decoder generates an inhibit signaf which
immediately stops the decoder command word process-
ing and allows no further decoder functioning until
26 consecutive command zero bits are directed to the
decoder after the lock signal indicates in lock once again.
The command word is comprised of 26 bits, as shown
in Fig. 15. The first three bits of a command word
(always 110) begin the command decoder function.
Bits 4 through 9 are the command address bits. They
completely identify which command word has been
sent. The remaining bits constitute quantitative infor-
mation bits. The Mariner command subsystem has the
capability of processing and executing 32 command
words. Twenty-nine of the command words are DC,
which cause a momentary switch closure in the recipient
subsystem or subsystem circuitry. DC makes use of only
the decoder start and address bits of the command
word. The remaining command words are QC which
direct to the CC&S subsystem bits 9 through 26 repre-
senting either roll, pitch, or velocity information neces-
sary for the two possible midcourse maneuvers.
Three command signals are directed to the spacecraft
telemetry subsystem to be telemetered to Earth. The
signals time-share the telemetry transmission channel
and are sampled at a rate determined by the telemetry
COMMAND BIT NO.
COMMAND BIT
IDENTIFICATION
COMMAND BIT VALUE
DIRECT COMMAND FORMAT
COM-MAND COMMAND = _
_z
:)ECODERsTARTADDRESS < _.
1 J1 Jo VARIABLE
BITS12-26 HAVE NO SIGNIFICANCE IN DC'S.
iN QC'S THEY FORM PARTOF THE CC&S
COMMAND
REFERTO QUANTITATIVE COMMAND FORMAT
ZERO FOR DC'S; VARIABLEFOR QC'S
COMMAND BIT NO.
CC&S COMMAND BIT NO.
CC&S COMMAND BIT
IDENTIFICATION
PITCH TURNQC
COM-
MAND
BIT
VALUES
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MOTOR BURN
NOTES:
QUANTITATIVE COMMAND FORMAT
I 8 9 10 11 2 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
I 2 3 4 S 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
I. COMMAND BITS 10 AND I1 ARE ADJUSTED TO ENSURE AGAINST SINGLE BIT ERRORS CAUSING AN INCORRECT COMMAND WORD OUTPUT.
2. COMMAND BITS 9 THROUGH 11 (CC&$ COMMAND BITS I THROUGH 3) ARE NOT USED QUANTITATIVELY BY CC&S BUT ARE USED TO REMAIN
COMPATIBLE WITH PREVIOUSLY DESIGNED HARDWARE (MARINER VENUS 1962).
3. COMMAND BiT 14 (CC&S COMMAND BIT 6) IS ADJUSTED IN QC'S TO GIVE AN ODD NUMBER OF ONE BITS IN COMMAND BITS 9 THROUGH
26 (CC&S BITS 1 THROUGH 18).
4. COMMAND BIT 26 (CC&S COMMAND BIT 18) MUST BE A ONE TO PRODUCE A CLOCKWISE (POSITIVE) SPACECRAFT ROTATION ABOUT THE
SPECIFIED SPACECRAFT AXIS. A ZERO IN THIS BIT POSITION WILL RESULT IN A COUNTERCLOCKWISE (NEGATIVE) SPACECRAFT ROTATION
ABOUT THE SPECIFIED SPACECRAFT AXIS. POLARITY BIT FOR MOTOR BURN COMMAND IS ALWAYS ONE.
5. COMMAND BITS 15 THROUGH 25 (CC&S COMMAND BITS 7 THROUGH 17) ARE A PSEUDOBINARY CODE REPRESENTATION OF THE TURN OR
MOTOR BURN DURATION.
Fig. 15. Command word format
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mode. A listing of the signals and a description of their
information content follow:
. Detector bit sync pulses are sent to the telemetry
subsystem to be conditioned into irfformation con-
cerning the detector VCO frequency. Between
telemetry data sample times, reference pulses at
the spacecraft 2.4-kc frequency are counted in the
interval between two consecutive bit sync pulses.
The number counted is indirectly proportional to
the VCO frequency. Thus, an average of the VCO
frequency, over an approximate 1-sec interval, is te-
lemetered each telemetry-data sample time. From this
telemetry data, the proper ground command signal
frequency may be ascertained so that minimum
command lock acquisition time may be accom-
plished.
. The detector lock signal is directed to the telem-
etry subsystem to be converted into one word
of information regarding the detector lock condi-
tion. If the lock signal indicates out of lock for at
least 1 sec in the interval between telemetry
sampling times, the detector lock telemetry data
will be at the binary state indicating out of lock
at the next sampling time. If no out-of-lock indica-
tions occur, the binary state indicating in lock will
result. The detector lock data indicates when the
command subsystem is capable of detecting and
processing the command signal.
3. Command event pulses are telemetered approxi-
mately 10 see after the command decoder has
recognized the decoder start bits of a command
word. The event pulse indicates normal decoding
timing function upon reception of the start bits.
It is also normally coincident with a command
address recognition and a DC execution by the
decoder. In the case of a QC command, a second
event pulse will be telemetered, immediately after
the last QC bit is directed to the CC&S subsystem.
b. Performance. During the Mariner IV mission, the
performance of the spacecraft command subsystem was
excellent. A total of 85 commands was sent to the space-
craft through the completion of the first phase of the
mission. Table 9 is a listing of commands and the times
at which they were sent. Analysis of spacecraft telem-
etry indicated that all commands were received and
correctly acted upon.
Table 9. Ground commands received by Mariner IV
Date
November 30, 1964
December 4
I
I
I
I
_r
Time, GMT
09:13:00
10:45:00
10:57:09
13:05:00
13:10:00
13:15:00
13:45:00
14:05:00
14:35:00
14:47:31
15:22:00
15:32:00
16:02:00
22:40:00
23:04:00
Command
DC-21 (roll override).
DC-21.
DC-21.
QC-I-I (pitch turn duration and
polarity).
QC-1-2 (roll turn duration and
polarity).
QC-1-3 (motor burn duration).
DC-29 (first maneuver arm).
DC-14 (release maneuver inhibit),
DC-27 (start midcourse maneuver).
DC-13 (inhibit maneuver).
DC-21.
DC-21.
DC-21.
DC-21.
DC-21.
Date
December 4, 1964
i
I
_r
f
13
17
February 11, 1965
Time, GMT
23:05:00
23:06:00
23:40:00
23:57:00
23:58:00
13:05:00
13:10:00
13:15:00
13:45:00
14:05:00
14:25:00
16:52:00
14:09:00
16:00:00
17:30:00
03:29:29
Command
DC-21.
DC-21.
DC-21.
DC-21.
DCo21.
QC-I-1.
QC-I-2.
QC-1-3.
DC-29.
DC-14.
DC-27.
DC-21.
DC-7 (switch power emplifiers).
DC-21.
DC-15 (Canopus gete overr_de)
transmiffed.
DC-3 (switch to Mode 3) transmitted.
Spacecraft telemetry to Mode 3.
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Table 9. Ground commands received by Mariner IV (cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Command
February 11, 1965 03:36:13
_r
July 14
_W
15
!
r
03:53:15
04:15:51
04:32:39
06:54:43
08:59:23
09:13:51
09:30:56
10:21:20
10:27:08
10:49:35
14:27:55
17:10:18
22:10:29
00:11:57
00:31:42
00:32:40
00:37:00
00:42:00
00:47:00
DC-2 (switch to Mode 2) transmitted.
Spacecraft telemetry to Mode 2.
DC-26 (encounter science off) trans-
mitted. Spacecraft cruise science off,
battery charger off, boost mode enabled.
DC-2 transmitted. Spacecraft cruise
science on.
DC-28 (battery charger on) transmitted.
Spacecraft battery charger on, boost
mode disabled.
DC-25 (encounter science on) trans-
mitted. Spacecraft encounter science
on, scan cover deployed, platform scan
started, battery charger off, boost
mode enabled.
DC-24 (inhibit scan) transmitted.
Spacecraft scan platform stopped at
177.9-deg clock angle.
DC-28 transmitted. Spacecraft video
storage 2.4-kc power off, battery
charger on.
DC-3 transmitted. Spacecraft telemetry
to Mode 3. Television camera shutter
normal.
DC-2 transmitted. Spacecraft telemetry
to Mode 2.
DC-26 transmitted. Spacecraft
encounter science off, television shutter
positioned, battery charger off, boost
mode enabled, cruise science off.
DC-2 transmitted. Spacecraft cruise
science on.
DC-25 (encounter science on)
transmitted.
DC-24 (inhibit scan) transmitted.
DC-3 (transfer data encoder to Mode
3) transmitted.
DC-16 (narrow-angles acquisition)
transmitted.
DC-26 (all science off) transmitted.
DC-2 No. 1 (transfer data encoder to
Mode 2 and turn on cruise science)
transmitted.
DC-2 No. 2 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 3 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 4 transmitted.
Date
July 15, 1965
August 3
21
_f
22
_r
26
_V
Time, GMT
00:52:00
00:57:00
03:08:33
03:14:33
03:20:33
22:37:21
23:35:21
23:37:21
23:43:34
23:45:34
23:47:34
23:49:34
23:54:21
23:59:21
00:04:21
00:09:21
00:14:21
21:22:32
21:30:56
21:39:20
21:47:44
Command
DC-2 No. 5 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 6 transmitted.
DC-28 (turn off video storage 2.4-kc
power and turn on battery charger)
transmitted.
DC-26 (turn off battery charger)
transmitted.
DC-2 (transfer data encoder to Mode
2 and turn on cruise science)
transmitted.
DC-25 received at spacecraft.
Encounter science turned on and scan
platform in search mode.
DC-28 No. 1 received at spacecraft.
Video storage 2.4-kc power turned off
and battery charger turned on.
DC-28 No. 2 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-26 No. 1 received at spacecraft.
Battery charger and all science
turned off.
DC-26 No. 2 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-2 No. 1 received at spacecraft.
Cruise science turned on.
DC-2 No. 2 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-2 No. 3 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-2 No. 4 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-2 No. 5 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-2 No. 6 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-2 No. 7 received at spacecraft.
No effect.
DC-13 received at spacecraft. Inhibit
midcourse maneuver.
QC-I-1 received at spacecraft. Load
clockwise 0.18 deg pitch turn.
QC-1-2 received at spacecraft. Load
clockwise 0.18 deg roll turn.
QC-1-3 received at spacecraft. Load
0.08 sec motor burn duration.
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Table 9. Ground commands received by Mariner IV (cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Command
August 27, 1965 19:55:50
30
September 2
q P
October 1
20:45:56
21:26:20
23:04:29
23:51:22
_r
31 00:21:14
00:59:56
00:04:56
01:40:57
06:33:05
06:39:05
06:45:05
21:48:01
DC-17 received at spacecraft. Canopus
cone angle updated to 77.8 deg.
DC-25 received at spacecraft. Encounter
science on and scan platform in search
mode.
DC-3 received at spacecraft. Data
encoder transferred to Mode 3.
DC-24 received at spacecraft. Scan
platform motion inhibited.
DC-16 received at spacecraft. Narrow
angle acquisition logic actuated.
DC-2 received at spacecraft. No effectt
data encoder previously returned to
Mode 2 data by DAS logic.
DC-26 received at spacecraft. All
science off.
DC-22 received at spacecraft. Video
storage charge tracks.
DC-4 received at spacecraft. Data
encoder transferred to Mode 4/1 data.
DC-28 received at spacecraft. Video
storage 2.4-kc power off, battery
charger on.
DC-26 received at spacecraft. Battery
charger off.
DC-2 received at spacecraft. Cruise
science power on, data enceder to
Mode 2.
DC-12 received at spacecraft. Trans-
miffer switched to low-gain antenna,
The following are items of interest and problem areas
noted during the Mariner IV mission.
Command procedures. Normal procedures for send-
ing commands called for the ground command OSE
8)_, frequency to be set to the nominal spacecraft com-
mand subsystem 8[, design frequency after the command
detector was in lock and prior to sending commands.
This procedure was followed during all periods of the
mission when spacecraft telemetry was available to
indicate to SPAC that the command detector had
achieved and was maintaining lock. However, when the
spacecraft data encoder was in Mode 3 or 4, no engi-
neering telemetry was available to indicate the lock
status of the command detector.
A special procedure was adopted to insure maximum
likelihood of the command detector being in lock when
commands were sent with no telemetry indication of
detector in lock. Instead of returning the ground com-
mand OSE 8[, frequency to nominal prior to sending
commands, the 8jc, offset used to achieve detector lock
was left in. Thus if the command detector should be-
come transient and momentarily drop lock without
telemetry to indicate this to SPAC, it would attempt to
relock automatically.
VCO frequency monitoring. To determine the fre-
quency at which to set the ground command OSE in
order to optimize command detector loekup, it is neces-
sary to know the average out-of-lock frequency of the
spacecraft command detector. Spacecraft Telemetry
Channel 104 contains VCO frequency information as
well as an indication of command detector lock. An
IBM 1620 computer program was written to average
the readings of VCO frequency telemetry and convert
them to engineering units. Mariner operations technical
assistants ran this program for 500 telemetry samples
per week when the command detector was out of lock
and forwarded this information to the command sub-
system cognizant engineer. Figure 16 shows the VCO
frequency history.
Command detector lockup exercises. To ensure that
SPAC and DSIF personnel maintained their proficiency
in eala3ring out command procedures and to periodically
verify command operations, a series of command de-
tector lookup tests was initiated February 3, 1965 and
carried on throughout the mission. These tests consisted
of cognizant personnel following standard command
procedures and locking up the command detector with-
out sending commands. These tests were carried out at
all prime and backup stations including the 100-kw
station at DSIF 13. As a result, a high degree of confi-
dence was maintained in the ability to command the
spacecraft as necessary.
Command polarity verification. During compatibility
testing with DSIF and the spacecraft, it was discovered
that it was possible for the command subcarrier trans-
mitted by the DSIF station to be of the wrong polarity
with respect to the spacecraft command detector. To
resolve this problem and ensure that all ground stations
in the Net were transmitting a signal of the correct
polarity, a modulation checker was obtained. This
modulation checker was then carried to each station
and a qualified operator verified correctness of the
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Fig. 16. VCO frequency history
command subcarrier polarity. Subsequent to this verifi-
cation, the ground command subsystem at each station
was frozen to ensure against inadvertent polarity rever-
sals during the mission.
Ground command OSE tape punch anomaly. On
December 17, 1964, during preparation of the ground
command OSE for transmission of DC-15, the space-
craft command detector went out of lock when the
ground command OSE tape punch at DSIF 41 was
switched to the standby mode. Subsequent investigation
revealed that a power transient occurred in the ground
command OSE when the tape perforator standby switch
was operated. This caused momentary inhibition of the
command signal which in turn caused the spacecraft com-
mand subsystem to drop lock. After it was verified that
the problem was only concerned with the tape perforator
and standby switch, it was decided that the perfora-
tor should not be placed in standby condition while the
ground command OSE was locked up with the space-
craft. No further problems were encountered by use of
this procedure.
Drop of lock during 8f, normalization. During com-
mand lockup prior to the early science cover deploy-
ment operation on February 11, it was observed that
the command detector telemetry indicated out of lock
while the ground command OSE 8f8 was being normal-
ized. Subsequent investigation revealed no evidence of
malfunction of either the ground command OSE or the
spacecraft command subsystem. The command detector
was then relocked and all indications were normal. All
12 commands of the cover deployment sequence were
properly received and acted upon, and no further
anomalous indications were found.
c. Summary. No other problem areas arose concerning
the command subsystem and performance through the
end of picture playback continued to be normal. Since
all commands sent to the spacecraft were properly acted
upon, it can be concluded that all commands were
received with no bit errors, though it is not possible to
perform a statistical bit error test on a spacecraft in
flight.
6. Video Storage Subsystem
a. Description. The Mariner IV video storage sub-
system, which consists of a hermetically-sealed tape
transport unit and associated electronic equipment, is
required to accept and record digital television picture
data from the DAS at a fixed rate of 10,700 bits/sec,
and to store a minimum of 20 pictures of video data.
These data are then reproduced at a rate of 8% bps
during the picture playback period. The total bit capac-
ity of the tape recorder must be at least 5.24 × 10 _ bits,
contained on two tracks of 0.25-in. tape, 30-ft long.
Design bit error rate is less than 1 bit error in 105 bits,
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not including errors accumulated while establishing lock
or due to track changes.
The Mariner IV tape recorder has three operating
modes, described as follows:
Launch mode. During the launch phase of the flight,
the tape transport is operated at record speed, although
no actual recording takes place; this is to preclude any
possibility of tape spillage due to launch phase shock
and vibration. The record motor is started shortly before
launch and continues running until after the spacecraft
separates from the Agena rocket. When the spacecraft sep-
arates from the Agena rocket, the EOT pulse is com-
bined in an AND gate with the Agena separation
signal. The AND result is applied through an OR gate
and driver amplifier to a latching relay. This pulse
resets the latching relay which in turn deenergizes
a bias relay, thereby removing power from the record
motor and locking out the launch mode circuitry. After
the record motor and tape coast to a stop, the EOT foil
is positioned at a point approximately 2.5 ft beyond the
record/reproduce head. This is the normal tape position
from which to start the encounter record sequence.
Record mode. Application of 2400-cps power anal
single-phase 400-cps power prior to encounter energizes
all sections of the recorder system except those asso-
ciated with the launch mode. Assuming that the tape is
positioned properly, the recorder system is ready to
record at least 20 picture sequences while making two
complete pases of the tape, changing tracks after
the first pass and returning to the initial track after the
second pass. Response to record commands is inhibited
after the EOT foil passes the sensor contacts the
second time.
The absence of a playback command signal from the
data encoder conditions the system for recording by
applying power to the record head drivers, as shown in
the record mode functional diagram, Fig. 17. Thus,
whenever the recorder system is not operating in the
reproduce mode, it is in the record mode and will
record or erase the tape.
The start-stop relay applies power to the record motor
when in the start position, so that record operation
is controlled by the DAS via its start and stop pulses.
2.4- kc POWER
RETURN-TO-
ZERO DATA
DAS BIT SYNC )
+6
MAIN -6
POWER
SUPPLY +20
-20
OSE FREQUENCY- OSE RECORD
DOUBLED RECORD MOTOR MONITOR
MONITOR
I- ]
I I
I RETURN-TO-ZERO TO I
] FREQUENCY-DOUBLED CONVERTER I
I (DATA AND SYNC COMBINER) Jt
SINGLE-PHASE,
400-cps POWER-
UMBILICAL
INTEGRATOR 4
MONITOR
DAS
START RECORD
COMMAND
DAS ) INHIBIT
STOP RECORD
COMMAND
OSE
START RECORD )
COMMAND
HEAO DRIVERS
OSE
STOP RECORD )
COMMAND
STOP ._j ....
o I NORfAL
e]_ START
l o_-J J_o EOT
_+20 CIRCUIT
I
I
RELAY
MONOPULSE ___
I RESET
L GENERATOR
COUNT TWO
AND
STOP CIRCUITS
TRACK
CHANGE
CIRCUIT
OSE TRACK FLIGHT COMMAND
INDICATOR TRACK STEP
OSE OPERATIONAL SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
DAS DATA AUTOMATION SYSTEM
330-ft TAPE
ENDLESS LOOP
DATA ENCODER
< PLAYBACK
COMMAND
OSE PLAYBACK
MOTOR ON
DATA ENCODER
EOT
OSE
EOT
UMBILICAL
< TRACK STEP
DAS
EOT
Fig. 17. Video storage subsystem record mode block diagram
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I)uring recording, a pulse is generated for each com-
plete pass of the tape by the LOT circuit as the end-of-
tape foil passes over the sensor contacts. This LOT
pulse is applied internally to the track change and count-
two sections of the recorder system and externally to
the DAS and data encoder. In a normal planetary en-
counter record sequence, the DAS ignores the first LOT
pulse and responds to the second if it occurs between
the beginning of the nineteenth and the start of the
twenty-second picture sequence. The DAS is mecha-
nized to terminate encounter record sequences upon
receipt of the second EOT or at the end of the twenty-
second picture if an EOT pulse has not been received.
Track changes take place whenever the EOT circuit
generates a pulse. The track change circuit incorporates
a magnetic latching relay arranged in a bistable flip-
flop configuration. LOT pulses also trigger the count-
two-and-stop circuits of the recorder system to inhibit
DAS start record commands upon receipt of the second
LOT signal. The counter is reset to zero by the first
DAS start record command acting through a monopulse
reset generator. Further reset of the counter is impossible
unless 2400-cps power is removed from the system.
Reproduce mode. After planetary encounter and the
data have been recorded, the recorder system is switched
into the reproduce mode, Fig. 18, by a command from
the data eucoder. Playback signals are amplified and op-
erated on in such a manner as to reproduce the frequency-
doubled code waveform that was recorded. Bit sync is
separated from the data and compared in phase with the
master bit sync from the data encoder. These comparisons
determine indirectly the frequency of the VCO which
dictates playback tape speed. When the correct speed and
phase are achieved, the tape-signal-derived bit syne
and the master bit sync are in the proper phase relation-
ship for accurate readout of the data. If a stable phase
relationship has been established, the recorder system
is said to be phase-locked. The reproduce mode may
continue indefinitely after encounter, while the system
automatically changes tracks once for each pass of the
qb PHASE COMPARATOR
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tape. Complete reproduction of twenty picture se-
quences will require from 8 to 10 days. Because sections
of the tape were erased between record sequences, data
will not be present at the output of the system for
approximately 2 hr between picture data blocks. Pro-
vision has been made in the recorder system for detect-
ing this condition and automatically switching the data
encoder from stored data playback to engineering
data as long as the data are absent.
tracks are applied simultaneously to the playback track
switch where one signal is selected at a time.
Each complete pass of the tape loop generates an
EOT pulse as the EOT foil passes over sensor contacts.
As in the record mode, the EOT pulse is applied to the
track-change circuits and is also fed out to an event
counter in the data encoder.
Passage of the tape over the reproduce head gap
produces a signal which is roughly the derivative of the
tape flux. This signal, in the order of 50/_v peak-to-peak,
is amplified by low-noise preamplifiers located in the
tape transport subassembly and routed to the playback
track switch and main amplifier. Signals from both
b. Performance. The Mariner Mars 1964 video storage
subsystem mission functional specifications stipulated
the two prime requirements of storing twenty television
pictures of Mars and playing them back at an error rate
less than 1 in 10' bits. As indicated by Table 10, the
video storage subsystem exceeded the first requirement
Table 10. Picture start and stop times of the Mariner IV playback
From To
Picture No.
Date, 1965 Time, GMT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Date, 1965 Time, GMT
July 15 13:01:58
15 23:32:27
16 10:04:28
16 20:35:12
17 07:07:45
17 17:40:32
18 04:13:25
18 14:46:13
19 01:19:32
11:52:52
22:25:33
Ir
20 08:57:42
20 19:28:51
21 06:01:22
21 16:34:43
22 03:07:13
22 13:40:59
23 00:15:04
10:48:08
Ir 21:21:10
24 07:55:01
24 18:28:33
July 15
16
16
17
17
18
IF
19
19
20
20
21
21
22
_t
23
23
24
21:38:07
08:08:03
18:39:54
05:10:12
15:43:18
02:16:10
12:49:03
23:21:51
09:55:35
20:28:29
07:01:26
17:33:15
04:04:32
14:37:00
01:10:21
11:42:53
22: ! 6:37
08:50:41
19:23:48
05:56:50
16:30:40
19:26:33
From To
Picture No.
Date, 1965 Time, GMT
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
lO
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
Date, 1965 Time, GMT
July 24 21:21:53
25 07:53:36
25 18:24:31
26 04:56:24
26 15:27:47
27 02:00:57
21:08:41
07:40:41
28 18:12
29 04:45:32
29 15:19:13
30 01:51
12:21
22:55:28
I r
31 09:27
31 20:02:15
August 1 21:59:57
July 25
25
26
_r
27
_F
28
28
29
29
30
30
31
05:57:54
16:29:15
03:00:09
13:32:03
00:03:39
10:36:39
12:33:01
23:04:57
09:37
20:09:57
06:43:10
17:16:43
03:46:24
14:20
00:52
11:24
06:31
_r
2
2
3
08:28
19:07:10
05:40:00
16:14:48
August I
2
2
3
02:36
17:09:00
03:42:33
14:15:27
00:39
03:36:02
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b'y actually recording twenty-one full pictures and ap-
proximately one-tenth of the 22nd picture.
Although an absolute playback error rate for the
playback could not be determined, due to the large
amount of redundant information that is contained in a
television picture, it was possible to perform a pre-
liminary error rate analysis of the playback data. Also,
since the recorder was played back twice, the first play-
back can be compared with the second playback. The
redundant picture elements in the first picture playback
were examined in great depth and the error rate was
found to meet the specifications. Random samples of
the first and second playbacks, which have been com-
pared in all cases, confirmed this.
Significant video storage events through the end of
playback are shown in Table 11.
Recorder pressure seal. Because the recorder case
temperature change during the mission was very small,
it was assumed that all of the case pressure drop was
due to gas leaking through the seals. The pressure drop
of 0.86 lb was considered quite good in light of the
design tolerance of 19.0 lb.
Encounter performance. During the encounter record-
ing sequence, two abnormal false shutter indications
were observed and the data eneoder switch to Data
Mode 2 was thought to be 22 sec late.
The two false shutter indications could have come
from either the DAS or from the video storage sub-
system. A series of tests have been run on the video
storage subsystem type-approval unit in an attempt to
simulate the events observed on the Mariner IV space-
craft. The flight events could not be reproduced. Tests
on the PTM spacecraft have indicated that the DAS
can produce these events when 400-cps power is
switched, although no verification of the source is
possible.
With respect to the data encoder switch to Mode 2
data event, the DAS logic design is such that the DAS
will not issue a data encoder Mode 2 data command
until the end of Picture 22 if the video storage sub-
system second end-of-tape signal is received after the
start of Picture 22. During the Mariner IV spacecraft
encounter, the second EOT occurred in the twenty-
first line of Picture 22; consequently, the DAS did
not issue a switch to Mode 2 data command until the
Table 11. Video storage subsystem flight events
Date Time, GMT Event
November 28, 1964
!
I
_r
July 14, 1965
14:18:01
14:22:01
15:07:00
15:09:10
14:52:31
00:29:59
00:30:36
00:34:59
00:40:52
00:42:46
00:44:24
00:44:46
15 11:53:53
20 03:15:32
24 19:26:33
29 11:33:27
August 3 03:36:02
Launch mode on. Verified by Telem-
etry Channel 221.
Atlas liftoff. Recorder pressure 22.76
psi, recorder temperature 60.31°F.
(Approximate) Spacecraft/Agena
separation.
Calculated time for VSS launch mode
off. Spacecraft telemetry data was
available. Confirmation from Channel
221 delayed until 1514.
Encounter power on via DC-25 com-
mand. VSS power on confirmed by
Telemetry Channel 227.
Narrow angle acquisition.
Start of first picture television data.
Abnormal false shutter indication in
science data.
Abnormal false shutter indication in
science data.
Expected first end-of-tape event.
Verified at 00:43:22.
Expected second end-of-tape and
switch to Mode 2 data.
Mode 2 data 22 sec later than expected
Engineering telemetry verified EOT
events normal.
CC&S MT-9 command to start
playback.
Track change on Line 111 of Picture 11.
Track change on Line 21 of Picture 22.
Track change on Line 111 of Picture
11. Extra event observed.
Playback terminated on Line 18 of
Picture 22.
end of Picture 22. It is concluded that the switch to
Mode 2 data time observed at 00:44:46 GMT, July 14,
reflects proper spacecraft Operation, although this was
not understood at the time.
At the start of picture playback and again at the start
of the second playback, there were 68 sec of old data
prior to the first recorded Mars data. It was not erased
during the encounter sequence because the tape txaveled
0.68 in. farther during run-down at the completion of
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the launch sequence than it did after the second EOT
during encounter. This is a clear indication of friction
buildup.
The Mode 1 data spaces between pictures were ap-
proximately 117 rain long. Before launch, they averaged
123 min. The difference in run-down distance accounts
for 1 rain of this 6-rain discrepancy. To account for the
remaining 5 min, the acceleration time in the record
mode would have to have been at least 0.25 see larger
than in the prelaunch condition. Both friction buildup
and decreased 400-cycle encounter power voltage could
account for this change. While no direct measurement
of the 400-cycle voltage is made, it is felt that any
voltage change would be in the opposite direction, again
supporting the friction buildup hypothesis.
Calculations of utilization of the available tape indi-
cate that the tape must have been moving 7% slower
during Mode 1 data spaces than during Mode 4 data
spaces. This is normal and is the same as it was before
launch.
The observance of two telemetry events at the track
change during the second playback indicates that the
conductive foil used to stimulate track change events
had become contaminated by the second playback. This
is not unlikely since Mariner IV already had a large
number of passes on the tape machine at the time of
launch.
The major events in the flight history of the video
storage subsystem from launch through the end of the
second playback after encounter are shown in Table 11.
Television haze calibration sequence. During the
black-space television recording sequence performed
on August 30, 1965, a total of 101//2 pictures were
recorded. The first five pictures were played back for
analysis purposes, Table 12. Video storage subsystem
characteristics were the same as during the playback of
the planetary pictures.
7. Mission Operations
a. Support. Telecommunications support for the
Mariner SPAC consisted of telecommunications analysts
representing the entire communications system and sub-
system analysts representing radio, data encoder, com-
mand, video storage, and ground telemetry. In addition,
in-depth backup analysis support was provided by
Telecommunications Analysis Team (TCAT), which
consisted of Telecommunications Division personnel
Table 12. Television haze calibration picture
playback times
Picture
No.
From To
Date e1965 Time, GMT Date_ 1965 Time, GMT
August 31
p
September 1
!
2
02:00:46
12:30:40
23:01 .'03
09:31:40
20:03:20
06:34:46
Aug ust 31
31
September I
1
2
2
10:36:38
21:06:30
07:37:10
18:07:30
04:39:23
06:48:32
experienced in all phases of telecommunications system
operation, plus cognizant engineers from each of the
telecommunications subsystems.
During critical phases of the mission such as launch,
trajectory-correction maneuver, and encounter, support
was provided on a 24 hr-a-day basis. During the cruise
phase, daily checks of performance were made by each
subsystem and alarm limits were constantly monitored
by the SFOF computer system. Analysts from all sub-
systems were on call during the cruise phase, and if any
telemetry data violated predetermined limits, the cog-
nizant person was called. Despite some initial misgivings
as to the reliability of computerized alarm monitoring, the
system proved to work very well and provided real time
monitoring of data even when cognizant analysts were
not present.
b. Data sources and display. During the Mariner _W
mission, spacecraft telemetry data were made available
in several forms, some of which proved to be very useful
and others which have not been of significant value for
data analysis. A list of the various available data sources
is presented along with a discussion of their usefulness
to telecommunications system analysis.
Unprocessed telemetry data. While in a somewhat
inconvenient format for data analysis, the unprocessed
telemetry (raw) data as displayed on the 60 wpm
printers proved to be the most reliable source of real-
time data during the mission. With the use of overlays,
decoding matrices and a little practice, the raw teletype
(TTY) data could be converted to a useable form in a
matter of seconds. These data were usually several
seconds ahead of the IBM 7040 formatted data output,
and for this reason the raw data were sometimes used
even when formatted data were available. Whenever a
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question arose as to the validity of a datum point on
output from any source, the raw data were used as the
deciding factor. Even though the many computer out-
puts displayed the data in a more convenient form, it is
felt that the raw data display capability was more than
justified by its superior reliability alone.
Formatted telemetry data. Use of the IBM 7040 com-
puter permitted the telecommunications system telem-
etry channels to be displayed on a separate format
and to be converted to data numbers. This was by far
the most convenient data display available to telecom-
munications during the Mariner mission. During the
prelaunch phase, it was decided to display the 7040 data
as data numbers instead of in engineering units. In
retrospect, it appears that this was a good decision. It
became easier to evaluate data quality in real time using
data numbers instead of engineering units to spot bit
errors and out of locks. However, for postflight analysis
and evaluation of system performance, a display in engi-
neering units would be more convenient to use.
IPEDIT. JPEDIT was an NRT output of the total
data stream in a convenient format for performance
analysis, data records, etc._Its information content was
supposed to be the same or better than the 7040 for-
matted data. After several attempts to utilize JPEDIT
during the mission, it was found that it consistently
contained more time regressions and other erroneous
indications than the 7040 output. If a questionable datum
point were found in JPEDIT, it was always checked
against the 7040 data and the raw data. This low confi-
dence in JPEDIT made it of questionable value to tele-
communications system analysis, and it did not play a
significant role in mission operations.
EDPLOTM. EDPLOTM was a program that would
take the data used for JPEDIT and plot it out in data
numbers versus time for performance analysis and data
records. The EDPLOTM function appeared to be a
valuable tool and a series of display formats were
developed and used. However since its data source was
essentially the same as JPEDIT, it contained the same
time regressions and other erroneous indications. For
this reason, the EDPLOTM program, although it could
have been of great value, was not effectively used for
telecommunications analysis during the Mariner mission.
SSDM. SSDM was a program whose output was a
condensed version of JPEDIT. Essentially it would give
an output only when a data number changed in a
specified channel. This program was also of practically
no usefulness to telecommunications analysis because of
the erroneous indications it consistently contained.
MDL. The Master Data Library (MDL) will contain
a listing of the best data available from all sources for
the Mariner mission. This will also include selected
station functions as well as spacecraft data. Telecom-
munications plans were to use this data, when available,
to perform a statistical analysis of the uplink and down-
link signal level data from the flight. It is also desirable
to be able to get EDPLOTM runs of the MDL for a
handy, reliable source of mission data. At present, it is
not known ff this will be made available, but it seems
incongruous to have gone to considerable effort to
generate a best data source and not make full use of it.
c. Computer programs. To facilitate the rapid, accurate
analysis of telecommunications system data from a long
mission such as the Mariner, it is necessary to make
extensive use of automatic data processing whenever
possible. Computer programs were requested over a
year before launch to provide predictions of system
performance, AGC calibrations and evaluation of sys-
tem performance during the mission. The following
paragraphs describe the programs requested, their dis-
position and their use.
AGCM. This program provides the capability to take
station calibration data from before and after the track-
ing pass and generate curves and lookup tables of
received signal level vs AGC voltage. It also generates
tables of received signal level vs a subcarrier oscillator
frequency which is recorded on magnetic tape as a
permanent record. Along with each curve, coefficients
of third through fifth order least-square fits are gener-
ated for use during postflight analysis of signal-level
data.
This program was ready and checked out well before
launch and was used during critical phases of the
mission for near-real-time evaluation of signal-level
data. An addition was made to the program to accom-
modate calibrations from S-band stations as well as
L-to-S conversion stations. Further use of this program
will be made during postflight statistical analysis of
DSIF and spacecraft data.
CPPM. CPPM was the Mariner communications pre-
diction program that generated curves and tables of
predicted system performance using inputs from tra-
jectory SAVE tapes, DAP antenna pattern tapes, and
cards of telecommunications system parameters. This
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program was completed in its first stage, which did not
have the capability of utilizing DAP tapes, over a year
before launch. This version was used with antenna
patterns that were tediously generated by hand to
perform preliminary performance predictions.
The final version, which included DAP handling
capability, was completed in a frenzy of activity shortly
before launch and used to generate sets of final pre-
launch predicts. Due to the shortness of time when the
DAP processing capability was being programmed,
several compromises had to be made and the final
version of CPPM was somewhat bulky and time con-
suming to use, and was quite mission dependent. The
version of CPPM finally used for Mariner was very
satisfactory within its limitations as ultimately proved
by the excellent agreement between predicted and
actual values for the entire flight.
Program X. This program was requested over a year
before launch to provide an up-to-date analysis of
uplink and downlink performance during the flight.
When it became obvious that this program would not
be available, its scope was modified to that of a more
detailed postflight analysis program for which an RFP
is being generated. If this program in its original form
had been programmed as requested for the Mariner
flight, a more rapid and accurate evaluation of problems
such as variations in downlink AGC calibrations would
have been possible. Instead, hand plotting had to be
used to achieve a far more time-consuming and less
accurate result.
d, General problem areas, During the course of
mission operations, several general problems were noted
that are worthy of mention. This discussion will be
limited to operational problems rather than technical
problems which will be discussed with their respective
subsystem reports.
SFO/DSN Failure Problem Reports (E/PRs). The
SFO/DSN F/PR system did not provide correct, com-
plete answers to the satisfaction of the initiator. Many
of the F/PRs written by the telecommunications area
were answered in a token manner and closed out. It is
strongly recommended that for future missions a
SFO/DSN F/PR system be devised that will be con-
scientiously followed through, rather than merely being
accepted as was the present one. Final closeout should
require the signature of a cognizant section manager
and a system manager. Unanswered reports or reports
with unsatisfactory answers should be subject to the
same level of concern that the present flight equipment
P/FRs are. Only when everyone has confidence in the
system and those responsible for the system require
a complete, correct and timely action will an F/PR
system serve a useful purpose.
Communication between SPAC and DSIF stations.
On numerous occasions during the mission, anomalous
indications affecting the telecommunications system
would be observed in spacecraft telemetry data or by
the DSIF stations. Most of these anomalies, after in-
vestigation, proved to be attributable to a ground
station problem such as antenna hitching, cockpit error,
transmitter power variations, etc. However, on many
occasions the information necessary to rapidly and ac-
curately isolate the problem was not readily available
from the stations. As a consequence, many hours of the
spacecraft analysts' time were spent in finding answers
to P/FRs that were not concerned with the spacecraft.
A factor contributing to the difficulty in ascertaining
origin of problems that occur at the station could be
that the station crew was unaware they had a problem
until the effect of the problem was observed. One reason
for this may be the lack of instrumentation to adequately
monitor station functions during a tracking pass. A
typical example of instrumentation difficulties is in
monitoring the S-band transmitter at the stations. Space-
craft telemetry would indicate power or frequency
variations that were not verified by ground station data
until additional checks had been performed.
Another problem is the actual transfer of information
from the DSIF station to SFOF such that SPAC is
always aware of the station condition during critical
periods. During the excitement and turmoil of high
activity phases of the mission, station personnel are
sometimes unable to keep completely up to date on
reporting of significant events, or potential problems
sometimes go unnoticed. The only really satisfactory
solution to this problem is to have selected station func-
tions displayed in the SFOF in real time. Not only would
this provide analysts with up-to-date information on
station events concerning the telecommunications sys-
tem, but it would also free station personnel for more
important operational tasks.
The Mariner mission also pointed out that station
functions can play an important part in flight operations.
A good example is the use of AGC to provide roll
attitude information during Mode 3 data and during
roll search. The AGC display system used was some-
what hurriedly devised and did not have the desired
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resolution, but with more time and effort a reasonable
system could be implemented.
Some of the facilities to implement a real-time display
of station function "telemetry," such as digital input
system (DIS) and signal-to-noise ratio estimator (SNORE),
are presently being installed or checked out with DSIF
stations. Since the telecommunications system includes
the ground stations as well as the spacecraft, ground
station information is as necessary to the telecommuni-
cations analyst as spacecraft data. It would be of
definite advantage to future missions to include station
functions in their real time data display requirements.
C. Power Subsystem
1. Description
The Mariner IV power subsystem performed two
major spacecraft functions:
1. It generated standard voltages for distribution to
spacecraft power users.
2. It controlled the turning on and off of various loads.
The system that was designed to carry out these
functions was made up of a power source containing
four photovoltaic solar panels with a combined active
area of 70 sq ft; a 1200-whr silver-zinc battery to pro-
vide power during periods when the spacecraft was not
Sun-oriented, dc-regulating devices; 2400-eps inverters;
400-cps inverters; and battery-charging, load-switching,
and frequency-control devices.
a. Energy source. Figure 19 shows the functional
block diagram of the power subsystem. The main source
of spacecraft power is four photovoltaic solar panels with
a combined active area of 70 sq ft. Each panel consists
of four electrically isolated sections containing 1764 p-on-n
silicon solar cells. Electrically, each section is made up of
21 parallel combinations of 84 cells in series. These
sections are connected to the unregulated power bus
through blocking diodes that prevent reverse current
flow if a short should occur in any one section. This
ensures that a short circuit in the solar panel cell matrix
would reduce the power capability no more than
about 6%.
In order to increase system reliability, the solar panels
were sized to carry all loads required after the mid-
course maneuver. This significantly increased the theo-
retical probability of performing the encounter sequence
successfully by not requiring battery operation except
for a nonstandard situation.
Because the launch trajectories required the spacecraft
to remain in the Earth's shadow for a period of up to
20 min, and because there was a large solar panel
power-capability near Earth, it was necessary to limit
the panel-output voltage immediately after the space-
craft left the Earth's shadow. Solar panel temperatures
as low as -80"C could be expected, and these would
lead to voltages as high as 68 v if no limiting were pro-
vided. Although regulation equipment could have been
designed to handle the high voltage peak, it could have
been done only by allowing a substantial decrease in
regulator efficiency and a reduction in component de-
rating factors. To remedy the problem, the voltage
output of each section was limited to 50 v by a series
string of six 50-w zener diodes across each section.
Figure 20 shows the predicted solar panel maximum
power capability vs time curves for the Mariner IV
spacecraft. Also shown is the actual Mars encounter load.
During the early design phase, when the exact solar
panel output power, the exact power system loads, and
the exact conversion equipment efficiencies were not
known, the anticipated nominal panel power was re-
duced by a factor of 20.5% to obtain an available-power
number that could be used in the design. This percent-
age was broken down as follows:
1. Five percent for operation off the solar panel
maximum-power point
2. Seven percent for solar panel design and test
tolerances
3. Eight and one-half percent for conversion efficiency
and load uncertainties
The substantial power margins shown in Figure 20
are due primarily to increased solar cell efficiency
resulting from better control (less cell degradation)
during the panel fabrication than was initially predicted.
b. Energy storage. During periods when the space-
craft is not Sun-oriented, spacecraft power is obtained
from a silver-zinc 18-cell secondary battery. The battery
has a capacity of 1200 whr at launch. The battery
forms an interface with the unregulated bus through a
blocking diode in such a way that it is disconnected
from the bus whenever the solar panel voltage exceeds
that of the battery.
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Fig. 20. Mariner IV solar panel power capability
Normally, the battery is used to supply power for
from 7 min before launch until solar panel Sun acqui-
sition. From Sun acquisition until the midcourse maneu-
ver/ the battery is partially recharged using the flight
charger. After the maneuver, the battery is fully re-
charged and the charger is turned off. After this time
the battery is a redundant energy source and is not
normally expected to be used again. For increased re-
liability, the battery capacity was chosen so that both the
launch and maneuver phases could be completed with-
out battery recharging. Designing in this manner re-
moved the battery charger as a series element in the
power system.
c. Power regulation. The voltage-regulating elements
of the power subsystem consist of two booster regulators,
each capable of operating at power levels up to 150 w.
The regulators accept power from the unregulated bus
at voltages ranging from 25 vdc, the lowest battery
voltage, to 50 vdc, the highest solar panel voltage, and
add sufficient voltage to bring the outputs up to 52 vdc
-± 1%. The main booster-regulator is normally on
throughout the entire flight, supplying power to all
spacecraft loads except the communications converter,
which accepts unregulated power directly from the
battery or solar panels.
If a failure should occur in the main regulator that
allows its output to deviate from a 47- to 59-v range for
a period of 2 to 3 sec, on-board logic senses a failure,
starts the maneuver regulator, and permanently transfers
all spacecraft loads to this unit. In order to protect the
power users from a failure that would allow the regula-
tor to go to its maximum output voltage, resulting in a
68-v output for 2 to 3 see, overvoltage protection limits
the voltage to 60 vdc. All spacecraft equipment can
stand this 16 percent overvoltage for 3 sec.
Choice of the booster type regulator, as opposed to
the down-regulating switched regulator, was based pri-
marily on reliability considerations. Even if both regu-
lators should fail, a diode shunt path exists around the
regulators that would allow the inverters to run directly
from the solar panels. Solar panel output voltage varies
from about 43 v near Earth to 50 v at Mars. Thus, a fail-
ure of both regulators near Mars would mean a dc out-
put to the inverters of approximately 48 vdc instead of
52 vdc, as there are two diodes in series between the
panels and the dc output. Tests have shown that even at
this reduced output the spacecraft could complete the mis-
sion, though performance would be somewhat degraded.
d. Dc-to-ac inversion. The main power for spacecraft
users is a 100-v (p-p), 2400-cps squarewave obtained
from a dc-to-ac inverter. Users take this power and, by
using transformer-rectifier combinations, obtain the
needed dc voltages for their equipment. This method of
distributing energy has proved superior to dc distribu-
tion on the Mars Mariner for two reasons:
, User voltage requirements vary greatly, especially
in the space science area where many instruments
require more than 1 kv. Transmission of these high
voltages through the spacecraft cabling is difficult.
. Greater design flexibility is obtained, since users
can change voltage requirements late in a program
without affecting the power subsystem or requiring
changes in the spacecraft cabling.
The maneuver booster-regulator is used to power a
large part of the attitude control system and is on during
the launch and midcourse maneuver phases. Turn-on of
the maneuver booster-regulator is normally controlled
by the attitude control system. The main reason for
using two regulators is to ensure increased reliability.
_Two to 10 days
Under normal conditions the main inverter receives
dc power from the main regulator. An identical inverter
receives dc power from the maneuver booster-regulator
and supplies 100-v (p-p), 2400-cps voltage to the attitude
control subsystem. Also powered from the maneuver
regulator is a 27-v rms, 400-cps, 3-phase inverter that de-
livers step squarewave power to the gyroscope spin
motors. A 400-cps, single-phase, squarewave inverter
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supplying nominal outputs of 56 and 65 v peak-to-
peak (p-p), to the science scan platform and video
storage subsystem, respectively, operates from the main
regulator. This inverter is off except at Mars encounter.
e. Power frequency synchronization. The power syn-
chronizer unit provides a synchronizing signal or a
frequency-stable driving voltage for all power sub-
system inverters. A 38.4-kc signal received from the
CC&S subsystem is counted down to provide both
2400-cps, single-phase and 400-cps, single-phase and
3-phase signals. In the 2400- and 400-cps single-phase
inverters, these signals are used to frequency-synchronize
the units and obtain 0.01% stability. The 400-cps,
3-phase inverter is actually a power amplifier driven
from the power synchronizer with an accuracy of 0.01%.
If the CC&S should fail to produce the 38.4-kc signal,
or if a CC&S failure should result in a single frequency
of twice 38.4 kc, a 38.4-kc oscillator internal to the
power synchronizer starts, automatically disconnects the
CC&S input, and takes over as the frequency source.
While the power system is running on its internal
oscillator, its frequency is controlled to ±2%. If the
internal oscillator or the synchronizer countdown chain
should fail, the 2400- and 400-cps single-phase inverters
self-oscillate within 5% of the desired frequency. (The
3-phase 400-cps inverter does not.) All spacecraft sub-
systems are designed to operate at frequencies in this
worst-case range of ±5%.
Some spacecraft subsystems always receive power
whenever the power subsystem is operating; others are
turned on and off during various parts of the mission by
onboard logic or direct radio command. The actual
switching of these loads is done by the power subsystem
Table 13. Power subsystem command capability
Control input Source" Type of signal Required action by power subsystem
1. Encounter start CC&S MT-7
2. Encounter start
3. Encounter
terminate
4. All science
experiments
and battery
charger off
5. Transmitter
power up,
cruise science on
6. Cruise science on
7. Baffery charger on
8. Change to data
Mode 4
C/D DC-25
Isolated circuit
closure (permanent)
Isolated circuit
a. Connect planet science to primary 2.4-kc power source
b. Connect cruise science to primary 2.4-kc power source
c. Turn on 400-cps, slngle-phase supply
d. Connect tape machine to primary 2.4-kc power source
e. Turn off battery charger
a. Same as No. I. above
CC&S MT-8
C/D DC-26
Spacecraft
separation
connector
closure
(pulse _ 100 ms)
Isolated circuit
closure (permanent)
Isolated circuit
closure
(pulse _ 100 ms)
Series interruptions
on one isolated
circuit
a. Disconnect planet science 2.4-kc power source
b. Disconnect redundant cruise science 2.4-kc power source
c. Turn off 400-cps, single-phase supply
a. Same as No. 3. above
b. Same as No. 3. above
c. Same as No. 3. above
d. Disconnect main cruise science 2.4-kc power source
e. Turn off battery charger
a. Connect cruise science to primary 2.4-kc power source
b. Provide RF power-up signal by opening normally
closed relay contact (irreversible in flight)
C/D DC-2
C/D DC-28
Data encoder
Isolated circuit
closure
(pulse _ 100 ms)
Isolated circuit
closure
(pulse _ 100 ms)
Isolated circuit
closure
a. Connect cruise science to primary 2.4-kc power source
a. Turn on battery charger
b. Turn off tape electronics
e. Disconnect cruise science from primary 2.4-kc power
source
aMT--Internal CC&S command, C/D-Command decoder, DC--Direct radio aommand.
Remarks
Redundant
connection
Backup for No. 1
Backup for No. 3,
plus functions
as noted
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in the power distribution subassembly. This unit accepts
commands from other spacecraft subsystems and trans-
lates the commands into relay closures. Since loads are
switched as groups 4 central control of the switching, as
opposed to individual user switching, proved highly
successful. Table 13 shows the power subsystem com-
mand flexibility.
f. Battery charging. After solar panel Sun acquisition,
the battery is recharged by the flight battery charger.
The charger takes power from the unregulated bus and
delivers a current-limited, voltage-regulated charge to
the battery. After the battery is fully charged, the capa-
bility exists to turn off the charger by direct radio
command to prolong battery life. If the battery should
be used again, as a result of losing Sun acquisition, a
radio command capability exists for reapplying the
charger.
In addition to its battery charging function, the
charger may also be used to remove the solar
panel/battery combination from an unnecessary battery-
sharing mode. Such a mode could be entered if a power
transient should instantaneously exceed the maximum
power capability of the solar panels. If this should
happen during the latter part of the mission when the
battery charger was turned off in the charge mode,
on-board logic would 1) sense the condition, 2) shift the
charger into a current-limited, constant-voltage mode
of 45-w capacity, 3) connect the input of the charger to
the battery and the output to the unregulated power
bus, and 4) boost the system out of the sharing mode.
When sharing ceased, the logic would return the unit to its
normally off position. Boosting would be inhibited dur-
ing periods when battery sharing should normally occur-
launch and midcourse maneuver. If unnecessary
battery-sharing should occur near Earth when the
charger is charging the battery in a normal manner _
on-board logic would sense the sharing condition, stop
the battery-charging operation, and await a ground com-
mand. A direct radio command could then be sent to
initiate the boost mode.
g. Engineering telemetry. Proper selection of engi-
neering telemetry points is an important part of the
power subsystem design. Figure 19 shows the location of
18 of the 22 power system telemetry measurements. Not
included are the three solar panel standard-cell measure-
ments and the Bay I temperature transducers (all of the
4E • .
.g., cruise scaence expeximents and encotmte_ science experiments.
•Very unlikely owing to the large power capability of the solar
panels in this region.
electronics except the two dc regulators and the battery).
Table 14 lists all 22 telemetry measurements.
h. Solar panel standard-ceU transducers. To more
accurately predict the current/voltage characteristics
of the solar panels in flight, the outputs of three
standard solar ceils are telemetered. The open-circuit
voltage and short-circuit current of two cells, identieal
with those used in the solar arrays, form the bases of
the predictions. These readings are compared with read-
ings taken on the Earth, and the open-circuit voltage
and short-circuit current of the four-panel combination
are determined. These readings in turn lead to determi-
nation of solar panel maximum power capability and
spacecraft power margins. The third cell is insensitive
to radiation; that is, it is a standard p-n silicon solar cell
Table 14. Power subsystem telemetry measurements
Channel Measurement Range Deck rate
109 PS&L '_ output voltage, vdc 23 to 53 High
203 Dual booster regulator input current, amp 0 to 10 Medium
204 PS&L current to communication, amp 0 to 5
205 Main booster regulator output current, aml: 0 to 5
206 Battery voltage, vdc 23 to 40
207 Main 2.4-kc output voltage, vdc 40 to 60 J
216 Battery charge current, amp 0 to 1
221 Maneuver booster regulator output, amp 0 to 5
222 Solar panel 4A1 current, amp 0 to 5
223 Solar panel 4A5 current, amp 0 to 5
I
224 Solar panel 4A3 current, amp 0 to 5
225 Solar panel 4A7 current, amp 0 to 5
226 Battery drain current, amp 0 to 10
227 Main 2.4-kc output current, amp 0.5 to 2.5 i p
401 Ray I temperature, °F 25 to 175 Low
407 Bay VIII temperature, °F 25 to 175
409 Solar panel 4AI temperature, °F --40to 160
415 Standard cell current, ma 0 to 100
416 Radiation resistant cell current, ma 0 to 100
417 Standard cell voltage, my 0 to 100
428 Battery temperature, °F 25 to 150
429 Solar panel 4A5 temperature, °F -40 to 160 ' '
"Power switch and logic.
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that has been degraded by radiation to a point where
further radiation has little effect on cell output. Com-
parison of its short-circuit output in flight with the
short-circuit output of the other standard cell allowed
a determination of the effect of radiation upon the solar
panels.
2. Performance
With the one exception of a higher-than-expected
battery voltage, operation of the power subsystem was
completely normal and predictable throughout the flight
of Mariner IV.
a. Solar panels. Operation of the solar panels began
in a normal manner 61 min after launch when Sun
acquisition occurred. During the 10-rain period during
which the spacecraft was in the Earth's shadow, the
solar panel temperature slipped to an estimated 0°F.
This is much warmer than the -l12°F which would
o
result from a maximum shadow time of about 20 min.
As a result of the relatively warm solar array tempera-
ture, no zener diode operation was required.
Figure 21 shows the solar panel currents immediately
after Sun acquisition. The wide differences in current
result from variations in solar panel temperatures. After
1 hr the temperatures equalized and the currents merged.
During the remainder of Phase 1 of the mission, flight
data obtained in the performance of the solar array indi-
cated that the individual panels performed as predicted
and no abnormalities or degradations were encountered
during the 307 days of deep space exposure. Presented
in Fig. 22 is a plot of the solar panel output currents
and the PS&L voltages as a function of time in flight.
It was observed that prior to January 27, 1965, the
maximum spread of the output currents of the panels
was 0.15 amp. On January 27, assuming the predicted
20"C gradient between the surface temperature of the
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Fig. 21. Solar panel currents at Sun acquisition
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panel and the zener diode shunt regulator," the zeners
would have been at the proper temperature to begin
limiting the output voltage of the panel. That this did
occur is manifested in the relative adjusting of the load
sharing of the four panels during the subsequent days.
Between February 1 and March 31, the solar-array
sharing gradually changed, resulting in a maximum
difference of 0.4 amp among the four panel currents.
The differences in solar panel currents gradually
changed throughout the mission as the zener diodes and
the solar panel sections gradually changed their thermal-
electrical equilibrium point.
As explained in the Description Section, a short-
circuit-current, open-circuit-voltage transducer was
mounted on one of the panels to aid in the evaluation of
the solar array's flight performance. This transducer,
which was monitored throughout the flight, consisted
_Located on the panel spars.
of three solar cell assemblies all similar to the cell
assemblies of the array. However, one of the cells was
instrumented to record its open-circuit voltage, a second
was instrumented to record its short-circuit current and
a third cell, which had been irradiated with 1 mev
electrons to a 10 '5 electrons/cm z flux level before
assembly, was instrumented to record its short-circuit
current. The third cell served as a radiation-resistant
standard. Before flight, the output of this transducer
was calibrated with the short-circuit current and open-
circuit voltage of the array.
Plots of the flight performance of the Isc - Voc trans-
ducers are shown in Figs. 23-25. The initial flight
data from these ceils read approximately 2 telemetry
data numbers (about 3%) lower than the predicted
values. This deviation is considered to be within accept-
able limits of predictability. It is observed that the
outputs of the cells generally follow their predicted time
performance curves and do not indicate the occurrence
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of degradation. This absence of degradation to the
transducer offers additional confirmation of the unde-
graded condition of the array during flight.
b. Battery. During the prelaunch and launch activities
the battery was used _or 68 rain. The total energy drain
during this time was approximately 8 amp-hr. Immedi-
ately after solar panel Sun acquisition, the battery
charger began charging the battery. Figure 26 shows
the battery-voltage battery-charge current relationship
after Sun acquisition. Five days after launch the battery
voltage had risen to 34.8 vdc and the charge current
had decreased to 0.010 amp. Because of the relatively
small pitch turn of 39 deg during the midcourse maneu-
ver, the solar panels supplied all spacecraft power and
the battery was not required.
On February 11, 1965, the battery charger was turned
off to prolong battery life and on February 19 the bat-
tery voltage reached a new high of 35.0 vdc. After that
time the battery voltage increased steadily, except for
brief periods during which changing spacecraft loads re-
sulted in higher battery temperature and lower battery
voltage, Fig. 27. The cause of this increasing voltage was
the source of much concern throughout the flight. Two
theories were proposed to explain the increase:
1. The increase was a normal consequence of the 0-g
gravitational field, temperature effects, and the
small (1.6 ma) charge current produced by
the battery-voltage telemetry transducer.
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Fig. 27. Battery voltage increase during flight
2. The battery case had cracked and the electrolyte
was leaking out slowly and evaporating, producing
an open cell, which the battery-voltage telemetry
transducer interpreted as increased voltage.
Because the voltage did not exceed 38.0 vdc, a limit at
which theory 2 would become more likely, there is no
way of determining which theory was correct. Numerous
attempts were made to resolve the problem 7 but no
solutions were reached. A definite answer to the battery-
voltage anomaly, using Mariner IV data, appears un-
likely. Only continued study of silver-zinc batteries may
provide the answer.
c. Conversion equipment. Operation of the power
conversion equipment was normal in all respects. During
the flight the main inverter output voltage varied over
the range 50.4 to 51.0 vac, the higher voltage being
maintained during the low-power television picture-
playback phase and the lower value being reached
during the early magnetometer-calibration part of the
flight. Before DC-15 was sent to inhibit the turn-on of
the maneuver booster-regulator by the gyro-on signal
as the result of an attitude control disturbance, it was
turned on and off a total of 22 times by the attitude
control subsystem. No problems were noted.
As a result of the science cover deployment exercise on
February 11, 1965, and the actual encounter sequence
on July 14, 1965, all elements of the power distribution
_Including life tests with identical batteries, tests on individual
ceils, conferences with representatives of the battery manufac-
turers, etc.
assembly were checked and found to operate properly.
All commands were processed in a normal manner.
Operating performance characteristics of the conver-
sion system as a whole agreed well with both prelaunch
system tests and manufacturing bench tests.
d. Power subsystem loading. In all cases power sub-
system loading, as reflected on the battery or solar panel
energy source, was identical 8 to the equivalent system
test loading observed before launch. No anomalies were
noted. Figure 28 is a plot of the actual spacecraft power
demand-vs-mission phase.
3. Recommendations
Although operation of the Mariner IV power sub-
system was satisfactory throughout the flight, several
changes could be made to the design that would improve
subsystem reliability and performance.
a. Three-phase inverter frequency control. The pres-
ent 400-cps, three-phase inverter will not operate if the
power subsystem synchronizer frequency-dividing net-
work should fail. This could be corrected by driving the
three-phase generation circuit directly from the 2400-cps
main inverter-output instead of from the synchronizer
frequency-dividing network.
b. Battery-voltage telemetry monitor. The battery-
voltage telemetry monitor should be changed so that no
current is injected into the battery. This would remove
the undesirable trickle charge current into the battery
that resulted in problems described earlier in the battery
flight analysis section.
c. Power regulator changes. Several circuit changes
could be made in the power regulators that would
further improve transient response and lead to circuit
simplification. Also, the booster-regulator's failure-
sensing circuit could be simplified and made more
reliable by a redesign.
D. Central Computer and Sequencer
l. Description
The Mariner CC&S subsystem is the central timing
and synchronizing source on board the spacecraft.
Spacecraft timing and synchronization are accomplished
_Within the tolerance of the telemetry measurements.
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through a CC&S-supplied 38.4-kc (±0.01%) signal to
the power subsystem. The 38.4-kc signal is used as the
frequency source for the power subsystem inverters,
resulting in a common frequency reference for each
subsystem.
In addition, the CC&S provides three commands
shortly after launch to get the spacecraft into a cruise
configuration. It is capable of receiving, storing, and
executing commands for the trajectory-correction
maneuver, and provides nine commands during the
cruise portion of flight to automatically initiate
mission-dependent functions at the proper time. A cyclic
command (every 66% hr) is also generated for the
duration of the flight to provide an automatic switching
capability to the radio subsystem under certain failure
conditions.
2. Performance
All functional requirements specified for the CC&S
were met during the flight, and operation continued to
be normal. Table 15 lists the flight sequence of CC&S
commands along with the observed times of occurrence.
Power was initially applied to the CC&S at approx-
imately launch minus 41/.2 hr on November 28, 1964.
Operation was uninterrupted and normal from that time
to the termination of telemetry coverage. The CC&S
28v supply (Channel 309) remained at 27.8v throughout
the flight.
The three launch-phase commands L-l, L-2, and L-3
occurred normally, as did the nine master-timer events
(MT-1 through MT-9).
Two trajectory-correction maneuvers were initiated
with the Mariner IV spacecraft, the first on December 4,
1964 and the second on December 5, 1964. The first
maneuver was terminated after the loss of Canopus
acquisition shortly after initiation of the sequence. The
abort command (DC-13) did not inhibit the CC&S from
issuing all the programmed maneuver commands suc-
cessfully although it did inhibit the spacecraft from
reacting to any of them. The second attempted mid-
course maneuver was successful and was completed
without incident. Tables 16 and 17 include event times
for the two mideourse maneuvers.
a. Accuracy. CC&S clock accuracy is dependent on
the temperature of the crystal oscillator. Below 72"F the
oscillator frequency increases with increasing tempera-
ture, and above 72"F it decreases with increasing tem-
perature. The particular crystal used in Mariner IV was
slightly lower than its rated frequency of 38.4 kc at all
temperatures, resulting in a negative frequency error. °.
9I.e., the clock was running slow.
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Event Date
Inhibit
Release
Launch
L-1 (deploy
solar panels)
L-2 (Sun
acquisition)
L-3 (Canopus
acquisition)
Cyclic No. 1
(CY-1 No. 1)
CY-1 No. 2
1st (aborted)
Midcourse
Maneuver
CY-1 No. 3
2nd (actual)
Midcourse
Maneuver
CY-1 No. 4
CY-1 No. 5
CY-1 No. 6
CY-1 No. 7
CY-1 No. 8
CY-1 No. 9
CY-1 No. 10
CY-1 No. 11
CY-1 No. 12
CY-1 No. 13
MT-6
(change
bit rate)
CY-1 No. 14
CY-1 No. 15
CY-1 No. 16
CY-1 No. 17
CY-1 No. 18
CY-1 No. 19
CY-1 No. 20
CY-1 No. 21
November 28, 1964
29
29
December 2
4
8
10
13
16
19
21
24
27
30
January 2, 1965
3
4
7
10
13
15
18
21
24
Expected
time, GMT
15:15:00
15:19:00
06:59:00
16:59:00
11:39:05
(see Table
16)
06:19:09
(see Table
17)
00:59:13
19:39:17
14:19:21
08:59:26
03:39:30
22:19:34
16:59:38
11:39:42
06:19:46
00:59:51
16:59:54
19:39:56
14:20:01
09:00:06
03:40:11
22:20:16
17:00:21
11:40_27
06:20:32
Table 15.
Observed time, GMT
14:19:01
14:22:01
15:14:52 to 15:15:06
15:18:52 to 15:19:05
06:58:49 to 06:59:00
16:59:00to 16:59:14
11:38:56 to 11:39:10
13:05:00 to 17:54:08
No data
13:05:00 to 17:44:11
00:59:01 to 00:59:14
19:39:12 to 19:39:25
14:19:21 to 14:!9:33
08:59:17 to 08:59:30
03:39:27 to 03:39:39
22:19:23 to 22:19:35
16:59:32 to 16:59:45
11:39:41 to 11:39:53
06:19:37 to 06:19:50
00:59:47 to 00:59:59
16:59:54
19:39:12 to 19:40:03
14:19:26 to 14:20:17
08:59:36 to 09:00:26
03:39:45 to 03:40:36
22:19:56 to 22:20:46
17:00:05 to 17:00:55
11:40:16 to 11:41:07
06:20:26 to 06:21 : 16
CC&S commands
Event
CY-I No. 22
CYol No. 23
CY-I No. 24
CY-1 No. 25
CY-1 No. 26
CY-1 No. 27
CY-1 No. 28
CY-1 No. 29
CY-1 No. 30
CY-1 No. 31
CY-1 No. 32
CY-1 No. 33
MT-1
(Canopus
update
No. I)
CY-1 No. 34
Date
January 27, 1965
29
February 1
4
7
9
12
15
18
21
23
26
27
March 1
CY-1 No. 35
MT-5
(transfer to
high-gain
antenna)
CY-i No. 36
CY-1 No. 37
CY-1 No. 38
CY-i No. 39
CY-1 No. 40
CY-1 No. 41
CY-I No. 42
CY-1 No. 43
CY-I No. 44
CY-1 No. 45
MT-2
(Canopus
update
No. 2)
CY-1 No. 46
CY-1 No. 47
CY-i No. 48
6
9
12
15
18
20
23
26
29
31
April 2
Expected
time, GMT
01:00:38
19:40:44
14:20:51
09:00:57
03:41:04
22:21:12
17:01:18
11:41:27
06:21:35
01:01:44
19:41:53
14:21:02
17:02:05
09:02:13
03:42:23
13:02:25
22:22:34
17:02:44
11:42:55
06:23:06
01:03:18
19:43:29
14:23:41
09:03:54
03:44:06
22:24:19
14:24:25
17:04:32
11:44:45
06:24:58
Observed time, GMT
01:00:37 to 01:01:28
19:39:58 to 19:40:48
14:20:10 to 14:21:00
09:00:21 to 09:01 :I 1
03:40:32 to 03:41:23
No data
17:00:57 to 17:01:47
11:41:09 to 11:41:59
06:21:22 to 06:22:13"
01:01:35 to 01:02:25
No data
14:22:03 to 14:22:54
17:01:29 to 17:02:19
09:01:27 to 09:02:18
03:41:41 to 03:42:32
13:01:47 to 13:02:37
22:21:56 to 22:22:47
17:02:12 to 17:03:03
11:42:28 to 11:43:18
06:22:44 to 06:23:34
01:03:00 to 01:03:50
No data
14:23:33 to 14:24:24
09:03:50 to 09:04:40
03:43:17 to 03:44:07
22:23:35 to 22:24:25
14:24:25 to 14:25:15
17:03:52 to 17:04:42
11:44:11 to 11:45:01
06:24:29 to 06:25:19
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Event
CY-1 No. 49
CY-1 No. 50
CY-1 No. 51
CY-1 No. 52
CY-1 No. 53
CY-1 No. 54
CY-1 No. 55
CY-1 No. 56
CY-1 No. 57
CY-1 No. 58
MT-3
(Canopus
update
No. 3)
CY-1 No. 59
CY-1 No. 60
CY-1 No. 61
CY-1 No. 62
CY-1 No. 63
CY-1 No. 64
CY-1 No. 65
CY-1 No. 66
CY-1 No. 67
CY-1 No. 68
CY-I No. 69
CY-I No. 70
CY-1 No. 71
MT-4
(Canopu'_
update
No. 4)
CY-1 No. 72
CY-1 No. 73
CY-1 No. 74
CY-1 No. 75
CY-1 No. 76
:CY-1 No. 77
CY-1 No. 78
Table 15. CC&S commands (cant'd)
Date
April 12, 1965
14
17
20
23
25
28
Mey 1
4
7
7
9
12
15
18
20
23
26
29
June 1
3
6
9
12
14
14
17
20
23
26
28
July 1
Expe_ed
time, GMT
01:05:12
19:45:26
14:25:40
09:05:54
03:46:09
22:26:23
17:06:38
11:46:54
06:27:09
01:07:24
14:27:25
19:47:39
14:27:55
09:08:09
03:48:24
22:28:40
17:08:55
1i :49:11
06:29:27
01:09:43
19:49:59
14:30:15
09:10:31
03:50:47
15:50:57
22:31:02
17:11:!8
11:51:34
06:31:49
01:i2:05
19:52:21
14:32:36
Observed time, GMT
01:04:47 to 01:05:38
19:45:05 to 19:45:55
14:25:24 to 14:26:14
09:05:43 to 09:06:33
03:46:03 to 03:46:53
22:26:21 to 22:27:11
17:05:51 to 17:06:41
11:46:11 to 11:47:02
06:26:30 to 06:27:21
01:06:50 to 01:07:41
14:27:25 to 14:28:15
19:47:10 to 19:48:01
14:27:30 to 14:28:20
09:07:50 to 09:08:41
03:48:11 to 03:49:01
22:28:31 to 22:29:22
17:08:52 to 17:09:42
11:48:21 to 11:49:12
06:28:42 to 06:29:33
01:09:03 to 01:09:53
19:49:23 to 19:50:14
14:29:44 to 14:30:35
09:10:05 to 09:10:56
03:50:25 to 03:51:16
15:50:54 to 15:51:45
22:30:46 to 22:31:36
17:11:06 to 17:11:57
11:51:27 to 11:52:17
06:30:58 to 06:31:49
01:11:19 to 01:12:09
19:51:39to 19:52:29
14:31:59 to 14:32:49
Event
CY-1 No. 79
CY-1 No. 80
CY-1 No. 81
CY-1 No. 82
MT-7
(turn on
encounter
science)
MT-8
(turn off
encounter
science)
CY-1 No. 83
and MT.9
(start picture
playback)
CY-1 No. 84
CY-I No. 85
CY-1 No. 86
CY-1 No. 87
CY-1 No. 88
CY-1 No. 89
Date
July 4,1965
CY-1 No. 90
CY-! No. 91
CY-1 No. 92
CY-1 No. 93
CY-1 No. 94
CY-1 No. 95
CY-1 No. 96
CY-1 No. 97
CY-1 No. 98
QC-1
QC.2
QC-3
CY-1 No. 99
CY-1 No. 100
7
9
12
14
15
15
18
21
23
26
29
August 1
3
6
9
12
15
17
20
23
26
28
31
Expected
time, GMT
09:12:52
03:53:08
22:33:23
17:i3:39
15:53:49
05:13:52
11:53:53
06:34:08
01:14:23
19:54:38
14:34:52
09:15:06
03:55:21
22:35:36
17:15:50
11:56:04
06:36:18
01:16:32
19:56:46
14:36:59
09:17:12
03:57:26
21:45:56
21:54:20
22:02:44
22:37:39
17:17:52
Observed time, GMT
09:12:19 to 09:13:10
03:52:40 to 03:53:30
No data
17:13:22 to 17:14:07
15:53:15 to 15:54:05
05:13:49 to 05:14:39
11:53:53.12 to
11:53:53.24
Arrived during Mode 4
data
Arrived during Mode 4
data
19:54:23 to 19:54:40
14:30:47 to 14:34:59
Arrived during Mode 4
dete
Arrived during Mode 4
data
22:35:07 to 22:35:57
17:15:25 to 17:16:15
No data
06:36:03 to 06:36:53
01:16:21 to 01:17:12
19:56:40 to 19:57:30
14:36:08 to 14:36:59
09:16:25 to 09:17:15
03:56:44 to 03:57:34
21:45:16 to 21:46:06
21:53:42 to 21:54:32
22:02:04 to 22:02:54
22:37:01 to 22:37:52
Arrived during Mode 4
data
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Table15.CC&Scommands(cant'd)
Event
CY-1 No. 101
CY-1 No. 102
CY-1 No. 103
CY-1 No. 104
CY-1 No. 105
CY-1 No. 106
CY-I No. 107
CY-I No. 108
CY-1 No. 109
CY-1 No. 110
CY-I No. 111
Date
September 3, 1965
6
9
11
14
17
Expected
time, GMT
11:58:03
06:38:16
01:18:28
19:58:40
14:38:51
09:19:03
Observed time, GMT
11:57:35 to 11:58:25
06:37:52 to 06:38:42
01:18:09 to 01:18:59
19:58:25 to 19:59:16
14:38:42 to 14:39:32
09:18:58 to 09:19:49
20
22
25
28
October I
03:59:15
22:39:26
17:19:37
11:59:47
06:39:58
03:58:24 to 03:59:15
22:38:40 to 22:39:31
17:18:56 to 17:19:4Z
No data
06:39:26 to 06:40:17
At launch the CC&S clock was running about 0.00070%
slow. As the Bay VII temperature decreased during the
flight (CC&S is mounted in Bay VII), the clock error
increased as predicted, and on August 5, 1965 was
running about 0.0011% slow. CC&S clock frequency
error in percent as a function of time is plotted in
Fig. 29.
On August 5, 1965 the CC&S clock had lost a total of
188.5 sec in 250 days, resulting in an accumulated
clock frequency error of -0.00087%. CC&S clock error
in seconds as a function of time is plotted in Fig. 30.
b. Bay VII temperature variations. At launch the
Bay VII temperature was 730F, reached a maximum of
75"F about 14 hr after launch, and stabilized at 64.4"F
by 25 hr after launch. During the trajectory-correction
maneuver the temperature went up from 64.4"F to a
maximum of 71.2°F following the motor burn, and then
back down to a stable 64.4"F about 5 hr after Sun
reacquisition. During cruise, Bay VII temperature de-
creased from 64.4"F following the midcourse maneuver
to 57.6"F just prior to encounter. During encounter the
temperature rose to 59.6"F a few hours after encounter
science was turned on and stabilized at 56.6"F following
the turn-off of all science (MT-9). The temperature
remained stable at 56.6"F until the end of picture play-
back and return to cruise mode configuration, where-
upon it restabilized at 58.6"F. Bay VII temperature is
plotted as a function of time on the reverse scale of
Fig. 29.
Table 16. First trajectory-correction maneuver
attempt (aborted)
Time observed, GMT Best estimate ofEvent
December 4, 1964 actual time, GMT
' QCI-1 sent
QCI-I verified by
CC&S
QC1-2 sent
QC1-2 verified by
CC&S
QC1-3 sent
QCI-3 verified by
CC&S
DC-27 sent
DC-27 received by
CC&S
Pitch start
Pitch stop
Duration
Duration from data
encoder timer
Roll start
Roll stop
Duration
Duration from data
encoder timer
Motor start
Motor stop
Duration
Duration from data
encoder timer
Sun reacq uisition
start
CC&S counter
overflow
13:06:06 to 13:06:18
13:10:55 to 13:11:08
13:15:57 to 13:16:1 i
14:35:47 to 14:35:53
15:34:59 to 15:35:11
15:39:11 to 15:39:24
15:57:02 to 15:57:15
16:11:19 to 16:11:32
16:19:05 to 16:19:18
16:19:18 to 16:19:31
16:24:58 to 16:25:11
17:54:01 to 17:54:15
13:05:00
13:06:07
13:10:00
13:11:07
13:15:00
13:16:07
14:35:00
14:35:53
15:35:08 "t- 1.42, -- 0.42 sec
15:39:19 -I- 1.42, -- 0.42 sec
251 ± 1.84 sec
249.9 ± 0.42 sec
15:57:08 q- 1.42, -- 0.42 sec
16:11:20 -I- 1.42, -- 0.42 sec
852 ± 1.84 sec
851 ± 0.42 sec
16:19:08 -t- 1.42, -- 0.42 sec
16:19:29 "t- 1.42, -- 0.42 sec
21 -4- 1.84 sec
20.6 -----0.42 sec
16:25:08
i 7:54:08
Note: The estimate of the actual time of the start and stop commands of the
pitch, roll, and motor burn was determined by extrapolation of the
data encoder timer readings (Channel 220). The resolution given was
determined as follows:
+1, --0 sec is the resolution of the time tags
"4-0.42 sec is the resolution of the data encoder timer
The total resolution is therefore:
-I-1.42, --0.42 sec
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Table17.Secondtrajectory-correctionmaneuver,
Event
December 5, 1964 attempt
Time observed, GMT ! Best estimate of
December 5, 1964 actual time, GMT
QCI-1 sent
QCI-1 verified by CC&S
QC1-2 sent
QC1o2 verified by CC&S
QC1-3 sent
QC1-3 verified by CC&S
DC-27 sent
DC-27 received by CC&S
Pitch start
Pitch stop
Duration
Duration from data
encoder timer
Roll start
Roll stop
Duration
13:06:05 to 13:06:18
13:11:08 to 13:11:20
13:15:58 to 13:16:11
14:25:47 to 14:25:52
15:25:10
15:28:52 to 15:28:54
15:47:09 to 15:47:i2
16:01:18 to 16:01:21
Duration from data
13:05:00
13:06:08
13:10:00
13:11:08
13:15:00
13:16:08
14:25:00
14:25:51
15:25:10.6 ± 0.3 sec
15:28:53 "4- I sec
222.4 ± 1.3 sec
223.4 ± 0.42 sec
15:47:10.6 -I- 0.3 sec
16:01:20 ----- 1.3 sec
849.4 ± 1.6 sec
850 ± 0.42 sec
encoder timer
Motor start
Motor stop
Duration
Duration from data
encoder timer
Sun reacquisition start
CC&S counter overflow
16:09:10 to 16:09:12
16:09:29 to 16:09:34
16:15:10 to 16:15:12
17:44:07 to 17:44:21
16:09:10.6 --4---0.3 sec
16:09:31 ± 1.1 sec
20.4 ± 1.4 sec
20.58 ± 0.42 sec
16:15:10.6 ± 0.3 sec
17:44:10.6 ± 0.3 sec
Note: The estimate of the actual time of the start and stop commands of
pitch, roll, and motor burn was determined by use of the analog re-
cording from the high-speed data llne. This allowed time tagging to
within -I-0.1 sec and improved the overall reSOlution somewhat from
the TTY data (compare with Table 16). The pitch start command was
tagged to within -t-0.3 sec which was used to estimate the stort times
of roll and motor burn.
c. Operational anomalies. Four anomalies have oc-
curred during the flight that may have been associated
with the CC&S; none of the four affected spacecraft
operation, however.
The first was observed, initially, coincident with
Cyclic No. 34 and involved an apparent drop in received
RF signal strength. Further checking indicated that this
phenomenon had occurred previously and, in fact,
occurred each time a cyclic was received while the
spacecraft was being tracked in one-way lock. The prob-
lem was traced to an auxiliary oscillator in the radio
subsystem that operated when in one-way lock, and
would shift frequency slightly when a cyclic was re-
ceived, due to additional loading on the power supply.
The frequency shift appeared at the DSIF receiver as
a drop in received signal strength. After it had been
established that this was a design characteristic of the
radio subsystem, no further action was necessary.
The second anomaly was a data encoder deck skip
coincident with CC&S command MT-1 (first Canopus
update). The data encoder has had a history at skipping
decks, but the skips were usually caused by spacecraft
power transients. No appreciable power transient should
have occurred due to command MT-1 and the deck skip
was not anticipated. Tests were run on the PTM in an
attempt to duplicate the phenomenon but to no avail.
Component failures were simulated in the CC&S to
purposely introduce noise into the system, but no deek
skips occurred. All other MT events occurred on the
spacecraft without incident. The MT-1 command differs
from the other MT commands in that a spare relay is
set simultaneously with MT-1. No other MT event has
a spare relay set coincident with it, but there is no
obvious reason why two relays set at the same time
should be any more apt to cause the data encoder to
skip than just one. At the present time there is no precise
explanation as to the cause of the data encoder deck skip.
The third anomaly occurred coincident with Cyclic
No. 75, and involved erroneous readings in Event Regis-
ter Channels 115 and 116. The cyclic was received by
Station 41 while tracking in one-way lock, and the
resultant drop in RF received signal strength caused an
out-of-lock indication for several seconds. The out-of-
lock indication resulted in bit errors being introduced
into the data for several seconds and caused the channels
being interrogated to indicate erroneous readings. Since
the cyclic occurred during the interrogation of Chan-
nel 115, the erroneous readings in the event registers
of Channels 115 and 116 were assumed to have been the
result of the out-of-lock condition. Similar errors were
noted in other telemetry channels coincident with cyclic
occurrences. Subsequent event register readings were
normal.
The fourth anomaly concerned the receipt of two
events in the CC&S event register (Channel 115 Regis-
ter 2) following MT-9, instead of the normal and
expected indication of one event. Since there was a
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cyclic command (Cyclic No. 83) coincident with MT-9
and two separate relays were involved (one spring
loaded and one latching), the assumption is that the two
relay closures may have occurred at slightly different
times and caused the generation of two events. For the
data encoder to react to two event pulses, the pulses
must be at least 2 msec apart, (assuming proper data
encoder operation), which means that the two relay
closures would have had to be at least 2 msec apart;
however, the inputs to the two relay drivers are within
a few t_sec of each other.
Previous testing in the CC&S lab has indicated that
relays kept in storage for several months without being
exercised, such as was the case with the MT-9 relay,
tend to switch more slowly the first time than do relays
exercised periodically, x° It has not yet been determined
whether this phenomenon could create enough differ-
ence in switching time to cause the two events. Another
source of difference in relay switching time is ass'ociated
with the different relay types involved (one spring
loaded and one latching), but this difference is small
compared to 2 msec. Further analysis is being done in
an attempt to better understand the problem.
d. Future operational capability. All command func-
tions of the CC&S have been completed with the
exception of the 66_-hr cyclics. The cyclic commands
will continue, barring an associated circuit malfunction,
and the CC&S clock will continue to provide timing
and synchronizing information to the spacecraft unless
interrupted in a similar manner. Although the capability
for only one more motor burn exists, any number of
midcourse maneuver sequences can be initiated and
executed by the CC&S.
3. Recommendations
The functional design of the Mariner CC&S was
adequate, although some packaging and circuit design
changes could be made to make the unit more reliable.
The accomplishment of the improvements listed below
would require a major redesign of the CC&S, however.
Recommendations for improvements of future equip-
ment are listed below in order of importance.
1. Redesign of packaging and potting techniques of
magnetic shift registers and counters
2. Elimination of back-side printed circuit wiring
'°The cyclic relay was exercised every 66_ hr.
.
.
.
.
,
Reduction of component density to eliminate stack-
ing and provision for specified 3/16-in. body-to-
terminal lead lengths
Provision of proper spacing for subassembly
harnessing
Replacement of shift registers with units having
wider margins and not requiring sensistor temper-
ature compensation
Redesign of input decoder subassembly to reduce
complexity
Redesign of magnetic counters to increase margins
so that initial test time is reduced and the need for
optimization of adjustments is eliminated
E. Attitude Control Subsystem
The attitude control subsystem establishes and main-
tains three-axis stabilization of the spacecraft using the
Sun and the star Canopus as references. Two-axis Sun
stabilization aligns the spacecraft Z-axis with the space-
craft-Sun line, keeping the solar panel surfaces presented
fully to the Sun. Roll stabilization about the Z-axis with
the star Canopus as the reference insures that the high-
gain antenna beam will include Earth during the latter
portions of the mission.
The attitude control subsystem orients the spacecraft
to the commanded attitude during the midcourse tra-
jectory correction and maintains it during the motor
firing interval. After the correction, Sun and Canopus
acquisition are re-established.
In addition to the normal cruise control, a number of
alternate modes of operation including inertial roll
control are designed into the attitude control subsystem.
1. Description
The variety of requirements placed upon the attitude
control subsystem during the mission dictate that the
subsystem consist of a number of separate functional
units each operating in a manner appropriate to the
attitude control mode required for any particular portion
of the mission. The largest part of the Mariner mission
is flown in the interplanetary cruise mode. In cruise the
attitude control subsystem must orient and maintain
the X- and Y-axes normal to the Sun line and at the
desired angular position about the Z-axis. The primary
means of control is a system of cold gas thrusters.
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a. Gas iets. The spacecraft is maintained at certain
angular positions, or is rotated at prescribed angular
rates through the application of appropriate torques
obtained by the expulsion of gas through pairs of jet
nozzles, located so as to produce couples about each
of the principle axes. The gas jets are opened and
dosed by solenoid valves operated by switching ampli-
fiers. The switching amplifiers respond to signals from
sensors which measure spacecraft angular position and
rate.
The gas supply is contained in two completely
independent nitrogen-gas systems. Assuming flight
equipment is well-enough controlled during manufac-
ture, assembly, and testing to preclude any severe
weaknesses or manufacturing flaws, the most probable
failure mode would be loss of gas pressure due to
random sticking of the gas valves. The redundancy of
gas valves between the two half-systems permits normal
operation if a valve fails closed; and if it fails open there
are two opposing valves to counteract it, one in its own
half-system and one in the redundant half-system. After
all of the gas in the failed half-system has been ex-
pended, enough remains in the redundant half-system
to allow the completion of the mission.
b. Inertial sensors. Gyros provide error signals pro-
portional to angular rate. The rate error signal from a
gyro may be fed to a switching amplifier to maintain an
angular rate within the rate deadband orientation.
Angular rates other than zero are obtained either by
torquing the gyros or by providing a bias signal to the
switching amplifiers. Torquing the gyro at a constant
rate will produce a rate error signal, operating the gas
jets, until the spacecraft is rotating at the same rate at
which the gyro is being torqued. The rate error signal
will then go to zero. A fixed-rate bias signal to the
switching amplifier will operate the jets until a rate is
established in which the gyro rate error signal just
cancels the bias signal.
The rate error signal from the gyro may be integrated
to give position error. When operating the switching
amplifier from position error signals, the gyro rate error
signals may also be used as damping signals to damp
out spacecraft oscillations about the desired position.
c. Celestial sensors. Sun sensors produce error signals
proportional to angular position displacement about the
pitch (X) and yaw (Y) axes. Similarly, the Canopus star
sensor will, when a star is in its field of view, produce
error signals proportional to the angular displacement
of the star from the sensor boresight line (only the
angular position error component about the Z-axis is
sensed).
If these three-position error signals are fed to the
switching amplifiers, they cause gas jet firings which
accelerate the spacecraft so as to reduce the errors.
Hence three-axis stabilization is achieved. In the absence
of a damping force, however, the spacecraft will con-
tinue to oscillate about the null positions indefinitely.
The rate signals from the gyros might be mixed with
the position error signals to damp out the oscillations.
However, since the gyros are not operating throughout
most of the flight, another source of damping must be
found.
When the gas jet pairs are opened in response to
error signals, the regulated flow of gas produces a
constant torque, hence a constant angular acceleration.
The attitude control gyro power is turned on prior to
launch. The attitude control subsystem power is turned
on when the spacecraft separates from the Agena stage.
The turn-on is one function of the pyrotechnic arming
switch. The CC&S also issues a backup command to
turn on the attitude control subsystem power at lift-off
plus 57 min.
Alignment of the Z-axis with the spacecraft-Sun line
begins at this turn on of power. Acquisition Sun sensors
looking away from the normal Sun direction supple-
ment the cruise Sun sensors so that the Sun is in the
field of view of at least one set of Sun sensors regardless
of the spacecraft angular orientation. The Sun sensors
produce angle-position error signals which cause the
switching amplifiers to open the appropriate gas jets.
The thrusts from the jet pairs produce torques which
rotate the spacecraft and thus reduce the angular posi-
tion errors. Oscillations are damped out by mixing a rate
damping signal from the rate gyro with the position error
signal. Sun stabilization occurs within approximately
20 rain depending upon spacecraft initial angular posi-
tion and rate.
When the Z-axis is aligned with the spacecraft-Sun
line, the Sun gate is illuminated and switches the ac-
quisition sensors off; stabilization is maintained by the
cruise Sun sensor signals. The Sun gate signal also
enables the roll-spin or roll-search mode.
After pitch- and yaw-axis Sun stabilization has been
accomplished, a controlled turn rate about the Z-axis at
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either one of two rates is executed. Normally, Sun
stabilization will occur well in advance of CC&S L-3
(T + 997 min). A spin signal is then fed to the switching
amplifier firing the roll jets and accelerating the space-
craft to a constant 3.5 milliradians/second (mrad/sec)
rate. The roll spin provides calibration data for the
magnetometer.
At T + 997 min, the Canopus sensor is turned on by
CC&S L-3. L-3 also switches the input of the amplifier
from the spin signal of 3.5 mrad/sec to the search signal
of 2 mrad/see. The spacecraft decelerates appropriately,
then remains in the search mode until a star of sufficient
brightness appears in the field of view of the Canopus
sensor, which then initiates star acquisition and switch-
to-cruise mode.
An inoperative gyro failing to provide a rate signal to
buck out the spin (or search) signal would cause the
spacecraft to continue to accelerate indefinitely. To
prevent such a failure from being catastrophic, the jet
firing times are electrically integrated. After a iet firing
time slightly in excess of normal, the input signal (spin
or search) to the switching amplifier is interrupted,
allowing back-up of roll control to be used.
A star of sufficient brightness in the field of view of
the Canopus sensor will operate the acquisition gate.
The signal from this gate places the spacecraft in the
cruise mode, turning off all gyros and switching in
derived-rate networks. The acquisition gate signal also
switches the Canopus sensor error signal into the switch-
ing amplifier in order to provide roll position control.
The long cruise period of almost 8 mo created a desire
to enhance reliability by using a passive stabilization
technique in place of the gyros. A system of proved
performance had been developed for the Mariner H
Venus spacecraft, called derived rate switching amplifier
compensation, which was used on Mariner IV. Funda-
mentally, it is a lag feedback around the switching
amplifier with a long time constant of about 100 see.
Whenever there is a switching amplifier output to acti-
vate the gas jets, the long time constant produces a
feedback signal to the input. While the gas jets are on,
the spacecraft is accelerating and the feedback ap-
pears the same as a rate feedback obtained by gyro
integration of acceleration (thus the term derived rate),
provided that: 1) the gas jets are on for a much shorter
period than the derived rate time constant, and 2) the
initial spacecraft rate is nearly zero, because the derived
rate signal is not correlated with the actual spacecraft
rate. For conditions other than these, the control system
damping is increasingly less efficient. The derived rate
system, however, is capable of controlling any cruise
mode disturbance. For single-axis operation, the system
has enough acquisition capability to replace a gyro that
is providing no output, though it is quite inefficient in
that mode.
A cruise mode limit cycle is established by controlling
the maximum angular excursion by means of the switch-
ing amplifier deadband, and by controlling the minimum
rate increment by means of a minimum-on-time circuit
in the switching amplifier. That is to say, whenever the
angular error exceeds the deadband value, the gas jets
are activated to reverse the direction of motion. In
addition, the gas jets are caused to remain on for a
minimum of 20 msec even though the input signal is of
less duration. The 20 msec minimum-on-time circuit
establishes the minimum torque impulse capability of
the control system. The derived rate damping will re-
duce the angular rates to the minimum impulse level,
which is about ___2 deg/hr on either side of null. The
angular position deadband on either side of null is
0.5 deg for pitch and yaw and 0.25 deg for roll.
Direct command DC-15 (acquisition gate override)
provides a means of bypassing the acquisition gate,
thereby stabilizing roll position using any star bright
enough to produce position error signals. After normal
star acquisition, direct command DC-21 (roll override)
provides a means of interrupting the acquisition gate
signal, thus commanding further roll search for another
star.
Additional options are afforded by DC-18 (inertial
roll control) which places the roll axis only in inertial
control while pitch and yaw are still controlled in posi-
tion by the Sun sensors, and by DC-20 (roll drift) which
removes all roll control. In the inertial roll control mode
the roll position may be commanded from the ground
in 2V4 deg increments. After the first DC-18 initiates
the inertial roll mode, each subsequent DC-18 will
trigger a one shot which applies a positive command
current into the roll-gyro torquer for a time equivalent
to a positive 2V4 deg roll turn. A DC-21 command will
trigger another one shot, giving a negative 2x/4 deg turn.
Each of the alternate modes-inertial roll control,
roll drift, or acquisition gate override- may be reset
and normal control established through the use of an
additional command, DC-19 (normal roll control).
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: d. Trajectory-correction maneuver. During the tra-
jectory-correction sequence the spacecraft is placed in
inertial control on all axes.
This control mode maintains spacecraft angular posi-
tions in inertial space, under control of the gyros. The
mode is commanded by the CC&S and is maintained
throughout the maneuver sequence.
A large integrating capacitor is inserted in the gyro
feedback loop to the torquer, integrating the gyro rate
signal output and thereby providing position informa-
tion. Whenever some disturbance produces a spacecraft
angular rate, the gyro pick-off amplifier provides a
corrective signal to fire the jets and also an electrieal
current to the gyro torquer. The flow of torquer current
produces a charge accumulation on the capacitor pro-
portional to the position error introduced. When the
jets have reduced the rate to zero, the capacitor will
deliver torquing current of opposite polarity. This cur-
rent produces a rate opposite that of the initial distur-
bance. Torquing current will cease to flow when the
capacitor charge (and hence the position error) is
reduced to zero.
During the period of PIPS rocket motor burn, the
rate, plus position-error signal is used by the autopilot to
maintain stabilization by appropriate positioning of four
jet vanes in the rocket exhaust.
The rocket motor thrust vector is aligned for the
trajectory correction by the performance of commanded
pitch and roll turns. The desired thrust vector orientation
is determined on the ground from tracking data and the
necessary turn information is sent by radio command
and stored in the CC&S. After maneuver initiation, the
CC&S commands generate a torquing current to pro-
duce a precision current that will torque the gyro at
0.18 deg/sec. The polarity of the current, hence the
direction of the turn, is determined by the presence or
absence of an additional CC&S command. The precision
torquing current torques the gyro, producing a gyro
output which opens the appropriate jets, accelerating
the spacecraft. When the spacecraft angular velocity
reaches 0.18 deg/sec, the error signal goes to zero, the
gas jets are closed, and the spacecraft continues to turn
at a constant rate. The duration of the turn (and hence
the magnitude of the turn angle) is determined by the
timing functon of the CC&S counter, which, at over-
flow, commands an interruption of the flow of torquing
current. The spacecraft angular rate then produces a
gyro output which opens the appropriate jets until the
rate is reduced to zero. This new orientation is then
maintained by the spacecraft in the inertial control
mode.
The midcourse autopilot is used to control the attitude
of the spacecraft during the motor burn interval. Control
is accomplished by continuous adjustment of the angular
positions of four jet vanes mounted in the midcourse
motor nozzle. Since the motor is not mounted along any
of the spacecraft body axes, the motion of each jet vane
is controlled by a mixture of the signals of the three
gyros.
Each jet vane has its own control system, consisting
of an autopilot amplifier, a jet vane actuator and a feed-
back loop. Power to the autopilot is switched on only
during the midcourse correction sequence. The three
gyro signals and the feedback signal are summed in
different ratios at the input to each amplifier. The jet
vanes are then adjusted so that the motor thrust vector
passes through the spacecraft center of gravity, hulling
the gyro error signals.
e. Solar pressure vanes. An auxiliary two-axis Sun-
stabilization system employs solar pressure to provide a
restoring torque. Solar pressure vanes are automatically
positioned to balance the solar pressure about the space-
craft center of gravity at the correct spacecraft Z-axis
alignment.
Every time the pitch or yaw jets are opened, the
solar vane electronics operate solar vane actuators which
make step changes in the angular position of the ap-
propriate solar vanes.
As opposite solar vanes are stepped toward and away
from the plane normal to the Sun line, the solar center
of pressure is shifted, creating a solar torque of the same
sense as the opened iet as shown in Fig. 31.
The gas jets fire only when the position error has
exceeded the deadband limit, for a spacecraft in normal
cruise mode. In normal limit cycle operation, the limit
on one side of the null position is reached as many times
as the limit on the other side. If a torque bias exists,
however, the number of times that a correction of one
polarity is required exceeds that for the other. The
differential stepping of the solar pressure vanes shifts
the center of pressure in such a manner as to oppose
the bias torque, driving the mean position error to zero.
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2. Pedormance
The attitude control subsystem performed in a satis-
factory manner throughout the mission. Sun acquisition
was maintained without incident throughout the mission
except during the midcourse trajectory correction se-
quence. Some problems were encountered in maintain-
ing Canopus acquisition until an alternate control mode
was initiated with the transmission of a ground com-
mand disabling the automatic reacquisition logic in the
star tracker. There were no other anomalies observed
during the flight which might have placed any of the
mission objeetives in jeopardy, although problems were
observed in the solar pressure vane system operation.
a. Initial Sun acquisition. Separation of the spacecraft
from the Agena occurred in the Earth shadow
15:07:10 GMT on November 28, 1964. There were no
Sun sensor error signals in the shadow, but the three
single-degree-of-freedom gyros about each spacecraft
axis sensed the tumbling of the spacecraft and turned
on the attitude control jets until the rates were reduced
to within the deadband of the switching amplifier. The
rate deadband was __+1.27 mrad/sec in pitch and yaw
and ±0.33 mrad/sec in roll. When post-separation
telemetry first became avai/able, the rates were already
within the deadband, indicating that the separation
rates were very low.
The actual time of exit from the Earth shadow took
place at 15:17:35 but Sun sensor signals were first noted
at 15:16:37 GMT due to the refraction of sunlight
through the Earth atmosphere.
When the spacecraft was completely in the sunlight,
the pitch error was seen to be equal to -1.0 deg, and
for all practical purposes the pitch axis had acquired.
The yaw Sun sensors were saturated and had established
a rate determined by this saturation equal to -2.2
mrad/sec (-0.126 deg/sec). The yaw sensors came out
of saturation at 15:29:56 GMT at an angle of +11.5 deg.
This indicated that at the start of yaw acquisition, the
yaw angle was about + 106 deg.
A Sun gate event occurred at 15:30:59 GMT. This
indicated that the Sun gate cone-angle field of view
was 2.2 deg, which is within the design tolerance.
The Sun gate initiated the magnetometer calibration
roll as required. A search signal was switched into the
roll axis control system and the spacecraft accelerated
to a rate of -3.55 mrad/sec (-0.203 deg/sec), which
was the design nominal value.
During the magnetometer roll mode, the pitch and
yaw errors were observed to limit cycle against one
side of the deadband. The pitch axis stayed at + 8.7 mrad
edge and yaw at the -8.5 mrad edge. This was as ex-
pected and was due to crosscoupling from the cross-
products of inertia.
b. Star acquisition. Before launch it was felt that
star identification would be a major problem. The only
information from the Canopus sensor, other than an
error signal, was a brightness measurement and a
knowledge of the cone angle of an object within -+-5 deg.
The absolute calibration of the Canopus sensor for all
the stars in the sky was not known and the problem was
further complicated because the brightness signal in-
eluded the integrated background of stars in the field.
However, during the roll-search mode, the tracker made
good relative measurements of the star, plus background
brightness. This information was basic to the star iden-
tification procedure.
A map-matching technique was developed to identify
objects seen by the Canopus sensor during the roll
search mode. As an aid to establishing the map-
matching technique, other corroborating information
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was used for initial acquisition. This included a fixed,
wide-angle (26 deg by 83 deg) field-of-view Earth
detector to provide an output if Canopus was in the
star sensor field of view; magnetometer information ob-
tained during the calibration mode for rate and position
information; and low-gain antenna pattern variations to
also provide rate and position information. The magne-
tometer and antenna information was relatively crude
and could only be used with a low weighting function
on their corroboration.
Fundamental to the map-matching was an a priori
telemetry map of sensor brightness output versus clock
angle (angle about the Sun line measured from Cano-
pus). A reasonably sophisticated mathematical model
of the Canopus tracker and the sky, including the Milky
Way, was developed so that with trajectory information,
a 7094 program printed a map of the expected telemetry
output of the brightness channel seen during roll search.
This then was matched with an actual telemetry map to
identify observed objects.
Initially, an extensive computer program was devised
to process the telemetry data to produce the actual
telemetry map. This was statistically correlated with
the a priori map, Earth detector output, magnetometer
data, and low-gain antenna data. Whenever an object
was acquired subsequent to a roll search, a calculation
was made of the probability that each acquirable object
had been acquired. If the object was not Canopus, a
roll override command would institute another roll
search and another computer run was made until Can-
opus was identified as acquired.
The computerized version of the map-matching was
necessary due to the lack of knowledge of the tracker
response to the innumerable objects and integrated back-
ground that would be seen by the tracker. Until the
tracker was actually calibrated in flight, the uncertain-
ties required that the best possible analysis techniques
be prepared beforehand.
In addition to the computerized star identification
program, a second map-matching technique was de-
veloped and implemented during the flight which was
much simpler, but required actual flight experience to
prove reliability. A continuous strip-ehart recorder was
employed to plot in real time the star tracker brightness
telemetry. An a priori map derived from the computer
program was transcribed to a transparent overlay in the
same scale as the real time telemetry plot so that they
could be instantaneously compared during the roll
search. The process turned out to be surprisingly good
and became the primary technique for star identifica-
tion. It was quite accurate and the fastest possible way
of identifying objects. One of the mission accomplish-
ments can be said to be the development of the pro-
cedure consisting of excellent a priori maps matched in
real time with brightness telemetry data, as shown
in Fig. 32.
Initial roll acquisition was commanded by the CC&S
to take place at 06:59:00 GMT on November 29. Just
before this command (CC&S L-3), the spacecraft was
in the magnetometer calibration mode, rolling at a rate
of -3.55 mrad/see (-0.203 deg/sec). At the roll acquisi-
tion command, the search command signal was switched
in and the roll rate was reduced to -2.35 mrad/sec
(-0.135 deg/sec), the upper edge of the deadband about
the nominal search rate. An acquisition occurred at
07:07:47 GMT. At this point, Earth light reflections on
the Canopus sensor optics caused a bright enough
background in conjunction with a spurious error signal
to cause the acquisition logic to discontinue the roll
search. Even though there was no acquirable object, a
"logic" acquisition had been effected. The clock angle
at this point was about 129 deg.
Even though the logic circuitry was satisfied, there
was no real error signal and the roll axis was essentially
in a drift mode with the attitude control gas jets firing
at random due to background noise. The cumulative
action caused the spacecraft to drift primarily in a
direction of increasing clock angle. At some unknown
time during the drift, the star Alderamin was acquired
at a clock angle of 171 deg, after drifting about 42 deg.
Alderamin was about 0.05 times as bright as Canopus,
with a bright background, and the error signals were
too noisy to determine the time of acquisition.
On November 29, at 13:12:34 GMT, the spacecraft
went into an automatic roll search. At 13:26:15 GMT
after 13 rain and 41 sec of roll search, the star Regulus
was acquired at a clock angle of 278 deg. Lock was
maintained on Regulus until the next day, since Canopus
acquisition was not necessary to the mission at the time.
At 09:13:47 on November 30, DC-21 (roll override)
was sent and the star Naos was acquired at 09:20:56 GMT,
at a clock angle of 338 deg. Another DC-21 at
10:45:09 GMT caused _, Velorum to be acquired at a
clock angle of 343 deg at 10:46:00 GMT. Canopus was
acquired by a DC-21 initiated at 10:57:57 GMT and
lock was obtained at 10:59:38 GMT.
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c. Solar pressure vane operation. The first solar
pressure vane measurements were coincident with the
turn-on of the adaptive mode actuators at the time of
CC&S L-3 (initial star acquisition). It was then observed
that the vanes had been deployed beyond the nominal
position angle of 35 deg below the plane of the solar
panels. They were deployed in the following positions:
1) +X at 21deg, 2) -X at 15 deg, 3) +Y at 17 deg,
and 4) -Y at 7 deg.
The deployment failure was due to an unsuspected
source of friction that was present during ground testing,
but not present in the space environment. In spite of the
overtraveI, the center of pressure of the spacecraft was
behind the center of gravity such that there was a net
restoring torque of about 1.1 dyne-cm/deg about the
pitch axis and 1.7 dyne-cm/deg about yaw.
for the other direction. The vanes were stepped 0.01
deg by the actuator for each valve firing, in phase with
that firing. The differential firing of the valves caused
the vanes to be rotated in a direction to cancel the
torque causing the difference.
The +X and -X vanes, which control the yaw axis,
worked properly in the adaptive mode by canceling out
an initial unbalanced torque of about 25 dyne-cm,
probably due to the skewed angle of the high-gain
antenna. The +Y and -Y vanes were definitely in a
failed mode. The most likely explanation is that the
actuators were locked up electrically. The design was
such that within the first 30 msee of actuator turn-on,
if a gas jet fired, the actuator would lock up. The
telemetry data indicated that it was very likely that a
jet fired at that time.
In the adaptive mode of operation, stepping motor
actuators rotated the solar pressure vanes about their
deployed positions to cancel out unbalanced solar
torques. An unbalanced torque would cause the valves
for one direction to fire more frequently than the ones
The thermal actuators were designed to provide
damping such that after the stepping motor actuators
cancel out the unbalanced torque, the limit cycle damps
out within the deadband of the gas subsystem. The
thermal actuators are exposed differentially to sunlight
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by a Sun shade so that the varying angle with respect
to the Sun line causes the vanes to be rotated in a
direction to reduce slightly the restoring torque. This
should have caused the limit cycle oscillation to be
damped out eventually.
Because the +X and -X vanes were operating in
the adaptive mode to reduce the unbalanced torques,
they were expected to eventually operate in the thermal
mode to damp out the limit cycle. After the unbalanced
torque was reduced to about 5 dyne-cm, the disturbance
torques proved to be quite variable. The torques
changed by as much as 5 dyne-cm between valve firings.
Over longer periods, such as several weeks, the dis-
turbance torques varied as much as 25 dyne-cm. The
maximum restoring torque of the spacecraft over the
---+l/_-deg limit cycle was 0.85 dyne-cm and the vane
damping was 0.30 dyne-cmlL It was not possible for the
thermal actuators to perform their function under these
circumstances.
11This represents degraded performance due to over_avel at
deployment.
These varying disturbance torques were obviously not
solar torques. It is probable that they were due to the
normal leakage of the gas valves. The normal valve
leakage of 3.0 cc/hr at standard conditions actually
provides 16 dyne-cm/valve of torque ff it is assumed
that the nominal gas laws apply. There were 4 valves
controlling each axis, and the leakage has been observed
in testing to vary with valve actuation. Therefore, even
though the average leakage was known, it was obvious
that the leakage, and hence the torques, could vary
considerably over a period of time. If the seating char-
acteristics of the valves changed over a period of time,
long-term variations in the disturbance torques would
be expected, and as has been discussed, if the seating
for each valve firing was slightly different, then short-
term variations would be observed.
Since the long-term disturbance torques did vary, it
should be noted that the +X and -X vanes were
observed moving and canceling out these disturbances
in the adaptive mode of operation, Fig. 33. Figure 34
shows a representative limit axle plot for all three axes
during cruise.
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d. First trajectory-correction maneuver attempt
(aborted). The start of the first trajectory-correction
attempt (initiation of DC-27) took place at 14:35:00 GMT
on December 4. This command turns on the gyros for
warmup 1 hr before the start of the commanded
turns. At 14:35:47 GMT the gyros came on and started
to spin up. The spin-up of the gyros caused a dis-
turbance in the attitude control system and the pitch,
yaw, and roll error signals were driven over to one side
of the deadband. The roll channel, which was of par-
ticular interest, started limit cycling against the negative
side of the deadband with an angular excursion of 1 DN
which was a resolution of 0.41 mrad. After 49.3 see of
operation (11 frames of data) a large transient was ob-
served in the roll-error channel equivalent to -16.0 mrad.
The next data frame (4.2 sec later) showed the spacecraft
going into automatic roll search, which continued until
Earth light reflections caused an acquisition to occur at
14:52:32 GMT at a clock angle of about 90 deg.
The fact that the roll-error signal was forced to one
side of the deadband by the gyro spin-up was a com-
pletely expected, normal event. The huge transient in
the roll channel and subsequent loss of acquisition
necessitated the termination of the maneuver and caused
it to be postponed for one day. The one sample of roll
error of -16.0 mrad was impossible to explain by actual
spacecraft motion, because the impulse required is
catastrophic, and would have been observed in the
pitch and yaw channels and on the roll gyro, which it
was not. It was first thought that the signal was an
electrical transient of some kind.
In view of the experience and analysis in connection
with the loss of star acquisition in general, which
generated the minute-particle theory as the cause of
losses of acquisition, it now seems that the loss of
Canopus at the initiation of mideourse falls into the
same category. It is postulated that the time correlation
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of gyro warmup to subsequent loss of acquisition is due
to the gyro starting transient shaking loose particles
from the solar panels that were then driven in front of
the Canopus sensor by solar pressure or spacecraft static
charge. An instantaneous bright flash would cause a
high gate violation and a false error signal. Since the
resolution of events in this mode was 4.2 sec, it was
possible to miss obtaining a sample of the flash in the
brightness channel.
Ten DC-21s were transmitted before the spacecraft
reacquired Canopus. The high degree of correlation
between the a priori star maps and the telemetered data
can best be seen for this reacquisition. See Fig. 32.
The performance of the spacecraft at initiation of gyro
warmup prior to the start of the second and successful
midcourse sequence was identical to the first except for
the loss of acquisition.
e. Second traiectory-correction maneuver attempt
(successful). The start of the second trajectory-correction
maneuver attempt took place at the initiation of DC-27
at 12:25:13 GMT on December 5. The gyros went on
and the gyro spin-up caused the roll limit cycle to stay
on the negative side of the deadband, as in the first
maneuver try. It should be pointed out that this is
normal. After the gyros were up to speed, the roll limit
cycle was normal.
The maneuver consisted of a counterclockwise (ccw)
pitch turn of 39.16 deg and a cw roll turn of 156.07 deg.
The pitch turn starting transient was seen at
15:25:12 GMT and the stopping transient at 15:28:54
GMT. The start roll transient was at 15:47:10 GMT and
stopping transient at 16:01:19 GMT. The turns were
correct in every respect. The amount of overshoot in the
rate, plus position measurement scan during the starting
and stopping transients, was within the tolerances ex-
pected for the attitude control subsystem acceleration of
0.45 mrad/sec. This was the only good confirmation
available of the steady-state operation of the gas jets.
The start of motor burn was at 16:09:10 GMT and
stop at 16:09:30 GMT.
Sun reacquisition was commanded by the CC&S at
16:15:10 GMT. Since the pitch turn was of such a small
magnitude, the Sun acquisition was short, taking place
at 16:21:07 GMT. Again the Sun gate field of view was
seen to be 2.2 deg.
The Sun gate event started roll search for Canopus
and the first star acquired was _ Velorum at 16:44:36 GMT
at a clock angle of 342.8 deg. A roll override command
was initiated at 16:52:50, Canopus was acquired at
16:55:00 GMT, and regular roll control was established.
J. Autopilot perJormance. The successful trajectory-
correction maneuver was initiated at 14:25:13 GMT on
December 5 with gyro warmup. At 15:25:12 GMT the
attitude control subsystem was switched to inertial mode
and the commanded turns were started. The ccw pitch
turn was 39.16 deg and the cw roll turn was 156.07 deg.
These turn angles include a vernier adjustment in pitch
and roll to compensate for a known center-of-gravity
(cg) misalignrnent error. The action of the autopilot
under the known cg misalignment rotates the thrust
vector to the proper direction in inertial space.
A vernier adjustment was also made to the motor
burn time to compensate for jet vane drag. The com-
pensation was based on the predicted initial conditions
to the autopilot from the attitude control subsystem. On
the basis of the commanded turn angles, it was expected
that solar torques would keep both pitch and yaw
angular positions held against the negative side of the
attitude control deadband. This initial angular offset
caused the autopilot to drive the jet vanes hard over,
producing 6-lbf drag. The integral of the drag force
over the transient period following motor ignition pro-
vided the magnitude of the motor burn time correction.
The actual position of the spacecraft in the pitch and
yaw attitude control deadband was exactly as predicted.
The midcourse motor was ignited at 16:09:09.6 GMT
and burned for 20.4 sec. Four data points on the gyro
signals were received during the motor burn period.
Although this did not provide enough data for a thor-
ough analysis, three events of significance appeared to
fit the observed points. These were: 1) the first data
point after motor ignition indicated a transient over-
shoot in pitch and yawl2; 2) for the remaining three
points during the burn period, pitch and yaw main-
tained an equal and opposite offset, indicating a cg mis-
alignment angle of approximately 2.2 mrad or 0.064 in.;
and 3) a very slow motion in the roll channel may have
been a low-amplitude limit cycle due to friction in the
jet vane actuators. This limit cycle was theoretically
predictable and was observed in analog computer simu-
lations, but was not observed in previous spacecraft
_2This was expected from the known, initial conditions on the
autopilot.
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because of insufficient data during the midcourse
maneuvers.
The entire maneuver and the performance of all sub-
systems was very satisfactory. Subsequent tracking data
verified that the Mariner IV midcourse was very
accurate.
g. Cruise performance
Pitch and yaw control. The pitch and yaw control
systems have performed well throughout the entire
flight. One outstanding anomaly is the fact that the
minimum rate increment was twice what it should be,
but this is a system problem that is also observed in the
roll channel, and is discussed at length in the gas system
section. The position deadband was ±8.6 mrad and the
limit cycle rate increment is ±18.4 _rad/sec. The design
value rate increment was ±9.0 _rad/sec.
Roll control. The roll control system, like pitch and
yaw, exhibits an excessive rate increment (50% too
large). The deadband is ±4.5 mrad and rate increment
is -+-14.0 tzrad/see; the design value being ±9.0 tzrad/sec.
A significant problem in roll control observed through-
out the mission is the roll transient problem. The evi-
dence gathered indicates that roll transients are caused
by bright flashes, external to the spacecraft, detected by
the star sensor. Extensive PTM tests tended to deny the
possibility that the cause could be an internal electrical
problem. In addition, analysis seemed to rule out the
possibility that energetic particles or radiation were
interacting with the star sensor. The only reasonable
theory left was the external flash hypothesis. In the
early part of the flight, when the telemetry operated at
the high data transmission rate (12.6 sec between sam-
pies) there were several instances of excessive brightness
samples coincident with roll transients. If the transients
were caused by the bright flashes, the magnitude of the
transients indicated that their duration must be on the
order of less than a half second. This would explain why
a flash is seldom detected at the time of a transient.
The evidence led to the use of DC-15 to deactivate
the brightness gate logic to prevent loss of acquisition.
The validity of that decision is proved by the fact that
from that time there was never a loss of acquisition in
spite of about 40 observed roll transients. Subsequent
to MT-6 the low data rate of 50.4 sec between samples
precluded the observance of most brightness transients.
On June 9, however, a 25-times-Canopus brightness
telemetry sample was obtained coincident with a roll
transient.
The source of the bright flashes is still not known
positively. Some indication of the probable source is
found in the fact that of the four times that the space-
craft was mechanically disturbed from the cruise mode,
two were accompanied by vigorous roll transients. The
first was at gyro turn-on during the initial midcourse
attempt and the second was at the science cover de-
ployment. The mechanical disturbances themselves
could not explain the transients, but particles shaken
from the spacecraft such that they floated by the star
sensor could cause flashes. Before the flight, the cog-
nizant engineer reported that the extreme sensitivity of
the star sensor made it possible to detect particles
0.005 in. in diameter at 2500 ft from the sensor. It was
not suspected, however, that the spacecraft would pre-
sent a serious problem as a source of particles.
An explanation was sought for the source of the
continuing roll transients taking place during the long
cruise period. The hypothesis was advanced, with some
analytical justification, that undetectable mierometeor-
ites striking the solar panels could detach surface
particles, which float by the sensor. Occasionally, very
small rate impulses in the pitch or yaw channels were
observed to be correlated with roll transients. It was
suggested that a mierometeorite struck a solar panel,
imparting a pitch or yaw impulse, and dislodging a
particle which caused a roll transient. However, these
pitch and yaw impulses can as easily be explained as
crosscoupling effects from the roll axis, due to gas jet
and moment arm misalignment. The magnitude of the
impulses is about 15 to 20% of the roll impulse,
about the same observed in normal limit cycle operation.
It is interesting that the polarity of the pitch and yaw
impulses are always the same, independent of the roll
polarity. This would be the case if the positive and
negative roll iets have the same misalignment com-
ponents about the pitch (or yaw) axes.
It must be noted that there has never been a correla-
tion of a roll transient with a cosmic dust detector
micrometeorite event. However, this, along with the
foregoing discussion, does not rule out micrometeorites
as a cause for spacecraft particle generation. This
hypothesis postulates micrometeorites below the de-
tectable level. It does mean, though, that the micro-
meteorites hypothesis is not verifiable, even though it
stands as the most reasonable explanation for continuing
roll transients.
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Table 18 lists all of
throughout the mission.
the roll transients reported Control gas actuator subsystem. The gas-usage rate
throughout the mission was between 3 × 10 -2 and
Date Time, GMT
November 29, 1964 13:12157
November 30 13:41:00
December 2 10:09:00
4 14:36:31
i
f 23:29
5 16:56
7 12:29:41
8 i 0:43
9 05:35:36
13 20:48:27
14 22:51
17 05:36:15
07:16:43
_P
26 20:04:04
31 00:53:46
January 4, 1965 18:49:14
6 11 : 16:27
8 05:01:15
13 14:13:51
20 23:46:00
February 4 13:55
5 04:16
7 05140:00
Table 18. Roll transients observed
Event
Roll acquisition lost, gyros on. Low-gate
violation.
A transient was noted in the roll position
telemetry. Not severe enough to cause the
loss of Canopus acquisition.
Canopus acquisition lost, gyros on.
Approximately 52 sec after the initiation
of the midcourse sequence, roll acquisi-
i tion was lost and the spacecraft went into
roll search.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Canopus acquisition lost, gyros on.
Spacecraft in roll search.
Roll transient.
Gyros on, spacecraft in roll search during
one sample of the roll position channel.
Acquisition of the star y Velorum lost,
gyros on. Reacquisltion was immediate.
Roll transient.
Brightness transient noted on the
Canopus intensity channel. No loss of
acquisition occurred.
Acquisition of the star y Velorum lost,
gyros on. Reacquisition of y Velorum
was normal.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Large roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Large roll transient. Disturbances were
also seen in pitch and yaw.
Date Time, GMT
February 11, 1965 06158
12 02:53122
16 13147:24
27 13:56
March 11 04:47
14 02:17
18 01:03:50
April 7 11:10
11 06:18
15 09:55
24 23:47
June 9 11:41:05
10 19:54
11 15:40
12 08149
14 15:53
16 11:38
19 04:50
27 07:14
18:47
July 3 09:56
5 09:27
6 03:10
12 05:40156
06123:46
August 4 03:32
L 03:42
' 16:17
Event
A large roll transient was observed
coincident with science cover deploy-
ment and scan search initiation.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Extremely small roll transient.
Roll transient.
A vigorous roll transient was observed
coincident with a large change in
Canopus brightness and a visible impulse
on the spacecraft yaw axis.
Small roll transient.
A roll transient was observed coincident
with slight impulses in the pitch and
yaw axes.
Small roll transient.
Roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Roll transient.
Roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
Small roll transient.
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4 × 10-3 lb per day, indicating a probable total gas sys-
tem lifetime in excess of 4 yr from launch. The gas usage
rate is illustrated in Fig. 35.
During the flight it was noted that the minimum rate
increments that establish limit cycle performance were
about 200% in pitch and yaw, and 150% in roll,
of the design values. The attitude control gas system
operates in two modes: (1) steady state, where the
valves are activating longer than one second, and (2)
pulse mode, where the valves are activated for 20 msec.
Analysis of flight data indicates that in the steady state
mode the design acceleration was achieved from the
constant gas flow.
The pulse mode establishes the limit cycle rates by
generating a minimum impulse bit proportional to the
amount of gas expelled from the valve during one
20-msec pulse. The minimum rate increment was de-
signed to be that which is generated by a minimum
impulse bit obtained from 20 msec of steady state flow.
Aetually the dynamic flow characteristic of the valve-
plenum chamber-nozzle system has been found to create
a gas flow about 30 times the steady state flow during
the first 3 msec of valve actuation. Analysis indicates
that this fully explains the observed rate increments for
all three axes.
h. Encounter operation. During the encounter period,
the only discernible attitude control activity was the
scan platform motion effect on the attitude control limit
cycle activity. This was expected and was used to verify
proper scan operation.
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Fig. 35. Attitude control gas usage
No planetary effects upon the attitude control sub-
system operation were observed. No gravity gradient
torques, atmospheric torques, stray light reflections, or
radiation effects could be detected in the telemetry data.
3. Recommendations
a. Roll transient problem. The in-flight solution to
the roll transient problem was to disable the Canopus
sensor brightness gates. This was not without disad-
vantage, because the automatic reacquisition logic for
the attitude control subsystem is also disabled. Since the
high-brightness gate is required for initial acquisition
only 13, there is no reason that logic circuitry could not
be included to disable it automatically at gyro turn-off.
Whenever the gyros were off for cruise operation, the
high gate would be removed, therefore a bright flash
would not start a roll search, yet all of the other auto-
matic features of the subsystem would still be enabled.
b. Solar pressure vanes. From the beginning of the
flight, it has been noted that the damping mode, as de-
signed for the Mariner spacecraft, is not effective for
attitude control. It appears that a different design con-
cept such as active control would be required before
solar pressure damping could provide a practical means
of controlling spacecraft attitude.
The adaptive mode, however, has proved to be quite
adequate for its purpose. The basic problem in the
adaptive mode operation revolved around the extremely
slow response of the vanes, especially compared with
the rate of change of torques acting on the spacecraft. If
the Mariner damping mode is discarded, the step size
for the adaptive mode could be increased considerably 1.
and the offset torques would be rebalaneed quickly,
providing more efficient operation.
c. Gas valve transient flow. No reliable method had
been developed at JPL before launch to measure the
minimum impulses required from the gas jets, hence,
the transient effect went unobserved until the flight.
Because this is a primary spacecraft system, some con-
siderable effort should be made to develop this capabil-
ity as a regular flight test operation.
One simple way to solve the transient effect in the
valve design would be to restrict the poppet valve
exhaust orifice such that it approaches the gas jet
lSThe only object hrighter than Canopus in the sensor field of
view, during the flight, is the Earth at initial acquisition.
l_To perhaps 1 deg.
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nozzle in area. This would diminish the transient flow
to the steady state level. Decreasing the minimum-on-
time is not practical, since the transient flow takes place
in the first few msec.
F. Pyrotechnics
1. Description
The Mariner pyrotechnics control assembly (PCA)
supplies power and performs switching for seven
functions:
1. Pin retraction of eight solar panel latches
2. Pin retraction on one science platform latch
3. First start, PIPS motor
4. First stop, PIPS motor
5. Second start, PIPS motor
6. Second stop, PIPS motor
7. Solenoid release, science cover
The PCA receives 2.4-kc power from the bus, rectifies
this and charges capacitor banks. The energy in these
banks is switched upon command by solid-state switches
(silicon-controlled rectifiers or SCRs) to actuate pyro-
technic devices and the science cover solenoid release.
Telemetry measurements for in-flight monitoring of the
subsystem performance was limited to non-quantitative
event register indications. An indication of nominal cur-
rent being delivered to each squib bank during pyro-
technic firing and an indication of nominal voltage
appearing at the output to the solenoid during actuation
constituted the PCA flight engineering information.
2. Performance.
The subsystem performance appeared normal. PCA
events were received as expected.
Auxiliary events indicating squib firings were received
upon backup command for solar panel deployment. This
occurred during both Mariner HI and Mariner IV
launches and was accepted as a normal condition result-
ing from solar panel pin puller squib shorts. A nominal-
voltage-to-solenoid event was received as a part of the
planetary encounter sequence. This indicated that one
channel of the redundant PCA was still nominally
charged and functioning at encounter.
Critical parameters such as capacitor bank voltage
and leakage currents of the SCRs and capacitor banks
were not available.
3. Recommendations
No specific recommendations are presented for this
subsystem as a result of the flight information. Various
recommendations relating to the results of ground test-
ing and considered design improvements have been
documented elsewhere.
G. Postinjection Propulsion Subsystem (PIPS)
1. Description
The system is a monopropellant-hydrazine, regulated-
gas-pressure-fed, constant-thrust rocket.
The principal system components are:
1. Nitrogen tank (3000 psia high-pressure gas
reservoir)
2. Pressure regulator for reducing fuel tank inlet pres-
sure to a constant 310 psia
3. Propellant tank and propellant bladder which con-
tains the hydrazine
4. Rocket engine
5. Explosive valves
Thrust initiation and termination are controlled by
explosive valves which fire simultaneously to initiate
nitrogen, propellant and oxidizer flow; and terminate
nitrogen and propellant flow. Ganged valves in parallel
are used for the two-start requirement. A 15-cc slug of
N_O4 is injected for each of the two starts resulting in •
roughly, 1 sec of hypergolic bipropellant operation
which heats the catalyst bed so that monopropellant
decomposition can be sustained.
System design and operational philosophy is aimed at:
1. Maximizing reliability
2. Maximizing start and shutoff reproducibility
3. Minimizing preflight handling and spacecraft
interactions
4. Minimizing inflight electrical signals and sequencing
5. Minimizing number of system components
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2. Performance
a. Traiectortj-correction maneuver. Inflight telemetry
coverage of the Mariner IV PIPS has been excellent to
date. The reduced data for the nitrogen tank pressure,
propellant tank pressure, and oxidizer start cartridge
pressure are plotted in Fig. 36--38 respectively.
As depicted in Fig. 36, nitrogen tank pressure re-
mained constant up to the time of the postinjection
maneuver indicating a leak-tight system through boost
and during the 7-day pre-correction maneuver coast
period. This nominal nitrogen tank pressure would have
supported a maximum correction maneuver as limited
by the amount of fuel available, and resulted in a
maximum predicted velocity increment capability of
86.97 m/see.
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Fig. 37. Propellant tank pressure
The propellant tank pressure, Fig. 37, and oxidizer
pressure, Fig. 38, maintained a constant pressure prior
to launch and up to the time of the correction maneuver.
Based on the pressure regulator setting for the
Mariner IV PIPS, and nominal engine performance at
the expected jet vane deflection, an engine vacuum
thrust of 49.40 lbf was predicted. This thrust level along
with the velocity increment requirement of 16.70 m/see
and a spacecraft weight of 574.74 Ibm resulted in a
predicted motor burn time of 20.06 see. From the dopp-
ler shift data acquired during the correction maneuver
and from the thrust chamber pressure transducer, motor
ignition and thrust termination were verified, the burn-
ing time being as predicted. Further verification of
normal PIPS operation during the trajectory-correction
maneuver is provided by the post-maneuver propellant
tank and nitrogen tank pressures and temperatures.
Using these data and premaneuver nitrogen and pro-
pellant tank pressures and temperatures, the delivered
velocity increment was calculated to be within 5% of
the commanded maneuver. It should be noted that this
discrepancy between the aforementioned calculated
velocity increment and the command increment
(16.70 m/see) is well within the accuracy of the com-
putation and does not necessarily indicate an error in
the execution of the maneuver.
It is significant to note that because of the inclusion
of a timer shutoff mechanism in the Mariner spacecraft
a stringent total impulse predictability and reproduci-
bility requirement was placed on the PIPS. From the
data received, the propulsion subsystem performed very
well and within its design limits. In addition, the propul-
sion subsystem remained leak tight throughout the entire
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mission, presenting no anomalous torques to the space-
craft, and provided a reliable second trajectory correc-
tion capability.
b. Diagnosis of abnormal conditions.
Trajectory-correction period. The rocket-motor
chamber-pressure transducer indicated a higher than
expected value and the propellant-tank pressure trans-
ducer indicated a lower than expected value. However,
by comparing the propellant tank pressure transducer
calibration curve against the TA test history data, non-
]inearity in the region of operating pressure was appar-
ent. In addition, the motor chamber pressure transducer
was not pressure calibrated prior to flight.
Cruise period. On February 3, 1965 a pressure rise of
approximately 4 psi was noted in the fuel tank when all
other propulsion oriented pressures and temperatures
were dropping. This event was not totally unexpected.
A small amount of bladder/hydrazine incompatibility
was expected from past test history; however, in at-
tempting to explain the pressure rise the following three
cases were considered:
Case I -Pressure leaking through the nitrogen ex-
plosive valve (shutoff)
Case II-Pressure that is locked up between the
nitrogen explosive valve and the regulator
Case III-Pressure rise due to hydrazine/bladder
incompatibility
Cases I and II were examined by calculating the leak
rates that would result in the indicated pressure rise.
These data were not conclusive because the very low
magnitude of the pressures involved is on the threshold
of the telemetry resolution.
In support of Case III several bladder tests were
initiated and the preliminary data indicated that
bladder/hydrazine incompatibility fits into the pattern
of the actual data very well. Since the life-test system
bladder test results were similar to the actual flight
conditions, an attempt was made to duplicate the de-
graded condition of the life-test bladder. Under con-
trolled conditions, a sample of bladder material was
subjected to the temperature/pressure profile of the life
test. At ambient temperature in excess of +100°F,
decomposition of hydrazine, caused by the sample
bladder, produced an appreciable rate of pressure in-
crease in the sample vessel. Since reaction rates such as
those obtained with this bladder/hydrazine combination
are known to be extremely temperature dependent, the
effect on the system due to pressure rise is proportional
to the increase in the absolute value of the temperature.
For temperatures below + 100*F the rate of decomposi-
tion falls off sharply. However, it should be noted that
even at room temperature, -I-70*F, a finite decompo-
sition occurs.
3. Recommendations
a. PIPS. It would be most desirable to develop a
completely compatible bladder for a system of this type
in future applications. Although the present bladder
design proved capable and in fact accomplished the
mission objectives, a totally compatible bladder would
be a necessity in more sophisticated propulsion systems.
A significant weight and reliability gain would be
realized by using a spontaneous catalyst ignition tech-
nique instead of the bipropellant ignition system pres-
ently used. Use of a spontaneous catalyst would also
provide for a multistart concept enhancing the present
two-start capability.
b. SPAC evaluation
1. The actual flight SPAC operations were, in general,
operated in a satisfactory manner; however, the
data simulation for test purposes could be improved
so that it would be more meaningful to propulsion
personnel.
2. Since the necessity for a certain amount of docu-
mentation is unavoidable, the repetition of inputs
should be kept to a minimum. Daily reports for
instance, during inflight cruise phase could be
reduced to a weekly report with daily reports made
on a verbal basis except during emergencies.
3. A direct line of verbal communication should be
established between the SPAC representatives and
the technicians that distribute the incoming data.
This would help resolve problems of data distri-
bution in a faster manner.
H. Temperature Control
1. Description
a. Temperature control subsystem. The temperature
control subsystem is comprised of all devices and design
features employed for the purpose of maintaining tem-
peratures within specified bounds for subassemblies,
assemblies, and components of the spacecraft. Included
hardware are louvers, radiation shields, surface coatings,
and thermal insulation. Design details influenced by
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temperature control requirements include component
placement, methods of attachment, structural material
and configuration where conduction is important, and
surface finish of structure components.
The Mariner Mars 1964 bus temperature-control de-
sign provides isolation from solar heating, minimum
internal resistance to radiative and conductive heat
transfer, and active control for all bays except II and IV.
Protection from the variable Sun input is provided by
a multiple layer aluminized mylar upper thermal shield.
Relatively uniform internal temperatures are obtained
by using good thermally conducting joints and structural
materials and by treating interior surfaces to produce
high emittances. Bimetallic-actuated variable-emittance
louvers reduce the temperature variations caused by
changes in solar heating and internal power dissipation.
External science and appendages are separately and
passively controlled by surface property selection, regu-
lation of conduction paths, and selective Sun shielding.
Conductive and/or radiative thermal coupling with the
actively controlled bus is provided where possible to
minimize both transient and long-term temperature
variations.
b. Absorptivity standard. The absorptivity standard
is an engineering experiment flown to enable the space-
craft temperature control designers to:
1. Measure the solar absorptance a_ of four typical
spacecraft surfaces in real sunlight.
2. Measure the change or degradation of the surface
properties with time in space, and
3. Determine the effects of basing flight predictions
upon the temperatures measured during space
simulator testing.
The instrument works upon the principle of measuring
the temperature of an insulated flat plate normal to the
solar irradiation. The temperature measurement system is
designed to circumvent the possible 3*F inaccuracy of
the typical spacecraft thermister data. The time at which
a known temperature is reached is signalled rather than
telemetering a continuously varying temperature history.
The sensor system uses the mercury thread in special
thermometers to short out a series of resistances, pro-
viding large step change in the telemetry signal.
The four sample surfaces are: 1) ARF-2, a zinc oxide-
potassium silicate white paint; 2) Cat-a-lac black paint;
3) aluminum silicone paint; and 4) polished aluminum.
The ARF-2 sample contains a black stripe to prevent
freezing of the thermometer mercury and the polished
aluminum sample contains an ARF-2 stripe to cool the
sample to a level compatible with the structural plastic.
2. Performance
Monitored temperatures remained within allowable
limits throughout flight. Flight temperatures were gen-
erally lower than pre-launch predictions because simu-
lator tests were conducted at higher solar intensities
than those seen in flightlL The transient behavior of the
spacecraft in flight was similar to that exhibited in
prelaunch testing.
The flight results indicated that the thermal design
succeeded and that all thermal control hardware func-
tioned as designed. Discrepancies between predictions
and flight data were attributable to an imperfect under-
standing of test data and spacecraft characteristics, not
to hardware degradation or malfunctions. Specifically,
louvers, thermal shields, and surface coatings used on
Mariner IV reliably fulfilled mission requirements. The
relatively small Earth-to-Mars temperature drop within
the bus provided confirmation of proper louver behavior.
The absence of unexplainable temperature anomalies
verified the proper operation of the temperature control
subsystem as a whole. Louver position indicators showed
only fair correlation with corresponding bay tempera-
tures, however.
a. Cruise temperatures. As shown in Table 19, initial
cruise temperatures were considerably lower than pre-
dicted on the basis of space simulator testing. Those
items most sensitive to the solar input had the largest
discrepancies. The ion chamber and associated electron-
ics were 30°F cooler than predicted; the magnetometer
sensor was 20*F cooler, and the solar panels were
15" F low.
Postlaunch checks in the JPL 25-ft space simulator
indicated that the spacecraft was probably tested at a
solar intensity 11% high at Earth cruise and 17% high
at Mars cruise. The absorptivity standard black and
gray samples agree with these findings, as do the solar
panel temperatures. The problem appears to have been
caused by improper calibration or interpretation of the
reference thermopile, but no significant source of ther-
mopile error has yet been discovered.
_6Temperature histories are shown in detail in Appendix B.
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Table 19. Flight temperature evaluation
Channel
401
421
402
423
404
424
405
426
407
408
428
4O9
429
410
430
411
431
434
435
436
437
418
438
419
439
217
218
219
Temperature measurement
Bay I
Bay II
Bay III
Bay IV
Bay V
Crystal oscillator
Bay VI
Bay VII
Power regulator
PIPS nitrogen tank
Battery
Solar panel 4A1
Solar panel 4A5
Canopus sensor
Lower ring
Scan actuator
Upper ring
Upper thermal shield
Lower thermal shield
Tape recorder
SPITS
Television
Trapped-radiation detector
Ion chamber
Magnetometer
PIPS fuel tank
Affitude control +X/--Y nitrogen tank
Attitude control --X/-_Y nitrogen tank
•Cruise science off.
November
30, 1964
Earth cruise,!
oF
Predicted
Earth cruise,
oF
76
71
70
72
66
72
71
63
95
70
75
136
136
6O
63
71
87
223
--126
106
83
85
150
150
62
69
82
104
268
--95
68
37
38
81
70
71
46
46
97
100
July
13, 1965
Mars cruise,
oF
34
72
70
71
6O
41
51
54
6O
69
70
58
83
47
60
9
Predicted
Mars cruise,
oF
December
5, 1964
Midcourse
maximum,
oF
August
2, 1965
Playback _
minimum,
oF
54
80
78
76
89
85
74
80
69
77
75
68
11
52
55
50
46
82
--131
58
14
13
49
--19
--35
49
54
51
62
46
55
57
60
69
73
57
87
51
64
20
20
51
56
53
52
110
--105
60
26
26
55
10
--19
52
54
53
88
94
73
75
73
74
73
70
114
136
81
135
134
68
72
77
109
221
-- 126
70
39
39
84
95
102
84
77
76
54
33
34
47
59
68
69
57
77
38
57
8
9
49
53
44
37
80
--131
58
9
9
39
--28 b
--68
39
50
45
bEstimated.
Operating
tempecature
limits,
oF
14to 167
35 to 125
14 to 122
14 to 167
14 to 149
14 to 167
14to 167
30 to 131
14 to 167
35 to 125
40 to 140
lOto 175
10 to 175
Oto 100
-- 300 to 300
--30 to 200
--300 to 300
-- 200 to 300
--200 to 300
14 to 149
--20to 122
--4 to 104
14to 122
--22 to 158
--40to 131
35 to 125
40 to 140
40 to 140
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The above discrepancy does not provide the whole
answer to incorrect flight temperature prediction, how-
ever, since different components indicated different
amounts of intensity mismatch. For example, the solar
panels, bus, and ion chamber results require 10, 20, and
30% reductions, respectively, to explain the flight re-
sults. After correcting for the solar intensity, however,
flight temperatures are within the expected prediction
accuracy. The remaining errors are associated with the
failure to correct for inherent space simulator limita-
tions, such as decollimation of the solar beam and
extraneous inputs of thermal radiation. The Mariner
flight data have resulted in an improved understanding
of these error sources.
b. Deviations from post-launch predictions. Correla-
tion of temperature-time predictions, based on initial
flight data and simulator test results, is generally good,
subject to the following considerations.
A flight anomaly, apparent on inspection of predicted
vs actual flight data, was that induced by incorrect
solar panel temperatures during simulator tests. The
dummy panels were forced to 150" and 0*F at Earth
and Mars, respectively. Corresponding flight tempera-
tures are 135" and 10*F. On the basis of these tests, the
Earth-to-Mars temperature drop was overestimated for
bays which have radiative inputs from the panels; these
are primarily odd-numbered bays. The resultant error
is small and conservative, but the requirement for care-
ful test interpretation is clear.
The magnetometer temperature gradually departed
from the predictions, as shown in Fig. 39. By encounter,
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Fig. 39. Magnetometer temperature
the magnetometer was 6°F below the anticipated tem-
perature. This instrument had significant heat inputs
from both the Sun and internal power dissipation, and
a deficiency in either input could cause such a drop. The
playback mode turn-off of the magnetometer produced
a smaller temperature drop than experienced during
simulator tests, however; and this result gives a firm
indication of below normal power dissipation in the unit.
The lower thermal shield temperature was somewhat
lower than that observed during simulator tests, and the
temperature drop during flight was slightly less than
expected. These data indicate that a small heat input,
about 2% of a solar constant, to the bottom of the bus
existed during the simulator tests.
c. Launch and maneuver transients. Launch tempera-
tures were sufficiently low to prevent overheating during
ascent, parking orbit, and Sun acquisition. The launch
azimuth resulted in a moderate thermal environment.
The spacecraft separation occurred in the shadow of the
Earth, and the Sun acquisition time was relatively short.
At Sun acquisition, the temperature of the Canopus
tracker (100*F upper limit) was 70*F. A shroud-off
verification was obtained during the parking orbit by
comparing the temperatures of two solar panels.
No constraint was placed on the trajectory-correction
maneuver for thermal reasons. The pitch turn selected
did not cause extreme solar inputs. A mild heating
transient was caused by the increased solar heating,
increased power dissipation, and motor burn. All tem-
peratures remained within acceptable limits. The mag-
netometer sensor heated more rapidly than expected;
the discrepancy stemmed from an oversimplified tran-
sient thermal analysis. Many of the maneuver events
were verified by observation of changes in spacecraft
temperature distribution. A qualitative confirmation by
temperature measurements was obtained for changes in
power distribution, extent and direction of pitch and
roll turns, and motor firing.
d. Thermal effects of internal power changes. Gyro
turn-ons during the early days of flight caused some
variation in bus temperatures, particularly in Bay VII.
Long term gyro operation caused a 10*F rise in temper-
ature in this bay.
Fifteen days after launch, the power amplifiers werc
switched in the radio transmitter in Bay VI. The re-
suiting increase in power dissipation resulted in a 9*F
increase in the temperature of Bay VI and a general
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increase of I*F in the bus temperature. These changes
were very nearly the same as experienced in pre-flight
space simulator tests.
The cover drop and battery charger turn-off on the
75th day of the flight combined to lower bus and scan
platform temperatures. Bay I dropped 5*F and cooled
adjacent bays slightly. The scan platform temperature
dropped 8°F due to the increase in unblocked radiation
area and the decreased heat input from the bus. Since
the Mars cruise temperature predictions were based
implicitly on a charger-off condition, the bus tempera-
tures after the turn-off were nearer the nominal values.
The slight rise in television temperature at the begin-
ning of the scan sequence coupled with the temperature
drop after television turn-off provided confirmation of
normal television power dissipation and of a normal
science cover drop. These data are in good agreement
with corresponding space simulator results.
e. Encounter and playback remits. Encounter warm-
ing transients, Fig. 40, were similar to those experienced
during the cover drop exercise. The battery charger
turn-off earlier in flight resulted in more pronounced
temperature rises at encounter than occurred during
corresponding simulator tests, a6
Bus temperatures, particularly those in Bay III,
showed a sizable temperature drop during the playback
sequence due to the turn-off of cruise science. This drop
averaged about I*F more than experienced in pre-flight
tests, probably because the louvers were more nearly
dosed (and therefore less effective) in flight. The mag-
netometer temperature-drop was 12*F less than ex-
pected, which indicates that the power dissipation in
this sensor was less than had been assumed. A gradual
decrease in power consumption during the flight seems
likely. The ion chamber temperature transducer dropped
leThe net power increase was greater in flight than in tests.
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off scale during playback which prevented an estimation
of this unit's power consumption. Such an estimate
would have been very helpful in failure mode analysis.
Bus temperatures returned to their pre-playback levels
at the end of playback. This repeatability rules out
louver hysteresis caused by bearing friction.
_. Absorptivity standard. The absorptivity standard
has provided good information regarding the degrada-
tion of surfaces in space and the problems arising from
the testing in the JPL space simulator. The determina-
tion of a, in space has not been successful because the
radiation and conduction losses are too large. The ratio
of a, at any given step to the _ at the initial step is
plotted in Fig. 41.
One of the first results noticed was that the ARF-2
paint was yellowing or degrading at a rate much greater
than expected due to ultraviolet (UV) exposure. This
has continued at a pace about ten times as rapid as
measured during the development of this coating. Sub-
sequent ultraviolet exposure tests on ARF-2 samples
prepared at the same time as the flight surfaces show
rapid degradation, raising the question of the validity
of predicting a paint's performance without additional
tests of samples prepared and applied by the user.
It was found that the wiring was reversed between
the Cat-a-lac black and aluminum silicone sample
sensors. The sensor idiosyncrasies made this deduction
concrete by mid-January 1965. This embarrassing prob-
lem probably is due to the cable harness being fabri-
cated to an obsolete drawing. Once this error was
discovered, the data for the Cat-a-lac black paint was
very consistent and predictable, showing negligible deg-
radation. On February 13, 1965 another interesting event
occurred when the black sample switched a month
prematurely. This was attributed to a design oversight.
The thermometers are insensitive to 100-g accelerations
when the mercury meniscus is within the capillary;
but, when the meniscus extends into the gas chamber, the
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thermometer is vulnerable to shocks. During the mid-
course maneuver, the sample temperature was such that
the mercury of the No. 4 thermometer was probably
advanced into the gas chamber and the accelerations of
the squibs and midcourse motor shook some mercury
loose, changing the calibration. Each sensor contains
four mercury thermometers in this sensor; the first three
thermometers overlap in the temperature range of 275
to 208°F, while the fourth thermometer spans 180
to 130 °F.
The aluminum silicone paint had degraded more than
expected but the degree is uncertain due to sensor
calibration shifts.
The polished aluminum sample showed an early
degradation greater than that due to the ARF-2 stripe
alone. After the first two steps, the data paralleled the
degradation due to the stripe alone. This would indicate
that perhaps the metallic surface was vacuum cleaned
early in the flight and then did not further degrade. Two
P/FRs were written against the sample. The third (final)
step of the No. 3 thermometer never occurred and the
first step of the No. 4 thermometer occurred early. The
missing step is attributed to a broken thermometer and
the early step is due to the same design oversight
mentioned for the black sample.
The absorptivity standard showed that the space
simulator has solar simulation intensity problems as
well as spectral mismatch problems. Comparison of the
simulator test and flight data of the black and aluminum
silicone samples reveal that the simulator intensity was
10% higher than the simulator instrumentation said.
The _ of the ARF-2 and polished aluminum for the
JPL solar simulation are respectively 37 and 9% greater
than for sunlight.
3. Recommendations
a. Temperature control subsystem. On the basis of
Mariner IV flight results, the following recommenda-
tions are made:
, Future flights should include temperature trans-
ducers specifically located to aid in thermal data
analysis. On Mariner IV, for example, solar simu-
lator decollimation effects could have been eval-
uated with a transducer on the low-gain antenna;
transducers on the high-gain feed and plasma
probe would have provided valuable information
on the UV degradation of white paints.
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2. A more conservative approach to the temperature
control of isolated components is recommended.
Small items such as the magnetometer are in-
herently sensitive to small changes in their thermal
balance. Contingency heater power or lightweight
active control devices should be considered for
such components in future missions.
3. Comprehensive and painstaking checkout of space
simulator facilities should be performed before
committing to a flight design based on test. Par-
ticular emphasis should be placed on the evalua-
tion of solar simulator performance and on the
detection of extraneous heat inputs from chamber
walls.
4. The use of temperature control surfaces subject to
degradation in flight should be avoided. Sunlit
white paints should be eliminated when possible
by the use of Sun shields and/or configuration
control.
5. Improved louver position indicators should be
developed.
6. Parametric tests should be performed to evaluate
the effects of changes from design thermal condi-
tions. Parameters of interest are internal power
dissipation, solar heat inputs, and radiation and
conduction coupling.
b. Absorptivity standard. The information gained
from the absorptivity standard has proved of much value
even though all objectives were not met. The following
recommendations are made:
1. An instrument, although perhaps not the present
absorptivity standard, to verify as predictions and
to measure the degradation of surface properties
of new surface treatments would be of value on
future flights.
2. If the present instrument concept is to be used in
the future, the design should be improved to
reduce the heat leaks.
3. Type approval level tests on modified hardware
have shown that the unit is structurally over-
designed. A lighter, modified structure and a re-
design of certain components is recommended.
4. The temperature sensor system had problems but
was basically sound. The problems encountered in
flight can be easily remedied if this design concept
is used again.
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5. The use of mercury step thermometers to calibrate
resistance thermometers may be useful in other
design applications.
I. Data Automation Subsystem
A digital computer is required to provide a unified
electrical interface between the varied science instru-
ments and the spacecraft. On Mariner IV, this subsystem
was called the data automation subsystem (DAS). The
DAS automatically controls and synchronizes the data
gathering sequence of all science instruments and pro-
cesses and formats all the diversified science data into
a single, continuous bit stream of ls and 0s for the
telecommunications subsystem, with a separate bit
stream for the video storage subsystem.
The DAS sends and receives commands as required
by the spacecraft or mission profile, and processes
ground commands to the science instruments. All science
data is formatted and identified so that every bit is
unique and can be referenced to its source in time and
space.
1. Description
Each of the science instruments is sampled at a
different rate and in a different format. The data are
converted from the form presented by the instrument
such as serial, parallel, analog-to-digital conversion,
pulses which must be counted, etc., into a single, serial
bit stream which is transmitted to the spacecraft telem-
etry system for transmission to Earth. Some data are
submitted to the tape machine for recording and later
transmission to Earth. The only functions which bypass
the DAS (going from and to the science instruments
directly from the spacecraft), are the 2.4-kc power from
the power subsystem and the temperature measurements
which are performed by the data encoder. The DAS
receives commands from the spacecraft and issues com-
mands to the spacecraft, as required to perform the
science mission. The DAS provides identification infor-
mation to the data such that each block of data bits is
uniquely identified so that those science measurements
represented by any block of data may be placed in
time and thus in space through the knowledge of the
spacecraft trajectory. The DAS processes not only scien-
tific measurements, but also performs science subsystem
performance measurements to help in the engineering
evaluation of the science payload. Also, performance
data assist in the calibration of the science instruments
to provide confidence in the science data.
The DAS weighs approximately 12 lb and requires a
maximum of 10.7 w. The system contains 11,021 electronic
components in a volume of approximately 380 in?
(6 × 7½ × 8½ in.). The acceptable operating tempera-
ture range extends from -10" to +75"C. With a few
minor exceptions, all signals between the DAS and the
spacecraft or between the DAS and the science instru-
ments, are ac-coupled through transformers.
a. Real time DAS. The real time (RT) DAS is that
portion of the DAS which operates continuously. It is
turned on after launch and remains on until after the
Mars encounter. The RT DAS sequences the cruise
instruments and collects their data for transmission to
the data encoder and thence to Earth. The cruise in-
struments consist of the following: helium magnetom-
eter; plasma probe; ion chamber; cosmic dust detector;
trapped radiation detectors; cosmic ray telescope.
These instruments gather data in the near-Earth en-
vironment, in deep space (in the interplanetary environ-
ment), and in the near-Mars environment.
For the majority of the mission, the spacecraft telem-
etry system is in the Mode 2 or cruise mode. In this
condition, each spacecraft data frame contains 420 bits
of data and is composed of two portions: one portion
contains 140 bits of spacecraft engineering data from
the data encoder; the other portion contains 280 bits
from the data automation system. This is the science
portion of each frame. The DAS divides the 280 bits
into 10-bit segments so that there are 28 words in the
science portion of the format. The science instruments
do not necessarily require 10-bit words; some require
more, some less. Therefore, the 10-bit words are, in
some cases, combined or divided to provide the neces-
sary length data word for the appropriate measurements.
During the Mars encounter period when the NRT
DAS is operating, the real time (RT) DAS also sequences
the data gathering from the scan subsystem and the tele-
vision subsystem (except for video data). These data are
combined with the other cruise science data and, when
the telemetry switches to Mode 3, then all 420 bits of
each frame of data are used by science and contain
science data. The 280 bits originally transmitted remain
essentially the same, while the extra 140 bits contain the
scan and television information, along with additional
measurements of some of the cruise information.
Conversion of analog data to a digital format is one
of the prime functions of the DAS. For the helium
magnetometer, which has three axes (X, Y, and Z), the
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l('r DAS performs three simultaneous A/D conversions.
Six unipolar analog-to-pulse width (A/PW) converters
are installed physically in the magnetometer. These
comprise three bipolar ADCs when operated in con-
junction with three 10-bit registers in the DAS. To
perform the conversion, the DAS sends a start pulse to
the A/PW converters in the magnetometer. This begins
the analog comparison. Simultaneously with the start
pulse, the DAS begins to count 55.5 kc into the three
DAS registers (the X, Y, and Z registers). When an
analog reference becomes equal to the input of mag-
netometer data, a stop-pulse is sent from the appropriate
converter to the corresponding DAS register. This pulse
stops the 55.5 kc count in the DAS counter-shift register.
It also determines the polarity of the conversion. This
polarity is indicated by the tenth bit in the DAS register;
0 indicating a positive conversion, 1 indicating a
negative conversion. The remaining nine bits contain the
binary number proportional to the analog signal which
was measured, 511 being full scale (binary all ones) and
equal to 6v.
After the three stop pulses, all three registers then
have data indicating the magnetic amplitude for three
axes. At the appropriate moment, the data are shifted
from the X register into the telemetry bit stream. Then
the Y register is shifted, and finally the Z register. In
this manner, the three analog-to-digital A/D conver-
sions are performed simultaneously, but the data flow
into the bit stream in a bit-by-bit fashion. Similar A/D
conversions are performed in the plasma probe instru-
ment, in the scan instrument, and in the television
instrument. In each of these cases, however, each con-
version is unipolar, leaving the tenth bit always zero.
The plasma probe has 72 steps in its sequence. The
DAS provides a stepping pulse to advance the next
level prior to each A/D conversion. The plasma probe
only requires one ADC. Similarly, the scan has only one
ADC; however, it has six different inputs to the converter.
These are switched with reed switches in the scan upon
command from the DAS prior to each A/D conversion.
The television operates essentially the same as the scan,
with one ADC having two inputs and switched by reed
switches as commanded by the DAS. The UV instrument
requires two ADCs with three inputs. One input is con-
nected to one ADC and the other two inputs are alter-
nately switched to the second converter upon command
of the DAS. This completes the analog-to-digital conver-
sion system of the RT DAS.
The particle instruments require a different technique
for data conversion. For the trapped radiation detector
the DAS provides a 20-bit counter. Each frame of 420
bits of science and engineering data requires 50.4 sec
to be transmitted at the cruise bit rate of 81/a bits per
see (bps). Thus, the frame period is 50.4 sec. There are
five trapped radiation detectors and one geiger tube
(which is associated with the ion chamber experiment).
Every eight DAS frames, one of the six detectors is
observed by the DAS through a gate which opens for
45 sec and allows the pulses for this interval to accumu-
late in a 20-bit counter. If this counter should count
high enough to place a one in the 20th stage, then a
divide-by-four pre-scaler is inserted into the count so
that the counter now becomes a 22-bit counter. After
the 45-sec gate has closed, the most significant ten bits
of the counter are parallel-dumped into the X shift
register of the DAS and are shifted out to the telemetry
bit stream. Then the second ten bits of the counter are
parallel-dumped into the X register and are shifted out
to the telemetry bit stream. Thus the telemetry bit
stream contains twenty bits in series indicating the
number of pulses from one of the detectors in a 45-see
period. If the 20th bit is a 1, the data must be multiplied
by four and added to 2 TM, the original number of counts
which caused the 20th stage to shift to 1. Of the six
detectors, four are observed once in every eight DAS
frames. The other two detectors are each observed twice
during the eight-frame period.
The ion chamber is handled in a somewhat different
manner by the RT DAS. This is because there is usually
a larger period between pulses for the ion chamber
than for the other particle detectors. For instance,
during normal cruise the ion chamber may only pulse
once every 7 or 8 min, compared to several pulses per
see for the trapped radiation detectors. Therefore, the
DAS accommodates the dual possibilities for the ion
chamber by measuring the time between pulses and/or
the total number of pulses occurring within each frame.
This is accomplished by one 10-bit counter in the DAS
which is divided into two portions. The first portion is
a 3-bit counter. This counts the number of pulses in a
frame, up to the maximum of seven. In the average
frame, the number of pulses in this counter will be either
0 or 1. The second portion of the counter consists of
six stages which count time from the beginning of the
frame until the first pulse occurs. A time pulse occurs
every ten bits of telemetry data, or every 1.2 sec at
8% bps. Therefore, each frame has a maximum possibil-
ity of 42 time pulses (equalling 50.4 see) in this six-stage
counter. This would occur if no ion chamber pulses
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were counted. If the ion chamber did pulse during this
frame, a count would be noted in the first three bits of
the counter. The time of this pulse would be noted in
the second six bits of the counter because, when the
pulse arrives, the time count stops. Now, if an additional
pulse were to arrive, it would also be counted in the first
three bits while the time count would remain unchanged,
representing only the time of the first pulse. The same is
true for three pulses, four, five, and six. On the seventh
pulse, however, the time counter is reset and connected
as an overflow counter to the first three bits so that time
is lost, but now the measurement is performed by a single
nine-stage ion pulse counter. This is useful during a flare
period where the ion chamber pulses a large number of
times in a frame. Under these conditions, the precise
period between pulses is relatively unimportant com-
pared to the total number in a given frame. In this
manner, a total of 511 pulses can be counted. The tenth
bit in this counter is simply the indicator for whether
the six bits are time or overflow pulses from the basic
three-stage counter. A 0 indicates that the 6 bits are
time and a 1 indicates all 9 bits represent the total
number of counts from the ion chamber for this particu-
lar frame of 50.4 sec.
The cosmic ray telescope has two 10-bit registers
divided into several counters. However, the DAS treats
these as two 10-bit counters. To transfer the data from
the cosmic ray telescope to the DAS, the DAS selects
one of the two counters and transmits 111-kc pulses to
it while simultaneously counting the 111-kc pulses in
one of the DAS registers. The cosmic ray telescope
counts the 111 ke in its counter. When this counter
reaches overflow, a stop pulse is sent to the DAS. The
DAS then stops sending lll-kc pulses and stops count-
ing. The DAS now has a number in its register which
is indicative of the number originally in the cosmic ray
telescope counter. This number, which is the data
complement, is now shifted bit-by-bit into the telemetry
data stream.
The remaining instrument in the cruise science com-
plement is the cosmic dust detector. This instrument has
two 8-bit output registers. The DAS makes a parallel
conversion from one of the cosmic dust registers into the
DAS X-register, i.e., eight wires carry eight bits simul-
taneously. This is initiated by the DAS dump command
and causes the cosmic dust detector to alternately select
one of its two registers. Thus it is seen that the RT DAS
is required to perform many types of data conversions.
This is required because of the varied design of the
instrument interfaces. In addition to all of the DAS data
conditioning functions, the DAS also maintains a clock
which counts every bit, every word, and every frame up
to a maximum of 2,048 or 2 ll. This counter overflows
approximately every 282/3 hr at 81/3 bps. At this time the
count starts over again and calibration signals are sent
to each of the instruments which require them: the
magnetometer, the cosmic dust detector, and the cosmic
ray telescope all use these calibrate signals to prove the
validity of the scientific data generated by these instru-
ments. The DAS clock frame count is shifted to the te-
lemetry bit stream to uniquely identify each frame of
data. The RT DAS also provides status information of
various spacecraft events pertaining to the science mis-
sion and a pseudonoise sequence at the beginning of each
frame to use as a reference starting point for the data.
b. NRT DAS. NRT DAS is dormant for the majority
of the mission. It is normally turned on a few hours
prior to Mars closest approach. At this time, the scan,
television, NRT DAS, and video storage subsystem are
all turned on and begin functioning. The NRT DAS is
completely independent of the RT, and vice versa. Each
has a separate power supply and sequencer. The NRT
primary function is to provide the sequencing for the
television recording portion of the encounter.
After turn-on, the NRT DAS begins issuing shutter
commands to the television every 48 sec. It issues stop-
tape commands to the video storage subsystem two times
in each 144-see period. It also issues line start and stop
commands to the television, and A/D conversion com-
mands similar to those issued by the RT DAS. At 8½
bps, the telemetry bit rate, each bit period requires
120 msec. This is used as the sync for line start. That is,
each line of the television picture requires 120 msec to
record.
The NRT timing is derived from a crystal oscillator
which runs at 111 kc. This frequency is counted down
through a 15-stage counter to make a basic period of
115.2 msec. All the microsequencing in the NRT DAS
is performed in this period. The basic sync is the
telemetry bit sync. When a bit sync occurs, this 15-stage
counter begins to count. When it reaches 115.2 msec the
count is inhibited until the next bit sync pulse (which
occurs 4.8 msec later). Furthermore, each bit sync pulse
is counted in a nine-stage counter which counts up to
200. This makes up the 200 television lines. The output
of this counter is fed into a subframe counter which
counts each 24-sec period (200 television lines). The
subframe counter counts to six before recycling. Thus,
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dn NRT frame is made up of 144 sec which are six 24-sec
periods, each 24-sec period being made up of two
hundred 120-msec periods, the 120-msec period being
the basic line rate. In the 144-sec NRT frame, a tele-
vision picture is recorded during the first 24-sec period;
during the third 24-sec period, a second picture is re-
corded, to make an overlapping pair.
Recording occurs at 10.7 kc, which is the rate of
transmission of data from the DAS to the video storage
subsystem. The television, however, must scan at a
high rate, with the result that the data from the tele-
vision to the DAS occurs at 83.3 kc. This mismatch of
data rates requires that the NRT DAS provide buffering
between television and video storage subsystem. This is
accomplished through the use of two 1320-bit buffers.
While one buffer is being loaded with information, the
second buffer is being read out to the video storage sub-
system. When the second buffer is empty, the first buffer
is read out to the video storage subsystem and the sec-
ond buffer is filled with new information. In this man-
ner the buffers transmit alternate television lines to the
video storage subsystem.
Each television line of information contains 1200 bits
of television data, derived from 200 elements with six
bits per element, for a total of 1200. In addition, the
DAS provides a 31-bit pseudonoise sequence to identify
the start of each line of data. Also provided are: four
bits for frame count to indicate of which picture pair
this line is a member, three bits for subframe count to
indicate which of the two pictures of the pair this line
is a member, nine bits for the line number count, three
bits for commutated digital television performance data,
one bit of RT information, ten bits of commutated analog
performance data, and an average of 23 spare bits at the
end of each line.
The various blocks of bits are dropped into the
buffer at various times within the 120-millisecond period.
They are generated at various rates; for instance, the
31-bit pseudonoise sequence is generated at 13.9 kc,
but the 1200 television bits are generated at 83.3 kc and
only take up 14.4 msec of the total 120-msec line period.
In addition to the 200 lines of television information
sent to the video storage subsystem, an extra buffer load
of information is sent at the beginning of each television
picture. This is required because 80 zeros must be sent
to the video storage subsystem to synchronize its timing
before proper recording can commence.
All sequencing of the television and the buffers and
the transmission of the data to the video storage subsys-
tem begins at power turn-on and continues throughout
the operation. The only function inhibited is the issuance
of start-tape commands. These commands are not issued
until the narrow-angle planet-in-view signals occur. Prior
to that time, in the nominal encounter sequence, the scan
system would have locked onto the planet and begun to
track it. When planet tracking commences, the scan sub-
system sends a wide-angle planet-in-view to the NRT
DAS. This causes the DAS to issue a switch-to-Mode 3
command to the data encoder, which in turn causes all
of the 420 RT telemetry bits to be allotted to the science
RT DAS.
Then, when the planet comes into the field of view
of the narrow-angle Mars gate and the television, these
instruments send a narrow-angle planet-in-view to the
NRT DAS. This initiates the NAS condition which in
turn causes the NAA condition. At NAS, a signal is sent
to the scan instrument, inhibiting any further motion.
That is, 400-cycle power is removed from the scan motor.
The condition of NAA allows the recording sequence
to start. Depending on the condition of the DAS clock,
the recording sequence will commence when the
clock reaches the appropriate point in timing after NAA
has occurred. When this time is reached, a start-tape
command is issued to the video storage subsystem. This
starts the record motor on the video storage subsystem,
which takes several seconds to reach record synchroniza-
tion speed. A shutter command is issued to the television
3.6 sec after the tape-start command. The television then
takes a picture which is retained in the vidicon. The
DAS then immediately sends a television line-start com-
mand which causes the television to scan one line of the
television picture. This information is loaded into the
buffer and then to the tape machine, as previously de-
scribed. After 24 sec and 200 lines, the first picture has
been recorded and a tape-stop command occurs to stop
the tape machine. Another start occurs 20.4 sec later.
Then, 3.6 sec later, the next shutter occurs, followed by
the next picture. Finally, 24 sec later, the stop-tape com-
mand occurs, followed by a 68.4-sec period before the
next start-tape command. Thus, in a 144-sec period, the
television has taken three pictures, two of which have
been recorded by the tape machine. This sequence is
repeated until one of the conditions required for termi-
nation of television recording occurs.
After the beginning of Picture 19, if the second end-
of-tape occurs, recording ceases; that is, the DAS will
not send any more start-tape commands. If the second
end-of-tape does not occur by the end of Picture 22,
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further recording is inhibited regardless of end-of-tape.
In addition to this mechanization of the DAS, the video
storage subsystem automatically stops itself and inhibits
further starts when it reaches the second end-of-tape. If
the second end-of-tape occurs during Pictures 19, 20, or
21, a switch-to-Mode 2 data command is immediately
sent to the data encoder. If the second end-of-tape occurs
during Picture 22, the switch-to-Mode 2 data command
is issued at the end of Picture 22. In either case, this
mode switch command causes the telemetry system to
be switched back to the condition of 280 bits for the
RT DAS and 140 bits for the engineering data encoder.
No further science events occur until the NRT DAS
and encounter instruments are turned off several hours
after Mars closest approach. Later, the RT DAS and
cruise instruments are turned off and the tape machine
commences the playback. This is essentially the end of
the mission for the science system and the DAS, al-
though the option exists after playback is complete, to
again turn on science and the RT DAS in the cruise
mode.
2. Performance
The DAS was designed to sequence the science in-
struments and to process science data into a format
suitable for RT telemetry and NRT recording. Every
DAS function has performed exactly as intended for the
entire mission and continues to operate in an exemplary
manner.
a. RT DAS. At the turn-on of science power after
launch, the DAS began operation, sequencing the RT
science instruments in their data gathering and then
processing this data from all of the various forms from
different instruments into a continuous, serial stream of
data to the telecommunications subsystem. Since that
turn-on, the RT DAS has functioned continuously, with
two short commanded interruptions, precisely correct,
without a single anomaly. Every bit of data produced
by every instrument was sent to telemetry at exactly the
correct instant in exactly the correct form.
In the more than 26,000,000 see of operation during
Phase I of the Mariner IV mission, over 200,000,000 bits
of data have been processed by the RT DAS. One flip-
flop has changed state well over two trillion (2 × 10 TM)
times without missing a beat. The system operated cor-
rectly from almost 32 to 80*F at various points in the
mission.
b. NRT DAS. The NRT DAS was operated three
times during the mission. It was first turned on for a
short period at the science cover deployment exercise.
The correct operation at this time gave confidence that
encounter would be successful.
At Mars, the NRT DAS was turned on for the second
time, after five months of non-operation in space. Its
primary function was to sequence the TV system and,
through the use of buffers, to change the 83-kc TV data
to 10.7-kc data for the tape machine and to synchronize
the tape machine recordings in proper sequence. In
addition, the NRT DAS had to generate identification
information and interleave TV engineering data and RT
science data with the TV picture data transmitted to the
tape machine. Furthermore, the initiation and cessation
of the recording sequence and the switching of telemetry
modes was controlled by the NRT DAS. Table 20 lists
the encounter event times as determined from DAS data
to the best possible accuracy. These times are all
referenced to TTY print times (except command initiate
times), so that, to be absolutely correct, 0.3 sec of fixed
TTY delay should be subtracted from each time.
Every NRT function was performed exactly as de-
signed. Every goal was fulfilled, thus providing the first
pictures of Mars.
The only DAS events which could, even remotely, be
considered non-standard for the entire mission, were two
extra EOT events monitored through the RT data. These
events were, in all probability, noise spikes on the EOT
line. The DAS monitor flip-flop is quite sensitive and
noise pulses would trigger it just as full-sized EOT
pulses from the video storage subsystem would. The DAS
was performing exactly as designed in every aspect, even
when recording noise spikes. It is especially interesting
to note that, functionally, the DAS ignored the spikes,
even while monitoring them. It was purposely designed
to not act on any EOT pulse prior to the beginning of
Picture 19.
c. TV haze calibration. The NRT DAS was turned on
for 4 hr, 14 min and 1.6 sec during the television calibra-
tion recording sequence on August 30, 1965. The first
shutter pulse occurred 20.3 see after turn-on. Tele-
vision and DAS personnel computed time for the initia-
tion of DC-16 to cause the second recorded picture to be
taken through the red filter No. 2 in gain 01 (the mini-
mum possible gain under these conditions). This calcula-
tion was based on knowledge of the filter position at
turn-off at Mars encounter (green No. 2) and on the
period of NRT operation for the initial attempt or_
August 21, 1965 (1 hr, 6 min, 14 sec), plus observation
of Mode 3 data to derive the RT/NRT relationship.
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Table20. DASdatatimesatencounter
Event Ground initiate Spacecraft Ground verify Uncertainty a
DC-25
MT-7
DC-24
DC-3
WAA (SPIV)
HAS
HAA
First start tape
No. 1 shutter
No. 2 shuffer
No. 3 shuffer
No. 4 shutter
First EOT event
No. 5 shutter
No. 6 shutter
DC-16
No. 7 shutter
No. 8 shutter
No. 9 shutter
Second EOT event
No. 10 shutter
No. 11 shutter
Third EOT event
No. 12 shutter
No. 13 shutter
No. 14 shutter
No. 15 shutter
No. 16 shutter
No. 17 shutter
No. 18 shutter
No. 19 shutter
No. 20 shutter
End NAMGA
14:27:55
NA b
17:10:18
22:10:29
NA
NA
NA
HA
HA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
00:11:57
NA
NA
HA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
14:40:32.8
15:41:48.9
17:22:55
22:23:07
23:42:00.3
00:16:50.1
00:17:21.1
00:18:29.6
00:18:33.1
00:19:21.1
00:20:57.1
00:21:45.1
00:22:30.3
00:23:21.1
00:24:09.1
00:24:36
00:25:45.1
00:26:33.1
00:28:09.1
00:28:23.1
00:28:57.1
00:30:33.1
00:30:54.3
00:31:21.1
00:32:57.1
00:33:45.1
00:35:21.1
00:36:09.1
00:37:45.1
00:38:33.1
00:40:09.1
00:40:57.1
00:42:14.7
14:52:32.3
15:53:48.6
17:34:55
22:35:08
23:54:01.6
00:28:51.5
00:29:22.5
00:30:31
00:30:34.5
00:31:22.5
00:32:58.5
00:33:46.5
00:34:31.7
00:35:22.5
00:36:10.5
00:36:37
00:37:46.5
00:38:34.5
00:40:10.5
00:40:24.5
00:40:58.5
00:42:34.5
00:42:55.7
00:43:22.5
00:44:58.6
00:45:46.6
00:47:22.6
00:48:10.6
00:49:46.6
00:50:34.6
00:52:10.6
00:52:58.6
00:54:15.2
aApplies to Ground initiate when applicable; when Ground initiate is NA, Uncertaintyapplies to SpacecraFtcolumn.
bNA, abbreviation for Not applicable
--0.1 "t-1.0
--0.3 sec
--0.1 -t-1.0
--0.1 +1.0
± 10.8 sec
± 12.6 sec
±0.1 sec
-----0.1sec
-----0.1sec
-----0.1sec
4"0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
-----25.2 sec
-----0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
--0.1 +1.0
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
± 25.2 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
± 25.2 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±0.1 sec
±25.2 sec
RT frame Bit
411 273
484 247
604 401
962 139
1056/0 100
41 295
42 133
43 284
43 313
44 293
46 253
47 233
48 190
49 193
50 173
50 395
52 133
53 i13
55 73
55 190
56 53
58 13
58 190
58 413
60 373
61 353
63 313
64 293
66 253
67 233
69 193
70 173
71 400
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Table20. DASdatatimesat encounter(cant'd)
Event Ground initiate Spacecraft Ground verify Uncertainty I RT frame Bit
No. 21 shutter
No. 22 shutter
Last stop tape
Switch to Mode 2
DC-26
DC-2 (No. 1)
Telemetry lost
Enter occultation
Exit occultation
MT-8
MT-9
NA
NA
NA
NA
00:31:42
00:32:40
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
00:42:33.1
00:43:21.1
00:43:45.1
00:43:45.1
00:44:21.5
00:45:19.6
02:18:44
02:19:11
03:13:04
05:01:49
11:41:49.8
00:54:34.6
00:55:22.6
00:55:46.6
00:55:46.6
00:56:23.0
00:57:21.1
02:30:45.8
02:31:12
03:25:06
05:13:52
11:53:53.3
-----0.1sec
-----0.1sec
-----0.1sec
± 0.2 sec
--0.1 4-0.2
±0.3 sac
-- 1.0 sec
NA
NA
± 0.3 sac
-- 0.2 sec
72
73
73
73
74
75
110
111
175
304
781
133
113
313
313
197
261
343
148
209
404
68
aApplies to Ground initiate when applicable; when Ground initiate is NA, Uncertainty applies to Spacecraft column.
bNA, abbreviation for Not applicable
All events were precisely as predicted for this exer-
cise. Table 21 lists the event times as determined from
command initiation times and DAS data to the best
possible accuracy.
3. Recommendations
a. DAS. Every goal was achieved, considering the
constraints which were in effect during the design, fabri-
cation and testing of the DAS. Had different constraints
been in effect the program probably could have
achieved the same success with less effort and less cost.
b. SPAC. SPAC activities were satisfactory, particu-
larly after operations had been shifted so that all per-
formance analysis personnel were physically located
together. However, since operations in the future will
doubtless involve more persons, a need is felt for closer
operational ties between SPAC and SSAC. For example,
where SPAC and SSAC are separated, the science SPAC
representative should be supplemented by cognizant
individuals from each of the science subsystems. This
team would concentrate on the rapid analysis of science
instrument performance for dissemination to others in
SPAC and to SSAC. On the other hand, the SSAC oper-
ation might concentrate most heavily on analyzing the
data for its scientific implications. Implicit in this change
is the need for proper and sufficient additional output
devices to support this SPAC team. The scheme in use
Table 21. TV haze calibration sequence events
Event
DC-25 20:30:00
First shutter pulse
DC-3 21:10:24
DC-24 22:48:33
PN of Frame 0
DC-16 23:35:26
First start tape
First recorded
shutter (green
No. 2--00 gain)
End of tape No. 1
End of tape No, 2
Switch to Mode 2
DC-2 00:05:00
DC-26 00:44:00
Initiate Spacecraft
time time
Earth verify
time
Tolerance
20:45:55.3 21:01:13.3 4"2 sec --0
20:46:15.6 21:01:33.6 ±0.1 sec
21:26:19.4 21:41:37.5 4" 2 sec --0
23:04:28.6 23:19:47.0 4-2 sec --0
23:51:20.5 00:06:39.0 --0.3 sec
23:51:21.7 00:06:40.2 4.0.4 sec --0
23:52:36.0 00:07:54.5 -I- 0.1 sec
23:52:39.6 00:07:58.1 ±0.1 sec
23:53:23.8 00:08:42.3 -- 25.2 sec
00:05:09.4 00:20:27.9 ±25.2 sac
00:17:39.4 00:32:58.0 ± 16.8 sac
00:20:55.8 00:36:14.3 q- 2 sac -- 0
00:59:56.0 01:15:14.9 "t" 1.3 sec --0
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at present by SPAC seems appropriate. That is, a raw
printer giving data reducible to the science format and
a high speed printer displaying selected parameters for
each two subsystems. An effort of this magnitude is
necessary to guarantee the timely, comprehensive reports
required during critical mission phases.
J. Cosmic Ray Telescope
1. Description
a. Purpose
1. To detect and measure trapped corpuscular radia-
tion in the vicinity of Mars.
2. To measure the flux and energy of alpha particles
and protons as a function of position and time in
interplanetary space.
Figure 42 shows a block diagram of the cosmic ray
telescope and associated circuits leading to the develop-
ment of the 10-bit words which are read into the data
automation subsystem.
b. Function
Detectors. The complete detector system consists of
three solid-state surface-barrier detectors, D1, D2, and
D3, arranged as a telescope. The depletion depth of each
detector is 200 ft. The area of D1 and D2 is 2.38 cm 2, and
of D3 is 4.6 cm 2. The detectors are arranged so that the
half-angle of the cone of acceptance of the telescope is
20 deg, and the geometrical factor is approximately
0.3 cm2-ster. Absorbers are interposed between D1 and
Dz, and between D2 and Ds. When an ionizing particle
passes through such a surface-barrier detector, the de-
tector puts out a pulse of charge whose size is propor-
tional to the energy lost by the particle in the depletion
layer of the detector. One ion-electron pair (equivalent
to 1.6 X 10 -19 coulombs charge) is generated for every
3.5 electron volts (ev) of energy lost.
Calibration. For operation in flight and during space-
craft testing, a calibrate mode of instrument operation
is incorporated in the cosmic ray telescope. This utilizes
the permanent installation of low-level Am _41 alpha
particle sources in front of each of the three detectors.
These sources are encapsulated between two thin layers
of Mylar and have only enough energy to penetrate to
the detector on which they are mounted. In the data
TEST POINTS
I
I .....
I POWER SUBSYSTEM
I
12400 ohms
,50 v rms
Fig. 42. Cosmic ray telescope block diagram
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mode of operation, therefore, they produce no coinci-
dences or pulse-height analyses but only contribute to
the DZlD2 rate. In the CRT-calibrate mode of operation,
the coincidence circuits are disabled, allowing the indi-
vidual count rates on D2 and Ds to be recorded and
pulse height analysis of the DxD2 events to proceed.
Amplifiers, discriminators, and pulse-height analyzers
(PHAs). A charge-sensitive preamplifier and an ampli-
fier is connected to each detector. A voltage pulse, pro-
portional to the charge collected from the detector, is
generated at the output of an amplifier. The amplifiers
connect to pulse height discriminators D1, D_, D2, Ds,
and D_, respectively. Discriminators D1, D_/, D2, and Dg
pass pulses only if the input to them exceeds a level
corresponding to an energy loss of 210 key. The thresh-
old of D_ is 400 key. In addition, the amplifier associated
with detector D1 connects to a height-to-time converter
which sorts pulses corresponding to energy losses be-
tween 210 key and 5.2 Mev into one of 128 channels.
Logic circuits. The coincidence-anticoincidence logic
provides the following outputs: D_, D2/D1, D_/DzD3/D_,
and D_D2D._/D2 in the normal/calibrate modes. These
three coincidence rates are recorded in different portions
of the 10-bit register II which is read out as Words B
and D. The D/_Dz rate is prescaled by 4 before being
recorded. One bit in register I (Words A and C) indicates
if one or more coincidences D_/D2D3 have been received
since the last readout. In the calibrate mode, the regis-
ters record the singles rated D(, D2 and Ds as shown.
In addition, the first double or triple coincidence after
register I is read out by the DAS opens a gate which
allows the height to time converter to analyze the pulse
from D1 associated with the coincidence. Pulses are
provided to two indicator bits in register I which show
whether the coincidence analyzed was double D1D_D_,
D1 2D3. In calibrate mode, thetriple D_D2D_ or triple D /
PHA simply records the first pulse from D_ without
coincidence.
Registers. Two 10-bit registers record the current rate
and pulse height analysis data as shown in Fig. 42.
The registers are read out alternately by the DAS. To
accomplish this, the DAS adds pulses to the register at
111 kc/sec until the register overflows. The DAS counts
the number of pulses required to produce an overflow.
The registers are cleared by readout, and the PHA logic
is reset.
Power converter. The power converter changes the
2400-cps spacecraft power into various dc voltages re-
quired by the detectors and electronics.
2. Performance
The instrument performed well throughout Mission
Phase I of the Mariner IV interplanetary flight. Data
were obtained within the design objective of the instru-
ment for the counting rates, the PHA, and the calibrate
mode. The PHA peak shifted down three channels dur-
ing the first five or six weeks of flight, but after this
period of time no more shift was observed. The shift was
caused by a shift in a zener diode. This same shift in the
PHA has been observed on other cosmic ray telescope
instruments flown on other spacecraft by the University
of Chicago. However, this small shift in the PHA does
not affect the data.
3. Recommendations
Two design changes in the cosmic ray telescope would
improve the data output considerably. The first change
would add an anticoincidence shield to the instrument.
This shield is used to reject secondary particles pro-
duced in the spacecraft.
The D1 rate Word 6 assigned to the cosmic ray tele-
scope overflowed approximately four times and Word
22 overflowed one time per readout. The second
change in the telescope would add sufficient binary
circuits to prevent the rate words from overflowing.
K. Cosmic Dust Detector
1. Description
a. Physical. The cosmic dust detector is a single
assembly containing a sensor plate mounted on the top
cover of an electronics chassis with a microphone
bonded to one side and penetration capacitors on both
sides, which provide measurements of dust particle
impacts by direct penetration, and microphonic tech-
niques. The instrument configuration aboard the space-
craft is such that the sensor is exposed to space, and
the electronics chassis is beneath the thermal blanket.
b. Functional. The sensor is an aluminum impact
plate, 0.030-in. thick, with a crystal acoustical transducer
bonded to one side. The transducer will detect acoustical
waves set up in the plate by impinging particles. Both
sides of the plate are coated with 15,000 X of non-
conducting material over which is evaporated a thin
film of aluminum. The impact plate-dielectric-aluminum
film combination on each side constitutes a penetration
detector in the form of a capacitor. With a static potential
applied across the capacitors and a limiting resistor, an
impacting particle which penetrates the dielectric will
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produce a voltage pulse across the resistor, which in
turn will trigger the penetration circuitry. The films are
used on both sides of the impact plate to provide an
indication of the impacting particle's incoming direc-
tion. Data from the capacitors are stored in a three-bit
binary accumulator. The microphone is the portion of
the sensor from which momentum analysis is derived.
The microphone output is amplified, rectified, and pulse
height to pulse width converted, with the resultant being
a direct indication of the impacting particle momentum.
The microphone is inhibited for 30 msec after a particle
impact, to allow for analysis of the particle. Thus, the
penetration capacitor and microphone data combine to
produce the following:
1. Particle momentum data (pulse-height analysis)
2. Particle incoming direction relative to the space-
craft
3. An accumulation of hits that may have occurred
during the readout period
4. Binary accumulation in the microphone non-
resetting hit accumulator
2. Performance
Shortly after launch, on November 28, 1964, bi-
directional impacts were noted in the cosmic dust data,
which continued until approximately 1730 GMT. System
test data had shown this to be the result of electro-
magnetic noise. Since the instrument at this time would
also be detecting acoustical creaking in the spacecraft
due to rapid temperature changes, and separation of
real hits from spacecraft generated noise would he
extremely difficult, it was concluded that instrument
operation under these conditions was normal.
On December 6, these fingerprints were again noted
in the data. They continued from approximately 0200
GMT on December 6 to 0400 GMT on December 7.
Investigation revealed that during this exact period, an
intermittent are had developed in the plasma probe
high voltage supply. The events in the cosmic dust data
were in agreement with the plasma probe anomalies.
The thin film capacitor sensors failed to register a
dust particle impact during the first 146 days of flight
(through April 23, 1965). The assumptions were that the
films had failed or were damaged by impacts before
power turn-on. Hypervelocity firings were conducted at
Goddard Space Flight Center on the original backup
sensor using iron spheres. This sensor worked in a
satisfactory manner. It is the opinion of the experi-
menter that the particles impacting the Mariner IV
sensor were most probably silicates, or cometary icy
fragments; and it is quite conceivable that the threshold
mass sensitivity of the films to these particles is one to
two orders of magnitude greater than for the iron
spheres. The microphone is sensitive to total mass only,
not particle composition or density.
On April 24, 1965, a film hit was recorded in coinci-
dence with a microphone event, indicating normal film
operation. The microphone PHA was saturated. Another
such coincidence was recorded on April 27. There are
two films on the sensor, one on each side, and each one
recorded a hit: the direct side was hit April 24; the
retro side on April 27. These two events were considered
to be real in view of the fact that they occurred during
the period of maximum flux experienced to that time;
and the microphone PHA was saturated, indicating par-
ticles of sufficient mass to activate the films.
3. Recommendations
Testing at Goddard Space Flight Center revealed that
impacts on the sensor with no power applied could
permanently short the penetration capacitors. On
Mariner IV, during the period from shroud ejection to
science power on, there was no power applied to the
sensor. It is recommended on future flights, that a
keep-alive voltage be applied to the sensor when the
instrument power is off, to prevent the possibility of
permanently shorting the sensor capacitors.
L. Trapped Radiation Detector
1. Description
a. Physical. The trapped radiation detector consists
of three GM tubes, a solid-state proton detector, and a
power supply within a single magnesium chassis. The
electronics for the solid-state proton detector are con-
tained in a separate chassis within the main chassis.
The GM tubes are referred to as Detectors A, B, and
C, and are sensitive to electrons and protons within
given energy ranges, Table 22. The solid state proton
detector is referred to as Detector D or D1 - D2 (two
discrimination levels), and is sensitive to protons within
given energy ranges.
b. Functional
GM tubes. Detectors A, B, and C are EON type
6213 GM end window counters, which measure the total
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Table22.Detectorcharacteristics
Unidirectional
Detec- geometric
tar factor
B 0.055 -i- 0.005
C 0.050 ± 0.005
Dt 0.065±0.003
D2 0.065 ± 0.003
Omnidirec-
tional
geometric
factor
cm 2
_0.15
_0.15
_0.15
Particles to which
sensitive
Eledrons:
E_ _> 45 key
Protons:
Ep _ 670 -I- 30 kev
Electrons:
Eo _ 45 key
Protons:
Ep _ 550 ± 20 key
Electrons:
E_ _> 150 key
Protons:
E_ _ 3.1 Mev
Electrons: none
Protons:
0.50 _ Ep _ !1 Mev
Electrons: none
Protons:
0.88 _ Ep _ 4.0 Mev
Dynamic
range
From galactic
cosmic ray
rate of 0.6
counts/sec to
107 counts/
sec
From galactic
cosmic ray
rste of 0.6
counts/sec tc
10 7 counts/
sec
From galacti_
cosmic ray
rate of 0.6
counts/see t©
10 _ counts/
sec
From in-
flight source
rate to 10 _
counts/sec
From in-
flight source
rate to 106
counts/see
number of charged particles passing through their sensi-
tive volumes. The sensitive volume of each tube is
shielded such that low energy particles can enter only
by passing through the window at the end of the tube.
By allowing for omnidirectional flux of higher energy
particles, a directional measurement can be made of the
low energy particles.
The windows of Detectors A and B are approximately
1.4 mgm/cm z of mica, making the tubes sensitive to
electrons >_40 kev and protons >_500 key. A shield
defines the angle through which the particles may enter
the window. This look angle is 60 deg and lies along
an axis that is 135 deg to the Sun-probe line for Detector
A, and 70 deg to the Sun-probe line for Detector B.
A visor is incorporated on the end of each tube
housing to protect the detectors from exposure to direct
sunlight during cruise.
An aluminum foil of approximately 20 mg/cm 2 is
placed behind the aperture on Detector C to increase
the energy threshold to 150 key for electrons and 3 Mev
for protons. The look angle of 60 deg for Detector C is
along an axis 70 deg to the Sun-probe line. The shield
configuration is the same as that of Detectors A and B.
The GM counter outputs are shaped by means of
saturating current amplifiers before being sent to the
DAS.
Solid state Detector D,- D_. Detector D is a silicon
surface-barrier diode, having a thickness of 35 /z, and
covered with a nickel foil, 0.242 mg/cm 2 of air equiva-
lent, to make it light tight. The detector, used as a two-
channel proton spectrometer, is capable of detecting
protons in a high electron field. Sensitivity to electrons
is minimized by: 1) making the detector too thin to
absorb energy from electrons, 2) setting the discrimina-
tion level much higher than the expected electron
energy loss and, 3) using delay line pulse clipping. The
energy discrimination levels are: 1) Channel D1, 500 kev
and 11 Mev and, 2) Channel D_, 880 kev and 4 Mev.
The look angle of Detector D is 60 deg and lies along
an axis 70 deg to the Sun-probe line.
The Detector D output is fed into a linear-charge
sensitive amplifier (preamplifier), which is followed by
a series of highly-stable negative-feedback voltage am-
plifiers (post amplifiers). The output of the second post
amplifier is fed in parallel to two more post amplifiers
having different voltage gains. The outputs of these
amplifiers are in turn transferred to two identical ampli-
tude discriminators with a common reference supply.
Gains of the post amplifiers are set to produce pulses at
the discriminators that correspond to the particles de-
tected. The discriminator reference supply is tempera-
ture compensated to keep the discrimination levels
constant.
2. Performance
Except for one period between February 5, 1965, and
March 5, 1965, the instrument performance was normal.
During the above-mentioned period there was an
increase in bad data points in the user program, which
was attributed to the reduction of low-gain antenna
signal strength. When the switch to the high-gain
antenna was completed, the problem disappeared.
The performance of the instrument was such that the
scientific aims were accomplished. These aims were:
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:1. The detection and preliminary measurements of
the intensity, composition and distribution of any
magnetically trapped particles (belts) in the vicinity
of Mars.
2. To study the occurrence of energetic particles in
interplanetary space, with reference to their iden-
tity, energy spectra, angular distribution with
respect to the Sun-probe line, and their time
histories.
M. Ionization Chamber
1. Description
The ionization chamber experiment on the Mariner
Mars 1964 spacecraft employs two detectors. The first
detector is an integrating ion chamber of the quartz-
fiber electrometer variety. The quartz electrometer is
housed in a 5-in. diameter stainless steel sphere filled
with four atmospheres of argon gas. The second de-
tector is a conventional, halogen quenched GM tube,
Type 10311, which was procured from Radiation
Counter Laboratories. The GM tube is mounted in a
thin-walled shield of stainless steel 5 in. long and
approximately z/4 in. in diameter.
The two detectors are mounted to a gold-plated
chassis which houses the high-voltage power supply and
the pulse amplifying and shaping electronics. To mini-
mize the effects of backscattering and shielding due to
the presence of the spacecraft, the detector package is
mounted part way up the cylindrical wave guide.
The quartz electrometer, housed within the ion
chamber sphere, consists of a quartz collector rod and
a thin quartz fiber that is separated from the rod by
approximately 0.02 in. The collector is coated with
Aquadag and the fiber is coated with a thin film of
metal. Although the collector is electrically isolated
from the fiber and sphere, it is normally positively
charged. This charge is produced by a +360 vdc
potential on the fiber, which induces a negative image
charge on the Aquadag surface of the collector near it.
As a result of this image charge, the fiber is attracted
to the collector and momentarily contacts it. During
contact electrons pass from the collector to the fiber.
When the electron exchange is completed, the fiber
springs back to its normal position leaving the rod
positively charged to +360 v.
When ionizing particles penetrate the sphere, the
gas within the chamber becomes ionized. The resulting
positive ions are attracted to the grounded sphere while
the electrons are attracted to the collector and tend to
neutralize its positive charge. When the collector charge
is sufficiently neutralized, the image charge, as pre-
viously described, attains sufficient magnitude and the
fiber is pulled to the collector and finally contacts it.
A surge of electrons passes from the collector to the
fiber and through a load resistor. This current pulse is
amplified, shaped, and presented to the DAS. Each
output represents a fixed amount of charge collected
from the gas. Thus, the interval between pulses is
inversely proportional to the ionization rate.
The GM sensor comprises a glass tube encased
in a stainless steel cylinder. The anode consists of a
tungsten wire stretched along the axis of the tube while
the cathode consists of a thin, transparent, conductive
coating on the inner glass wall. A potential of approx-
imately 900 v is maintained between the electrodes.
Charged particles which penetrate both the steel shield
and the glass wall and enter into the sensitive volume
of the tube ionize the gas molecules. The high electric
field between the anode and the electrode accelerates
the dissociated ions and electrons. The electrons acceler-
ate rapidly due to their low mass and ionize other gas
molecules. The ultimate result of the avalanche effect
thus produced between electrodes is a momentary
current flow through an appropriate load resistor. The
resulting pulse is amplified, shaped, and delivered to
the DAS. One output pulse is generated for each
charged particle that penetrates the shield and enters
the sensitive region of the tube. Thus, the pulse rate is
directly proportional to the radiation flux.
Because of a judicious choice of GM tube shield
thickness, both the ionization chamber and the GM tube
detect particles of the same energy; i.e., electrons of
energy greater than 0.5 Mev, protons of energy greater
than 10 Mev, and alpha particles of energy greater than
40 Mev are capable of penetrating the walls of either
detector. Both sensors have omnidirectional sensitivity.
The ionization chamber measures the average rate of
ionization and the GM tube measures the omnidirec-
tional flux.
The time between successive output pulses is the
important ionization chamber parameter to be mea-
sured, while in the case of the GM tube the number of
pulses per unit time is the parameter required. In both
eases the respective pulses are transmitted on separate
lines to the DAS for handling. The DAS measures the
time interval between the beginning of a frame and the
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arrival of an ion chamber output pulse in increments
of 1.2 see or 0.3 see, depending on the prevailing bit
rate. In addition, the number of ion chamber pulses per
frame is recorded. If the rate from the ion chamber
is one pulse per frame or less (the usual case in quiescent
space), the time between ion chamber output pulses can
be calculated. For more than one pulse per frame, the
exact time between pulses cannot be obtained, but the
number of pulses per frame is more significant at these
rates and is directly recorded. At rates of 7 or more
pulses per frame, all interval-timing bits are reset and
the entire ion chamber data word is devoted strictly to
counting pulses. An indicator bit is set by the eighth
pulse in any one frame and is useful in reducing the
data. In this mode the data register is capable of tab-
ulating as many as (29 - 1) pulses per frame. Ion cham-
ber data are read out once every frame.
The GM tube registers are capable of recording as
many as 5 × 2 TM pulses per frame. When 19 bits of the
20-bit register are filled (219 - 1 pulses per frame), the
next pulse triggers a change of tabulating mode. In-
coming GM tube pulses are then prescaled by a factor
of four before being recorded in the data register. The
change to the prescale mode is signalled by an indicator
bit to avoid ambiguity. Data from the GM tube are
commutated with data from other sensors and conse-
quently are read out only every fourth frame. Pulses
are accumulated for 45 see or 11.25 see at 8% and
33½ bits/see respectively.
2. Pedormance
The Mariner IV ionization chamber performed nom-
inally through the first 70 days of the mission. During
this period, a profile of radiation intensity was faithfully
recorded by the instrument as the spacecraft passed
through each of the Van Allen belts, through the bound-
ary of the magnetosphere, and into the relatively stable
interplanetary region. Sixty-nine days after the mission
began, i.e., January 5, 1965, a solar flare occurred. Both
the ion chamber and the GM tube recorded peak ac-
tivity of the flare. As the flare subsided and the ion
chamber returned to the normal background level, the
GM tube indicated a slightly higher rate than expected
over the downward trend, leveling off at a value ap-
proximately 30% above the expected preflare level. On
the 84th day of the mission, February 20, after about
10 days of comparatively stable operation at this
slightly anomalous level, the GM tube rate rose sharply
from approximately 40 counts/see to 18,000 counts/see,
indicating a spontaneous, self-sustained discharge.
On the 109th day of the mission, March 17, the GI_I
tube counting rate dropped to zero and the ion chamber
interval became infinite. No response from either sensor
has been observed since that time.
It is calculated that the GM tube had first failed (by
spontaneous discharge) after having counted approx-
imately 8 × 108 counts, i.e., after expending only 8%
of its rated 10 _° count life. In an attempt to understand
this phenomenon, ten tubes were taken from the batch
from which the flight tubes were selected. Seven tubes
were operated at various fixed count rates until such
time as each tube failed by continuous discharge. Three
tubes were exposed to the higher flux levels, but without
power applied. No significant shift in the voltage pla-
teaus of these latter tubes was observed.
The tentative conclusion from the results obtained was
that the total life-count of a tube depends upon the rate
at which the tube counts; the higher the count rate, the
more counts a tube will assimilate before the onset of
spontaneous discharge. Since each pulse is smaller at
higher rates, it is likely that the tubes fail by spontaneous
discharge after a certain amount of charge has passed
through them. It also appears that the tube selected for
Mariner IV may have been an especially short-lived tube
in spite of the excellent stability displayed in selection
tests and also in prelaunch systems tests. It appears that
any other tube in the batch would have had a life-count
capacity capable of completing the mission.
In an effort to understand the mechanism of the
failure mode, it was speculated that perhaps the quench
gas, a mixture of chlorine and silicon tetrafluoride, was
depleted. This would explain the sustained count rate
in the absence of sources. With this in mind, good tubes
and failed tubes were submitted to Chemistry Section
326 for analysis and comparison. Analysis of the filling
gas as performed by a mass spectrometer indicated no
significant differences between gas from good tubes
and gas from expended tubes. However, this test is
deemed inconclusive due to the poor sensitivity of the
available spectrometer. Gas samples have been sub-
mitted for further analysis and comparison on a spec-
trometer with improved sensitivity.
A darkening of the transparent cathode of the expired
tubes was noted as they were allowed to operate in the
spontaneous counting mode. Chemical analysis of
cathode washings showed chlorine, one of the quenching
gases, to be present on the cathodes of both good and
expired tubes.
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The most significant and entirely unexpected finding
occurred when the tin oxide cathode of a blackened
tube was carefully scraped and the scrapings submitted
to spectrographic analysis. Tests showed a remarkable
72% (by weight) tungsten content. The mechanism for
tungsten transport from anode to cathode is not yet
fully understood.
The subsequent failure of the ion chamber portion of
the instrument on the spacecraft, accompanied by the
apparent simultaneous drop to zero in the GM tube rate
gave rise to speculation that perhaps the power supply,
which is common to both detectors, had failed or had
been shorted. This speculation was made more credible
in view of the tungsten transport phenomenon. It was
hypothesized that the anode was steadily weakened by
the emission of tungsten until electrostatic attraction by
the cathode was sufficient to break the anode. Further,
it was theorized that the slender anode might be at-
tracted to the cathode to the extent that physical contact
might be made, the ensuing arc providing the energy
necessary to weld the anode to the cathode, resulting
essentially in a short circuit of the power supply. In
order to provide a method of quickly testing the hy-
pothesis, it was necessary to find a means of severing
the anode of the tube while the tube was counting
normally under applied high voltage. To accomplish
this feat, a good tube was mounted to the breadboard
circuit. By means of optical lenses, the beam from a
ruby laser was focused through the glass envelope of
the tube onto the anode. The laser was pulsed, with the
tube in normal counting operation and powered by the
breadboard ion chamber circuit. The anode burned in
two and the energized segment was attracted to the
cathode as postulated. However, welding of the anode
to the cathode did not occur immediately, but required
a period of approximately 40 min, during which time the
arcing between the electrodes was visible through the
glass tube. A possible reason why the welding was not
instantaneous in this case, but may have been instan-
taneous with the unit in space, was that burning the
anode in half resulted in the formation of a small ball
of tungsten on the melted ends of the anode. The addi-
tional mass of tungsten, slightly larger than the diameter
of the anode wire, might be expected to require con-
siderably more energy for welding than an anode wire
eroded to the breaking point by tungsten emission. Also,
an eroded wire might have significantly less restoring
force to counter the electrostatic attraction.
Additional evidence supporting the shorted power
supply hypothesis was later obtained. Three failed tubes
functioning in their spontaneous discharge modes were
successively operated on the breadboard circuit until
output from the tubes ceased. In all three cases when
each tube finally quit producing the spontaneous output
pulses, it was noted that the filaments had broken. In
two of the tubes, the anode was observed to have been
instantaneously welded to the cathode, resulting in a
short circuit of the power supply. The third tube proved
to have an open circuit within the tube. This occurred
because the break in the anode was located so close to
the glass feed-through sheath as to provide insufficient
length for the energized segment of the broken anode
to reach the cathode.
Further evidence for the postulated failure mode
occurred when the life-test unit failed in a manner much
the same as the Mariner IV instrument. Output of the
GM tube dropped to zero after a count-rate profile and
a time interval comparable to that of the spacecraft
instrument. Simultaneously, the test voltages at all
monitor points dropped in a manner that suggested a
shorted supply. However, the ion chamber sensor con-
tinued to function with only slight increase in the ex-
pected period as opposed to the immediate failure of
the chamber in space. This apparent discrepancy in the
failure modes seems to have been first resolved by
subsequent tests on the breadboard circuit. Breadboard
tests based on the assumption that the power supply is
shorted through the GM tube indicated that, if the life
test unit (operating at ambient room temperature) were
subjected to cold temperatures comparable to those
experienced by the unit in space, the high voltage
would decrease to a value below the ion chamber puls-
ing threshold. This assumption was verified by sub-
jecting the life test unit to low temperatures, in vacuum,
after life tests were completed. The ion chamber ceased
operation at - 14 °F.
Early in the failure investigation there was one bit of
evidence that seemed to contradict the proposed failure
mode. Based on tests performed on the breadboard it
was calculated that, if a short occurred in the GM tube
as postulated, the step function increase in power dissi-
pated by the instrument would probably be detectable
in the instrument's thermal performance. A review of
thermal data from the Mariner IV instrument during
the time in question did not indicate any obvious change
in dissipated power. However, the apparent discrepancy
was resolved during tests performed on the life test unit,
in thermal vacuum, after life tests were completed.
These tests revealed an increase in power dissipation of
only 100 mw when the GM tube was shorted. This
resulted in a temperature increase of less than 3*F, a
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change small enough to challenge the resolving power
of the thermal measuring system. Based on this test,
personnel from the thermal control area feel that the
flight temperature data received during failure are not
inconsistent with the postulated failure mode.
Finally, after all pertinent tests were completed on
the life-test unit, the failed GM tube was removed
from the instrument for observation. Inspection of the
tube revealed a broken anode, the end of which made
physical contact with the blackened cathode.
3. Recommendations
The Type 10311 GM tube was originally chosen be-
cause it was the only tube commercially available which
had the proper geometric factor and wall thickness, and
was constructed of nonmagnetic materials. Other GM
tubes recently made available commercially should be
evaluated for potential use in future missions.
The problem of determining the total life-count
capability of a given tube early in its life should be
investigated. This problem might prove to be as simple
as ensuring proper quality control during fabrication
and filling of the tube.
In the area of circuit design, when two or more
sensors operate from the same power supply, the design
should preclude the possibility of a short circuit in either
detector affecting the operation of the other, no matter
how remote the possibility of a short may appear.
Finally, the necessity for completing life testing of
flight hardware early in the program, and certainly
before launch, has been demonstrated by the experi-
ence derived from Mariner IV.
N. Planeto_ Scan Subsystem
This section describes the planetary scan subsystem
performance in flight. To relate the performance to the
various operations, a brief description of the subsystem
operation is included. The subsystem was energized
three times throughout the flight. It was first energized
on February 11, 1965 during the science cover deploy-
ment sequence, then during the 9-hr planet encounter
period on July 14, 1965, and finally during the television
haze calibration August 2, 1965. Subsystem performance
analysis is made on the various devices having unique
engineering characteristics. In spite of their superficially
unreliable appearances, these devices have proven to be
reliable in operation. These devices with their unique
physical and performance characteristics should be ap-
plicable to the design of future systems.
1. Description
The planetary scan subsystem was designed and de-
veloped to support the planet encounter activities
during the 9-hr period prior to the television picture-
taking sequence. Its primary function was to orient the
television camera correctly for picture taking.
The original operational sequence and the various
functions designed into the subsystem were as follows:
a. Searching operation. When power to the encounter
instruments is turned on by either the on-board CC&S
function MT-7 or the Earth-based command DC-25, the
scan subsystem enters into a planet searching operation.
Since the television is mounted on a platform which
rotates about the roll axis of the spacecraft, the sub-
system drives the platform back and forth through
180 deg of arc searching for the planet at a rate of
0.5 deg/sec. This scanning provides planet searching
motion in one direction while the motion of the space-
craft provides planet searching motion approximately
perpendicular to the scanning plane. Limit switches
actuate scan reversals when the platform completes each
of the 180-deg rotations. To provide redundancy, two
switches connected in parallel and operated in series
are incorporated at each of the two scan reversal limits.
b. Tracking operation. Mounted on the platform and
bore-sighted with the television is a wide-angle planet
sensor. This sensor, which has a 50-deg circular field
of view, detects the presence of the planet and senses
the position of the planet with respect to the spacecraft.
When the planet comes into the field of view of the
sensor, the subsystem generates a wide-angle planet-
in-view (PIV) signal and switches the subsystem to
planet tracking such that the television is oriented
toward the desired portion of the planet. When the
spacecraft reaches the proper position for picture taking,
a scan-inhibit signal is initiated by either the narrow-
angle Mars gate, which was also mounted on the plat-
form, or by the television system itself. This signal
indicates that the planet is in the television field of
view, stops the tracking motion, and initiates the picture
recording sequence.
At encounter on July 14, 1965, however, this automatic
planet tracking sequence was not exercised and the
platform was stopped at a predetermined position
through the use of the scan inhibit command DC-24.
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c. Telemetry measurements. The wide-angle sensor
was constructed such that two differential voltage out-
puts, those from the X-axis and Y-axis, were formed
from the outputs of the sensor's quadrants through a
resistor matrix. The scan platform motion affects the
X-axis output and this output was used as the error
signal for planet tracking. The spacecraft orbital motion
affected the Y-axis output which provided a telemetry
indication of planet brightness and the relative position
of the planet with respect to the spacecraft. The Y-axis
output, together with other data required for subsystem
performance evaluation, was telemetered back to Earth
in near real time. The various data channels and their
functions are shown in Table 23.
Table 23. Data channels and functions
Channel
DAS
channel
number
Scan position No. 1 21
Y-axis output 29
Calibration signal 36
Detector temperature 37
and scan actuator
pressure
Transformer-rectifier 40
voltage
Scan position No. 2 42
Fundion
indicates the pointing direction of the
platform.
indicates the brightness and relative
position of planet.
For calibration of scan position data
and for indicating proper operation of
electronic power supply.
Indicates temperature and pressure in
alternate data frames.
For calibration of scan position data
and for indicating proper operation of
electronic power supply.
Indicates the pointing direction of the
platform.
2. Performance
a. Science cover deployment exercise. The first block
of subsystem flight performance data was obtained
during the science cover deployment sequence on
February 11, 1965, seventy-five days after launch. The
scan subsystem responded properly to DC-25, the
encounter science power-on command, by immediately
entering the search mode. The correct initial search
direction was obtained and the subsystem made a total
of ten search cycles. Analysis of the received data indi-
cated the subsystem was operating under the following
conditions:
1. All scan reversals were actuated by the primary
switches since each of the reversals occurred at the
proper limiting positions. The redundant or back-up
switches were not used.
2. All searching logic, including the microelectronic
integrated circuits operated properly and there
were no premature scan reversals due to improper
logic state changes.
3. The average searching time had decreased by 4 see
per search cycle from the pre-launch scan period
of 717 see per cycle.
4. The pressure readout indicated that the actuator
was operating under full pressure with an insig-
nificant amount of change over the prelaunch value
of 30 psia.
5. The subsystem sensor and optics operated at a
temperature of minus 3"C as compared to the
operating temperature of O°C for the neighboring
instrument, the television optics assembly.
The Y-axis output indicated that no objects having
radiation energy of 1.0t_w or greater in the integrated
spectral range of 0.5 to 1.1/_ were observed by the wide
angle sensor. The numerical value of this output re-
mained constant at a value corresponding to no signifi-
cant input.
At that time, it was decided to time the scan inhibit
command, DC-24, to stop the scan motion. This oper-
ation was performed for two reasons:
1. To determine whether the platform could be
stopped accurately at a predetermined position, and
2. To stop the platform at a position which would
ensure the attainment of at least some television
pictures of Mars in the event of any later spacecraft
failure which would prevent platform motion at
encounter.
Accordingly, the time for the initiation of DC-24 was
calculated based on the desired television pointing
direction, in terms of spacecraft clock angle, and the
scan speed calculated from the data received for the
first six scan cycles. The command time was projected
four scan cycles ahead to allow for calculation time, the
various transmission delays and time for command
processing. Upon receiving DC-24, the platform stopped
0.72 deg away from the desired position.
The success of this platform positioning operation via
ground command led to the consideration of using
this method as another means of positioning the tele-
vision camera. Subsequent tests with the proof test
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model spacecraft indicated that it was possible to pre-
position the scan platform over a simulated communica-
tion range of 135 million miles with a positioning
accuracy of 1 deg. The performance of the scan sub-
system during the early science cover deployment
sequence is summarized in Table 24.
Table 24. Scan subsystem performance during
science cover deployment sequence
Function
Average scan search time per
cycle, sec
Desired platform inhibit
position, deg
Actual platform inhibit
position, deg
Calibrate signal, v
Transformer-rectlfier voltage, v
,Sensor temperature, °C
Actuator pressure, psla
Y-axis output with no input, v
Prelaunch or Actual data
predicted value
(DN) Engineer- (ON) Engineer-
ing units ing units
717.0 712.9
177.19
177.94
(85) 0.998 (85) 0.998
(417) 4.896 (417) 4.896
(318) --3.0
(143) 30 (146) 30
(261) 3.064 (261) 3.064
b. Encounter. On July 15, 1965, the scan subsystem
responded to the DC-25 by initiating a planet searching
operation at 14:40:33 GMT at the spacecraft. The sub-
system began its search in the correct direction. To
evaluate the planet searching performance, a graph of
the platform position as a function of search time was
generated based on the received real-time flight data.
Analysis of the graph indicated that the subsystem was
operating properly under the following conditions:
1. The scan reversals occurred at the predicted
position as indicated by the magnitudes of the
position output voltage. Each of the reversals was
actuated by a primary switch.
2. The linearity of scan platform position as a function
of search time and the position output voltages at
the reversal points were within the specified limits.
Therefore, no corrections were required on the
established conversion table of scan position volt-
age to scan position in terms of spacecraft clock
angle.
3. All searching logic, including the microelectron{'c
integrated circuits, operated properly and there
were no premature scan reversals due to improper
logic state changes.
4. The average searching time per cycle was within
1/_ sec of the rate calculated during the early science
cover deployment sequence.
5. The pressure readout indicated that the actuator
was operating at a pressure of about 26 psia, or a
decrease of 4 psi after some 8 mo of space travel.
6. The subsystem sensor and optics operated at a
temperature of minus 8.5"C.
The original encounter operating plan was revised
such that, operational and scan subsystem conditions
permitting, the scan platform inhibit command DC-24
would be used to pre-position the platform. The com-
mand initiation time was to be calculated to stop the
platform at a position for optimum pictures. The auto-
matic planet tracking sequence was to be used as the
backup operation in the event the pre-positioning could
not be exercised or failed to produce the intended
results. Because of the occultation experiment, the final
prelaunch trajectory change was such that the relative
value of television pictures with automatic planet track-
ing was not optimum.
Accordingly, a command initiation time was calcu-
lated based on the desired television pointing direction,
the calculated scan search speed averaged over the first
seven search cycles, the communication transmission
delay and command processing time. The initiation time
of DC-24, proiected seven scan cycles ahead, was calcu-
lated to be 17:10:18 GMT for a desired inhibit position
of 179.19 deg in clock angle. The calculation was based
on the following selected parameters:
1. Average scan time per cycle = 713.4 sec
2. Communication transmission delay time for the last
frame of scan data used in the command time
calculation = 11 min 59.8 sec
3. Communication transmission delay time at time of
command initiation = 12 min 00.0 see
4. Command processing time = 37.3 sec
5. Motor coastdown time = 0.2 sec
Upon receipt of DC-24, the scan platform motion was
inhibited at a clock angle of 178.45 deg, or 0.72 deg
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away from the desired position. This positioning was
considered acceptable since the television pictures at
the actual inhibited position would have essentially the
same relative value as pictures taken at the desired
pointing position.
At 23:42:00 GMT at the spacecraft, the wide-angle
sensor deteeted the edge of the planet and the subsystem
initiated a planet-in-view signal. Twenty-three min later,
the planet came into the television camera field of view.
The Y-axis output, as the planet entered and swept
across the sensor field of view, varied in accordance
with the relative planet/spacecraft position and the
amount of radiant energy received. Figure 43 shows
the actual Y-axis output as a function of GMT (Curve A)
along with the calculated Y-axis output based on the
pre-encounter trajectory data (Curve B). Because of
the Y-axis amplifier feedback adjustment, the Y-axis out-
put was saturated part of the time and the Y-axis output
curve has been expanded through extrapolations and
calculations. Figure 43 illustrates that Curve B is located
to the left of Curve A, indicating that the planet entered
the wide-angle sensor field of view about 5 min earlier
than expected. This deviation is partially due to an error
in the prediction of the spacecraft arrival time and
partially due to error in the Y-axis output prediction
calculation. The performances of the scan subsystem
during the planet encounter period are summarized in
Table 25. For comparison, the data received during the
early science cover deployment sequence is also shown.
c. Television haze calibration exercise. The scan sub-
system was energized during the television haze cali-
bration sequence on August 8, 1965. The subsystem
operated properly throughout the sequence. Upon the
receipt of encounter science power resulting from
DC-25, the subsystem responded by initiating a planet
searching operation in the correct search direction. A
total of eleven search cycles was performed with each
reversal actuated by the primary limit switches. During
this time, the subsystem sensor and optics assembly was
operating at a temperature of -11.0"C as compared to
1.0
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Fig. 43. Scan subsystem Y-axis output at encounter
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Table 25. Scan subsystem performance data
_n_on
Average scan time per
cycle, soc
Desired platform inhibit
position, deg
Actual platform inhibit
position, deg
Calibration signal, v
i Trensformur-ructifier
voltage, v
Sensor temperature, oC
Actuator pressure, psi-.
Y-ax;s output with no
input, v
No. of search cycle
performed
Prelaunch
or predicted
value
717.0
O.998(85)"
4.896(417)
- 10°C for
encounter
operation
30 (143)
3.064 (261)
Data readout
during science
Cover
deployment
712.9
177.19
177.94
0.998 (85)
4.896 (417)
-3.o (318)
30 (146)
3.064 (261)
10
Data readout
during planet
encounter
713.4
179.19
178.45
O.998(as)
4.896 (417)
--8.5 (351)
26 (187)
3.076 (262)
14
• Number in parenthesis indicates the Data Number.
-8.5"C at planet encounter. The Y-axis output re-
mained constant at a numerical value corresponding to
no significant input, i.e., the Y-axis output indicated that
no objects having radiation energy of 1.0 t_w or
greater in the integrated spectral range of 0.5 to 1.1 tL
were observed by the wide-angle sensor. All other
signals were well within the specified and predicted
limits.
The initiation time for the scan inhibit command
(DC-24) was based on the flight data received for the
first four scan cycles and a one-way communication
delay time of 15 rain 18.3 see. The average searching
time per cycle was 713.5 see, or 0.1 see longer than that
calculated during the planet encounter sequence on
July 15, 1965. The calculated initiation time for DC-24,
projected seven scan cycles ahead, was 22:48:33 GMT
for a desired inhibit clock angle of 148.80 deg. Upon
receipt of DC-24, the scan platform motion was inhibited
at a clock angle of 148.43 deg, 0.37 deg from the desired
position.
d. OveraU sub,stem performance analysis. As men-
tioned, a graph of the platform position as a function
of planet search time was made to determine the subsys-
tern planet search performance. Data of the first search
cycle on the graph indicated that the motor initiated the
search operation at a proper speed. This observation
revealed that the motor was driving a nominal starting
torque and no excessive bonding between the surfaces
of the platform shaft and spacecraft structure was ex-
perienced. Although the motor assembly pressure had
been reduced from 30 to 26 psi, the motor was con-
sidered operating in a suitable environment since the
assembly was designed to survive the 8-mo journey and
to operate at encounter even in a hard vacuum. The
pressurization was simply an added safety factor.
The subsystem sensor and optics assembly was oper-
ating at a temperature of -8.5"C as compared to the
predicted values of - 10"C.
To simplify the design requirements of the electronic
amplification circuitry, the de outputs of the sensor
were converted to ac signals by a pair of photomodu-
lators, each consisting of a pair of small neon lamps and
a matched pair of cadmium selenide photocells. Extreme
care had been taken in the mounting of the frail lamps.
For proper operation, the lamps and photocells were
housed in light-tight compartments. However, it was
known that neon lamps fail to fire properly when pulsed
in darkness, or after long periods in the non-conducting
state in darkness, because the time required for gas
ionization increases when the lamps are operating in
the dark. This ionization time was reduced by the addi-
tion of a radioactive substance to the gas of the lamps.
The apparent proper operation of the photomodulator
as indicated by Y-axis output provides evidence that
this method, along with its resultant advantages, can
be utilized reliably for low-level signal modulation.
To conserve weight, volume and power consumption,
microeleetronic integrated networks were utilized in the
searching, tracking and planet-in-view logic circuits.
These networks were packaged in welded modules in
order to take advantage of their small, flat, packaging
dimensions. Since the various operations controlled by
these logic circuits occurred as anticipated, they have
amply demonstrated their suitability for utilization in cir-
cuits which must operate reliably in a space environment.
In addition to indicating the planet position, the
Y-axis output from the sensor was also used to determine
the amount of reflected solar energy received from the
planet. The Y-axis output as the planet swept across
the field of view of the sensor is shown in Fig. 43. The
data indicated that the sensor received 20 to 30% more
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ehergy than expected• Therefore, the calculated energy
level and the data used in the energy calculations must
be modified for use in designing future systems.
Although all the functions designed into the subsystem
were not exercised during planet encounter, the various
operations performed in flight coupled with the data
received during various ground and life-testing opera-
tions indicated that performance was at all times well
within the design tolerances.
O. Plasma Probe
1. Description
The plasma probe was designed to measure and
record the magnitudes of the positive-ion currents inter-
cepted by each of the three sectors of its current-
collecting electrode in each of 32 slightly-overlapping
energy windows that cover the range from 45 to 9370 ev
per unit charge.
A block diagram of the instrument is given in Fig. 44.
The principal subsystems include:
1. The high-voltage subsystem modulator, transformer,
multiplier, and voltage divider which supplies se-
lected magnitudes of square wave ae to a grid so
as to select the various energy windows.
2. The current measurement chain, including the
three current-collecting sectors with their individual
preamplifiers, of which any one or all three outputs
can be gated into the summing amplifier and sub-
sequent circuitry.
3. The calibration signal generator which produces
two standard dc currents that are gated periodically
into the three sector preamps.
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Fig. 44. Plasma probe block diagram
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4. The digital control circuitry which steps the
instrument through the proper sequence of mea-
surements. The eomplete measurement sequence
comprises 144 measurements, including: 2.
a. Each of 32 energy windows on each of three
collector segments
b. Each of 32 energy windows with all segments
gated in
c. Two current calibration measurements on each
collector segment
d. The modulation voltage on the 27th energy
window
e. The modulation voltage on the 28th energy
window
f. Two temperature measurements
g. Six extra marker measurements.
2. Pedormance
The digital control section of the instrument ap-
parently operated faultlessly throughout the flight. It
executed its 144-step cycle 18,783 times before telem-
etry was terminated. There were no instances of stepping
errors that did not have demonstrable causes such as
spacecraft commands or (during one 24-hr period) high-
voltage arcs.
The calibration circuitry and the current measurement
chain appear to have operated in an entirely normal
manner and in agreement with prelaunch expectations.
This is attested by the great stability of the high-current
(3 × 10 -9 amp) calibration readings, which were repeat-
able within one or two numbers for long periods of time,
varying with changes in temperature in approximately
the predicted manner. The low-current (3 × 10 -11 amp)
calibration readings exhibited essentially the same be-
havior, although the readings deviated more from the
mean values because of proximity to the noise threshold
of the measurement chain.
The high-voltage modulation circuitry (exclusive of
the voltage divider) did not exhibit any detectable anom-
alies, and it is probable that it operated essentially as
intended. There is insufficient evidence for a positive
evaluation of its performance, however, for two reasons:
1. During the first 8 days of the mission, the two
voltage-calibration measurements were stable and
varied predictably with temperature, but as only
two of the 32 voltage levels were sampled, one can
only infer that the values of the other 30 were
approximately normal from the fact that the solar-
wind data obtained appears normal.
Failure of the high-voltage resistor in the voltage
divider eliminated the voltage calibrations during
the rest of the mission and so garbled the data that
even a fairly major drift of the high-voltage output
might be difficult to detect from the data. No
evidence for such a drift has been seen, and it is
clear that (excepting the resistor) no catastrophic
failure occurred in any portion of the instrument.
The voltage divider consists of two resistors in series:
R339, a 300-meg high-voltage resistor, and R342, a
499-kflohm 1/_-w resistor. Its two functions in the cir-
cuit are:
1. To supply to the calibrate circuitry a low voltage
that is proportional to the output of the voltage
multiplier, and
2. To discharge the capacitance of the multiplier be-
tween current readings.
The very long time constant for discharge of the
voltage multiplier after the large increase in resistance
pushed most of the readings up to an energy above that
of the solar wind and introduced considerable uncer-
tainty into the energy of all the readings.
From the data gathered between launeh and resistor
failure November 28, 1964, and December 5, 1964,
significant information has been extracted. Velocity,
density, and flux have been calculated for most of the
1400 plasma spectra obtained, and calculations of tem-
perature and flow direction are in progress.
For the rest of the high-rate data, December 6, 1964,
to January 3, 1965, the situation was not encouraging.
The discharge time constant was such a large fraction
of the duration of the measurement cycle that very few
measurements showed any current at all except for one
day in mid-December when the solar-wind velocity was
exceptionally high.
During January, February, and March the data indi-
cated that, after the switch to low data rate, the dis-
charge time constant was short enough relative to the
interval between readings that most of the data from
the third sector sampled were taken at or near the
proper energy. It was therefore easily possible to re-
construct enough of the plasma spectrum to derive fairly
reliable estimates of the solar-wind velocity.
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" Because the back resistance of the high-voltage diodes
in the multiplier was extremely temperature-sensitive,
the discharge time constant increased steadily with time
as the spacecraft cooled; sometime in March or April it
had become so long that no simple scheme of data
analysis was valid any more, and virtually no information
has been gleaned from this later data.
instrument output through the DAS for periodic checks
of both linearity and scale factor. The cycle was initiated
at the beginning of each DAS sequence. The in-flight
calibration data indicated that both the instrument
linearity and scale factor remained stable throughout
the mission, and were identical to prdaunch calibration
of the instrument.
Although more careful investigation of the properties
of high-voltage resistors following the failure revealed
that they were not a good choice for the application in
which they were used, there is obviously a considerable
dement of luck involved. This fact was demonstrated
by the two post-launch life tests. The MC-4 plasma
electronics package was operated in vacuum at JPL for
approximately 5050 hr from December 27 to July 22.
The MC-0 electronics package was operated in vacuum
at MIT for 4690 hr ending on September 6. No change
in the properties of the resistor was apparent in either
test.
3. Recommendations
Apart from the resistor failure, for which the remedy
is obvious, the limitations of the plasma probe were
already clear before launch, but the schedule did not
permit further improvements. The limited sensitivity of
the probe is a major problem on which considerable
effort has been expended both at Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (MIT) and at JPL for future missions. The
noise level in the Mariner IV instrument makes current
readings below about 10 -11 amp unreliable. Improved
circuit design and more effective shielding between the
modulating grid and the collector can reduce the noise
level by a factor of five and hopefully even ten. The
uncertainty of the magnitude of the modulating voltage
on the various steps is the second major limitation; it
can be overcome in a straight-forward manner by in-
corporating a more complex sequence of voltage cali-
brations, as is being done in later versions of the probe.
P. Magnetometer
1. Description
The helium-vapor magnetometer uses the principle
that absorption of light by a cell containing helium gas
is a function of the angle between the ambient magnetic
field and the optic axis. The instrument was mechanized
with calibration circuitry which, by command from the
DAS, superimposed magnetic steps of - 80, -40, +40,
and 4-80 gamma at the magnetometer sensor. This
sequence of steps allowed calibration of the combined
a. Sensor. The resultant light, after passage through
the helium absorption cell, is monitored for absorption
as a function of time by an infrared (IR) detector. The
detector output represents a measure of the field before
refinement. Surrounding the sensor is a tri-axial array
of Helmholtz coils which creates a sweeping magnetic
vector for comparison with the IR detector output.
b. Oscillator and phase shifter. The oscillator and
phase shifter produces two sinusoidal currents with a
phase angle of 90 deg between them. One current is
sent to the Z-axis Helmholtz coil and the other is corn-
mutated between the X and Y axes of the coil system,
thereby creating a rotating field in either the X-Z or
Y-Z sweep planes.
c. Commutator. The commutator switches the X and
Y components of the sweep field on alternate cycles
and synchronously switches the X and Y servo amplifiers.
d. RF power supply. The RF power supply is used to
maintain a flow discharge in the helium lamp to supply
resonant light and in the absorption cell, Fig. 45, to
maintain helium atoms in the metastable state.
e. Servo amplifiers. Each servo amplifier: 1) converts
the first harmonic component of the IR detector output
that is in phase with the corresponding component of
the sweep vector to a dc current and 2) nulls one com-
ponent of the external magnetic field by applying the
de current to a Hdmholtz coil.
f. Magnetometer outputs. The analog output of the
magnetometer is proportional to the hulling current for
each axis and is taken directly from the servo loop. The
analog signal is fed to analog-to-pulse-width converters,
and these converters are the interface with the DAS.
2. Performance
The performance of the magnetometer during all
phases of the mission was nominal; no anomalies were
observed in its performance. During the period before
Canopus acquisition, the magnetometer was successfully
used to assist in the determination of the spacecraft
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orientation, and during this roll period the X and Y
components of the spacecraft magnetic field were
determined.
The magnetometer was useful in establishing the time
that the gyros came on or went off, because it indicated
a shift of several DN whenever the gyros came on.
During periods of low interplanetary magnetic field
activity, there were periods in excess of half an hour
when there were no changes in the magnetometer out-
put, indicating that the noise level of the magnetometer
was well below the 0.7 7 quantization limit of the DAS.
This low-noise behavior has been the best indicator of
good magnetometer performance and minimal degrada-
tion during the mission.
The instrument calibration remained steady during
the entire mission, indicating that there was no shift in
output scale factor or linearity from prelaunch calibration.
The inflight calibration steps were of sufficient ampli-
tude to exercise all six analog-to-pulse-width converters.
The performance of the instrument during and after
encounter was nominal; therefore, the results of the
planetary measurements can be accepted with confidence.
3. Recommendations
At the present time there is an advanced-development
program being conducted on the helium magnetometer
at JPL. By and large, the results of this program indicate
that the Mariner IV magnetometer sensor design was
nearly optimum. The areas for improvement are pri-
marily the optimization of the electronie design to
reduce weight and power and to increase noise per-
formance. Some improvements in mechanization and
qualification testing have also been suggested by life-
test results.
Q. Television Subsystem
1. Description
The television subsystem consists of a single camera
employing a narrow-angle telescope. The camera is a
shuttered system utilizing a slow-scan vidicon capable
of storing an image with negligible degradation for the
24-see frame time. The subsystem will take and encode
two-color television pictures upon receipt of frame and
line start signals from the DAS.
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Fig. 46. Television subsystem functional block diagram
A functional block diagram is shown in Fig. 46. A
more detailed block diagram showing circuitry blocks
is shown in Fig. 47. The subsystem is divided into eight
functional parts; a description of each follows.
a. Optics and Shutter. This part is the mechanical
assembly of the telescope and the combination shutter-
filter. The telescope is an _/8 Cassegrain with a 12-in.
effective focal length and a 1.05 by 1.05 deg field of
view. The shutter contains both shutter and filter
functions. This is accomplished by the use of a disk
containing four cutouts; two contain red filters and the
other two, green. These filters are introduced into the
light path by a rotating solenoid and remain until a
second current pulse energizes the solenoid. Eight such
pulses cause one complete rotation of the shutter filter
wheel.
b. Camera Head. The camera head contains the vidi-
con tube, preamplifier circuitry, 110-kc oscillator, and
filtering and distribution circuitry. The vidicon tube is
a photosensor and provides the electrical video signal.
The ll0-kc oscillator provides vidicon beam modulation
which serves as a carrier for amplitude-modulated video
information. The video signal is amplified by the tuned
preamplifier. The filtering and distribution circuitry
provides filtering and distribution of the voltages re-
quired for operation of the vidicon tube.
c. Sweeps. This part consists of the horizontal and
vertical sweep circuitry and the 4-ke oscillator. The
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sweep circuitry provides the voltages necessary for
horizontal and vertical defleetion of the vidieon beam
both during picture readout and when the vidicon target
is being erased and primed for the next picture. The
sweep voltages are adjusted to scan a 0.22 by 0.22-in. sq
area of the vidicon target. The 4-kc oscillator is gated on
during the interval between pictures and causes the
vertical sweep voltage to vary at that rate. This provides
erasure of the image on the vidicon target.
d. Camera control and computer. The gain control
computer circuitry, shutter control circuitry, G1 control
circuitry and planet acquisition circuitry are contained
in the camera control and computer. This circuitry per-
forms simple computer operations and provides control
of certain functions that affect the subsystem operation
and dynamic range. The video signal level is sampled
and video gain adjusted accordingly. The shutter ex-
posure time is decreased if the video signal exceeds a
preset level. The G1 control circuit regulates the amount
of vidicon beam current for readout, prime, and erase of
the vidicon target. The planet acquisition circuit pro-
vides a planet-in-view signal to the DAS when the video
signal exceeds a preset level.
e. Camera control logic. The camera control logic
consists of the external DAS command logic, divide-by-25
counter logic, frame control logic, and control logic gages
circuitry. These circuits provide logic control of all
camera timing functions such as shutter, picture readout,
target erase and prime, and various switching functions
necessary to the above. The control logic operates syn-
chronously from external frame and line timing infor-
mation received from the DAS.
f. Video channel. The video channel provides ampli-
fication, demodulation and de clamping for the video
signal. This part consists of the RF amplifier and de-
tector and the video output amplifier. A feedback
channel is provided so that video gain control can be
exercised. The output from the video output amplifier
is directed to the television data encoder.
g. ADC. The television ADC provides A/D conversion
of the television picture data to 6 bits per picture-
element pulse-code-modulation (PCM) conversion. These
data are transferred to the DAS at an 83,333 bps rate.
The data output conditioner, accumulator and shift
register, analog-to-digital comparator and gates, 1 Mc
clock and gate, ramp generator, matrix, matrix buffers,
programmer and OSE buffers circuitry perform this
encoding function. In addition, A/PW conversions are
performed on certain critical television performance
data and are coupled to the DAS by the A/PW con-
verter circuit. The line sync generator circuit reconstructs
line synchronization information and couples it to the
camera control logic.
h. Power supply. The power supply transforms the
2400-cps square wave power into the voltages, with
appropriate regulation, necessary to operate the tele-
vision subsystem.
The television subsystem provides several outputs:
1. PCM 83.3-kc data to the DAS; this is the digitized
video data.
2. Planet-in-view signal to the DAS; this signal
indicates the subsystem has received sufficient
illumination from a source or has received a planet-
in-view command from the DAS.
3. Multiplexed A/PW digital pulse output; this is an
analog-to-digital pulse width conversion for two
critical television parameters, signal voltage level
and G1 readout voltage.
4. Digital status data; five digital bits are parallel de
coupled to indicate the status of the video gain
control circuitry, color filter position, and shutter
exposure time.
2. Performance
a. Science cover deployment exercise. The television
instrument was turned on and operated three times
during the mission: during the science cover drop,
February 11, 1965; during the encounter, July 14; and
during the television haze calibration exercise performed
on August 30, 1965.
The command to deploy the science cover (DC-25)
also turned on the television subsystem. When the
switch to Mode 3 data was made, real time telemetry
data on the television subsystem was received. Reduc-
tion of the data from 60 frames in Mode 3 provided the
results shown in Table 26.
Word 41 data indicated proper alternation of the
filter position and also indicated the shutter was oper-
ating properly. The data indicated the shutter exposure
time was 200 msec and also that no planet-in-view signal
had been received nor generated. The gain control
computer remained inhibited in the minimum gain state
and the video level was less than 2 v. All these indications
were normal and expected for the cover drop operation.
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Table 26. Television subsystem performance data
Parameter
TV G1 voltage
(DAS word 31),
photometer mode, vdc
TV GI voltage
(DA5 word 31), normal
mode, vdc
TV + 10 voltage
(DAS word 39), vdc
Prelaunch
--43.4 ± 0.2
--46.4 ± 0.2
9.57 ± 0.01
Science cover
deployment
February
10, 1965
--43.4 ± 0.2
9.50 ± 0.01
Encounter
July 14, 1965
--43.4 ± 0.2
--46.4 ± 0.2
9.51 ± 0.01
No anomalies were detected during the operation. The
turn-off of the TV subsystem was timed to ensure the
shutter was in a closed position.
b. Encounter. The TV subsystem was turned on by
DC-25 on July 14 for the encounter operation. The sub-
system operated for approximately 7z/4 hr prior to the
switch to data Mode 3. Reduction of the data received
prior to NAA agreed with the February 10 data
(Table 26). It is known also from tests performed prior
to launch that the voltage measuring device varies an
order of magnitude more than the voltage. The measur-
ing device is also more temperature sensitive. Again, the
Word 41 data were as expected. The shutter filter indica-
tion was proper as were the exposure time of 200 msec,
the lack of a planet-in-view signal, less than 2 v of video
indication, and the minimum gain position of the
computer.
On Frame 41 (the DAS frame counter is reset con-
current with WAA) the Word 41 data indicated a tele-
vision planet-in-view. All other television data remained
the same. In testing and calibration prior to launch,
there was always an over-2-v-of-video indication before
the light intensity was high enough to cause a television
planet-in-view. It is therefore considered that the tele-
vision subsystem received the planet-in-view signal from
the DAS with the Mars gate as the originator.
In the next Frame No. 42, the data indicated an over-
2-v-of-video signal. In Frame No. 43, the voltage indica-
tion from Word 31 changed abruptly, which indicated
that the television had switched out of the photometer
mode to the normal mode (Table 26) and the inhibit was
released from the gain control computer. The computer
remained in the minimum gain state since the video
signal was large enough. The video signal, however, was
not large enough to cause the shutter exposure time to
switch to the backup 80 msec time. The recording of the
first picture was Frame No. 43.
The data remained the same with the filter color
alternating, until Frame No. 59. In this frame, the video
signal level indicated less than 2 v. In the next frame,
the indicator was again over 2 v. Frame No. 59 indicated
a green filter and the subsystem was designed such that
the gain would change after a green picture with less
than 2 v of video. The gain, however, did not change.
A close check of the time of Word 41 sampling indicated
it occurred during the time when the first six television
lines of a frame are blanked out. This condition had
occurred several times during systems tests. This was not
an anomaly or a problem.
The gain remained at minimum until Frame No. 68,
where it stepped up one level. In the previous frame,
the video signal was less than 2 v. The gain switched
again in Frame No. 70 and switched to maximum in
Frame No. 72. The video signal indication remained
less than 2 v until Frame No. 72 where it again indicated
over 2 v. The spacecraft switched to Data Mode 2 before
data could be received on Frame No. 73. All frame
numbers refer to the DAS frame counter.
The pictures received demonstrated, along with the
telemetry data, that the television subsystem operation
was flawless. The optical and electronic focus, resolu-
tion, gray-scale rendition and sensitivity were the same
as prior to launch.
c. Televlsion haze calibration exercise. A dark en-
counter exercise was undertaken primarily in an attempt
to learn more about the haze found in the pictures of
Mars. Secondarily, it was hoped that some explanation
of the periodic interference seen in the pictures taken
through the red No. 2 filter might be found.
Although an initial attempt, terminated because of
ground problems, moved the shutter disc, analysis of
the timing indicated an 0.8 probability that the first red
picture recorded would be filter No. 1 ff the proper
sequence of turn-on commands were used.
The predetermined procedure was followed and the
encounter sequence initiated at 2030 GMT on August
30, 1965. The Mode 3 telemetry was carefully analyzed
to determine whether the AAC-3 function (___2 vpk
video) tripped. Additionally, the frame start/end of tape
(bit 408) and the television filter (bit 406) functions were
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monitored for a repeat of the anomalous events seen
during the Mars encounter.
The results of the encounter were essentially negative.
No video was detected, and the played-back pictures
showed no excessive noise indicative of increased dark
current in the vidicon. At the maximum gain state, the
average video level DN was 61.510 c.f. 59.010 as the
quietest "capped optics" picture taken during calibra-
tion. Space would appear to be quieter and darker than a
test lab as no interference was found. All telemetry data
were nominal, including bias voltages and temperature.
3. Recommendations
The television subsystem met all of the design goals
and objectives placed on it. For future missions, if the
same type of photographic subsystem were used, im-
provements that could be made are:
1. Obtain a vidicon with improved performance. The
vidieon used was at the state-of-the-art. For a
future mission, perhaps a vidicon with greater
sensitivity, better erase characteristics, and less
shading could be developed.
2. Use a system with higher gain to distinguish
features in the darker portions of the planet. A
better determination of the light characteristics of
the planet can now be made from the results
of Mariner IV.
3. For any future spacecraft system, more data storage
capacity and a higher rate is desired. With these
capabilities, a higher resolution photographic sys-
tem could be used.
IV. SPAC ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION
A. Operations Philosophy
1. SPAC Responsibility and Function
The responsibility of the Mariner SPAC group was to
monitor and analyze spacecraft performance and make
recommendations for courses of action which would
enhance the probability of achievement of the mission
objectives. This group was one of three analysis groups
within the SFO organization established to support the
Mariner Mars 1964 Project. The other analysis groups
were the SSAC group and the FPAC group. These
groups were responsible for the analysis of science data
and the analysis of the flight path (trajectory), respec-
tively, and for making recommendations for ground
commands to enhance mission success from their points
of view. The directors of the analysis groups, in addition
to the directors of the mission support groups, such as
DSIF, the Data Processing System (DPS) and the Oper-
ational Communications System (OCS), reported to the
SFOD.
In analyzing the spacecraft data the SPAC continually
attempted to evaluate the actual performance against
the anticipated performance based on the design. Exten-
sive effort was applied to explain every unexpected
condition observed. Frequently, the cause was an in-
complete understanding of the spacecraft in a space
environment.
Under guidelines established by the SSAC and the
Project Office the SPAC also attempted to maximize
the scientific data recovery. A primary goal through-
out the mission was the ultimate attainment of television
pictures of Mars and data from the occultation of the
spacecraft by Mars. The responsibility of the SPAC
group relative to the attainment of scientific data was
to assure the acquisition of the planet-oriented data and
then, wherever possible within engineering constraints,
to assure the acquisition of the maximum amount of
interplanetary data. In the Mariner IV mission the latter
was easily accommodated.
The development of a mission operations plan was
undertaken by the SPAC group to execute the responsi-
bilities with which it was charged. SPAC planning efforts
were instrumental in the development of the overall
SFO sequence of events for the various mission phases.
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2. Organization
The Mariner SPAC organization had as its nucleus
the SPAC Division Representatives, the SPAC Director
and the Assistant SPAC Director. SPAC Division repre-
sentatives were members of the following Technical
Divisions at JPL: Division 32, Space Science; Division
33, Telecommunications; Division 34, Guidance and
Control; Division 35, Engineering Mechanics; and
Division 38, Propulsion. The SPAC Director and Assis-
tant Director represented Division 29, Project Engineer-
ing. In this manner, there was available in the SPAC
organization knowledge of the spacecraft from each of
the broad disciplines which contributed to the design.
This nucleus formulated the SPAC organization and was
responsible for the implementation of the group's goals.
The goals can be summarized as follows: define facility,
computer, and staffing requirements; adequately staff
the various positions; effect training of the SPAC per-
sonnel through procedure generation and test participa-
tion; analyze flight data, and recommend actions to be
taken during the mission.
Detailed knowledge of the major subsystems aboard
the spacecraft was brought into the SPAC organization
through subsystem representatives, usually the cognizant
engineer or his alternate. Responsibilities of each repre-
sentative included knowledge relative to the design,
fabrication, test history, and capabilities of his sub-
system in flight. In addition, the subsystem representa-
tive was responsible for the achievement of the detailed
analysis of his hardware in flight, analyzing real time
telemetry, advising his division representative or the
SPAC Director of his subsystem's performance, and
providing information relative to the status of this sub-
system during any discussion of action to be taken in
the event of a non-standard spacecraft condition. With
the subsystem representatives supporting the SPAC
nucleus, the non-staff portion of the SPAC organization
was essentially complete. This organization provided
the SPAC Director with only a small group which he
had to manage directly, and also provided the desirable
feature of having the subsystem representatives be re-
sponsible to a member of their own division. The SPAC
line organization is shown in Fig. 48.
During the actual flight operations, especially the
long-duration critical phases, some modification was
necessary in the organization of the Mariner SPAC. In
the operations the SPAC personnel were organized in a
functional manner rather than by individual as described
above. During planning phases the Division Representa-
tive, for example, is an individual charged with the
responsibilities of that position. No alternate may act in
his behalf unless duly authorized by the Project Office,
SPAC, and the Division in question. This is necessary
because his duties involve commitments and recommen-
dations which are binding both on the Project and on
his Division. During an operation, however, two facts
serve to void this necessity for individual responsibility:
1. It is not possible to require individual responsibility
and extended full time support simultaneously from
the same person.
2. All commitments and recommendations which re-
quire participation by this individual will have
been previously made; the responsibility for those
oeeurring during the operation rests with the
SPAC Director, the SFOD, and the Project Office.
As a result the operational organization of the Mariner
SPAC permits the position of Division Representative
to become a functional responsibility, so that any qual-
ified person may serve in that capacity.
Early in the mission it was attempted to treat the
position of SPAC Director in the same manner. The
SPAC Director, however, is still required to be individ-
ually accountable during a flight operation, since he is
the only spacecraft representative active in flight opera-
tions who is recognized directly by the SFOD and the
Project Office. Thus, while an alternate could be ap-
pointed, neither full responsibility nor authority could
be transferred. In order to reduce the burden upon the
SPAC Director, his duties were catalogued as to indi-
vidual or functional responsibility. Those which were
individual in nature were reserved to the SPAC Director.
The functional responsibilities were assigned to the
Assistant SPAC Director position which could be
manned by any of the qualified members of the SPAC
Director's staff. Figure 49 represents the flight operations
organization for SPAC.
Another modification to the organizational structure
of the SPAC during flight operations was the elimina-
tion of the line structure requirement that all interfacing
between the SPAC Direction Team and the individual
subsystem representatives be carried out via the ap-
propriate division representative. Prior to launch or
during the routine transaction of SPAC business the
direct insertion of the division representative is neces-
sary in order to guarantee proper coordination of the
division's SPAC effort. During an operation, however,
it places on the operation the unreasonable burden of
maintaining an additional level in the organization. To
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Fig. 48. SPAC line organization
avoid this the subsystem representatives were encour-
aged to report directly to the Assistant SPAC Director,
with all reports or recommendations subject to the
division representative's concurrence.
One staff function was performed for the SPAC
Director by individuals on loan from the organization of
the Space Flight Operation Director. These individuals,
called operations assistants, aided in the integration of
the mission-oriented SPAC group into the basically
mission-independent Spacecraft Performance and Anal-
ysis Area. They also aided in verification and checkout
of computer programs to be used by SPAC. Subsequent-
ly they provided the SPAC interface with the facility
and the computers during the critical (high activity)
phases of the mission. During the cruise phase the opera-
tions assistants reverted back to the Space Flight Oper-
ation Directors organization. Their function then was
to serve as mission operations controllers during the
24 hr/day tracking and data acquisition activities of
the cruise phase. During any of the critical phases of the
mission, including encounter, the operations assistants
were utilized to augment the activities required of the
Space Flight Operation organization.
Additional line support was available to the SPAC
Division Representatives through the specialized support
from individuals within their divisions who were unique-
ly aware of various assemblies of the spacecraft or had
a special analytical ability. During the critical phases of
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the mission these individuals were not housed in the
Spacecraft Performance Analysis Area, (SPAA) or the
Mariner Mission Support Area (MMSA), but did have
access to the data and could contact their division
representative, as required. They could be summoned
into the operations area for consultation as the need
arose.
The importance of a person on the Mariner SPAC
group solely responsible for documentation was not
recognized until after the launch. The Spacecraft Sys-
tems Manager requested of the SPAC, subsequent to
the launch, periodic on-lab formal reports of spacecraft
performance. In order to achieve this objective, it was
necessary for the Mariner SPAC to acquire a documen-
tation engineer. With his assistance the SPAC Director
was able to publish formal reports covering spacecraft
performance for each 6-wk period throughout the mis-
sion. He was able also to publish informal weekly
reports of the spacecraft performance. Later in the
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rflission this individual was also responsible for helping
generate SPAC Operational Procedures. The documen-
tation to support the Encounter Preparation Working
Group and the evolution of the final encounter sequence
plan was generated with his help.
3. Operations Philosophy
The operations philosophy of the Mariner SPAC
group was to maintain 24 hr/day coverage by the
majority of the SPAC representatives during the critical
phases of the mission, such as launch, Canopus acquisi-
tion, midcourse, encounter and any additional situations
requiring ground command action. The basis for this
philosophy was the recognition that: 1) any imminent
change of state of the spacecraft should be preceded by
an interval of extensive data examination prior to com-
mitment to such an action, and 2) any recent change of
the spacecraft should be monitored to verify that all
expected results are observed and to ensure against some
unexpected effect going unobserved.
In the early phases of the mission (prior to the
trajectory-correction maneuver) the intervals between
critical phases were manned with only division repre-
sentatives, or equivalent, support in addition to a
member of the SPAC Director's staff. Subsequent to the
mideourse maneuver, the coverage by the SPAC was
reduced to daily reviews of the data, followed by daily
meetings of the SPAC Director and the Division
Representatives.
Continuous monitoring of the data was accomplished
by an alarm program in the IBM 7044 Computer under
the supervision of the SFO Operations Controllers
(previously SPAC Operations Assistants). Any violations
of alarm limits previously read into the computer would
cause the Operations Controller to be alerted. He would,
in turn, notify the SPAC Director and the appropriate
Division or subsystem representatives who would take
whatever action was warranted as a result of the alarm
limits being violated.
In situations where an unexpected condition existed,
there frequently was some action that could be taken
on the ground to provide deeper insight into the con-
dition of the spacecraft, or there existed an obvious need
for the transmission of a ground command. More fre-
quently, however, the unexpected condition was the
result only of bad data, or perhaps of some unknown
condition. One aspect of the SPAC function was to
ascertain just what the cause of any unexpected con-
dition was before any overt action was taken. The
philosophy which pertained was that no intentional
perturbation to the spacecraft would be initiated on the
ground unless such action was clearly warranted and
justified.
In previous missions this had been interpreted as
precluding the transmission of any command unless
corrective action for a particular problem was required.
The nature of the Mariner IV mission, however, was
such that an extension of the basic philosophy was evolved
during the mission. Ground commands were utilized to
preempt automatic features aboard the spacecraft and
to exercise a back-up to an automatic function before
the need for such a command was demonstrated. The
necessity for this change in philosophy resulted from
the intricacies of the spacecraft logic and from recog-
nition of the 12-min one-way transmission time of
signals between the spacecraft and the Earth at en-
counter. Before a ground command to correct an unex-
pected condition aboard the spacecraft, at encounter
could reach the spacecraft, that condition which required
the corrective command was at least 24 min old. If that
amount of time was consumed before a back-up was
effective, the utility of the back-up might be so marginal
as to be useless.
4. SPAC Interfaces
To successfully complete its task the SPAC group had
to have numerous interactions with other elements of
the SFO organization. This section describes those inter-
faces in order to provide an understanding of the broad
scope of efforts involved in a spacecraft performance
analysis activity.
a. Facility. One of the major interfaces was the
interface with the SFOF. The SFOF housed all the SFO
activity at JPL during the Mariner mission. One segment
of the SFOF was the SPAA which housed the SPAC for
the first 2 mo of the mission. To properly utilize the
SPAA it was necessary for SPAC to define its equipment
needs, including telephones, desks, data display devices
and communication net requirements. Subsequent to
defining the equipment needs it was necessary to derive
a layout for the various pieces of equipment. The re-
quirement in this regard was to assure that people
needing access to various pieces of equipment could
have such conveniently. Since the SFOF and the SPAA
were basically mission independent, it was necessary
for the Mariner SPAC to consider the requirements of
other projects also using the SPAA in deriving its final
room arrangement. Significant negotiation took place
prior to the definition of a room layout which was easily
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adaptable to both the Ranger and the Mariner missions.
The final room arrangement is shown in Fig. 50.
Because of the desire of the Mariner Project Office
to provide a working place for Mariner personnel during
the cruise phase of the mission, it was decided to imple-
ment the MMSA. Such an area would provide an
interference-free location where Mariner personnel
could work, meet, and eventually test and execute the
encounter sequence when the spacecraft passed the
planet in July 1965. The MMSA was completed and
occupied by the Mariner Project in mid-January 1965.
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The room arrangement of the MMSA is shown in
Fig. 51. This room housed activities which were pre-
viously distributed among various areas in the SFOF:
SSAC, SPAC, FPAC, DSIF and the SFOD.
b. Data processing system. To accomplish the SPAC
responsibility of data analysis, it was necessary to inter-
act with the SFOF Data Processing System (DPS). The
SPAC group received output from the DPS as a result
of real time and nonreal time data processing. Real time
data processing involved decoding, identifying and
time tagging data received from the DSIF tracking sta-
tions very shortly following its reception at the station.
Real time data processing led to an immediate display
of the data in desired formats in the user (SPAC) area.
Nonreal time data processing involved special computer
operations on data stored in the SFOF. In general this
data was in excess of 30 min old. During the majority of
the mission nonreal time processing was done on a daily
basis using the data received during the past 24 hr.
The real time computer processing programs were
utilized continuously throughout the mission. All data
received in real time from the DSIF stations was pro-
cessed by the real time editing program and operated
on by the alarm program. In situations where the real
time programs could not be run due to computer con-
flicts or computer breakdown, the data from the DSIF
stations was interpretable from the output of a teletype
machine attached directly to the incoming teletype line.
The value of the real time programs was proved to the
satisfaction of those reviewing the teletype machine
printout.
The SFOF and DPS interfaces were preliminary to
the major SPAC task of mission operations, which in-
volved a general interface with the SFOD and the
Project Office. In order to succeed in SPAC's responsi-
bility for reviewing the data and suggesting any
corrective action that was necessary, extensive effort
had to be applied in the areas of test planning, develop-
ment of operational procedures, and determination of a
sequence of events. The goal of the mission operations
phase is to have a set of agreed-upon operational pro-
cedures and also a sequence of events which would
indicate to those concerned what activities were to be
followed in the execution of that particular flight
sequence. To achieve the twin goals of an operational
procedure and a sequence of events, a test plan had to
be developed. The test plan utilized by the SPAC was
directed toward gradually educating the SPAC per-
sonnel to the capabilities of the facility and computer
system, then conducting a series of tests in which their
knowledge of the spacecraft and its operational modes
was tested.
Initially, the tests that were run were conducted
using simulated data derived from a computer program
based upon inputs from the various technical areas as
to what their subsystem telemetry should look like as
a function of time within a flight sequence. This type
of testing was primarily effective during the initial
portions of the testing program when the primary
activity consisted of checking out the facility and the
computers. The complexity of the Mariner Mars 1964
spacecraft, however, made it very difficult to adequately
simulate the data to show reactions to spacecraft com-
mands and changes of state due to other sources. Be-
ginning in October, 1964, in order to provide SPAC with
more realistic data, the proof test model (PTM) space-
craft which had been previously utilized in the spacecraft
test and assembly program was used as the data source.
It was now possible to show immediate responses to
spacecraft commands and to more adequately test the
SPAC group through the use of the capability of simu-
lating failure modes. The operation of the PTM was
controlled by the PTM test team in the Spacecraft
Assembly Facility. Data from this spacecraft was
brought into the SFOF via hard-line.
c. Deep Space Instrumentation Facility. The neces-
sary interaction between the DSIF and the SPAC was
handled by the SPAC Director and the Telecommunica-
tions Division representative, or their alternates. During
critical operations the DSIF Project Engineer was
accessible to SPAC only through the SFOD. Since all
telemetry was received by the DSIF stations and
all commands are transmitted by the DSIF stations, it is
natural that much information about the DSIF station
at any particular point in the mission be of interest to
the SPAC group. The primary interface activity involved
the determination of a two-way tracking schedule in
conjunction with the FPAC group, discussion regarding
the use of the 100-kw transmitter at the Goldstone
station, and determination of the procedures involved
with sending commands and receiving spacecraft telem-
etry signals. Periodically it was necessary to request of
the DSIF information such as station time, transmitter
frequency, ground-received signal level or a readout of
some telemetry channel directly from the telemetry
processing equipment at the station. When problems oc-
curred in the communication lines bringing telemetry
data into the SFOF, it was necessary to request the DSIF
to monitor various telemetry channels and report by
voice when and if these channels changed in value. This
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permitted rapid action on the part of personnel in
Pasadena, even if they were unable to view the telem-
etry that was being received at the station at that
particular moment.
An example of the special functions which the DSIF
was requested to perform was a monitoring of the analog
recorders at the stations to fix the time when frequency
transients were noted on the downlink signal. One type
of frequency transient occurred when the spacecraft
cyclic command occurred while the spacecraft receiver
was in a one-way lock condition. The SPAC requirement
for precise timing of the transients was based on a need
for information about the spacecraft CC&S clock
frequency.
The DSIF received-signal level was displayed during
the late portions of the mission in the Mariner Mission
Support Area on an analog recorder. This requirement
was established after detailed investigations into the
implementation of the spacecraft roll inertial control
mode indicated that the high gain antenna pointing
error was the only measurable roll attitude indicator.
This capability to monitor received-signal level per-
mitted the telecommunication analyst in the SPAC to
gain some knowledge as to the signal level changes as
a function of time.
d. Analysis areas. The interfaces with the other two
analysis areas, SSAC and FPAC, were very important
to the SPAC in the successful accomplishment of its
responsibilities. The SSAC group was able to assist the
SPAC in the interpretation of the scientific mission
objectives so that the proper determination of the
mission plan could be effected. SPAC felt a responsi-
bility to implement the desired goals of the scientific
community whenever such could be accomplished with-
out detrimental effect upon the final accomplishment
of a successful encounter sequence.
The evaluation of the science data by the science
cognizant engineers and scientists provided the SPAC
group with an indication of the environment which the
spacecraft was observing, in addition to providing some
useful inputs to the SPAC relative to the occurrence
of various events. Some of the anomalous conditions
observed on the Mariner IV were evidenced in both
the science and engineering telemetry. Correlation of the
times of these occurrences in both telemetry types
permitted more concrete determination of the cause of
such anomalous conditions. The interface between the
SPAC and SSAC was effected by the SPAC Director
and the SPAC Science representative, each of which
had contact with the SSAC Director. Additionally, the
SPAC Science representative had direct communication
with the science subsystem cognizant engineers who
were located in the SSAC area. After the MMSA be-
came operational, direct communications of an informal
nature between individual SPAC and SSAC personnel
were possible.
The FPAC group provided the SPAC with trajectory
information including the geometry of the spacecraft
relative to the Sun and Earth and other celestial objects
at such times as midcourse and encounter and also the
cruise phase. This information permitted detailed and
knowledgeable interpretation of the performance of the
spacecraft as concerned both the telemetry and the
radio signals observed on the Earth. An important
function which was satisfied by the FPAC group was
the prediction of the frequency of the radio-received
signal at the Earth and the proper frequency for trans-
mission to the spacecraft. This was necessary due to the
continually changing doppler effect on the radio signal.
The availability of such information to SPAC permitted
better an0_lysis of the radio signals as well as the rapid
lockup of both the uplink and downlink signals.
e. Encounter preparation working group. The En-
counter Preparation Working Group (EPWG) greatly
influenced the operations within the SPAC group for the
latter portions of the mission. The EPWG was one of
several groups established by the Mariner Project Office
in January 1965 to support Space Flight Operations
in its preparations for the remainder of the Mariner Mars
1964 mission. Basic responsibilities of this group were to
augment the SFO organization by studying the potential
encounter phase in July at great length and making
recommendations to this organization and the Mariner
Project Office as to what strategy should be employed
to maximize the probability of mission success. The
major outputs of the EPWG were the recommendations
for a science cover deployment exercise during the
month of February, and the generation of the encounter
sequence plan that was utilized in the July encounter
of Mars.
The chairman of the EPWG was the Spacecraft
Project Engineer. His committee members were basically
the Project Representatives from the various technical
divisions and areas of responsibility.
In the preparation for encounter, hidden facets of the
spacecraft design and operation were uncovered or re-
discovered to a much greater extent than had been
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anticipated. The acquisition of detailed knowledge
relative to the spacecraft design and predicted per-
formance based on testing was very useful in the
evolution of the encounter sequence plan. This encounter
sequence plan was thoroughly tested prior to encoun-
ter with a series of tests conducted with the PTM
spacecraft. An additional result of the EPWG effort was
the generation of techniques and computer programs
required to support the encounter phase; e.g., the pro-
gram to predict the scan platform position as a function
of time based upon real time telemetry input. Another
computer program was generated which defined the
true spacecraft time based upon the timing associated
with real time telemetry at the DSIF stations. Precise
timing of certain functions was mandatory for a success-
ful encounter sequence and was established and verified
through test and re-evaluation of the systems involved.
5. SPAC Data Output
Enormous quantities of data were generated for SPAC
use during the course of the Mariner IV mission. The
real time data processing was done entirely with the
IBM 7044 Computer, and the nonreal time processing
was done with the IBM 7094 Computer. The gross
design of the data processing system in the SFOF calls
for the output of the 7094 to be available in near real
time. The Mariner SPAC did not utilize this capability,
although at times, prior to the mission, it had been
anticipated that such would be done. The lack of prior-
ity of this capability for Mariner precluded additional
work to correct computer deficiencies in this area.
There were four basic sources for Mariner data
throughout the mission. One source was the IBM 7044
Computer which provided three outputs utilized by the
SPAC group. One output was from the Stromberg-
Carlson 3070 Electrostatic Printer. Another output of
the 7044 was an output of selected telemetry measure-
ments on teletype machines modified to operate at a
rate of 100 words/min. These devices have been called
teleprinters. The third output of the 7044 was a plot of
the telemetry on a Milgo 30- × 30-in. plotter. This
device had the capability of printing and displaying only
12 selected engineering telemetry channels. The nature
of the Mariner data was such that this number of
channels appeared to be satisfactory.
A second source of data was the 7094 computer
which again generated three outputs utilized by the
SPAC group: 1) an editor program output called JPEDIT
which listed all engineering measurements in a for-
mat which provided easy access to the measurements in
question, 2) a data suppression program (SSDM) used
to reduce printout of non-changing telemetry channels,
and 3) a plotting program called EDPLOT. The SSDM
output contained the conversion in its output format;
this was due to the fact that JPEDIT was an editor
output and the engineering unit conversion was made
downstream of this particular portion of the 7094 com-
puter processing program. With EDPLOT, selected
telemetry channels could be plotted to desired time
scales to provide for the SPAC members a graphical
display of the telemetry measurements for a segment
of time.
A third source of data to the SPAC group was the
display of non-decommutated data on teletype machines
in the area. This output was taken directly from the
teletype lines. The printout of the teletype signals was
made useable to SPAC by providing a special printing
head on slightly modified printers. Data in this format
were used when the computed outputs were not avail-
able, or when timing was critical and the delay within
the computer to process the data and display it would be
too long to permit operational decisions.
The fourth basic data source available to the SPAC
was a Franklin printer located in the area. This output
device is identical with that utilized on the System Test
Complex during the spacecraft system testing. Special
conversion equipment was provided to accept the tele-
type signal and convert it into a signal compatible with
the input requirements of the ground telemetry process-
ing equipment. The output of the Franklin printer
became available only late in the mission and was
primarily useful in the period of time when the recorded
television picture data were being transmitted. The real
time computer processing program had no convenient
means of displaying the output of the television data.
It was decided not to expend additional effort attempt-
ing to modify the 7044 computer programs to handle this
data when the availability of the Franklin printer output
was recognized.
Some other special data sources were employed within
SPAC. The data conversion equipment used in con-
junction with the ground telemetry equipment and
the Franklin printers was developed and used by the
Guidance and Control analysts to provide a rapid analog
display of some important telemetry channels. This
technique of displaying digital telemetry to satisfy
unique requirements proved very worthwhile throughout
the mission, but particularly in the early phases of the
mission at the time of Canopus acquisition and the mid-
course maneuver.
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' Each of the outputs available to the SPAC group was
intended to fill a specific purpose. The 3070 printer
output was utilized continuously throughout the mission
by the SPAC Direction Team, and the mission operations
controllers to assess the status of the spacecraft, and by
the telemetry subsystem analysts to verify the state of
their subsystem. These printers had the desirable capa-
bility of printing all telemetry channels. All SPAC
personnel did not have ready access to a 3070 printer,
however, because there were few available in each area.
Subsystem data analysts used the output of the high-
speed teleprinters, driven by the 7044 computer, as the
prime data source throughout the mission. The outputs
of these devices were specially formatted with only
telemetry measurements of interest displayed to each
analyst. The Milgo plotter output was utilized by the
attitude control engineers in analyzing the performance
of the spacecraft control system in its limit cycle
operation.
The JPEDIT output was intended to provide a com-
plete nonreal time record of the spacecraft engineering
data in a reasonably compact form, affording each
SPAC analyst a reference library of telemetry data.
Problems with the 7094 editor program rendered
JPEDIT less useful than hoped, especially during the
early stages of the mission. SSDM was intended to
supplement the JPEDIT, but in a compressed form,
much like a nonreal time alarm record. The EDPLOT
output was to provide a graphical equivalent to JPEDIT
for selected measurements. The utility of both SSDM
and EDPLOT were also reduced by the 7094 editor
program deficiencies.
All data generated in the Mariner IV mission were
stored by an organization of the SFOF called Opera-
tional Document Control. Possession of all this data on
file provided the SPAC representatives with a means
of obtaining and reviewing any segment of the mission
desired.
An MDL of engineering telemetry has been generated
which is a compilation of all the best data recorded at
the DSIF stations. The MDL provides an accurate and
reliable record of all mission data. The output of the
MDL, as far as engineering telemetry is concerned, is
in two forms; the first is an engineering lister which is
essentially a decommutated listing of all engineering
channels in their decimal value format, i.e., no engineer-
ing conversion. The EDPLOT program provides the
second means of displaying the MDL information. These
plots contain nearly all spacecraft generated data, pro-
viding a graphical means of reviewing long term data
for single measurements.
B. Performance Evaluation
1. General
It should be noted at the outset that there is no way
to measure directly the true worth of an SPAC group.
The Mariner SPAC was chartered to monitor the space-
craft, to determine from the telemetry the state of
the spacecraft, and to recommend to the SFOD and the
Project Office any action necessary to effect the achieve-
ment of the mission objectives. Since the SPAC did
perform these functions and since the mission objectives
were achieved, then the SPAC activity must be con-
sidered successful. The charter, however, allows such
a broad spectrum of action that mission success is a
very gross indicator of SPAC performance. The space-
craft is designed to perform its mission with no support
from SPAC. If it does, then that SPAG group is more
successful than one which heavily supported a spacecraft
that failed. Obviously if the failure can be traced to an
act of either commission or omission by the SPAC, then
the SPAC group was at fault; in all other cases no ab-
solute criterion exists by which to measure the effective-
ness of the SPAC.
The role of the Mariner SPAC is doubly difficult to
assess, in that the Mariner SPAC recognized the diffi-
culty involved in responding to spacecraft anomalies
with effective corrective action, especially at planetary
encounter distances with the associated 25-min com-
munications turn-around time. As a result the primary
effort was directed toward the implementation of an
operations plan which would prevent anomalous be-
havior rather than correct it. In a number of cases this
led to the pre-emption of an automatic spacecraft func-
tion, with the result that operation of those automatic
functions was never fully verified. Thus no after-the-
fact information is available to verify that the action of
SPAC was required, and any evaluation of the SPAC
performance must rest solely on an assessment of the
quality of the analyses which led to the adoption of
pre-emption as a flight procedure.
To the SPAC personnel themselves, the best indication
of the performance of SPAC was found in the high
degree of preparedness for the planetary encounter. A
very large number of possible failure modes had been
investigated and provided for, either through preventa-
tive action or the adoption of a plan for corrective action.
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Encounter testing showed that the capability to react was
high: telemetry predictions allowed almost immediate
recognition of failure modes, exchange of information
was quick and comlrlete, and non-standard procedures
were well understood. During the actual encounter
the SPAC representatives performed their duties with
the efficiency and dispatch of a highly professional team.
As with any undertaking of this magnitude, a number
of points stand out as primary contributors to success,
while others demonstrated considerable room for im-
provement. These are discussed in the following.
2. Facilities
One of the primary problems faced by the Mariner
SPAC revolved around the fact that it was the first SPAC
group to attempt to operate solely in the new SFOF. The
SFOF is a mission-independent facility equipped to
support a number of current and projected space flight
projects, both singly and simultaneously. As such it
has been built with the growth capability required
to handle extremely complex missions involving a wide
variety of spacecraft design concepts. As might be ex-
pected, a facility as flexible as this is extremely diffi-
cult to bring to an operational status, and even then
will not meet the particular requirements of a specific
spacecraft design as well as a simpler facility specifically
oriented to that spacecraft.
The combination of a facility which was both new
and mission independent and a spacecraft model which
had not been previously flown created a number of
problems which affected Mariner SPAC operations
throughout the Mariner IV mission. First, each of the
projects requiring the use of the SFOF had unique
requirements which were not always compatible. The
development of an SPAC capability requires a con-
siderable amount of time in advance of the actual flight
operations, so that significant conflict existed among the
Mariner, Ranger, and Surveyor Projects as to both physi-
cal configuration and facility utilization. The Mariner
SPAC received partial relief when the MMSA became
available shortly after Mariner IV launch, but computer
utilization conflicts remained subject to negotiation
throughout the mission. The DPS presented another
problem beside utilization conflicts. The computer sys-
tem, designed to meet the requirements of advanced
spacecraft beyond Mariner, used certain hardware and
software designed to be mission independent. This
placed so many constraints on its ability to handle
Mariner data that only a very small portion of the
capability of the computer system was available to
the SPAC. In addition, the development and checkout
of the hardware was so delayed that the primary goal of
the prelaunch testing in which SPAC took part was the
checkout of hardware and software. So far as the SPAC
activity was concerned, the real time computer programs
were more important than the nonreal time programs, so
that the real time programs were emphasized to the
exclusion of work on the nonreal time programs. Reasons
for this included the realization that real time data
processing was mandatory to support the mission during
the critical phases of launch, Canopus acquisition, and
the midcourse trajectory correction, and to provide a
real time alarm program to monitor spacecraft engineer-
ing telemetry automatically during the cruise phase.
Successful operation of the real time data processing
programs was demonstrated sufficiently far in advance
of launch to provide the SPAC group with confidence
that they would be able to adequately support the
mission. The real time data output, however, did con-
tinue to experience a variety of problems throughout
the portion of the mission that the spacecraft telemetry
rate was high (331/3 bits/sec), so that SPAC was forced
to rely heavily on the unprocessed teletype data as a
backup. Nonreal time processing was eventually brought
to operational status for a few programs, but their use-
fulness was limited by SPAC's reluctance to rely on data
outputs whose dependability had not been demonstrated
prior to launch; only two programs required for Canopus
acquisition met this requirement.
In retrospect, many problems rising between the
SPAC and the DPS resulted from insufficient under-
standing on the part of all parties concerned. Poor
liaison caused a part of this: the requesting SPAC
engineers failed to define the problem completely, and
the computer programmers did not adequately apprise the
requesting engineers of the system constraints and pro-
gramming progress. Another contributing factor, one
which should be expected every time a new spacecraft
model is flown, was that without previous flight opera-
tions experience on the Mariner Mars design, many of
the SPAC representatives did not fully understand their
own data processing requirements. Not until actual flight
experience was gained was it possible to evaluate ade-
quately the programs available for nonreal time process-
ing. This evaluation indicated the need for a significant
amount of revision, a requirement for several new
programs, and the fact that several of the existing pro-
grams were without significant value. The computer
system proved, however, to be so complex as to be
ponderous; program revisions and new program develop-
ment are so costly and lengthy a process that they could
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not be undertaken, especially when the SPAC had al-
ready demonstrated the capability to operate in spite of
degraded data processing.
The conflicts over the physical facility were relieved
by the creation of a separate Mariner area which could
be used in the manner best suited to the Mariner
operations without interference from other projects or
activities. The recommendation of SPAC is that a
similar solution be considered for the data processing
problems in future projects. Whether or not this would
mean the use of a mission dependent computer system
would depend largely upon the type of capability re-
quired and the projected utilization of the existing DPS
facilities by other projects. If a Mariner-type vehicle
were to be flown again under conditions similar to
Mariner IV, the recommendation by SPAC would be
that a mission-dependent system be used for SPAC and
SSAC telemetry processing. The basic processing re-
quirement would be that the system be capable of
displaying real time telemetry data to each user and
also be equipped to handle all mandatory operational
programs. Nonreal time processing, post processing, and
special real time processing would be the responsibility
of the user; logging of the incoming new data and a
real time telemetry output would provide the input for
these programs. Running them off-line would provide
the additional benefits of isolating the nonreal time
processing completely from the balance of the system
and making it possible to modify, discard, or generate
programs at any time it becomes advantageous.
Late in the Mariner IV mission, after it became clear
that the existing data processing and presentation
scheme could not satisfy all of the encounter require-
ments, the SPAC began casting about to determine what
steps could be taken to provide the additional capability
necessary. As it turned out, the above recommendation
for the consideration of mission dependent equipment
proved to be the most effective approach. No provision
existed in the DPS for processing Mode 4 Data in real
time, a capability necessary if the Video Storage analysts
and the SSAC operations personnel were to make engi-
neering assessments of their respective subsystems. Al-
though a number of possibilities were examined, the
most easily implemented involved the use of a portion
of the ground telemetry system (GTS) equipment from
the system test complex (STC). Provided that suitable
conversion equipment could be found, the GTS could
be driven from the raw teletype data. Suitable conver-
sion equipment did exist, in the form of a digital-to-
analog converter, designed to operate on the teletype
input, which had been used by the Guidance and Con-
trol representatives for special data displays during the
Sun- and Canopus-acquisition phases of the mission. The
resulting combination, while certainly no panacea for
data processing ills, more than proved the worth of
processing and display equipment designed to a specific
task. It should be noted that the SSAC group, which
relied more heavily on the DPS output throughout the
mission than did the SPAC group, also found that a
piece of STC equipment, the real time data translator
(RTDT) enhanced their operational capability
significantly.
It is not necessarily recommended that total standard-
ization of flight operations and system test data
processing and display equipment be attempted. There
is no reason to believe without further investigation
that the two are compatible. The significant point is that
the STC equipment was designed specifically for
Mariner, and as such provides a number of unique ad-
vantages over more-or-less universal equipment. When
joint use is possible, then it should certainly be con-
sidered, since among other things it lends continuity
across the transition from system test data analysis to
flight performance analysis. Even if the joint use of SPAC
and STC equipment is not possible, the use of mission
peculiar equipment in SPAC is recommended for many
purposes to which it will bring the capability of extract-
ing a maximum of usable information from the data
most efficiently.
Another source of information added to the SPAC
subsequent to launch was the analog display of the
prime DSIF stations' received signal level (AGC voltage).
This capability was implemented to provide an indica-
tion of spacecraft roll attitude should it have become
necessary to place the spacecraft on roll inertial control.
The late addition of the requirement for this capability,
Coupled with the sudden interest by SPAC in the
ground received frequency when it was observed that
frequency shifts were occurring simultaneously with the
CC&S cyclic pulses, implied that there exist additional
information sources in the DSN which co hld provide
data beneficial to the SPAC in determining the state
of the spacecraft but are not presently available to the
SFOF largely because they have not been requested.
All in all, the facilities available to the SPAC group
were for the most part adequate. The physical plant
was acceptable at launch, and, after the transfer to the
MMSA, were exceptionally good. The consensus of
the SPAC members is that conducting operations from the
MMSA contributed significantly to the success of the
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operation. The data processing facilities were generally
adequate for real time telemetry, though certainly not
optimum. Computer outages provided a continuing
problem throughout the cruise, though performance
during the critical phases was quite good. Nonreal
time data processing never did live up to expectations.
Computer program development suffered significantly
from: 1) the lack of a firm schedule, 2) the lack of a
clear definition of responsibility, and 3) the lack of
regular reporting from both sides of the SPAC- DPS
interface. Special requirements could be satisfied outside
of the SFO system with the use of Mariner peculiar
equipment when necessary.
3. Organization
a. SPAC internal organization. Review of the SPAC
organization reveals that basically the organization was
adequate to accomplish its required tasks. It was fash-
ioned along the lines of the Mariner project, with
Division Representatives reporting to the SPAC Director,
and subsystem representative reporting to the Division
Representatives. By bringing the influence of the SPAC
Division Representatives to bear within their own divi-
sions, the SPAC Director had an effective means of
implementing SPAC policies among all members of the
organization. This technique proved effective in achiev-
ing various tasks desired of the subsystem representatives.
There were three noticeable deficiencies which should
be corrected in future missions. First, there was no
full-time SPAC data-handling engineer. The requirement
for such an individual was recognized much before
launch, but this requirement was never adequately
implemented. As a result, people who were not thor-
oughly familiar with many facets of the 7044-7094
computer system in the SFOF were forced to participate
in resolution of many computer interface problems. With
insufficient time to adequately learn the computer sys-
tem, the SPAC personnel were not too helpful in resolv-
ing computer problems. In retrospect, having the proper
personnel on the user side of this interface would have
eased the problem experienced in checking out the
computer programs. Another of the functions of the
data-handling engineer would be to resolve any diffi-
culties in distribution of data or in the establishment of
computer program operational requirements in con-
junction with the data processing and SPAC personnel.
In the future a plan must be worked out to provide
such an individual from somewhere in the organization.
The experience gained on this project indicates that the
dollar-savings possible through the utilization of a data
handling engineer would
existence.
most certainly justify his
The second area that can be noted as a deficiency
in the SPAC organization is the relationship between
the SPAC Director, the Division 32 Science representa-
tives, and the engineers who report through him to the
SPAC. It is concluded that future projects must provide
adequate space to permit the science instrument engi-
neers to be face to face with the Division 32 Science
representative who must be located in the same room as
the SPAC Director. This arrangement will also enhance
direct communications as required between the instru-
ment cognizant engineers and other engineers on the
Mariner SPAC. As was learned in the Mariner opera-
tions, there are frequent opportunities for exchange of
information between the science engineers and the engi-
neers from other spacecraft subsystems. This fact was
not sufficiently acknowledged prior to the mission.
In actual practice, it was also learned that the science
analysis area can effectively be divided between oper-
ational personnel, that is, instrument cognizant engi-
neers, and scientific data analysis individuals. The latter
are generally the cognizant scientists and associated
investigators. Since the z_l_riner encounter operations
were conducted from the Mariner Mission Support Area,
SPAC can, indeed, see the validity of such a suggestion
and offer this recommendation for future missions. In
the encounter operations only those individuals from the
SSAC who would have a voice in the operational deci-
sions were permitted entrance. A special interface was
established with the scientific investigators located in
another area. This interface was handled by the SSAC
Director and his alternate.
The experience of the Mariner SPAC was that the
necessity for a documentation engineer cannot be under-
estimated. Initially, this need was not sufficiently recog-
nized. This was unfortunate, particularly on a mission of
such duration, because ability to document progress on
a continuing basis is most important. Keeping of ac-
curate records and logs is a prerequisite to good docu-
mentation; our efforts in this respect were woefully
lacking until the documentation responsibility was given
to a single individual.
From an operational point of view, the necessity for
adequate procedures cannot be minimized. The docu-
mentation engineer is able to provide the assistance
required in getting the procedures published. Another
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benefit accrued by the documentation engineer's par-
ticipation in the SPAC effort is dissemination of space-
craft performance information on a weekly basis. This
effort served to keep the laboratory personnel, including
those individuals who were reassigned to other projects
after the Mariner launch and initial flight operations,
informed throughout the mission. These weekly reports
seemed to solve one of the big potential problems on a
mission of many months' duration: a sense of participa-
tion in the flight operations for those personnel who
participated heavily on the pre-launch phase.
The documentation engineer provided services which
were indispensable in SPAC proposals to project man-
agement. As a result of the Mariner SPAC experiences,
it is recommended that in the future key positions in
the project organization be staffed to include one
individual whose prime purpose is to give documenta-
tion support.
One of the prime contributions to the effectiveness of
the SPAC organization was the fact that the majority
of the SPAC personnel were spacecraft-design oriented.
Many of them had followed the Mariner spacecraft in
one capacity or another since the inception of the
project. The resulting store of knowledge about every
facet of the spacecraft available to the SPAC made it
possible to assess the state of the spacecraft throughout
the mission with a high degree of confidence. While
the limited amount of data available through the telem-
etry link means that certain ambiguities will always
exist in determining the state of the spacecraft, it is
significant that at the termination of the first phase of
the mission on October 1, 1965 the SPAC members had
been able either to solve or advance workable, though
unverifiable, hypotheses as to the cause of all significant
flight anomalies. The necessity for personnel in flight
operations who are intimately acquainted with the
design of the spacecraft at all levels of detail cannot
be emphasized too highly.
b. SPAC external organization. While the internal
organization served well with the exceptions noted,
the organization external to SPAC, that is, the manner in
which SPAC interfaced with the balance of the SFO
organization, presented a number of problems. One of
the problem areas is discussed in the previous para-
graphs, that of the data processing interface. In this
ease it was the internal organization of SPAC which
was deficient; the addition of a full-time data-handling
engineer would have provided the necessary liaison to
prevent most if not all of the interface problems.
The entire problem of SPAC external organization can
be summarized as being one of incomplete definition of
responsibility. The intent of the Mariner SPAC was to
develop an active, spacecraft design oriented capability
within the flight operations structure, as is in keeping
with the nature of the design of the Mariner Mars space-
craft, rather than emphasizing an after the fact data
analysis capability. The extended length of the Mariner
mission, however, led to a degree of active participation
in the flight operations which had not been anticipated,
let alone experienced in previous projects. As a result,
most of the interfaces which the SPAC wished to use
had not previously been established, nor was there any
full understanding of the interface requirements. No
overlap of responsibility existed; in general the problem
was one of creating working relations with portions of
the flight operations organization which had not pre-
viously fallen within the SPAC sphere of activity.
One such interface was the SPAC- DSIF interface.
During the actual flight operations all contact with the
DSIF was through the SFOD, as it should be to ensure
control of the operations during critical phases. Prior to
launch, and during the cruise phase when full time
SPAC coverage was not required, however, there was
no provision for any official communication with the
DSIF Project Engineer. This deficiency was rectified
somewhat by the evolution of the SFOD's daily status
meetings to accommodate a planning function as well
as reporting. With both the SPAC Director and the
DSIF Project Engineer in attendance, procedures could
be established and discussed, then offered to the SFOD
and the Project Office Representative for concurrence.
In general, however, the major interaction between the
DSIF and the SPAC group took place on the unofficial
level throughout the entire mission.
Ultimately, this informal contact with the balance of
the SFO activities became the rule rather than the
exception until this gradual expansion of the SPAC's
sphere of influence to permit direct interfacing became
the accepted, if never formalized, working arrangement.
In this manner working relationships were established
with the Tracking Data Advisors (TDA), the Ground
Telemetry Advisors (GTA), and SSAC operations per-
sonnel, and the test team responsible for the operation
of the Mariner PTM spacecraft in support of the flight
operations. This direct contact approach permitted the
full exchange of information and resultant understanding
which contributed largely to the smoothness of the
encounter operations.
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The necessity for full interfacing by SPAC is derived
simply from the fact that the SPAC is the only group
within the flight operations organization with a body
of detailed spacecraft design knowledge at its command,
and thus is the unique source of information which
greatly affects operational procedures.
The creation in January 1965 of the EPWG to in-
vestigate and recommend to the Project Office the steps
necessary to enhance the probability of a successful
planetary encounter gave the SPAC yet another group
with which a direct interface was mandatory. The chair-
man of the EPWG was the Spacecraft Project Engineer.
His committee members were basically the Project
Representatives from the various technical divisions and
areas of responsibility. Initially these individuals were
not the prime members of the Mariner SPAC group. The
composition of the EPWG changed in the succeeding
months, however, with the result that the EPWG orga-
nization was primarily eomposed of individuals from
SPAC. That their participation in the EPWG increased
their ability to support the encounter operation was
amply demonstrated.
4. Preparation and Planning
The majority of SPAC Division representatives were
spacecraft design oriented and were required to phase
out of these activities to allow more time for flight
operations oriented activities. To preeipitate this phase-
out and to promote thought and discussion by all con-
cerned, weekly meetings of the SPAC nucleus were
initiated in July, 1964. SPAC testing commenced at
approximately this same time. These two activities were
complementary in regard to the establishment of the
configuration of the SPAA, the checkout of and familiar-
ization with the computer programs, and the generation
of operating procedures for the SPAC. Prior to these
meetings other meetings of the SPAC nucleus had been
called as necessary to respond to various action items,
such as establishment of the SPAC organization and
definition of computer programs. These weekly meetings
provided a sounding board for all aspects of the SPAC
effort; the results of these meetings were instrumental
in the success of the Mariner prelaunch preparation.
Subsequent to launch and the re-orientation of the
mission operations into the more routine cruise phase,
a series of daily, except Saturday and Sunday, SPAC
meetings was initiated. This series of meetings had the
prime purpose of reviewing the spacecraft performance
and data processing performance of the preceding day
to provide feedback into the Space Flight Operations
Direction and the Project Office as to the progress of
the mission. From the viewpoint of the SPAC Direction
Team the daily meeting technique was extremely effec-
tive in providing total SPAC performance coverage, and
as a result provided much insight into the operation of
the spacecraft by essentially dividing the discussion
of spacecraft performance into small, more easily assimi-
lated, segments. Had the meetings been held less
frequently, certain aspects of spacecraft performance
might have been ignored inadvertently in the press of
routine business. Ample opportunity was available to
the participants to mention and discuss some of the
finer points of spacecraft performance and operation,
because on many days there was only minimal reporting
to be done. The overall education and training of the
SPAC group members was enhanced through the inter-
change of information of those members in specialized
areas of operation. In conclusion, it was the constant
interaction between the SPAC Director and SPAC
Division representatives which resulted in the ability
of SPAC to take the lead in the generation of the mission
operations plans that were developed and executed
during the flight.
Operational procedures to be used during the critical
phases of the mission were generated by the SPAC
group prior to the respective phases. Preparation of
these procedures required considerable reflection upon
what would be done under a great variety of situations;
this very act of putting on paper the various plans which
could be followed increased to a great extent the SPAC
group's preparedness for unexpected conditions. Without
having considered in advance as many conditions as
possible, it would be questionable that all the necessary
considerations to any particular action might be forth-
coming when the actual condition occurred in flight. The
procedures indeed were complementary to the mission
operations, but it is recognized that a greater benefit
accrued from generating the operational procedures
than from having the procedures in hand at the begin-
ning of the mission phases.
The philosophy of the SPAC followed the Project
guidelines of sending as few spacecraft commands from
the ground as possible. Each command that was trans-
mitted was thoroughly justified, its effect on the space-
craft was analyzed, the effect of failure modes that
could be induced were analyzed, and subsequent to all
this analysis the recommendation was made and per-
mission granted by the Project Office for the commands
to be transmitted. This rigorous review of anticipated
action demanded individual mental and written justifi-
cation of the intended operations, in order to better
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understand and explain some of the ramifications of the
suggested actions. In effect, ff commands could not be
justified they were not sent. This philosophy is endorsed
and recommended very highly for future mission
operations.
One of the most significant assets to the Mariner
SPAC in preparation for critical phases of the mission
was the test program. During the initial testing, the test
objectives were the checkout of the DPS, the facility
and the analysis area data outputs. As a result the data
source was required to simulate nominal telemetry in a
nominal flight sequence. While this will adequately
demonstrate the ability of the SFO organization in
general to support a nominal mission, it does not test
SPAC. Since the spacecraft design calls for the success-
ful completion of the mission without SPAC support,
then it follows that the SPAC group's primary function
must be to anticipate, diagnose and correct anomalies.
Nominal spacecraft telemetry simulations cannot exer-
cise this function.
Not until October 1964, just 1 mo prior to the first
Mariner Mars launch, was an adequate data source
provided to the Mariner SPAC members. This was the
Mariner Proof Test Model (PTM) operated in JPL's
Spacecraft Assembly Facility (SAF) in Pasadena. With
a flight-type spacecraft as the data source, it was
possible not only to simulate the launch sequence in a
more realistic manner, but also to induce failure, request
commands, and show an immediate response to any
spacecraft event in the telemetry. The highest praise
that can be given to the prelaunch PTM test effort is
found in the fact the Canopus acquisition simulation
was criticized in the SPAC test critique as unrealistic by
the cognizant SPAC personnel, yet almost exactly dupli-
cated the sequence experienced later by the Mariner IV
in flight. Needless to say, none of the computer simula-
tions came close. Unfortunately insufficient time re-
mained prior to the Mariner III launch to fully utilize
this new found capability to the extent desirable.
The failure of the aerodynamic fairing covering the
Mariner III spacecraft and the problems encountered
by the SPAC in attempting to salvage the mission
reinforced strongly the view that failure mode testing
was necessary to provide the SPAC group with the
capability required to support adequately the Mariner
mission. As a result, the balance of the tests supported
by SPAC employed the PTM as the data source, and,
for the most part, permitted induced failures which
required SPAC analysis and command action.
This type of testing was implemented almost exclu-
sively during the post launch testing. The SPAC en-
counter test operations were intended to exercise the
engineering and science performance analysis personnel
in the performance of their duties with the objective of
developing and maintaining the proficiency required to
participate in the critical operations involved in the
planetary encounter. Because the personnel involved
had been actively engaged in the interpretation of
spacecraft telemetry data in order to determine the state
of the Mariner IV spacecraft from the time of launch,
it was not intended to test toward the objective of
orientation and familiarization with spacecraft opera-
tions, but rather to test toward the objective of exer-
cising all of the interfaces within the DSN which directly
affected the SPAC group, of providing a thorough under-
standing of the spacecraft logic which had been pre-
viously unexercised during the flight and of developing
in detail the procedures that would be used during the
actual flight operations.
Throughout the SPAC encounter test program, the
PTM Test Director was requested both to provide the
most realistic simulation possible and to induce cor-
rectable failures or responses to the space environment
at his discretion. Failure mode testing had the addi-
tional benefit of creating an air of competition between
the SPAC representatives and the SAF test team and
operators to the end that the degree of participation in
each of these tests by all personnel was the highest
observed during the program. Considerable effort was
expended by the SAF component of the test effort to
induce or simulate failures which were extremely hard
to diagnose or which required significant changes in
the normal operations procedure. It is the general con-
sensus that the SPAC group would not have been able
to attain a state of operational readiness for the en-
counter phase of the mission had PTM failure mode
testing not been employed.
5. Operations
The SPAC group participation in flight operations
went very smoothly. The primary reason for this was
the realization that during a critical operation spacecraft
performance analysis is a full-time task, with no allow-
ance for the presentation, discussion, decision and rec-
ommendation of corrective actions. This meant that as
many decisions as possible had to be anticipated, so that
SPAC response during the operation would be auto-
matic; the recognition of a certain set of spacecraft
events or parameters would lead directly to a recom-
mendation of a specific course of action. In this manner
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the major decisions by SPAC were made in advance,
after thorough investigation, lengthy discussion, and
careful review, rather than during the operation when
the press of time and the urgency for correct action
would severely limit the capability to give careful con-
sideration to all pertinent aspects of the problem.
There were two problems encountered by SPAC in
flight operations: effort was required to adapt the SPAC
organization to be compatible with 24-hr operations sup-
port, and some difficulty was involved in coordinating
the SPAC spacecraft performance analysis activities with
these SPAC recommendation and decision activities
which could not be handled in advance.
Initially no cognizance was taken of the fact that
certain of the responsibilities of the members of the
SPAC group were assignable, while others lay with
specifie people rather than positions in the SPAC
structure. As a result the prelaunch concept called for
qualified alternates to replace the primary SPAC mem-
bers in the less critical portions of any given mission
phase. It was not until after the Mariner IV launch that
it was realized there were certain non-assignable respon-
sibilities which the division representatives and the
SPAC Director were required to bear on a 24-hr basis
regardless of any arrangements to the contrary. The
science cover deployment marked the first time that
the SPAC structure as modified for operations was used.
Under this scheme the non-assignable duties were
specifically separated from the assignable ones. It was
then recognized that for a division representative to
commit his division to support a speeific operations
phase, he must necessarily have completed his non-
assignable tasks. He may then be replaced in the
operation by any alternate qualified to perform the same
level of analysis without jeopardizing the coordination
effort of that division's SPAC activities.
The SPAC Director's position presents a different
problem. Many of his non-assignable responsibilities
only begin as the effort shifts from preparation to
operation; at the same time the flight operation also
brings with it a wealth of routine tasks involving the
internal coordination of the SPAC group and the coor-
dination of SPAC's activities with the SFO groups
external to it. During the launch and midcourse phases,
when SPAC was located in the SPAA and thus isolated
physically as well as organizationally from the balance
of the flight operations organization, this problem was
solved by the addition of an SPAC Operations Assistant.
If the SPAC Director were to do his job adequately,
that is, pursuing the analysis of spacecraft data and
resolving potential problems, he had to be as free as
possible from the routine operational problems and
constraints imposed by the remainder of the Space
Flight Operations Facility and some of the mission
operations. The routine features of the Space Flight
Operations organization were turned over to the oper-
ations assistants for each of the areas.
Observations of previous JPL project operations indi-
cated that there was considerable emphasis on the
SPAC Director's participation in routine discussions with
other members of the Space Flight Operations organiza-
tion and his providing liaison between the SPAC and
other elements of the SFOF. The Mariner SPAC main-
tained the view that an operations assistant, with suffi-
cient training, could satisfy these requirements and free
the SPAC Director to concentrate on the analysis of the
spacecraft. This did, however, create the problem of
the Director interfacing with the operations assistants.
This particular interface required a good deal of effort,
but by the time of launch it was felt that the operational
assistant was an integral part of the organization and
his presence aided the total SPAC operations capability
to a great extent.
After the SPAC group was relocated in the MMSA,
the problem of physical separation no longer existed.
Members of the various flight operations groups could
meet face to face, and the majority of the business was
transacted over a single communications net, so that the
interfacing problem did not exist to the same extent.
The first operation performed in the MMSA was the
science cover drop exercise in February 1965. Since this
operation was via ground command only, it may be
considered a non-standard sequence; that is, not pro-
vided for in the nominal sequence of events. As such it
required that the SPAC Director continuously be avail-
able to the SFOD and the Project Manager for con-
sultation and discussion, since the SPAC Director is the
official spacecraft representative during the flight oper-
ations phase of the project. In order to meet this require-
ment it was decided that the assignable tasks involved
with the routine direction of the SPAC group should
pass to the position of Assistant SPAC Director, which
could be occupied by any of the SPAC Director's staff.
This concept of an SPAC direction team was employed
throughout the balance of the mission.
While the SPAC direction team approach solved one
problem, it emphasized another, that of providing the
necessary coordination between the performance-analysis
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component of SPAC, i.e., the SPAC representatives and
the Assistant SPAC Director, and the recommendation
and decision component, i.e., the SPAC Director. This
was a part of the general problem of communications
of the Project Manager, the SFOD, and the analysis area
directors with the members of the analysis and oper-
ations groups. The members of the various groups were
required to implement actions to be taken in the flight
operations but were often the last ones to be informed
of specific requirements. Frequently these people would
have been able to have more adequate preparation for
the ensuing action had they been kept abreast of the
proceedings in the closed door meetings held by the
SFOD, the Project Manager, advisors, and the area
directors. Due to the nature of the closed-door meetings
the area directors lost all contact with the members of
their groups. Partial relief for this was found when the
assistant area directors were permitted to attend the meet-
ings with the express purpose of establishing liaison be-
tween the meetings and the group members. This had
drawbacks also in that the two prime people from each
analysis area were out of the operations area.
The solution finally evolved was the establishment of
a private communications net for the Project Manager,
SFOD, and the analysis area directors in the Mariner
MSA. This permitted the area directors to be located
near their groups and permitted face-to-face conversa-
tions to be carried on with the members of their respec-
tive groups without loss of effectiveness relative to the
Project Manager and the SFOD. Quicker feedback
could be obtained with this system so that a more
complete understanding of any contemplated action was
achieved at all levels.
A similar system may offer some solution to the
problems encountered by future projects in the flight
operations area. However, the Mariner experience indi-
cates that all projects have totally different communica-
tions requirements, based on the nature of the spacecraft
design, the mission flown, and the individuals involved
in the operation. Rigorous efforts obviously must be
applied in future projects in order to understand fully
the requirements for communications at the upper levels
of the SFO organization.
V. SPAC PLANNING
A. Planning Philosophy
A significant portion of the activity of the Mariner
SPAC involved preparation for the various phases of
the mission. The objectives of this SPAC preparation
were to establish an acceptable plan for each phase of
the mission, to develop a nominal sequence of events
and a set of criteria by which the performance of the
spacecraft could be evaluated, to establish the courses
of action to be followed in the event of nonstandard
performance of the spacecraft, and to develop in the
SPAC personnel and procedures the level of proficiency
required to carry out the flight operations responsibili-
ties of the SPAC. All of this activity was specifically
directed toward the development of an SPAC capability
to react properly in the actual operation to any sequence
of events, standard or nonstandard.
Throughout the life of the program it became in-
creasingly apparent that the nature of the mission, and
the complexity of both the spacecraft and the ground
equipment precluded the successful execution of any
course of action which had not been detailed and agreed
to in advance by all parties concerned. This was espe-
cially true in the SPAC area, where the people who are
responsible for proposing and evaluating alternative
courses of action at a detailed level are the same people
responsible for evaluating spacecraft performance. Dur-
ing a critical phase of the flight operation these two
activities are mutually exclusive; if the SPAC members
concern themselves with evaluating the state of the
spacecraft they cannot simultaneously generate a rec-
ommended course of action effectively. If their attention
is diverted to the formulation and evaluation of a plan
of action, then little or no information on the state of
the spacecraft is obtained. Obviously, for a satisfactory
SPAC operation, both complete knowledge about the
current state of the spacecraft and an effective, well
understood plan of action are required.
As a corollary to this, even if the state of the space-
craft could be monitored effectively without the full
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time support of the SPAC members, it is practically
impossible to generate spontaneously a good emergency
procedure in response to an unanticipated anomaly on
the spacecraft. Unariticipated is the key word here. It
implies that the source or sources of the problem are
unknown, the impact of the failure, ff one exists, upon
the mission is not understood, and exact response of the
spacecraft to any given set of ground actions is uncertain
at best. Coupled with this are the facts that time is
usually critical and all of the possible ground actions
will carry with them disadvantages as well as advan-
tages, each of which must be weighed and evaluated.
In thirteen launches of Ranger and Mariner type space-
craft, six unanticipated spacecraft anomalies (as opposed
to trajectory anomalies) have occurred and the only one
which was was successfully circumvented was not ex-
tremely time critical (Mariner II partial power failure).
The remaining five spacecraft failed to achieve their
mission objectives. It is probable that none of these
missions could have been salvaged even ff the ground
performance had been flawless, but the important fact
is that the operations personnel performing the SPAC
function were unable to attempt in a timely manner the
proper corrective action.
This leads to the first principle underlying the Mariner
SPAC planning philosophy: the performance of the
spacecraft at each step in any sequence of events must
be understood and verifiable, and each possible failure
mode, its symptoms and its consequences, must be
anticipated. The second principle is as important as the
first: for each possible failure mode a plan for corrective
action must be generated before the fact and agreed
upon by the SPAC personnel. For probable or extremely
time-critical failure modes the plan for corrective action
should be agreed upon in principle by all parties con-
cerned in the flight operations, including the Project
Manager, so that reaction time is minimized. Given the
proper SPAC preparation for any phase of the flight
operation, any anomalous indication in the telemetry
would be immediately recognizable, and the possible
failure modes which would yield that particular anomaly
would be catalogued, along with the recommended
corrective action. The SPAC Director, the SFOD and
the Project Manager should be thoroughly cognizant of
the implications of both the anomaly and action required
to cure or circumvent it, so that the decision required to
take corrective action is a simple approval or disapproval
rather than a complex procedure of proposing, explain-
ing and evaluating.
The third axiom from which the planning philosophy
is derived is as obvious and elementary as the first two:
take no positive action without a positive reason. Tl_e
Mariner design is sufficiently complex that improper
ground command action may place the spacecraft in a
state from which recovery is not possible. Any time a
command is inserted into the spacecraft, there is the
possibility that either the initial state of the spacecraft
or the effect of the command are not completely under-
stood, with the result that irrepairable damage may be
done to the mission. This risk must be outweighed by
the value attached to ground action before any pertur-
bation to the spacecraft state is warranted.
The first activity in the SPAC planning for any par-
ticular portion of the mission is the recommendation of
a mission plan. For the standard phases of the mission,
such as launch, midcourse or encounter, a mission plan
already exists in the form of the CC&S programmed
sequence of events. This is in line, of course, with the
Mariner design philosophy which dictates that the
spacecraft must be able to perform a nominal mission,
except for the midcourse correction, without any ground-
based intervention or support. It is also true, however,
that the spacecraft is able to complete all of the mission
objectives without the CC&S, relying solely on ground
commands. In fact, since the CC&S sequence of events
is necessarily designed into the spacecraft a considerable
time before launch, the response of the spacecraft to its
environment during flight may render the prelaunch
nominal sequence less than optimum. In this case the
probability of achieving mission success may be en-
hanced considerably by augmenting or pre-empting the
CC&S events with ground commands.
It was the responsibility of the SPAC to generate a
plan for each phase of the mission or, if a CC&S nominal
plan existed, to review all of the possible alternatives
and recommend the optimum plan. For certain phases
of the mission this task encompasses so much work that
a separate ad hoc committee may be formed to perform
the mission planning and evaluation. This was the case
in the Mariner IV encounter phase where the Project
Manager chartered a special Encounter Planning Work-
ing Group (EPWG). Ultimately personnel changes re-
suited in an EPWG composed for the most part by
SPAC members and SFO personnel who interfaced
directly with the SPAC, so that the EPWG may be
considered largely as an SPAC activity.
In the establishment of a mission plan, the many
alternative courses of action were examined in the light
of the mission objectives as stated by the Mariner
Project Office. Any proposed command action from the
ground was evaluated by the SPAC group to determine
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ffhat undesirable side effects or possible failure modes
might be induced by it. Where possible, quantitative
analyses were made so that the relative desirability of
alternate plans might be assessed.
During the later stages of the mission, one particular
problem whose significance had not been fully appre-
ciated before became the overriding consideration in
developing an encounter plan. This was the transmission
delay which, on encounter day, was slightly longer than
12 min. As an example of the impact which this had on
planning, consider the event which initiates the plan-
etary television recording sequence. Normally controlled
by an onboard narrow-angle planet sensor, it can be
backed up by a ground command. For an Earth satellite
or lunar mission the standard flight operations practice
would be to confirm the onboard event in the telemetry.
If it did not occur, however, then the backup command
could be transmitted to the spacecraft with a minimal
effect to the mission objectives. Application of this type
of operation to the Mariner mission is a different matter.
Confirmation that recording had not started would ar-
rive on Earth after 12 rain and recognition, decision arLd
command initiation would require an additional 1 or 2
rain, so that the backup command would arrive at the
spacecraft 25 min after nominal time for recording
initiation or just after the planet had passed out of the
field of view of the camera. Obviously for the Mariner
mission this application of backup commands is im-
practical. If the backup command is transmitted early,
however, so that it arrives at the spacecraft at the same
time or slightly after the onboard event is to take place,
it is effective in providing a redundant means of per-
forming the required function. This means that the
latest possible time to commit the use of this backup is
some 20 to 25 rain before there is any indication of
whether or not it is required.
The extension of this same type of reasoning to the
balance of the events required during the highly time-
critical planetary encounter phase of the mission led to
the adoption of a mission plan for encounter which bore
little resemblance to the nominal sequence programmed
into the spacecraft prior to launch. Perhaps the most
significant thing to be noted in this modification of the
encounter plan is that the pre-emption of the nominal
programmed plan does not indicate that it was deficient
in any way. It was developed to provide nominal mission
capability to the spacecraft denied any support from the
ground and, had such been the case, it would have done
the job admirably. The actual plan was designed to make
the most efficient use of the full capabilities of the entire
DSN-spacecraft complex, which, of course, is the whole
point of flight operations planning.
In the development of the mission plan, then, attention
is not limited to the spacecraft alone, but must be given
to all of the areas and activities within this DSN-
spacecraft complex. Many of the possible ground com-
mand sequences which are most attractive from a
spacecraft point of view when performed correctly carry
such large penalties that they are discarded simply
because ground-based operational difficulties preclude
the guarantee of a sufficiently high probability of correct
performance.
After a recommended plan for each phase of the
mission had been formulated, it was presented, with
some discussion of its advantages and disadvantages, to
the Space Flight Operations Director and the Mariner
Project Office. Final responsibility for all Mariner mis-
sion plans rested with the Mariner Project Manager,
who issued the approved plan and coordinated any of
the activities required for its implementation.
The approval by the Projeet Office of a particular
plan of attack initiated another activity of the Mariner
SPAC group, the establishment of a nominal sequence
of events for that plan. The sequence of events is a
detailed chronology of all of the spacecraft changes of
state which will occur during the execution of a partic-
ular mission plan. The SPAC members are especially
telemetry-oriented since telemetry furnishes nearly all
of the information available concerning the state of the
spacecraft, so the effort to establish the sequence of
events led directly to the tabulation of nominal telem-
etry values.
The sequence of events with its associated telemetry
table provided the SPAC with all of the tools required
both to predict and verify all of the state changes of the
spacecraft. Not only did this allow immediate recog-
nition of a nonstandard occurrence onboard the space-
craft, but it also placed in the hands of the SPAC
analysts the primary diagnostic instrument for determin-
ing the cause of any deviation from normal performance.
Once the nominal sequence of events had been estab-
lished, an effort was initiated for the purpose of antici-
pating possible failure modes and appropriate corrective
action. One aspect of this activity during the Mariner IV
mission was the generation of a series of sequence flow
diagrams which depicted the large number of alternate
paths which were possible, either by option or due to
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failure, at any point in the sequence once it had been
initiated. This particular activity forced much thought on
the part of the SPAC personnel in the area of nonstandard
sequence plans. An important part of nonstandard se-
quence planning is the increased understanding gained
by SPAC of what corrective capability does exist within
the spacecraft design.
Nonstandard sequence plans were submitted to the
Project Office for approval prior to the actual flight
operation in order to provide the capability to take
action in a timely fashion whenever a nonstandard con-
dition arose. It was, however, still necessary for each
command transmission to the spacecraft to be approved
by the Mariner Project Office. The major significance of
the approval of nonstandard sequences of events was
that the SPAC group was now provided with an agreed-
upon reaction to various possible circumstances, so that
much discussion and debate could be eliminated at the
time of any inflight anomaly.
The final test of any plan, of course, is how well it
works when implemented. In order to verify that the
mission plan, the sequence of events and the alternate
plans were adequate, the SPAC conducted a series of
tests, often in conjunction with general SFO tests. A
large number of the tests conducted after Mariner IV
launch employed the PTM spacecraft as the data source,
rather than using simulated data or available test tapes.
So that the SPAC group could be put to the most
severe test of its proficiency and so that its procedures
could be best validated, the PTM Test Director was
allowed to induce or simulate spacecraft malfunctions
at his discretion. The SPAC and SSAC operations per-
sonnel were then responsible for determining the cor-
rective action required to allow the successful completion
of the test objectives.
The contribution to the mission success of this test
activity was emphasized by a large number of significant
changes to the sequence of events and the operational
procedures which followed each of the encounter prepa-
ration tests.
In retrospect it appears that the level of preparation
applied to the Mariner IV SPAC operations, especially
prior to encounter, represents little more than the
minimum amount required to meet acceptable SPAC
performance standards. By planetary encounter the
SPAC group and associated SSAC operations personnel
were able to conduct the encounter operations confi-
dently and efficiently. This was a requirement, however,
instead of an achievement; there still remained a number
of potential problem areas which might have compro-
mised the mission had certain failures occurred for
which adequate preparation had not been made.
The planning philosophy proved valid. The diligent
application of the philosophy to the preparation for
encounter provided the SPAC with sufficiently firm
guidelines to allow the successful execution of the
mission sequence even in the face of adverse circum-
stances. This planning allowed the establishment of a
set of criteria under which certain actions would be
taken. These criteria were approved and understood
among the Mariner SPAC Director, the SFOD, and the
Project Manager, thereby guaranteeing a maximum of
information flow and the maximum capability to react.
B. Launch Planning
1. General
The launch planning activity of the SPAC group was
handled in a somewhat different manner than the plan-
ning for the balance of the mission, largely because the
primary effort prior to launch was directed toward
developing the necessary operations capability within
the new and relatively untried SFOF. The SPAC group
was deeply involved with establishing data processing
requirements for flight operations, determining the
hardware utilization which would best fulfill these
requirements, developing its own internal organization,
and testing in order to learn how to use the facilities at
its command. Most of the tests performed in the facility
were not designed specifically to bring the SPAC to a
state of proficiency, as would have been desirable from
an SPAC point of view, but rather were designed to
qualify facility hardware and software. Obviously it is
fruitless to conduct operations tests with the objective
of providing a capability to react to nonstandard events
when no such capability exists for standard events. As
a result the principles furnishing the basis for the
Mariner SPAC planning philosophy were not adhered
to prior to launch as rigorously as they were during the
later stages of the mission.
It should be noted that one of the reasons for this is
that the urgent need for in-depth planning had not yet
been realized. This type of planning is primarily of value
in an active, real time operation. Prior to the Mariner
Mars project, flight operations at JPL had included a
performance analysis function which was largely passive
in nature. The basic design of the spacecraft flown had
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not called for a large scale participation by the per-
formance analysts; specifically, there was no provision
for the transmission of any commands, except those
required for the midcourse correction, for anything
less than a potentially catastrophic emergency. The
Mariner C design, on the other hand, was provided with
a large number of command options designed to be
used as necessary, not just limited to dire emergencies.
The first real indication that ground command trans-
mission might become a standard part of flight oper-
ations came with the realization that an extremely high
probability existed that acquisition of Canopus would
require weeks or months unless ground commands were
employed. With this development the SPAC began to
evolve to include an active command function.
2. Launch Plan
The launch of the spacecraft marks the transition
from control via the spacecraft test team to control via
the flight operations team. In effect this transition occurs
during the real time telemetry blackout which occurs
prior to post-injection acquisition of the spacecraft by
the DSIF. For the Mariner flight sequence, this transi-
tion period coincides with the booster separation events
and the initiation of Sun acquisition. As a result, the
first continuous postlaunch data from the spacecraft is
obtained after many of the significant events leading to
attitude stabilization have occurred. The SPAC group's
task, then, is primarily to determine precisely the new
state of the spacecraft from the telemetry without being
able to monitor it continuously through all of the state
changes. Because many of the measurements available
can be somewhat ambiguous, the SPAC launch planning
consists mainly of determining a unique set of telemetry
criteria for each possible spacecraft condition, and, for
each nonstandard condition which might adversely affect
the mission, of determining the possible corrective
actions.
The prime objectives of the launch phase of the
mission were the successful injection of the spacecraft
on a Mars trajectory, deployment of the solar panels, and
acquisition of the Sun. Without these the mission is an
immediate failure. The shroud failure on Mariner III,
for example, precluded all three of the launch objectives
and the spacecraft failed upon the depletion of the
battery. In addition to the primary objectives, a list of
secondary objectives was recognized. They were:
1. Turn on cruise science.
2. Increase radio transmitted power (RF power up).
3. Remove CC&S relay holding current.
4. Turn off video storage launch mode.
5. Attain magnetometer calibration roll.
6. Acquire Canopus.
7. Assess the ability of the spacecraft to perform the
midcourse maneuver.
Each of these objectives, primary and secondary, with
the exception of injection over which SPAC had no
control, had to be examined, the procedure by which its
verification could be made determined, and appropriate
plans for any corrective action developed.
a. Solar panel deployment. Spacecraft telemetry would
permit the SPAC to determine the following conditions
relative to solar panel deployment:
1. Whether the pyrotechnic subsystem had been
armed by the pyrotechnic arming switch or the
separation-initiated timer.
2. Which, or both, of the pyrotechnic subsystems
issued a solar panel deployment command.
3. Which of the solar panels were deployed to within
20 deg of the full open condition.
The latter condition infers that a solar panel was
completely deployed because of the nature of the solar
panel deployment mechanism. In addition, it is possible
to observe whether or not the CC&S launch counter did
generate the first of its commands to back up the initia-
tion of solar panel deployment. This particular function
could be inhibited if the CC&S relay holding current
had not been properly released at separation. The mech-
anization of this feature is such that the holding current
would certainly be removed whenever the gyro power
was turned off. Should the solar panels be observed to
be in their launch position and the CC&S command not
having been issued, the gyros would be turned off by
ground command. Subsequent to gyro turn-off, the
CC&S would be permitted to issue the solar deployment
command at some future time predictable from knowl-
edge of the CC&S counting sequence. It would be
preferred to transmit the gyro-off command, DC-15,
prior to launch plus 93 min. One constraint on the time
for the turn-off of the gyros is the recognition that the
video storage launch mode is also powered by one phase
of the gyro three-phase power supply. In the case of a
failure in the video storage launch mode logic, 1_ it would
be desirable to turn off the gyros such that the video
storage end-of-tape foil would have just passed over the
"See subheading g., which follows in this Section V.
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end-of-tape sensor when the command is executed. Sub-
sequent to the issuance of the CC&S L-1 command for
solar panel deployment, it would be permissible to
re-energize the gyros to effect the Sun acquisition by
the transmission of DC-19.
It is also recognized that whenever the gyros would
be on in the future it would be impossible for the
CC&S to generate any of its internal commands from
the launch counter or from the master timer (end
counter). A midcourse maneuver is permissible under
the conditions of a relay hold failure.
b. Sun acqu/_/t/on. Sun acquisition would commence
as soon as the attitude control switching amplifiers were
turned on. Of course, the Sun acquisition process would
not commence until the spacecraft was out of the
Earth's shadow: such conditions exist on approx-
imately aA of all near-Earth trajectories. Even in the
Earth's shadow the attitude control logic would cause
the rates about the control axes to be reduced to the
rate dead-band limits set by the gyros. The occurrence
of the pyro arming event in the telemetry as men-
tioned in the previous paragraph infers that the pyro-
technic arming switch has been activated and the
attitude control eleetronics should have been turned on;
however, ff the telemetry indicates that neither the rates
about the control axes are decreasing nor that the Sun
sensors are generating error signals, this particular func-
tion probably had not been accomplished. A backup
function is also available as a command from the CC&S
launch counter. This command is subject to the same
failure mode indicated in the above paragraph for the
solar panel deployment. In this condition, the gyros will
be maintained in the off mode by ground command for
a sufficient length of time to permit the CC&S to gen-
erate this backup attitude control turn-on command ff
such is necessary. Subsequent to the CC&S command,
the gyros would be turned on for the enhancement of the
Sun acquisition process. The acquisition of the Sun by
the spacecraft is completely automatic. No ground com-
mands are possible which aid the Sun acquisition once
the electronics have been turned on and the procedure
has been initiated.
c. Cruise science turn-on. Verification of cruise
science turn-on can be had from observation of the
spacecraft telemetry format and noting the change in
format of each data frame from % zeros and ½ engi-
neering to z/a science and ½ engineering. It is only at
the turn-on of the Data Automation Subsystem that it
begins to transmit science data to the Data Encoder for
subsequent transmission to the ground. Analysis of
science telemetry permits verification that all science
instruments are on. An alternate means of verifying
science instrument turn-on is to analyze the power sub-
system telemetry. Should the cruise science instruments
and the DAS not be turned on automatically at separa-
tion there is a ground command, DC-2, which will turn
on the cruise science through an alternate path. Should
this corrective action be insufficient, cruise science data
could only be obtained in the future by also turning
on the encounter science instruments. A feature of the de-
sign was to turn on cruise science at the time of the
initiation of the encounter sequence. This latter ap-
proach would not normally be followed prior to en-
counter because of the degradation to portions of the
encounter instruments that would result from excessive
turn-on and operation in the cruise phase.
d. Increase of transmitted RF power. RF power trans-
mitted from the spacecraft is maintained at approximately
1 w prior to separation by a relay holding-circuit pass-
ing through the spacecraft separation plane. This circuit
is to be opened at spacecraft separation. It is powered
by the power subsystem maneuver booster which is
required to activate the gyros. Should automatic RF
power-up not occur, it will be possible to attain in-
creased transmitted power from the spacecraft when-
ever the gyros are off. Conceivably the entire mission
could be attained even with this degraded mode of
operation; telemetry during a midcourse maneuver may
be degraded, however. The occurrence of RF power-up
can easily be verified by reviewing the received signal
level at the DSIF stations in addition to reviewing the
spacecraft telemetry which will indicate the transmitted
power.
e. Canopus acquisition. The orientation of the Cano-
pus sensor toward the star Canopus (Canopus acquisi-
tion) was very important to the Mariner flight sequence.
This technique had not previously been implemented
for a flight project, but Mariner was dependent upon it
to maintain a proper inertial orientation so that the
high-gain antenna could be oriented toward the Earth
for the latter portions of the mission. Additionally, the
attitude of the spacecraft had to be accurately known
so the midcourse maneuver calculations could be made.
The plan for achieving Canopus acquisition was to roll
the spacecraft about the roll axis, i.e., the Sun-directed
axis, and having the Canopus acquisition logic stop this
roll search when an object of the proper intensity was
observed. The initiation of this sequence occurred at
997 rain after launch. The acquisition of Canopus could
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be verified from spacecraft telemetry indicating the
brightness of the star being observed. Failure of the
spacecraft to internally initiate the Canopus acquisition
sequence can be counteracted by the ground command,
DC-13, which will override the spacecraft logic, turn
on the Canopus sensor, and initiate the roll search mode.
Before launch, a standard sequence of events during
Canopus acquisition was formulated because it was
anticipated that star identification might pose a serious
problem, and because the celestial geometry near launch
made it probable that the first star acquired would not
be Canopus. The sequence permitted the spacecraft to
acquire any object which fulfilled the Canopus sensor
acquisition logic requirements (Y4 to 8 times anticipated
Canopus brightness and a negative error signal) and to
become roll stabilized to that star. All data which might
provide evidence as to the roll orientation of the space-
craft would then be gathered and evaluated. Based on
this evaluation a recommendation for any command
action would be formulated and then implemented
during the next DSIF-11 (Goldstone) pass. This latter
statement is based upon the recognition that should
the Canopus sensor acquire a star determined not to be
Canopus, there is a capability to roll-override this
condition and force the spacecraft to go into a search
mode for another star.
A further discussion follows of the procedures and
plans developed for identifying the star, to which the
spacecraft Canopus sensor was oriented. The only infor-
mation from the Canopus sensor other than an error
signal was a brightness measurement and an indication
of the field-of-view of the sensor. The absolute calibra-
tion of the Canopus sensor for all the stars in the sky
was not known, and the problem was further compli-
cated because the brightness signal included the inte-
grated background of stars in the field.
A map-matching technique was developed to identify
objects seen by the Canopus sensor during the roll
search mode. As an aid to establishing the validity of
this map-matching technique, other corroborating infor-
mation was used for the initial acquisition. This included
information from a fixed wide-angle field-of-view Earth
sensor. Magnetometer information observed during the
magnetometer calibration roll sequence and low-gain
antenna pattern variations were used to provide rate and
position information. The magnetometer and antenna
information was anticipated to be relatively crude and
would be utilized with only a low weighting factor.
Fundamental to the map-matching was an a priori
telemetry map of sensor brightness output vs clock
.angle (angle about the Sun line measured from Canopus).
A reasonably sophisticated mathematical model of the
Canopus sensor and the sky, including the Milky Way,
was developed so that with trajectory information a
computer program printed a map of the expected
telemetry output of the brightness channel seen during
roll search. This then was matched with an actual
telemetry map to identify observed objects. Initially an
extensive computer program was devised to process the
telemetry data to produce the actual telemetry map.
This was statistically correlated with the a priori map,
the Earth-detector output, magnetometer data, and low-
gain antenna data. Whenever an object was acquired
subsequent to a roll search, a calculation was made of
the probability that each acquirable object had been
acquired. If the object was not Canopus, a roll-override
command would have to be instituted to initiate roll
search and another computer run would be made until
Canopus was identified as the acquired obiect.
This computerized version of the map-matching tech-
nique was necessary due to the lack of knowledge of
the sensor response and the innumerable objects and
integrated background that would be seen by the sensor.
Until the sensor was actually calibrated in flight, the
uncertainties required that the best possible analysis
techniques be prepared beforehand. Another map-
matching technique was developed prior to launch to
aid in the identification of the stars. It was recognized
that the dependence upon this technique would have to
wait for verification of the technique in flight. It con-
sisted of a continuous strip-chart recorder employed to
plot in real time the star brightness telemetry. An
a priori map derived from the computer program was
transcribed into a transparent overlay in the same scale
as the real time telemetry plot, so that they could be
instantaneously compared during the roll search.
_. Magnetometer roll calibration. To increase the
value of the magnetometer experiment, the spacecraft
was designed to roll at a fixed rate for many hours prior
to Canopus acquisition to attain an in-flight calibration
of the spacecraft's magnetic field as observed by the
magnetometer sensor. This calibration was possible be-
cause the observed magnetometer signals in the near-
Earth environment would have rotating components due
to the external environment (the geomagnetic field) and
fixed components due to the spacecraft environment.
Knowledge of the geomagnetic field of the Earth permits
determination of the spacecraft-induced magnetic field
at the magnetometer sensor.
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Every effort was made to achieve this objective;
however, it was recognized that under certain conditions
this could not be achieved• Not only was this calibration
desirable from a scientific point of view, but from the
operations point of view the inertial orientation of the
spacecraft axes should be determinable. This fact would
provide information to be utilized in the determination
of the spacecraft attitude at the time that Canopus ac-
quisition was initiated. It was recognized that the
magnetometer calibration sequence might not be possible
for every conceivable situation• The magnetometer cali-
bration roll rate could only be provided under the
conditions that Sun acquisition had been initiated
properly by the spacecraft and that Sun acquisition had
occurred. Should the Sun acquisition not be initiated
automatically by the spacecraft, the utilization of a
ground command would have to be made to initiate
Sun acquisition. The utilization of this command at this
time in the sequence would automatically cause the
initiation of the Canopus acquisition sequence; this essen-
tially would eliminate the interval of time during which
the magnetometer calibration roll could be achieved•
There was no capability aboard the spacecraft to com-
mand the magnetometer calibration roll. It was solely
a function of the automatic features aboard the spacecraft•
g. Turn-of[ of video storage launch mode. The video
storage subsystem record motor was energized during
the launch phase to maintain tension on the mylar tape
to preclude its spilling off the reel during the vibration
environment of the launch phase. The mechanization
for turning off this launch mode was to sense the first
end-of-tape signal generated by the video storage sub-
system subsequent to separation, and upon this signal
open the relay connecting the record motor with the
gyro three-phase power supply• Failure of this particular
logic could be overridden by automatic or commanded
turn-off of the gyros.
When it is considered that twelve passes over the
video storage tape occur every hour that the machine is
running, concern has been expressed about extensive
periods of time when the video storage subsystem must
be operative• Should the launch mode not stop the video
storage subsystem shortly after separation, a ground
command, DC-15, would be sent to turn off the gyro
power supply and consequently the video storage sub-
system• Upon subsequent energization of the gyros by
DC-19, the video storage logic would have been locked
out and the video storage subsystem would no longer
operate until initiated at encounter. A constraint upon
the use of the DC-15 command in this condition is that
whenever the gyros are off the spacecraft roll rate can-
• °_
not be controlled and a valid magnetometer cahbratlon
roll sequence is not possible• Consequently, it was
desirable to postpone the turn-off of the video storage
subsystem by ground command in the above-mentioned
fashion until at least three or four hours of magnetometer
data had been acquired. At the end of this interval the
spacecraft would have passed through the geomagnetic
field and its calibration data acquired would be mini-
mal. Verification of video storage turn-off was possible
by reviewing the power subsystem telemetry readings.
h. Removal of CC&S relay homing current. The
function of the CC&S relay holding current is to prevent
inadvertent actuation of relays within the CC&S during
the launch phase and consequently initiate parts of the
mission sequence at an inappropriate time. The relay
holding current is normally removed at separation but
will also be removed at those times when the gyro
power is turned off. Failure to release the relay holding
current permits no commands other than the midcourse
commands to be successfully issued by the CC&S. Re-
view of the spacecraft power subsystem telemetry read-
ings allows verification that the holding current has
indeed been released. Just when the gyros would be
turned off to provide a backup to the automatic space-
craft function of releasing the holding current would be
a function of what the spacecraft requirements were at
that particular time. If the Sun acquisition had been
initiated and the solar panels had been deployed, the
relay holding current could be maintained on until some
later time after the magnetometer calibration roll had
been completed• However, if the backup capability pro-
vided by the CC&S launch commands were necessary,
there would be no choice but to turn off the gyros as
soon as reasonable to permit the spacecraft backup
commands to be issued. Nominally this would occur
prior to launch plus 93 min.
C. Trajectory Correction Maneuver Planning
The trajectory correction maneuver is perhaps the
most demanding phase of the Mariner mission so far as
SPAC is concerned. Normally the accuracy of injection
of the spacecraft is such that a trajectory correction is
required for a successful mission, but no automatic
provision can be made for it in the design, since the
correction parameters must necessarily be furnished
from the ground some time after launch. Thus, the bur-
den of performing the correction fails upon the SFO
organization and FPAC and SPAC in particular. All
inputs must be inserted into the spacecraft via grotind
command and the performance during all portions of
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the sequence must be monitored carefully, since at best
a nonstandard midcourse means an unacceptable plane-
tary miss distance, while at worst a nonstandard mid-
course may result in total spacecraft failure.
The design of the Mariner Mars spacecraft includes
a capability for termination of the midcourse maneuver
before rocket motor ignition by the use of a ground
command (DC-13), if an anomaly were to jeopardize
the successful execution of a maneuver. When an abort
is required, the DC-13 causes the attitude control and
pyrotechnics subsystems to disregard the maneuver
commands issued by the CC&S. After a DC-13, the
CC&S continues counting and issuing its event register
and timing telemetry signals to the data encoder until
its maneuver clock is completely counted out and resets
itself.
Barring gross failure a terminated sequence has no
real effect, since the maneuver may be rescheduled and
performed successfully regardless of the number of
previous aborts. Thus the operations philosophy for the
midcourse correction phase is determined by the abort
capability inherent in the spacecraft design. Based upon
knowledge of the design, ground test experience, and
previous mission flight experience, it was fully expected
that the maneuver would be executed successfully with-
out deviation from the predetermined plan. An anomaly
noted during the maneuver sequence has a potentially
harmful effect and, therefore, requires that the maneu-
ver be terminated and that the anomaly be evaluated
to determine what corrective action, if any, should be
taken.
Consideration was also given to ensuring that the space-
craft would enter the midcourse sequence in the proper
state. Since subsystem and system testing prior to
launch had demonstrated the possibility of logic state
changes on the spacecraft due to electrical transient
effects or to shock and vibration effects upon relays, it
was determined that a reliance on non-verifiable, preset
logie states was foolhardy. Thus two additional com-
mands were added to the midcourse maneuver to ensure
that the spacecraft was in a proper state to perform the
midcourse maneuver. The first, DC-29, set the relays in
each independent half of the pyrotechnics subsystem,
arming the first set of motor burn start and stop squibs.
The desirability of this is obvious ff the results are con-
sidered, for example, of performing a maneuver on the
first burn stop squibs but the second burn start squibs,
a distinct possibility ff relay contacts are subject to
movement as the result of shock during boost. It was
also deemed advisable to ensure the arming of the
midcourse via the transmission of DC-14, the command
to revoke DC-13, maneuver termination. Both com-
mands were ultimately adopted as a part of the normal
mideourse command sequenee.
Just after Canopus acquisition the first Project Office
midcourse meeting was held to establish the guidelines
for midcourse operations. Subsequent to this first mid-
course meeting the detailed preparation for the midcourse
correction was initiated which led to a set of SPAC
criteria for termination of a maneuver by DC-13,
Table 27. This list was compiled by the SPAC Director
with inputs from the divisions shown, and was approved
by the Space Flight Operations Director and the Proiect
Manager. The loss of roll attitude ultimately experienced
during the first midcourse attempt was never considered
for inclusion on the list because of the implicit confi-
dence prevailing that the roll attitude would be main-
tained unless commanded to change or there was a failure
in the roll channel circuitry. The abnormality itself was,
however, covered implicitly by the Division 34 criteria.
Each division listed in Table 27 was responsible to the
SPAC Director for determining that its criteria were
satisfied.
Table 27. SPAC criteria for use of DC-13
Division Criteria
33 Abnormal RF performance of downlink which jeopardizes ability
to analyze performance.
Large-scale deck skips and resets. (Medium deck skip at eutopilot
turn-on would not be surprising. Gyro turn-on has caused deck
skips occasionally during system test, but not during the flight.)
Assuming a properly operating CC&S, Channel 220 (CC&S
timing of events) indicating greater than 1 DN from expected
value.
Inability to decommutate high rate and position 0 of medium-
rate data attributable to spacecraft malfunction.
34 Noncharacteristic gyro performance.
Wrong turn polarity.
Gyros do not turn on.
Turn starts and/or stops at wrong time.
Main or maneuver booster-regulator failure.
Failure of 2.4-kc inverter.
35 None.
38 Oxidizer start cartridge pressure less than 300 psia.
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Maneuver execution is affected ff the expected im-
pulse cannot be applied to the spacecraft. Although a
velocity of 17 m/see cannot be achieved if nitrogen
pressure is less than 650 psi, and the rocket motor
starting transient is affected by any drop in fuel pressure,
it was decided that DC-13 would not be transmitted for
either of these reasons because aborting the maneuver
might negate any possibility of correcting the trajectory
later, since either anomaly would probably indicate a
steady degradation in capability which would be ex-
pected to continue.
On December 4, 1964, the first attempt to correct the
trajectory of the spacecraft was initiated. The attempted
correction was terminated because of an'unexpected loss
of roll attitude shortly after maneuver sequence initia-
tion. Since this problem had not been specifically
planned for, with, of course, the exception of the DC-13
maneuver termination provision, detailed preparation
for such a problem was required before a second
attempt could be made.
Analysis of the telemetry indicated that about 50 sec
after the first maneuver sequence was initiated on the
spacecraft, the spacecraft dropped lock on Canopus and
went into a roll search mode, searching for another
acquirable object. A DC-13 was transmitted to the
spacecraft to abort the maneuver because it was deter-
mined that there was insufficient time to reacquire
Canopus with successive DC-21s before the CC&S
initiated the pitch-turn maneuver. After maneuver abor-
tion, the spacecraft maneuver clock responded properly
to the quantitative commands that had been stored in
the on-board logic, demonstrating that the affected
subsystems would respond properly during the next
maneuver attempt.
It was decided that the second maneuver attempt
could be scheduled for the next day (December 5, 1964)
provided that a satisfactory sequence of events and
procedures could be developed that would prevent a
recurrence of roll search during the maneuver. The
plan that was finally adopted used a spacecraft design
feature that allowed the stopping of spacecraft roll search
and the re-establishment of the correct roll attitude with-
out rolling the spacecraft through almost 360 deg of arc.
In the event of loss of roll acquisition the spacecraft
roll gyro placed in the inertial (rate-integrating) mode
via DC-18 to freeze its position in inertial space, then
the spacecraft would be backed up with successive
DC-18s until the Canopus sensor plane was properly
oriented. It was felt that inadvertent roll search was
associated with gyro turn-on so that before pitch-turn
start the spacecraft roll attitude would be referenced tb
Canopus again using a DC-19.
Although DC-18 had not been used previously in
flight, it would be used without prior test experience ff
the spacecraft went into roll search. It was decided not
to test the DC-18 method in order to reduce the number
of times the Canopus sensor was turned on and off
during the mission, since power transients are often the
cause of electronic equipment failures. Nor was there
any direct evidence that showed such a test was war-
ranted. If DC-18 did not prove effective, DC-13 could
be used to abort the maneuver again.
Table 5 lists the DC-18 maneuver sequence available
for use during the second midcourse maneuver attempt.
The sequence incorporates SFO-based constraints need-
ed because of the special sequence execution conditions.
The maneuver plan recognized that timing of the
DC-18 sequence was critical, since up to eight DC-18s
might be needed to compensate for the angular roll
displacement gained before the spacecraft received the
first DC-18 that would stop spacecraft motion. Table 28
shows the tentative time sequence evolved for the use
of DC-18 during second maneuver attempt, if such
action proved necessary.
Table 28. DC-18 time sequence
Time, see Event
R=0
R-I- 10
R+ 20
R-I- 35
R+ 80
R .1. 275
R ,1,1,755
R -I- 800
R-I- 860
Spececraft starts roll search
SPAC receiver telemetry indication of roll search
SPAC requests transmission of DC-|8
DSIF 11 notified to transmit DC-18
DC-18 received by spacecraft
DSIF 11 ready to transmit series of DC-18s
DSIF 11 transmits DC-18 No. 8
DC-18 No. 8 received by spacecraft
SPAC requests DC-19
D. Science Cover Deployment Planning
1. General
On February 11, 1965, a ground command initiated
a science cover deployment exercise with the threefold
objectives to:
1. Deploy the science cover
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2. Preposition the scan platform to the optimum
encounter position, and
3. Turn off the battery charger and enable the boost
mode.
The exercise was carried out over the DSIF 11 tracking
station. A total of twelve ground commands were trans-
mitted to the spacecraft. All were received and executed
normally. All objectives of the exercise were fully
achieved, and the spacecraft was returned to the cruise
state without difficulty.
The planning which preceded the science cover de-
ployment exercise was provided primarily by the
Mariner IV EPWG as a part of their chartered activities
of formulating plans and making those preparations
required to fully exploit the planetary encounter.
a. Preliminary analysis. During the design phase of
the Mariner Mars 1964 project it was decided that the
mechanization of the planetary experiments and asso-
ciated data conditioning equipment should revolve about
the simplest dormant design possible. Thus the planetary
instruments were designed to remain in the stowed
position with power off from launch until several hours
prior to closest approach to Mars. The only exception
to this was the scan platform latch, released at solar
panel deployment, which protected the platform and
actuator during the launch. While this approach had a
number of advantages, it did require that the encounter
equipment operate normally after an 8-too storage in
space, it did not allow for ground monitoring of instru-
ment status, and it did not allow a great deal of correc-
tive action capability by the ground in the event that it
was discovered at encounter power turn-on that a
failure had occurred.
As a result, the question of ground-commanded en-
counter exercises was investigated by the EPWG to
determine if there existed any significant advantage
to performing all, or any part of, an encounter sequence
during the cruise portion of the mission. These activities
were undertaken during the months of December 1964
and January 1965, since, were sufficient reason to per-
form some command exercise uncovered, it might be
desirable to do so while the spacecraft still had low-gain
antenna capability, both uplink and downlink.
The investigation by the EPWG showed that there
were a number of advantages to performing a prema-
ture science cover deployment. The advantages are
listed in Table 29.
Table 29. Advantages of premature science
cover deployment
Item Advantage
6
7
9
10
Reduced risk of Canopus loss during encounter due to cover
deployment:
a. No data loss with roll loss prior to MT-5
b. Confirmed command subsystem availability
c. Not a time-critical operation
Minimized risk of science cover deployment failure during
storage
Permitted assessment of encounter equipment
Turned battery charger off and enabled boost mode
Exercised procedures, personnel, and facilities required for
encounter
Positioned scan platform for encounter
Precluded possibility of premature NAJ_ from reflected light
off cover
Prevented possibility of encounter data loss due to science
calibration
Provided baseline data for assessing encounter performance
In the event of some malfunction, corrective action could be
attempted
Whenever commands are sent to a spacecraft to
change its electrical or mechanical configuration a num-
ber of risks are involved. Table 30 lists the risks in-
volved in the science cover deployment.
b. Potential failure modes. Particular interest was
focused on those failure modes to which the spacecraft
was exposed by deploying the cover early, and to which
it would not otherwise have been subject.
Table 30. Summary of risks
Item Risk
Scan subsystem malfunction
Loss-of-command lock
Command subsystem malfunction
Power subsystem malfunction
Micrometeorite damage to TV
Television shutter left open
Video storage malfunction
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Scan subsystem malfunction. The use of any sequence
exercising DC-24 exposed the scan subsystem to an
unnecessary failure mode. Before the exercise, the relay
which interrupts power to the scan subsystem upon
receipt of DC-24, DC-16, NAA, or television planet-in-
view (PIV) was in the reset position; i.e., the circuit was
completed. Sending DC-24 or DC-16 would set this
relay, which must then be reset again by logic circuitry
within the scan subsystem at encounter. Should the logic
circuit fail to work, assuming DC-24 or DC-16 had been
sent during the early deployment, the subsystem would
be exposed to a failure mode to which it would not
otherwise be susceptible. On the other hand, ff the relay
had failed to reset, but the scan platform had been
stopped at the proper clock angle, this would turn out
to be quite favorable. At that time the uncertainty in /7
was approximately ±3 deg. Providing that uncertainty
and the nominal value of # did not change appreciably,
this could turn out to be a risk that is actually desirable
to take.
Loss-of-command lock. There was no way to deter-
mine the command subsystem lock status during Data
Mode 3. Concern was expressed over using DC-3 espe-
cially since at least 2 hr of Mode 3 Data would
be required to accurately determine the TV frame
time TM. Blind command lockup tests were run at the
DSIF stations which demonstrated that ff command
lock was lost during Data Mode 3, it could be re-
established.
Command subsystem malfunctions. Failures of the
command subsystem come in two varieties:
1. A command sent to the spacecraft could be wrongly
interpreted by the command subsystem. A review
of all possible commands, however, showed that
none are irrevocable or catastrophic with the pos-
sible exception of DC-9 which would have exposed
us to the possibility of a receiver lookup asso-
ciated with the ranging equipment. The probability
of the command subsystem wrongly interpreting a
command is 0.97 × 10 -s at threshold. The probabil-
ity of interpreting any command sent as DC-9 other
than DC-9 itself is 0.33 × 10 -9 at threshold. The
command link performance margin at the contem-
plated time of the early cover deployment was pre-
dicted to be 10 db above the sum of the negative
tolerances. The probability of executing a wrongly
interpreted command was zero for all practical
considerations.
_SThis was required to determine the best transmission time for
DC-26 from a "IV shuttering point of view.
. A command which was required to complete the
cover deployment sequence and which was unavail-
able because of a component failure would have
been troublesome. There were three such com-
mands: DC-2, DC-26, and DC-28. DC-26 and DC-28,
which were required to recondition the encounter
equipment after the cover deployment, would be
demonstrated to have complete functional integrity
prior to committing to the cover deployment opera-
tion. DC-2, which was required to recondition the
cruise science, would be functionally checked ex-
cept for the integrity of approximately eleven com-
ponents when it was transmitted as the second
command in sequence. The probability that these
particular components would have failed since they
were last checked during the countdown was
1.2 × 10 -4. The effect of a failure in one of these
components would have resulted in being unable
to have cruise science on without also having en-
counter science on. The consequence of leaving the
encounter science on would be a wearout failure of
the TV shutter which was estimated to have a half-
life of 60 hr. A choice could be made between
cruise science or TV. Such a failure would not
affect the alternate cruise science turn-on which
occurs at MT-7 or DC-25.
Power subsystem malfunction. Failures in the Power
Distribution Subassembly 4All have effects similar to
those described above. There were thirteen components
whose failure could not be determined by the verifica-
tion sequence and which would have the same effect
as a failure of DC-2. There were six such components
whose failure would result in the inability to turn off
encounter science. There were also six such components
whose failure would leave the 2.4-kc power on to the
video storage subsystem. The probability that any of
these components would have failed since they were last
known to be working properly was 1.6 × 10 -3.
Micrometeorite damage to TV. With the cover open,
there existed the possibility of micrometeorite erosion
or possibly a cosmic ray deterioration of the encounter
optics. This phenomenon, which also affects the Canopus
sensor, is not thought to be a problem.
Television shutter left open. An unusual combination
of circumstances could have led to a possible problem
as follows:
1. After the cover was deployed and encounter power
was turned off, a problem could occur if the TV
shutter were left open.
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_2. The spacecraft, during the mission, lost lock on the
Sun-line (but managed to recover).
3. While either losing lock, or in the process of
reacquiring lock, the Sun passed through the field-
of-view of the eameralL
4. Enough energy could be absorbed by the vidicon
surface to destroy it.
The risk of leaving the shutter open, when DC-26 turns
the Encounter Science power off, was eliminated by
including DC-3 in the sequence to obtain the TV shut-
tering times. This allowed DC-26 to be sent so that it
would arrive at the spacecraft 6 see after a TV shutter.
The shutter is a logically controlled function occurring
once every 48 see. The probability of causing a shutter
pulse and therefore leaving the shutter open is extremely
low ff power is turned off within the first 10 see fol-
lowing shutter, and reaches approximately one chance
in a hundred (10 -2) if power is turned off within 2 see
preceding the next shutter. For 0.2 see, out of 48, the
probability is one out of one, for practical purposes, of
leaving the shutter open simply because during this
period of time it is normally open.
Video storage subsystem malfunction. The Video
Storage Subsystem end-of-tape circuitry had the un-
desirable characteristic that it produced a short (approx-
imately 1 ms) pulse on power turn-off. This pulse has
sufficient energy to forward bias transistor Q2, the
video storage subsystem channel change relay driver
transistor. However, this pulse does not hold Q2 on long
enough to ensure reliable relay operation.
With this low energy drive pulse, relay K1 may
behave in one of the five following fashions with the
noted results:
. The relay may properly function in that both sets
of armature contacts change from one set of con-
tacts to the other. This mode of operation, which
occurs approximately 90% of the time, causes the
video storage subsystem to effectively change
tracks.
. The relay armature may fail to operate in that the
armature contacts remain in their initial condition.
This mode of operation, occurring approximately
2% of the time, produces no change in the video
storage subsystem.
lgThe field of view is approximately 1.05 deg square and is at an
angle 120 deg with the --Z axis.
°
°
°
The relay armature making contacts with terminals
four and five may function properly while the
armature making contact with terminals one and
six may end up in a neutral condition wherein the
armature does not make contact with either ter-
minal. In this hung-up state, which occurs approxi-
mately 4% of the time, both record heads are
energized and both playback amplifiers are gated
off. Consequently, if any data is sent to the video
storage subsystem, this data will be recorded on
both tracks; however, since the playback amplifiers
are gated off, data cannot be played back. If the
channel change relay K1 is in this state when an
encounter sequence is begun, the operation of the
video storage subsystem will not be affected. Dur-
ing the first tape pass, the first 10½ pictures will
be recorded on both tracks. Since the steering con-
tacts four and five are still operable, relay K1 will
operate normally at the first end-of-tape, thereby
correcting the relay hang-up. During the second
tape pass, the next 10½ pictures will be re-
corded over the first 10½ pictures on one of the
tracks, thereby resulting in the storage of 21 com-
plete pictures. Picture playback would be normal.
In summary, this type of hang-up does not affect
the operation of the system for a normal encounter
sequence.
The relay armature making contact with terminals
one and six may function properly while the arma-
ture making contact with terminals four and five
may hang up in a neutral state. In this state, which
occurs approximately 4% of the time, the video
storage subsystem effectively becomes a one-track
machine since the channel change relay cannot be
thrown by transistor Q2 when one of the steering
contacts is not making contact. If 21 pictures are
recorded, the second 10½ pictures would be re-
corded over the first 10½ pictures on the same
track. Playback, which would consist of the last
101/_ pictures, would also be from this track.
Both relay armatures become hung-up. In this
state, which was not observed in testing, any
recorded data is recorded on both tracks. How-
ever, this data cannot be played back since the
playback amplifiers are gated off.
During video storage subsystem laboratory and
spacecraft testing, relay hang-ups were avoided by
sending manual OSE track change commands 1 sec
before power was turned off. These commands de-
pleted the energy in capacitors C1 and C2, the
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relay energy storage capacitors. With capacitors
C1 and C2 discharged, a pulse turning Q2 on had no
effect on relay K1 since there was no energy avail-
able to drive {he K1 coils.
Video storage subsystem electronics failure risk. The
risk of incurring a failure in the video storage subsystem
electronics by leaving the 2.4-ke power on for the
remainder of the mission is as follows:
1. Any small spacecraft power transients during the
rest of the mission might have caused the video
storage subsystem count-two circuitry to lock-up
in the following manner. A transient turns on the
monopulse reset generator clearing the count-two-
and-stop circuitry to zero. Later transients would
generate two counts into the count-two-and-stop
circuitry, thereby inhibiting the record sequence.
2. Leaving the video storage subsystem power on
would add unnecessary operating lifetime to the
video storage subsystem electronics. Unnecessary
operating lifetime is considered highly undesirable.
Therefore, these risks were removed by including a
DC-28 in the sequence generated to turn off the video
storage subsystem 2.4-ke electronics.
2. Considerations
a. Optimum calendar date. The best time to perform
the exercise appeared to be prior to the March 5 CC&S
MT-5, which switched the transmitter to the high-gain
directional antenna. The reasons which made this appear
to be the best time were:
. If the spacecraft had lost roll control as a result of
reflected light from dust particles knocked free by
the impact of the science cover deployment, it
would be very desirable to be able to receive data
during the resulting roll. Without telemetry it
would have been impossible to evaluate the space-
craft performance until Canopus was again ac-
quired. This would have required a DC-19 followed
by DC-21s periodically until telemetry reappeared
and Canopus was reacquired. Performing the exer-
cise before CC&S MT-5 would allow the desired
exercise to be completed even with the loss of roll
control, and later would allow Canopus to be re-
acquired, since data would not be lost during the
roll while transmitting over the low-gain antenna in
the near-Earth vicinity.
2. If the science cover would not deploy, it would Be
desirable to determine this early so that some
corrective measures could be employed. For ex-
ample, if the cover had not deployed, it might be
desired to turn the spacecraft so that solar heat is
applied directly on the latching mechanism. The
earlier this could be performed, the greater the
amount of heating which would be possible on a
Mars transfer trajectory. The spacecraft battery,
command subsystems and CC&S subsystems would
all be required for such an exercise, and all ap-
peared to function normally at that time.
3. All subsystems appeared to be functioning normally
in early February. Any of them, of course, could
have failed before encounter. It would be very
desirable, therefore, to put the spacecraft in the
most desirable position possible for the encounter
itself by using the backup commands at that time,
because command was working, instead of waiting
until encounter.
Some consideration was given to performing the
exercise in late March or early April to allow more time
to study the problems and trade-offs more closely. It
was felt that very little more could be learned and it
was not worth the risk of losing spacecraft telemetry in
case of a loss of roll control.
b. Television value. Before the trajectory-correction
maneuver, the trajectory-dependent value curves for the
television experiment were based on the following
considerations:
1. Resolution-degrades with increasing picture-taking
distance
2. Blur degradation-occurs with decreasing distance
3. Frame size-decreases with decreasing distance
4. Terminator and near-terminator coverage-a regular
function of 0
5. Surface featur_ and bright-dark transition cover-
age-an irregular function of O and of arrival time.
After the trajectory-correction and before the science
cover deployment exercise, the Mariner IV trajectory
was rather well defined. This made it possible to more
closely examine the relative TV value in terms of some
parameters which were still variable. It was determined
that the relative TV value changed as a function of scan
clock angle at which the scan head was positioned for
the pass over the planet.
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Figure 52 shows the scan geometry in relation to the
trajectory near the planet. The spacecraft is located at
the center of the coordinate system with the direction to
the Sun pointing vertically upward. The scan subsystem
is located 120 deg from the Sun direction. The planet
denoted orbital plane represents the relative motion of
the planet past the spacecraft.
The scan subsystem has associated with it a wide-
angle sensor and a narrow-angle sensor, with 25-deg
half-angle and 11/_- by 21/_-deg fields-of-view, respec-
tively. The scan subsystem is energized at Mars and the
scan rotates about the Sun-line between 296-deg and
ll6-deg clock angle. Clock angle is measured in the plane
perpendicular to the direction to the Sun with 0-deg clock
at the projection of Canopus onto the clock angle plane.
When the planet enters the 25-deg half-angle field-of-
view of the wide-angle sensor far enough to trigger the
WAA logic, the scan begins tracking the planet.
The tracking occurs by setting the scan clock angle
equal to the planet clock angle plus a small bias angle
which is a function of distance from spacecraft to planet.
When the planet enters the field-of-view of the narrow-
angle sensor (narrow-angle Mars gate, NAMG), active
tracking ceases and the picture-taking sequence is
triggered. Following the taking of 21 "IV pictures, the
sequence is ended.
In Fig. 52 it will be noted that the orbit plane is
inclined by about 50 to 55 deg to the Sun-line. This
results in rather non-optimum coverage for the "IV
subsystem unless biasing is included. This can be seen
as follows: relative to the two sensors, the active tracking
of the planet effectively cancels any motion of the planet
through the sensor in the clock angle direction. This
means that during tracking the planet changes in cone
angle only in the sensor, or climbs vertically up the
center line of the sensor. However, when active tracking
stops, the scan subsystem can no longer remove the
clock angle motion of the planet through the sensor.
The planet, therefore, appears at NAb, to change direc-
tion and pass through the sensor at a skewed angle
(equal to the angle the trajectory is inclined to the
Sun), with the result that the optic axis does not pass
through the center of the planet. This is illustrated in
Fig. 53, the view of the planet as seen by the sensors;
in any particular case, the scan trace will be parallel
with the one shown. The traces will begin near the
bright limb, and will be approximately the same length
as the one shown. Hence, to achieve near-optimum TV
coverage, a bias was built into the wide-angle sensor
which effectively displaced the planet in clock angle.
However, the bias that could be built into the scan
sensor, while adequate to provide good pictures, was
insufficient to bias the scan far enough to carry it across
the center of the planet.
When positioning the scan by ground command, the
scan axis could have been located at the optimal clock
angle for "IV pictures plus or minus the accuracy in
positioning process. In order to determine the allowable
tolerances in positioning the scan and in the trajectory
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Fig. 52. Scan subsystem trajectory geometry
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uncertainty, Fig. 54 was generated illustrating the clock
angle range for a given #2o that resulted in the scan
being able to see the planet. The box shown cross-
hatched in the center of the figure pointed out the
region in which it was most probable that the scan
subsystem would fall, assuming a ±3-deg uncertainty
in positioning the scan and a _3-deg uncertainty in
the orbit e.
In addition, it was important to know how the
uncertainty in trajectory would decrease with time.
Prelaunch studies indieated that the uncertainty in the
orbit dropped very slowly through the cruise phase.
When nearing the planet, a large decrease in the un-
certainty in the orbit was expected starting 2--4 hr before
closest approach and continuing through encounter. The
conclusion was that 1 or 2 days prior to encounter the
uncertainty in e was unlikely to be much smaller than
it was on February 11, 1965.
8 is the angle between the T vector and the B vector
in the RT plane, where the T vector lies in the plane
of the ecliptic and is perpendicular to the incoming
B.R
=e = arctan
BoT
asymptote. The B vector is the vector from the center
of the planet (center of the coordinate system) to the
point where the incoming asymptote intersects the RT
plane.
The television value vs scan clock angle is given in
Fig. 55. This curve was determined by the experimenters
and was based on the following considerations:
1. Coverage of the sub-solar region- shading here is
dependent largely on albedo and color differences,
not on surface slopes
2. Coverage of a maximum number of bright-dark
regions
3. Polar cap coverage
4. Avoidance of near-terminator emission angles e of
greater than 60 deg
5. Maximization of the number of usable pictures-
i.e., minimization of the number made beyond the
terminator
6. Coverage of Trivium Charontis- an intrinsically
interesting region
The trajectory that had been attained by Mariner IV
after the midcourse was assigned a television value
number of 0.9 or greater prior to midcourse. As indicated
in Fig. 55, the Mariner IV value was about 0.7, based on
scan-bias data. Other than the new ground rules, two
factors combined to bring the Mariner IV value below
nominal. First, there was an adverse mechanical clock
angle bias between the scan and television axes. Second,
the arrival time was 36 min earlier than nominal. The
first factor decreased the likelihood of obtaining polar
cap coverage. The two factors combined to eliminate
i.o /_ iuJ / 7"CA=O112GMT
b =13,500 kmo.8 8 =60 decj
160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195
_) 0.6 U') --<Z --
_ z
Z m
O_ / _mj
CLOCKANGLE,deg(SCANPOSITIONDURINGTV ENCOUNTER)
Fig. 55. Relative television values of various scan
platform positions
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coverage of Trivium Charontis, which would otherwise
have been obtained; hence, fewer light-dark transitions.
The value contotlr presented here was based on the
assumption that a full set of pictures would be received
at Mars encounter. If, due to an early science cover
deployment and associated circumstances, only the
second half of the set were received, the value of the
television experiment would have been degraded by a
factor of perhaps ten. Several factors entered into this
evaluation including:
1. Two or more of the second ten or eleven pictures
would be beyond the terminator in any case
2. No major desert region would be covered
3. Only less-distinct light-dark transitions would be
covered
4. Aerial photo-interpretation in unknown territory is
a difficult proposition at best; having only half the
pictures greatly reduces the data sample
5. One goal of this mission was to provide knowledge
to support future photographic missions; if the
brightness in the sub-solar region were not sampled,
it would not be possible to draw up even a relative
photometric curve for Mars based on the received
data
0. The best spectral-band information would be ex-
pected from the sub-solar region.
7. The trajectory and scan-position tolerances became
crucial: since the scan trace would be triggered by
narrow-angle acquisition, it would begin near the
limb and it would become very important that it
cross a wide part of the apparent disk; the number
of pictures lost beyond the terminator otherwise
would become a large fraction of the total number
obtained.
In short, the loss of the first 11 pictures would
have been very serious; however, while the relative
value of the remaining pictures would have been low,
their absolute value, incalculable before the fact, would
have been very great.
c. Temperature control. The early science cover de-
ployment would produce approximately an overall 4*F
drop in the temperature of equipments which were
thermally slaved to the bus. This was small enough not
to cause concern. No change in temperature would have
been expected following a normal MT-7 science cover de-
ployment because heat dissipated by the encounter equip-
ment nearly balances loss from the open cover. However
if Channels 418 and 437, which are the TV and SPITS
temperatures monitored in the instruments themselves,
were sampled shortly after the cover was opened, the
accompanying thermal transient would have verified the
event. After the cover deployment, the TV and SPITS
temperatures, because of the lower value, would posi-
tively verify cover deployment.
d. Ground command execution timing. It was obvious
that understanding of the timing parameters and accu-
racy in command timing would be necessary to position
the TV at the optimum angle.
It was determined by analysis and by testing that the
ground command OSE took 53.25 + 2.24 - 0.00 sec
to process a 26-bit command word in the normal mode.
By using the automatic start feature of the OSE, the
0.2 sec reaction time of the operator was removed from
the positive tolerance. It was further discovered that
the paper tape tolerance of 1.00 see could be removed
by going to Mode 2 verify and then backspacing. This
put the first bit of the command word adjacent to the
paper tape read-head. This leaves a tolerance from
0 to 1.04 sec, which is due to the lack of synchronism
between the station docks and the subcarrier oscillator
in the ground command OSE which drives the bit sync
generator. For any direct command (26 bits long) only
the first 10 bits are required before the command is
executed in the spacecraft. Therefore, 16 sec can be
subtracted (1 bit/sec) from the 53.25 sec. A ground
command OSE process time of 37.3 sec was used,
understanding that a 0 to 1.04 sec tolerance with uni-
form distribution existed on this time.
The run down time of the scan head was found to be
approximately 0.75 deg or two data numbers in the scan
position readout.
Armed with these data, tests were run with the PTM
to demonstrate and verify the timing techniques. These
tests proved the feasibility and, with minor corrections
to the procedure, the scan head could be positioned
within one data number (-4-0.36 deg) consistently. Tests
were run from the SPAC area at SFOF with the PTM
to develop an understanding of the two-way transmis-
sion time also. The method used to determine the trans-
mission time for the command was based on plotting
several cycles of the scan position on graph paper and
predicting ahead based on these data when the sensor
would be at the desired location. The two-way trans-
mission time and the 37.3 sec ground command OSE
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time were then subtracted from that projected time, to
arrive at the time to begin transmitting DC-24.
3. Deployment Sequence Development
Six possible command sequences were developed by
the EPWG for use in the science cover deployment
exercise. The total exercise was broken down into six
basic yes/no type decisions, Fig. 56. The outcome of
each of these decisions determined the course of action
to be pursued. The six plans ranged in difficulty from
Plan 1, which required no command action, to Plan 6,
which required 18 direct commands to: 1) turn off the
battery charger, 2) perform the encounter sequence,
3) playback, and 4) return to the cruise configuration.
Table 31 lists the effects of all the commands con-
sidered. Plan 4, Fig. 3, was adopted by the Mariner
Project Manager.
Phase Command
Command DC-3
verification
DC-2
DC-26
DC-2
DC-28
Table 31. Effects of commands considered for the science cover deployment
Effect
The command DC-3 is the first command in the
sequence, so that it will verify the correct opera-
tion of the command detector and allow DC-2, the
next command, to have a measurable effect. DC-3
will switch the Data Encoder to Data Mode 3
and place an event in Register No. 4 which will
not be detected until the Data Encoder is back in
Mode 2.
DC-2 is issued as the second command to verify
that it will be processed properly by the spacecraft
command subsystem. This command will switch
the Data Encoder to Mode 2, which is the proper
data format for the cruise portion of the mission.
The command DC-2 also is the only means of
turning on only the cruise science for the
remainder of the cruise portion of the mission.
The cruise-sclence portion of the command
operation can only be inferred by the Data
Encoder switch until after DC-26.
The command DC-26 is issued to verify it will be
processed by the spacecraft command subsystem.
cruise science prior to issuing the command
proper response to DC-26 under these conditions,
provides almost complete functional verification.
It is absolutely necessary that this command be
operative, since it is the only means of turning off
the encounter science before the Mars encounter.
The command DC-2 is issued next to turn on
cruise science prior to issuing the command
DC-25 in the initlate-encounter phase. Using
DC-2 to turn on the cruise science will minimize
the transient to the spacecraft power subsystem
upon execution of DC-25.
The command DC-28 is issued to verify that it will
be processed by the command subsystem. Battery-
charger-on, the proper response to DC-28 under
these conditions, provides almost complete
functional verification. The command DC-28 is
required to turn off the 2.4-kc power to the tape
subsystem subsequent to DC-25.
Phase Command Effect
Initiate DC-25
encounter
phase
Inhibit
scan phase
Inhibit
recording
phase
Science
format
phase
Initial
playback
phase
DC-24
DC-28
DC-3
DC-4
The command DC-25 will deploy the cover and
initiate the encounter sequence. It turns on both
the encounter science and the cruise science and
turns off the baffery charger. It also starts the
scan-search sequence. The command DC-25 is
required in order to record TV pictures or to
initiate the scan-search.
DC-24 may be sent to stop the scan platform
(otherwise it will be stopped upon receipt of
DC-26). DC-24 sets a relay within the scan
subsystem which must then be reset at encounter
for normal scan subsystem operation. If the
platform can actually be stopped at the desired
angle, DC-24 would be the better command to
use since the double constraint (scan platform
timing and TV shutter timing) on DC-26 is then
removed.
One of the plans offers the option of sending
DC-28 here in the sequence. The command
DC-28 turns off the 2.4-kc power to the video
storage subsystem electronics, inhibiting the
possibility of recording or playing back. The
:command will also turn the battery charger back
on, disenabllng the boost mode.
Two of the plans offer the option of sending
DC-3. DC-3 places the Data Encoder in Mode 3
which provides additional science data at the
expense of all engineering telemetry. The
additional data would provide information to
assess the performance of the TV subsystem, to
permit timing of DC-26 to reduce the probability
of leaving the shutter open. DC-3 is not required
to execute a tape playback or record sequence.
The command DC-4 will place the recorder in the
playback mode. If the tape recorder is to be
exercised at all prior to encounter it should be
0laced in the playback mode prior to performing
a record sequence. In playback the tape transport
moves more slowly (by a factor of 1200:1) and
greater torque is available; this minimizes any
undesirable effects in the event that the tape
0ack has become stuck.
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Table31. Effects of commands considered for the
science cover deployment (cont'd)
Phase Command! Effect
DC-2
Record
phase
Terminate
encounter
phase
Main
)layback
)base
DC-16
DC-26
Cruise
condition
)base
The command DC-2 will shut the recorder off and
restore Data Mode 2. This command should be
sent after verifying correct playback mode.
If it is desired to exercise the tape recorder in
the record mode, DC-16 must be sent. After
recording 21 pictures, the subsystem will shut
itself off at the second EOT or the DAS end of
Picture 22.
The command DC-26 may be sent to terminate
the encounter sequence. This command will turn
off encounter science and cruise science. If no
)layback of the recorder was planned the
command would be postponed to the cruise
condition phase.
DC-4 If a playback of the tape recorder is desired
following shutdown of the encounter science it
could be initiated at this point with DC-4. Since
there would be no data on the beginning of the
tape (space before Picture 1) the Mode 4/I
logic would format the data to Mode 1.
DC-22 After a short interval DC-22 could be sent which
would switch tracks on the machine. Data would
then be available from the middle of the eleventh
picture recorded in the Record Phase. This would
provide a functional check on the entire TV
data link. A total of about 40 or 50 rain, in the
playback mode, could be permitted with no loss
of recording capacity at encounter.
DC-2 The command DC-2 would terminate the record
phase and restore Date Mode 2 at this point. IE
the record and playback modes of operation were
skipped and the Data Encoder is in Data Mode 3
the command DC-2 must be sent to switch to
Data Mode 2. If this is not done all telemetry
from the spacecraft would stop from DC-26 to
DC-2.
DC-28 In order to finally condition the spacecraft for
the cruise mode, it is necessary to turn off the
tape-recorder 2.4-kc power. This is accomplished
by sending DC-28. This command also turns on
the battery charger. Since the desire is to end this
exercise with the battery charger turned off this
command must be sent before DC-26.
DC-26 The command DC-26 will turn off the battery
charger, enabling the boost mode (share
protector). For those sequences where the
encounter science is still on this command also
turns off all science (encounter and cruise) which
makes the last command necessary.
DC-2 The last command, DC-2, will turn the cruise
science instruments back on and establish the
required spacecraft cruise condition.
_°
4. Contingency Plans
Plans were developed before the exercise which laid
out the courses of action to follow, after careful dis-
cussion, for each envisioned exercise-induced anomalous
behavior of the spacecraft. These plans are shown in
Table 32.
E. Encounter Planning
1. General
The basic plan of the encounter sequence was to use
ground commands to pre-position the planetary scan
platform, to back up the initiation of the television record
sequence, and to back up the turn-off of the video stor-
age record motor to assure the attainment of television
pictures of Mars.
a. Initial conditions. The spacecraft was in the cruise
configuration at the start of the encounter phase. No
special preconditioning was required to prepare the
spacecraft for the initiation of the encounter phase by
ground command DC-25. Table 33 shows the configu-
ration of all spacecraft subsystems at the start of the
encounter phase.
b. Alternatives.
Received via high-gain antenna. The Mariner flight
sequence was originally based on the transfer of the
spacecraft receiver to the high-gain antenna before
May 1, 1965 because the spacecraft-received carrier-
power would have decreased to such an extent that
reliable Earth-to-spacecraft (uplink) communications
could not be maintained. However, by mid-February it
became apparent that previously predicted interference
patterns between the high- and low-gain antennas were
affecting the uplink power level. Careful plotting of the
interference pattern, Fig. 7, allowed a confident predic-
tion that the spacecraft uplink power would be rein-
forced by the interference pattern, allowing reliable
command capability with the DSIF 10-kw transmitters.
The spacecraft could have been operated in the re-
ceive via high-gain antenna mode ff required; however,
ff the spacecraft lost roll control while receiving via the
high-gain antenna, up to 133 hr could elapse before
on-board logic would switch the receiver to the low-
gain antenna and allow the receipt of ground commands.
Alternate methods of roll control. As shown in
Table 33, the spacecraft would be in the DC-15 roll-
control mode at the start of encounter. Two other modes
of roll control were available: DC-19 and DC-18.
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Table 32. Emergency action summary
Single failures or problems
1 DC-3
Wrong data mode
2 DC-2
Wrong data mode
3 DC-26
Cruise science on
Baffery charger on
4 DC-2
Cruise science off
Wrong data mode
5 DC-28
Battery charger off
6 DC-25
Loss of roll control
NAA early
Indication
Data Mode 1
Data Mode 2
Data Mode 1
Data Mode 3
.Science data in format
Power change
Mode 2 format science will be all zeros. Register No. 4 event
Mode 2 format science will be all zeros. No Register No. 4
event
Data Mode I
Data Mode 3 with science on
Data Mode 3 with no data
Power indications and Register No. 4 event
Power indications, no Register No. 4 event
Cinopus intensity will be many DN higher than 37 DN
If it occurs within the first 6 sac of DC-25, data encoder will
be in Data Mode 2 with record sequence on. DAS bit 17 will
indicate NAA. DAS bits 201 to 210, scan position, will not
change. Event counter 3 will give EaT indications.
Action
Do not know if this is Mode 4/1 or Mode 1 as video storage
subsystem is off. Send DC-2 and stop exercise.
If event in Register No. 4, stop exercise. If no event, check
ground command OSE and decide on retransmission of DC-3.
Do not know if this is Mode 4/1 or Mode I as video storage
subsystem is off. Send DC-2 again and stop exercise.
Check ground command OSE and retrensmit DC-2.
If battery charger off:
Terminate exercise.
If baffery charger on:
Check Register No. 4 for event -- if no event check ground
command OSE and command lock; if normal terminate
exercise, or
If cause is determined early and it is safe to proceed,
retransmit DC-26.
If science is off:
Transmit DC-2 and terminate exercise.
If science is on:
Check Register No. 4 for event; if no event, check ground
command OSE and command lock; if normal terminate
exercise, or
If cause is determined early and it is safe to proceed,
retransmit DC-2.
Check ground command OSE and command lock. Retransmit
DC-2 and terminate exercise.
Check ground command OSE and command lock. Retransmit
DC-2 and consider termination of exercise.
Check power for cruise science on. Retransmit DC-2 and
terminate exercise.
Retransmit DC-2 and terminate exercise.
Retransmit DC-2 and terminate exercise.
Ground command OSE and command lock. if normal
terminate exercise.
Check ground command OSE and command lock. If normal
terminate exercise; if not consider later exercise.
Continue exercise and reacqulre using DC-19 procedure after
exercise.
Send DC-3 within 10 man to get record information. Wait
until second EaT; the data mode will switch to Mode 2.
Send DC-28, DC-3, DC-26 (6 sac after shutter), DC-2. At this
stage it is not known whether it is light induced or electricall
induced.
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Table32. Emergencyactionsummary(cont'd)
Single failures or problems Indication Action
6 (Cont'd)
No encounter power
Battery charger on
No NRT power-on
indication
Cover not deployed
Scan position
Loss of downlink
Loss of upllnk
Loss of Sun
Switched power
amplifiers
Switched exciters
Switched to Data
Mode 3
Switched to Data
Mode 4/i
If it occurs after the first 6 sec of DC-25, data encoder will
be in Data Mode 3 with record sequence on.
Power telemetry channels 227, 203, 205, maybe 109;
temperature control can also verify this. DAS can also tell
from bit 197-NRT, bits 201-210 scan position.
Power telemetry channel 216.
DAS bit 197 should be a "1" for on,
Temperature control can verify from Channels 414, 418, and
437. (An event in Register No. 1 indicates that current has
passed through the pyrotechnics solenoid which is the primary
i deployment device.) After scan position has changed by
20 deg the cover lanyard should deploy the cover.
Position indication DAS bits 201 to 210 unchanged from
stowed position before launch. Temperature Channel 411 may
indicate hotter than normal clutch slipping.
Position indication DAS bits 201 to 210 unchanging at the
low clock angle. Temperature Channel 411 should indicate
hotter than normal clutch clipping.
Position indications DAS bits 201 to 210 unchanging at the
high clock angle. Temperature Channel 411 should indicate
hotter than normal clutch slipping.
No received signal from th_ spacecraft.
Verbal station report.
Power telemetry indications power switching and logic
(PS&L) voltage 109 will drop to battery voltage 226; battery
drain will increase; 203, 204 will increase, 222-225 will drop
off. Canopus sensor 108 will be turned off; 105, 106, 107
and 112, 113, 114, will most likely be unusual.
Low-gain antenna power will drop by some amount end
Channel 300 will change from present DN to around 60 or
61 DN.
Channels 301 and 302 may give different indications.
Science data in place of engineering.
Engineering data only.
Video storage subsystem playback.
Data encoder will switch to Data Mode 2 after 21 or 22
pictures. After the switch to Mode 2 send DC-28, DC-3,
DC-26 (6 sec after shutter), DC-2. At this stage it is not known
whether it is light induced or electrically induced.
Send DC-25 again send DC-28 if video storage 2.4-kc power
comes on. DC-3, DC.26 if the battery charger is on, DC-2 if
cruise science is off.
Proceed with exercise DC-24, DC-3, DC-28, DC-26, DC-2.
Evaluate power telemetry -- after about 10 min send DC-3
and evaluate DAS bits 281 to 420; send DC-2, DC-24, DC-28,
DC-3, DC-26, DC-2.
Send DC-25; since it is a solenoid the command can be
recycled; send DC-24, DC-28, DC-3, DC-26, and DC-2. At
some later time after study maybe • 90-180 deg pitch or •
midcourse maneuver.
Look at DA5 bit 17; if NAA see 2 above. If no NAA send
DC-3, DC-2, DC-24, DC-28, DC-3, DC-26, DC-2. At some
later time after study maybe a 90 -- 180 deg pitch or a
m_dcourse maneuver.
Have gone through the low clock angle limit switch. Send
DC-3 to evaluate other scan position and TR voltage; send
DC-2, DC-24, DC-28, DC-3, DC-26, DC-2. Could recycle here
(DC-25) and the scan platform will search out of this limit
switch.
Have gone through the high clock angle limit switch. Send
DC-3 to evaluate other than scan position and TR voltage; send
DC-2, DC-24, DC-28, DC-3, DC-26, DC-2. The scan platform
will not search out of this limit.
Use the standard DC-12, DC-7, DC-8 procedure. Proceed with
exercise after acquiring downllnk.
Make station repairs.
Send DC-19 which will turn the gyros back on and allow the
spacecraft to reacquire its references. Then DC-24, DC-28,
DC-3, DC-26, DC-2.
Complete exercise and send DC-7 later.
Proceed with exercise. Decide later question of switching
exciters back.
Evaluate "IV and scan. Get enough data up to 25 rain to be
able to send DC-26 6 sec after TV shutter. Send DC-2 and
evaluate engineering--proceed with exercise.
Do not know if in Mode 1 or tape is moving in Mode 4
and is in no-data-present configuration. Send DC-22. If still
Mode 1 then it was Mode 1; send DC-2 and proceed. If it goes
to Mode 4 after DC-22 then the Mode 4/I was present. Send
DC-2 end proceed.
Send DC-2 and proceed.
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Table32. Emergencyactionsummary(cont'd)
Single failures or problems
7 DC-24
Still searching
Wrong position
8 DC-28
Video storage sub-
system 2.4-kc power on
Battery charge does
not come on
Switched data modes
9 DC-3
Wrong data mode
10 DC-2
Wrong data mode
11 DC-26
Encounter science on
Cruise science on
12 DC-2
Cruise science off
Encounter science
still on
Some other data mode
Indication
DAS bits 201-210, scan position changing.
DAS bits 201-210, scan position not the predicted value.
Power telemetry Channel 227.
Power telemetry Channel 216.
Other than Data Mode 2
Data Mode 1
Data Mode 2; no Register No. 4 event
Data Mode 2; Register No. 4 event
Data Mode I
Data Mode 3
If cruise science is off, can be seen in Mode 2 format
If cruise science is on, check event Register No. 4 for event.
There will be cruise science in the Mode 2 format
Mode 2 format science will all be zeros.
DAS bit 197 should be a 0 for off. Also power telemetry
Channels 227, 203, 205, maybe 109. Temperature control can
also verify.
See DC-25 and DC-28 for general discussions.
Action
Calculate DC-24 again based upon last transmission time. Send
DC-24. If not successful proceed with DC-28 and DC-3. Then
calculate DC-26 to arrive nominally 6 sec after TV shutter
and position the scan. (DC-16 could be used but it will start
the record sequence.)
Proceed with exercise.
Send DC-28. Proceed with exercise DC-3, DC-26, DC-2.
Proceed with exercise DC-3, DC-26, DC-2.
Video storage subsystem should be off; if getting Data
Mode 4, the video storage subsystem is still running;
see DC-25.
Do not know if this is Mode 4/1 or Mode 1 as video storage
subsystem is off. Send DC-3, DC-2, DC-26, DC-2.
Check ground command OSE and command lock; send DC-3,
DC-2, DC-26, DC-2, or
Check ground command OSE and command lock; if normal,
send DC-26, DC-2.
Do not know if this is Mode 4/1 or Mode 1 as video storage
subsystem is off. Send DC-2, DC-26, DC-2.
Check ground command OSE and command lock. Send DC-2,
DC-26, DC-2.
Evaluate command in lock and power telemetry Channels
227, 203, 205, and maybe 109; DAS can verify with bit 197
NRT DAS power on. Temperature control also can verify.
Send DC-26 followed by DC-2.
See above.
With encounter science off -- terminate exercise.
Send DC-2 again. (DC-25 could be used, but will turn on
encounter science; this could only be done after additional
careful consideration.)
Send DC-26 again followed by DC-2.
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Table 33. Spacecraft configuration before the
start of the encounter sequence
Subsystem Configuration
Structures and
actuators
Radio
Command
Power
CC&S
Data encoder
Attitude control
Pyrotechnics and
PIPS
Video storage
Data automation
subsystem
Plasma probe
ion chamber
Cosmic dust
detector
Cosmic ray
telescope
Trapped radiation
detector
Helium
magnetometer
Planetary scan
subsystem
Television
subsystem
Scan platform preset to 177.9 deg
All solar pressure vanes deployed to nonoptimum
positions
Exciter A
Power amplifier A (traveling-wave tube)
Transmit via high-gain antenna
Receiver vie low-gain antenna
In lock
Main booster-regulator on
Maneuver booster-regulator off
Battery charger off
Battery voltage high (36.6-1- v)
Boost mode enabled
310 w available from solar panels
Launch counter L-I, L-2, and L-3 relays set
Master timer MT-1, MT-2, MT-3, MT-4, MT-5 and
MT-6 relays set
Data Mode 2 at 81/3 bps ADC/PNG A
Canopus gate logic overridden by DC-15
Canopus sensor cone angle at 82 deg
3.5 yr of attitude control gas remaining
Y-axis solar pressure vanes inoperative in the adaptive
mode
First motor burn capability expended
Second motor burn unarmed
Science cover deployed
All pyrotechnics devices except second motor burn
squibs expended
Off
RT DAS operating normally
NRT DAS off
Returning abnormal data
Totally inoperative
Microphone and pulse-height analyzer operating
normally
Penetration film operation questionable
I All returning useful data
I Off
A return to the DC-19 mode of operation would
reactivate the Canopus sensor brightness gates which
contributed to eight losses of star acquisition in the first
19 days of flight. Since DC-15 was used to remove the
brightness-gate logic in early December 1964, there was
not a single loss of star acquisition, although 37 roll
transients had been observed by the end of Mission
Phase I.
Although the inertial mode may have been the safest
mode for encounter, it was not to be attempted unless
sufficient evidence existed that picture data could not
be obtained or downlink telemetry could not be main-
tained without it. There would be considerable unknown
risk in turning on the gyros, there would be difficult
operational problems in maintaining roll orientation by
ground command (because of gyro drift in the inertial
mode), and DC-15 had demonstrated satisfactory per-
formance, even during heavy cosmic dust activity.
2. Encounter Sequence Development
a. Encounter sequence initiation. Two methods were
available for initiating the encounter sequence: ground
command DC-25 and CC&S command MT-7. After
detailed study, DC-25 was chosen as the best method
of initiating the sequence; MT-7 served as a backup
command.
DC-25 was transmitted at 14:27:55 GMT on July 14,
1965 and initiated the encounter sequence at 14:40:33
GMT (spacecraft time) by applying 2.4-kc power to the
encounter-science loads and the video storage subsystem,
and simultaneously applying 52 vdc from the booster-
regulator to the 400-cps, single-phase inverter that sup-
plied power to the scan subsystem drive motor and the
video storage subsystem record motor. The relative
merits of DC-25 and MT-7 are shown in Table 34.
Many circumstances might occur during the encoun-
ter phase which would require that the encounter
power be withdrawn and reapplied to recycle the
equipment involved. The nature of some circumstances
is such that the decision to recycle would be an
obvious one; and, therefore, the recycle would be
initiated without knowledge of whether DC-25 would
function. Other circumstances might make decisions not
quite so obvious. In those situations the possibility of
not turning on the equipment deenergized in the initial
phase of a recycle sequence must necessarily have been
weighed against the advantages to be gained by
recycling.
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Table34. Relative merits of DC-25 and
CC&S MT-7 command
Command Advantages Disadvantages
for initiation
DC-25
MT-7
1. Allows verification of
capability for possible
recycle requirement.
2. Permits added time for
making operational
decisions should some
malfunction occur at
encounter science turn-on.
3. Permits added time for
performing scan plat-
form pre-posltioning
calculations.
4. Allows selection of trans-
mission time to possibly
optimize chances of tele-
vision pictures if DC-24
and WAA ere unsuccessful
and the scan platform
searches all the way to
the planet limb inter-
section by a narrow.angle
sensor.
5. This technique has been
successfully used in flight.
Permits scan positioning
immediately after occur-
rence of MT-7 at nearly the
optimum position.
1. Adds shutter pulses to
the television subsystem.
2. Requires longer periods
of support from key
personnel.
3. Requires the use of
ground command capa-
bility as • primary mode,
rather than as a backup.
An apparent means of escaping this latter dilemma
would be to verify that the capability of turning on
encounter science by ground command really existed.
Then, if such a situation should occur, it would be
possible to make the recycle decision trade-offs with
more confidence. The only means of verifying the exis-
tence of a DC-25 capability before a recycle would be
to transmit DC-25 before MT-7 occurs.
It must be said that the more subtle situations which
might require a recycle sequence would be caused by
power transients changing the logic states within various
subsystems or by the failure of telemetry points. No
history of power transients in a normal encounter se-
quence existed and the failure of a telemetry point was
quite unlikely. The possibilities of being confronted by
one of these subtle situations were considered to be
very remote.
To accomplish the scan platform pre-positioning
within the existing time constraint of 2 hr after MT-7,
the procedure had to be very concise and all had to go
smoothly. There would be little time for retracing steps
if errors were discovered. Additional time, even an
hour, would provide some contingency against the indi-
cated latest time for transmission of the DC-24 platform
inhibit command. This time could be provided by earlier
initiation of the scanning motion by ground command.
Early turn-on of the encounter science would permit
longer reaction time to any nonstandard spacecraft
operation resulting from the turn-on, whatever the
initiation source.
With the intersection of the planet limb and narrow-
angle field-of-view used as a reference point for the
pre-positioning or automatic tracking of the planet,
proper initiation of scan motion would provide for scan-
ning to NAA, with high probability of obtaining accept-
able television pictures. For this approach to be mean-
ingful the traiectory predictions had to be dose to the
nominal estimated at one-half day prior to closest ap-
proach and the scan period had to be the same as during
science cover deployment exercise on February 10, 1965.
There were several arguments against transmitting
the early DC-25 to initiate the encounter sequence. The
most prominent of these was the fact that should a
DC-25 initiate the encounter sequence, the scan platform
pre-positioning could be effected only after approx-
imately 2 hr of data monitoring and calculations. Per-
mitting automatic initiation of the encounter sequence
afforded the opportunity to stop the platform with a
ground command as soon as the system would accept
it after power turn-on. Ground commands could not
arrive at the spacecraft as close to each other as was
necessary to effect this approach; consequently, this
mode of platform positioning had to be forfeited if the
early command initiated sequence were chosen.
Lesser disadvantages of an early encounter sequence
initiation were the additional shutter pulses accumulated
on the television shutter (75 pulses/hr of operation), and
the added time that key personnel were required to be
on duty. Information available on the shutter was that
a large margin existed, based on test data, in the num-
ber of pulses required before degraded performance
would occur. Assuming the DC-25 to be transmitted
90 min before MT-7 occurred, the added pulses were
not considered to be a factor of concern. Personnel par-
ticipation for an additional 90 rain was not considered
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too dangerous in that there would be some slack periods
during which breaks could be taken. If there should
be severe problems, the extra time would never be
noticed until after the encounter sequence was over.
A DC-25 was to be transmitted to initiate the en-
counter sequence because the knowledge attained by
observing the results of this command could contribute
immeasurably to future action in the encounter se-
quence. Without a working DC-25 command, the com-
mitment to any action that might require the DC-25 for
success would have to be carefully reviewed. If a poorly
positioned scan platform were the only situation requir-
ing an encounter power recycling, the need for the
DC-25 would not be so great.
The CC&S issued command MT-7 at 15:41:49 GMT
on July 14, 1965. The only effect of MT-7 was an event
in data eneoder Event Register 2. If DC-25 were not
successful in initiating the encounter sequence, MT-7
would cause 2.4-ke power to be applied to the encoder
science loads and the video storage subsystem and,
simultaneously, would cause 52 vdc from the booster-
regulator to be applied to the 400-cps, single-phase
inverter that in turn supplied power to the scan sub-
system drive motor and the video storage subsystem
record motor.
b. Scan platform pre-posltioning. Incorporated in the
design of the spacecraft was the means to position
the platform for taking the television pictures without the
use of ground commands. Failure of this function would
leave little reaction time because its occurrence could
only be observed very near to the planet. Therefore, the
platform was positioned using a ground command early
in the encounter phase, leaving the remaining hours
free for solving any problems which might occur.
Operationally, pre-positioning would be advantageous.
Implementation of this capability required use of the
ground command DC-24. The two major techniques for
utilizing this command were as follows:
1. Advantages of DC-24 following observation of
telemetry:
a. Optimum television camera positioning would
be possible.
b. The technique was employed successfully pre-
viously in the mission during the science cover
deployment exercise on February 10, 1965.
2. Advantages of DC-24 just after encounter power
turn-on:
a. The possibility of limit-switch failure would be
eliminated, which in turn would prevent the
platform from reversing.
b. Pre-positioning would be possible without per-
forming 2 hr of data calculations based upon
real-time telemetry.
c. Chances of recycling due to improper position-
ing would be reduced.
The scan platform position for achieving optimum
pictures was determined from studies by television
experimenters. Use of telemetry data to determine plat-
form position as a function of time permitted an estima-
tion of when the platform would be in the optimum
position. A command could be timed to arrive at the
spacecraft at the selected time and cause the platform
to stop.
Flight experience and numerous ground tests indi-
cated that this technique was quite accurate and could
be expected to be so during the encounter phase. Stop-
ping the platform to within 0.75 deg of the desired
position was anticipated using this technique.
Circumstances were such that the preencounter scan
platform position, achieved during the science cover
deployment exercise, was considered to be the optimum
one for television pictures. Due to changes in the pre-
diction of the spacecraft orbit, the optimum scan posi-
tion for television had changed approximately 2 deg.
When the scan electronics were turned on, the scan
platform moved initially in the direction which reduced
the difference between the initial position and the
optimum position.
The scan subsystem can react to the DC-24 command
8 sec after the power is initially applied to it. Arrival
of DC-24 at this time interval after MT-7 would assure
the platform is positioned to within 2 deg of the opti-
mum position, based upon the scan search rate of
0.5 deg/sec. There was reason to expect that the plat-
form would not move 4 deg during the initial 8 see
after turn-on. Mechanical backlash and torque buildup
in the scan actuator might delay movement of the plat-
form the equivalent of 0.5 deg. In addition there might
be other forces to be overcome when the platform was
initially activated, reducing the total movement prior
to the receipt of DC-24.
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An important aspect of the latter technique would be
the prediction of the time of the occurrence of the
MT-7 command. Fortunately, the flight experience had
shown that the times of cyclic command (CY-1) could
be accurately predicted to within 0.3 see of the actual
times. This ability to observe the time of the commands
accurately to verify predictions was the result of the
frequency transient which occurred on the downlink RF
carrier whenever a cyclic command was issued by the
spacecraft when the receiver was out of lock.
The critical operation of calculating the time for
transmitting the DC-24 based upon scan position telem-
etry reading could be eliminated by sending DC-24 to
arrive immediately after a CC&S initiated encounter
sequence. This could aid the entire operation by per-
mitting the concentration on other problems should they
arise. This method had not been proved on the flight
spacecraft but was successfully demonstrated on the
PTM.
The advantage of the platform positioning immedi-
ately after power turn-on could not be achieved when
a DC-25 initiated the encounter sequence because the
flight command subsystem could not accept more than
one command every 26 see and the ground command
subsystem could not issue more than one command
every 55 sec in the normal mode.
The best way to position the scan platform appeared
to be the use of DC-24 almost immediately (8 sec) after
the CC&S MT-7 event occurred at the spacecraft. This
was based upon the fact that the least demand would
be placed on the scan subsystem and the operations
personnel to effect such an action. However, it was felt
that the knowledge gained by having transmitted the
DC-25 to initiate the sequence was worth the risks and
extra effort required in positioning the platform based
on telemetry data.
Although the "immediate DC-24" plan would free up
to 2 hr of time for studying other situations aboard the
spacecraft, if the situation arose where recycle was a
possibility, the assurance that the DC-25 capability
still existed after many months of disuse would provide
SPAC with a valuable analytic tool.
c. Science data requirements. When the scan platform
was pre-positioned, the planet would not enter the field
of view of the wide-angle sensor until less than 45 min
before the first picOxre was to be taken. Only at this
time would the automatic switching of the data encoder
from Mode 2 to Mode 3 occur. When DC-3 was re-
ceived by the spacecraft at 22:23:07 GMT July 14, 1965,
it transferred the data encoder to Mode 3 operation
(all science words) as soon as the transfer was acceptable
to the data eneoder transfer logic. The use of DC-3
permitted evaluation of the NRT DAS and television
status when sufficient time would be available to recycle
the sequence should it be judged necessary after review-
ing the data.
In addition, the availability of Mode 3 data permitted
the accurate determination of the television shutter
sequence for subsequent determination of the time to
transmit a DC-16 backup to the on-board initiation of
the television record sequence and a DC-26 backup to
the on-board termination of the television record
sequence.
The lack of Mode 2 data detracted from the ability
to monitor spacecraft engineering performance. A very
critical feature of the all-science telemetry condition was
that the RF and command conditions were unknown.
In order to alleviate this situation the ground command
frequency was at an appropriate offset value which
would cause the automatic lockup of the command loop
to begin if an inadvertent loss of lock occurred.
It was demonstrated that the successful transmission
of commands to the spacecraft could be effected when
the lack of engineering telemetry existed.
An operational constraint recognized for the use of
DC-3 was that it was to arrive at the spacecraft in the
science portion of the Mode 2 data frame. This pre-
vented an early science gate from being generated and
disturbing the DAS frame-count-vs-time computations
which were being utilized in determining the times for
subsequent command transmissions.
DC-3 had to be transmitted at 2 hr before the ex-
pected start of the television recording sequence and
timed to arrive in the science portion of the data Mode 2
data frame.
d. Wide.angle acquisition. Wide-angle acquisition
would occur at about 23:55:45 GMT (0.7 probability)
on July 14, 1965 when the illuminated disk of Mars
would move into the field of view of the scan sub-
system wide-angle sensor. Because WAA was a backup
to the DC-24 scan platform pre-positioning and the DC-3
transfer to Mode 3, the only outward effect of WAA by
the scan subsystem would be the WAA event in" the
science data.
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WAA had the following two backup functions:
1. If the scan platform were not pre-positioned by
DC-24, the scan subsystem would be transferred
from the search mode to the track mode about 3 hr
before closest approach to Mars when the wide-
angle sensor detected the illuminated disk of Mars.
The DAS would then issue a command transferring
the data encoder to Mode 3.
2. If the scan platform were pre-positioned but the
data encoder could not be transferred to Mode 3 by
ground command DC-3, the DAS would transfer
the data encoder to Mode 3 when a wide-angle
signal was received from the scan subsystem about
45 min before the start of the television picture
recording sequence.
e. Narrow.angle acquisition. Narrow-angle acquisition
would occur nominally at 0017 GMT on July 15, 1965
when the illuminated disk of Mars moved into the field
of view of one of the narrow-angle sensors. When the
planet is sensed by a narrow-angle sensor, the scan sub-
system sends a narrow-angle signal (NAS) to the DAS,
which immediately removes 400-cps single-phase power
from the scan platform drive motor (backup to DC-24).
The DAS starts issuing start-tape-recorder and stop-tape-
recorder commands to the video storage subsystem with-
in 60 to 204 sec after NAS. The start and stop commands
continue until terminated by on-board logic or ground
command.
The initiation of the television record sequence was
such an important function that a ground command,
DC-16, was available as a backup for the two parallel
inputs from on-board sensing of the planet. DC-16
initiates an NAS and thereby conditions the DAS logic
to begin the television picture recording sequence and
to transfer the data encoder to Mode 3 (as a backup to
WAA). This command had to be transmitted prior to
the time the planet acquisition event was observed on
Earth ff the maximum benefit of its capability were to
be attained.
Allowing the spacecraft to react normally to the
stimulus of the planet in the field-of-view of the narrow-
angle sensors, prior to arrival of this command at the
spacecraft, was the philosophy employed in determining
the command transmission time. Due to the importance
of this initiation function, any unanticipated interaction
was prevented between the DC-16 and a recording se-
quence already in progress when it arrived. This con-
dition was so remote as to be nearly impossible, but to
safeguard against any stray signal path not present
before launch it was anticipated that two pictures from
the latest estimated automatically-initiated record se-
quence would have occurred when the DC-16 arrived
at the spacecraft.
Another feature of this command was its capability
to inhibit the scan platform motion if this function had
not already been performed. Should the command have
been utilized to effect this result also, the philosophy
for its use as mentioned in the previous paragraph would
have to be modified to assure the proper consideration
of the phasing of the scan platform position relative to
the planet disk at the time of command arrival. This
might result in initiation of the record sequence prior to
the limb crossing and force pictures of space to be taken
early at the possible expense of terminator pictures later
in the sequence. The thought under these conditions was
to achieve some pictures, not all nor necessarily the
best pictures.
Timing required to choose the instant of DC-16 arrival
at the spacecraft can be provided by the attainment of
sufficient data on the NRT DAS frame sequencing from
the Mode 3 data. As much as 144 sec could be saved by
the reduction in tolerances which must be applied to
the calculations if sufficient Mode 3 data were not
available.
It was concluded that transmission of the DC-16
should take place to provide the backup to automatic
record sequence initiation whenever possible.
_. Record sequence termination. The television record
sequence was to be terminated about 25 rain after its
initiation (nominally 0049 GMT at the spacecraft) and
the data encoder was to be transferred to Mode 2 by
one of three on-board methods:
1. The video storage subsystem count-two-and-stop
circuitry terminates the record sequence when two
end-of-tape signals have been received.
2. The DAS terminates the recording sequence when
it receives the first EOT after the start of Picture 19.
3. The DAS terminates the recording sequence when
22 pictures have been completed.
Ground command DC-26 would be transmitted 1 min
44 sec after NAA appeared in telemetry (normally 0038
GMT) to ensure that television data recorded on the
video storage tape would not be lost due to failure of
the recording sequence to terminate properly or failure
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of the video storage record motor to be stopped when
the picture sequence ended. DC-26 removes 2.4-kc
power from all science loads (video storage 2.4-kc power
remains on) and removes booster-regulator 52-vdc
power from the 400-eps, single-phase inverter that powers
the video storage record motor, causing the tape to stop
moving. DC-26 serves as a backup to the portions of the
video storage subsystem and the NRT DAS that are de-
signed to terminate the recording sequence.
Running of the tape past the record heads when no
useful data were being applied to the input amplifiers
would result in erasing the previously recorded data.
If a condition such as this existed, eradication of the
planetary data already recorded would occur with
the accompanying failure of a prime mission objective.
Various failure modes associated with the video storage
subsystem and DAS had been determined which could
have resulted in the loss of all pictures from the tape
after they had been recorded.
Some failure modes could be bypassed with the use
of DC-26 if the command were transmitted at the cor-
rect time. This was accomplished by allowing the DC-26
to effect various changes-of-state aboard the spacecraft
which would otherwise require a number of components
to function properly to accomplish the same result.
Should the components aboard the spacecraft be un-
successful in terminating the recording sequence prop-
erly, the DC-26 would arrive shortly after the sequence
should end and thus provide a backup. The round-trip
signal time was a critical constraint in that it prevented
observation of the telemetry data to determine whether
the command was really needed before the command
must be initiated to be effective. Unless the DC-26
arrived shortly after the recording sequence was to
automatically terminate, its effectiveness would be
drastically reduced; after 10 min it would not be useful
at all.
Recognizing that the number of component failures
guarded against by this command action was small, com-
pared with the great number of components which must
function satisfactorily to achieve mission success, it might
have been difficult statistically to become concerned
with failure of these components. It must be remembered
that most component failures could not be compensated
for through the use of ground commands, but where com-
ponent failures could be eliminated as series elements
to mission success, it was reasonable and judicious to
do so. This principle had merit not only in the design
phase but also in the flight operations phase. The equip-
ment which controlled the recording sequence had not
been used since the launch but DC-26 had, and conse-
quently there was uncertainty as to whether the control
equipment would survive the launch environment.
In addition to terminating the recording sequence,
DC-26 removed power from all science equipment as
stated previously. Although a DC-2 was to be sent
immediately after the DC-26 to reenergize the cruise
science equipment, there had been some concern ex-
pressed that all instruments might not turn on again due
to the low temperatures at which the instruments were
operating. A certain amount of risk was accepted in this
case to permit the backup function that was desired.
Should the DC-26 fail to turn off the encounter science
equipment, CC&S command MT-8 would back up this
function at 0501 GMT (spacecraft time). The objective
of this reduction in spacecraft power is to alleviate the
power demand during the playback phase.
Ground command DC-2 would be transmitted nomi-
nally 1 min after command DC-26 was sent. DC-2 ap-
plies 2.4-kc power to the cruise science instruments
(turned off by DC-26) and transfers the data encoder to
Mode 2 as a backup to the on-board logic that terminates
the recording sequence. DC-2 would transmit at 5-min
intervals until confirmation was received that cruise
science was on.
The probability that more than one DC-2 would be
required to turn on the cruise science instruments was
small, but there was a small but finite possibility of
dropping command lock between DC-26 and DC-2.
Due to the great interest in the near-planet field-and-
particles data, the periodic transmission of DC-2 would
ensure that cruise science instruments would be turned
on with minimum delay.
The field-and-particles instruments would be reacti-
vated before closest approach. DC-26 would turn off the
instruments about 20 min before closest approach when
the spacecraft would be at a radial distance from the
planet 1600 km farther than the distance of closest
approach.
g. Occultation. About 70 min after the spacecraft
makes its closest approach to Mars the spacecraft would
pass behind Mars as seen from Earth, entering the occul-
tation region at 0212 GMT (the RF signal would be lost
at about 0224 GMT) and emerging at about 0305 (the
RF signal would be reacquired at Earth at about 0317).
As the spacecraft enters and exits the occultation region
the 2300-Mc spacecraft tracking and telemetry signal
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traverses the atmosphere and ionosphere of Mars. The
changes caused in the frequency, phase, and amplitude
of the signal by passage through these media provide
the information from which a model of the Martian
atmosphere and ionosphere could be constructed.
The spacecraft would be in two-way lock as it entered
and exited the occultation region in order to provide
more accurate tracking data. The two-way-lock condi-
tion would be maintained until just prior to MT-9 when
the DSIF transmitters would be turned off.
Command MT-8 would be issued by the CC&S at
0501 GMT on July 15, 1965. MT-8 would function as a
backup to DC-26 because, if encounter science were
turned off on DC-26 as planned, the only effect of
MT-8 would be an event in data encoder Event Register 2.
h. Picture playback. At about 10 hr 40 min after closest
approach (1141 GMT) the CC&S would issue command
MT-9 which automatically would switch the data en-
coder to Mode 4/1, turn off the cruise science instru-
ments, and initiate playback of the television pictures
recorded by the video storage subsystem. After about
1 hr of Mode 1 (all engineering) data, the first recorded
data would be received. Recorded data including the
first television picture of Mars would continue for about
8 hr 35 min. Thereafter, about 2 hr of engineering Mode 1
data would alternate with 8 hr 35 min of recorded data
until additional commands were received by the space-
craft. The engineering data between pictures permitted
assessment of spacecraft performance and verification
of the condition of the spacecraft telecommunications to
aid the DSIF stations in maintaining their tracking capa-
bility.
The Mode 1 data would be obtained when on-board
logic in the video storage subsystem sensed that no re-
corded data was on the tape between picture recordings
and switched the data encoder to Mode 1. When the
video storage subsystem again sensed data on the tape,
the data encoder would be transferred to Mode 4
(recorded data playback). The lack of data on the tape
would be due to the fact that no data inputs were ap-
plied to the tape during the starting and stopping of
the tape during the record sequence. During the transi-
tion period between start and stop commands a certain
length of tape passed the record heads, causing a data
gap to exist between the segments of recorded data.
Because the playback rate is 1/1280th of the record
speed, the data gap requires about 2 hr to pass the play-
back heads. Many variables influence the leaagth of tape
traversed during the transitions between stop and start
and consequently the length of time before the start of
the first picture and between the pictures during play-
back could not be predicted precisely.
It was not planned to initiate playback before MT-9
was issued, if all spacecraft conditions appeared normal.
Although the spacecraft would be in two-way lock
during the occultation experiment, the spacecraft would
be tracked in the noncoherent (one-way) mode during
picture playback because less telemetry data would be
lost in the one-way mode than in the two-way (coherent)
mode. Data can be lost in the coherent mode because if
the ground transmitter experiences a transient, the space-
craft reacts by shifting the downlink frequency momen-
tarily, causing the ground receiver to drop lock and the
demodulator to lose telemetry data.
To ensure that the spacecraft is in the one-way mode
before the start of picture playback, the tracking DSIF
stations turn off their transmitters sufficiently before
MT-9 to cover the contingency of initially playing back
from the se'cond video storage tape recorder channel.
The stations switch to the two-way mode during the
2-hr intervals of Mode 1 data between pictures to obtain
more accurate tracking data. The period of two-way data
would be timed so that sufficient margin would be left
to ensure that the television pictures would be played
back in one-way lock.
Two complete playbacks of the recorded data would
be required. During this long span of time, the CC&S
cyclic commands (CY-1) continue to be issued. The
on-board logic which controls receiving antenna switch-
ing would be active during the playback period, so that
the periods of two-way lock would have to be scheduled
to prevent unwanted antenna switching by the on-board
circuitry.
Ground command DC-4 could be used to back up
MT-9 if it should become necessary. DC-4 transfers the
data encoder to Mode 4/1 operation as soon as the trans-
fer is acceptable to the data encoder transfer logic. If
television picture data are available from the video stor-
age tape recorder, television data are telemetered; if no
television data are present (as between television pic-
tures), engineering data are telemetered. DC-4 also re-
moves 2.4-kc power from the cruise science instruments.
The time chosen to terminate the playback mode had
several possibilities depending on future plans. The plan
chosen was one which made it possible to record new
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data over only half of the Mars data and play back these
new data without first playing back Mars data. This was
accomplished by sending DC-28, video storage 2.4-kc
power off, to arrive at the start of the twentieth line
(Line 19) of Picture 22. This allowed all recorded data,
except a little over three lines, to be played back twice.
These three lines of data provided enough tape left
before the EOT foil so that, when the video storage sub-
system was re-energized and the tape began to move, it
would reach a speed of over half the steady-state velocity
before the foil passed over the EOT sensor; the tape
velocity is 12.84 in./sec during the record mode. This
condition of over half the steady-state velocity was a
requirement to ensure that only one EOT signal was sent
to the count-two-and-stop circuitry from that pass of the
foil. This would then allow the tape to have new data
recorded on the next side up to the second pass of the
foil over the sensor and the tape would stop there.
By stopping three lines before the foil, the recorded data
on the tape from any future recording would be just after
the foil. This would allow the desired new data to be
played back without playing back Mars data first. This
would save time, allowing additional cruise science in-
formation to be transmitted.
Signal DC-28 would switch the data encoder to
data Mode 1 of the Mode 4/1 when the data encoder
logic sensed the absence of Mode 4 playback data at
video storage subsystem 2.4-kc power off; DC-28 also
turned the battery charger on. Thus, DC-26 was re-
quired to turn it off again. By allowing 6 rain between
DC-28 and DC-26, over two commutations of the data
encoder medium decks could be evaluated in that space-
craft condition.
To re-establish the cruise mode, DC-2 would have to
be sent 6 min after the DC-26. This also would allow
over two commutations of the data encoder medium
deck for data evaluation before the Mode 2 data started
arriving at Earth.
Another possibility studied for terminating the play-
back mode would be to send DC-28 after two complete
tape passes. This would allow receipt of all data twice
and put the recorder in a position to record two com-
plete tracks of data in the future. It seemed quite likely
that a special calibration recording would take place
for evaluation of the recorded data of Mars which would
only require five pictures. If this calibration were re-
quired, a tradeoff would have to be made between
recording over all the Mars data, destroying that data,
or playing back again to some point in the tape before
the foil, which would leave some of the Mars data.
Unless the tape were then positioned to just before the
foil (which would require approximately 5 days), the
tape would again have to be played back to the point
of record start before all the calibration data could be
played back. This plan would either require destroying
the Mars data by recording over it for a television cali-
bration, or would require from 5 to possibly 10 days of
loss of cruise science while the tape was being posi-
tioned. The plan chosen did not have these disadvan-
tages and the loss of playing back three lines of data for
the second time seemed inconsequential.
i. Recycle sequence. There are situations that can de-
velop during the encounter sequence that would require
that certain aspects of the spacecraft encounter logic be
reset. So that the spacecraft can be reconditioned in
some optimum manner, after an undesirable state has
been established by certain spacecraft encounter sub-
systems, a recycle sequence has been developed. After
the spacecraft has been exercised using the recycle
sequence, those subsystems acted upon should be in a
more advantageous state to fulfill their encounter func-
tions successfully.
The recycle sequence is used to recondition those sub-
systems that are associated with the picture taking se-
quence of the Mars encounter. The recycle sequence will
most likely be used to restart the scan platform ff the
pre-positioning exercise fails to position the scan plat-
form acceptably. However, other problems can occur
which can make use of the recycle sequence for possible
solution, e.g., early NAA or scan platform hangup at the
lower limit. Certain portions of the recycle sequence can
also be used in an attempt to solve problems associated
with the NRT DAS, the planet sensors, the television
subsystem, and the video storage subsystem.
The intent of the recycle sequence is to attempt to
correct those conditions for which it has been developed
in the minimum time and with the maximum obtainable
advantages for the minimum number of commands. The
command sequence is arranged so that each command is
transmitted with the maximum confidence and with the
minimum possible effect to other spacecraft circuitry.
Table 35 shows the recycle sequence timing.
DC-3. DC-3 transfers the data encoder to Mode 3 (all
science data). Mode 3 data is required so that the.se-
quencing of the television camera shutter can be deter-
mined. It is desirable that the television subsystem be
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Item Command
Table 35. Recycle sequence
Time Effect
1 DC,.3 X
2 DC-2 X q" 83 rain
3 DC-26 X "t- 98 min
4 DC-2 X "P 99 rain
5 DC-28 X -f" 102 rain
6 DC-25 X "t- 103 min
Transfer data encoder to Mode 3
Transfer data encoder to Mode 2
All science 2.4-kc power off and
400-cps, i-phase power off
Cruise science 2.4-kc power on
Video storage 2.4-kc power off
All science and video storage 2.4-kc
power on and 400-¢ps, slngle-phase
power on
DC-26 would be transmitted so that the television
subsystem would be turned off while the television cam-
era shutter is closed.
DC-2. This command would be used in the sequence
to turn on the 2.4-kc power to the cruise science loads.
Since this command turns power on to only the cruise
science loads, the power turn-on transient is reduced
using this command as the first step in reapplying power
to the science subsystem as compared to the command
that turns power on to all the science loads.
turned off with the camera shutter closed. This precau-
tion is taken to eliminate the requirement that shutter
resynchronization circuitry built into the television sub-
system be required to operate at power turn-on. Failure
of the resynehronization circuitry to operate when re-
quired could result in the catastrophic loss of all tele-
vision pictures. This information obtained during the
Mode 3 data will be used to calculate the time for trans-
mission of DC-26.
DC-3 would be transmitted as soon as possible after
the decision to recycle was made and at a time that
would cause the data encoder to transfer to Mode 3
while the data encoder was in the science portion of the
telemetry frame.
DC-2. This command is used to transfer the data en-
coder to Mode 2 (½ engineering data and % science
data). The command would be transmitted so that engi-
neering data would be transmitted from the spacecraft
when the science instruments were turned off.
DC-2 would be transmitted approximately 15 rain
before the transmission of DC-26.
DC-26. DC-26 turns off all science 2.4-kc power and
the 400-cps, single-phase power. The primary purpose
of this command in the recycle sequence would be to
remove the 2.4-ke power from the scan subsystem elec-
tronics. By reapplying the 2.4-ke power, the scan plat-
form inhibit logic would be reset. This command also
allows resetting the logic associated with the encounter-
sensing devices; such as the wide-angle and narrow-
angle sensors. The use of this command conditions the
NRT DAS and the scan platform electronics so that
when power is reapplied to these subsystems their logic
states are the same as when their power was initially
applied.
DC-28. This command would be used in the sequence
to remove the 2.4-kc power from the video storage sub-
system. This command also would enable the charge
mode of the battery charger. However, the next com-
mand in the sequence reverts the battery charger back
to its boost mode. The purpose in removing the 2.4-ke
power from the video storage system was to permit a
reinitialization of the video storage subsystem count-two-
and-stop circuitry which is designed to count two
EOT signals and then inhibit any further start-record
commands from the DAS. This command would be used
to ensure against the possibility that the power transients
associated with this sequence had not set the count-two
circuitry to its inhibit-start-command condition.
This command also would reduce the chances of a
catastrophic loss of all television pictures, should the
automatic reset of the count-two-and-stop circuitry not
occur at the first DAS start-record command.
DC-25. This command would be used in the sequence
to apply 2.4-kc power to the encounter-science loads and
the video storage subsystem and also apply 52 vdc to the
400-cps, single-phase inverter that supplies power to
the scan drive motor and the video storage subsystem
record motor. The command would also be used to re-
vert the battery charger back to its boost mode.
DC-25 would be transmitted at a time, at least 5 min
after the transmission of DC-26, such that if the scan
platform remained in the search mode all the way to the
planet, the scan platform would intersect the planet in
the southern hemisphere.
j. Encounter sequence summary. The encounter se-
quence ultimately adopted and executed by SPAC is
shown in Fig. 4 and Table 86.
177
JPL TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 32-882
Table 36. Encounter sequence timing
Date
July 14
July 15
Time, GMT Event
0933/E _
1421/E
1433/sb
I_5/E
I_51E
1507/S
1519/E
1529/E
1541/S
1_1/s
1553/E
1553/E
1753/E
1903/E
1934/E
2053/E
2210/E
2222/S
2234/E
2339/S
2349/S
0001/E
0017/E
0021/S
oo231s
oo24/s
Johannesburg rise
DC-25 transmitted (± 6 men)
DC-25 received (± 6 men)
DC-25 seen in date (± 6 men)
DC-25 transmitted (if first one did
not function) (± 6 men)
DC-25 received (± 6 men)
DC-25 seen in data (± 6 men)
DC-24 if DC-25 his been ineffective
MT-7
DC-24 (MT-7 ± 8 sec)
MT-7 seen in dote (15:53:47)
Scan pro-positioned |f MT-7 turned on encounter
science (15:53:55)
DC-24 -- Latest time to transmit
Goldstone _ Echo rise
Goldstone -- Pioneer rise
Johannesburg set
DC-3 transmitted (-I- 30 sec)
DC-3 received
Switch to Data Mode 3
Mars begins to enter scan field of view for
180-clog pre-posltioned platform (E -- 1 hr 24 rnln
WAA (0.7 probability)
WAA observed (0.7 probability)
DC-16 transmitted
NAS (E -- 42 men) nominal
NAA (NA5 "t- 0 to 132 sec)
Start TV record (NAA -t- 60 to 72 sec)
aGMT time on Earth.
bGMT time at spacecraft.
Date
July 15
Time, GMT Event
0029/S
0033/E
0035/E
0038/E
0039/E
0049/S
ooso/s
0051/S
0101/E
0102/E
0103/E
OLO3/S
0135/E
0153/E
o212/s
0224/E
0305/S
0317/E
0501/S
0513/E
0624/E
0630/E
0930/E
1141/S
1153/E
1241/5
1248/E
1253/E
1352/E
IGMT time on Earth.
bGMT time at spacecraft.
DC-16 received
NAS observed
NAA observed
DC-26 transmitted (NAA "t- 1 mln 44 sec)
DC-2 transmitted
TV record sequence complete; switch to Date
Mode 2 (TV start "t- 24 men 48 sec)
DC-26 received
DC-2 received
Switch to Data Mode 2
DC-26 observed
DC-2 observed
Closest approach (nominal E -- O)
Tidbinbilla rise
Woomera rise
Spacecraft enters occultation region
Loss of RF signal at Earth
Spacecraft exits occultation region
RF signal observed at Earth
CC&S MT-8
CC&S MT-8 event received
Goldstone --Pioneer set
Goldstone -- Echo set
Johannesburg rise
CC&S MT-9 at CY.1 No. 83
CC&5 MT-9 at CY-1 (initiate tape playback)
Start of Mode 4 data (Picture 1)
Tidb|nbilla set
Sterf of Mode 4 data (Picture 1)
Woomera set
3. Operational Considerations
a. DSIF transmitter frequency. During the encounter
phase, the DSIF transmitter VCO frequencies were
chosen so that one frequency would be satisfactory for
a long period of time. The SPE in the spacecraft receiver
VCO would not be maintained at a zero offset. Adjust-
ment of the SPE was accomplished with the command
modulation signal off. Since command modulation would
be applied to the uplink signal for long periods of time
during encounter, it was necessary to discard the pro-
eedure for maintaining a zero SPE in the spacecraft
receiver to prevent having to drop command modulation
frequently. Commands could be received by the space-
craft when the static phase error is not excessive, so a
modest static phase error would be tolerated.
Doppler shift and range effects cause the SPE to move
in a negative direction. Procedurally a transmitter VCO
frequency was chosen initially so the spacecraft SPE
telemetry indicated a positive error equivalent to several
DN (approximately 30 cps). With time, the error drifted
through zero and assumed negative values. The correct
transmitter VCO frequency values were obtained from
the Tracking Data Analyst (TDA).
Studies indicated that the doppler shifts during the
Goldstone closest approach pass could be accommodated
without rezeroing the spacecraft SPE using the above
technique from spacecraft rise until entry into the occul-
tation region. Figure 57 indicates this effect.
The figure shows the encounter sequence with respect
to GMT time from MT-7 to MT-9. The times of occur-
rence of MT-7, MT-8, MT-9 and the DSIF station rise
and set times were accurately predictable. Times for
WAA and NAA, closest approach (E), and occultation
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were subject to small uncertainties arising from uncer-
tainties in orbit determination.
The dotted curve represents predicted doppler shift
during encounter referenced to the ground transmitter
VCO frequency and to the spacecraft VCO frequency as
indicated by Channel 111, receiver SPE. The ground
transmitter frequency was adjusted at the start of the
Goldstone pass to provide a Channel 111 DN of low 63.
The ground VCO frequency corresponding to a low 63
could be determined from ground transmitter VCO fre-
quency predictions. By this procedure, the spacecraft
receiver VCO frequency remained within 2 DN of the
best-lock frequency for all doppler shifts from Goldstone
until the spacecraft entered the occultation region, with-
out requiring resetting of the ground transmitter VCO
frequency.
b. Ground command transmission procedures. The
early-mission practice of normalizing the ground com-
mand subsystem 8fs after locking up the command loop
was discontinued at encounter. Instead, the ground com-
mand frequency was chosen to provide an offset from
the normalized frequency. The intent was to maximize the
probability of regaining command lock in minimum time
if a transient from the ground transmitter should cause
a loss of lock. It had been judged that the ability of the
spacecraft to successfully receive commands was insig-
nificantly affected by this practice.
The usual practice of locking up to the command loop
with some frequency offset from the free-running VCO
frequency was continued. This offset frequency was
the frequency maintained for the command modulation
signal. Whenever command lock is dropped inadver-
tently the spacecraft command loop automatically at-
tempts to lock up and may lock up by the time the
telemetry received on the ground indicates loss of lock.
Because of the signal round-trip time consideration,
after verification that the ground command subsystem
was functioning properly, permission could b_ given to
transmit a command, although command-detector telem-
etry indicated out-of-lock.
c. Use oJ DSIF 13 during encounter. Use of DSIF 13
100-kw transmitter was considered as a backup to
DSIF 11 or as the command station when the spacecraft-
.received signal-level from DSIF 11 was unsatisfactory
for providing command capability. As planning for the
encounter phase progressed, the use of DSIF 13 as
the primary station for transmitting to the spacecraft
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was considered. It was determined from a space-
craft point of view that its use as the prime transmitting
station was most desirable.
In opposition to this was the fact that there was a sig-
nificant degradation in the quality of the tracking data
available for orbit determination when DSIF 13 was
transmitting to the spacecraft. This was due to the fact
that DSIF 13 was not a duplexed station 21 and the
ground instrumentation and data-handling operations
added degrading features to the frequency data attained
when the data from another station had to be compared
with the signals transmitted from DSIF 13. There did
not exist a tight-closed-loop operation in this mode.
It had been estimated that the orbit near Mars could
not be determined much better after encounter if
DSIF 13 were transmitting than it could be determined
before encounter, based solely on cruise-phase data.
This consideration, and its attendant adverse effects on
the occultation experiment, forced the use of DSIF 13
to be solely a backup to be used in the situation where
roll orientation was lost and telemetry from the planetary
experiments would be in serious jeopardy ff DSIF 13
were not utilized.
A recommendation from the occultation experimenters
to transmit from DSIF 13 at exit occultation still had to
be considered a possibility.
4. Contingency Plans
One of the primary aims of SPAC and the EPWG was
to determine the nonstandard events that were unique to
the encounter phase of the mission. It is recognized that
all possible nonstandard events that might have arisen
during the encounter sequence were not described in
this Section; however, the possible corrective actions for
many of the nonstandard conditions were described. The
exact conditions, applicable at the moment the non-
standard condition arose, determined the response in
most cases. Figure 58 shows a portion of the encounter
decision diagram developed by SPAC.
a. Command problems.
Inability to achieve command lock with lO-kw trans-
mitter. The use of any commands under this condition
would be restricted to the time when the spacecraft would
be over DSIF 13, assuming that the inability to lock up
the command detector sync loop could be corrected with
_'It could not transmit and receive simultaneously.
about 12-db more spacecraft-received carrier powei'.
Spacecraft failures could prevent any station from lock-
ing up the command loop.
Initially the effect would be that the pre-positioning
of the scan platform would have to be dropped as an
item in the sequence. If MT-7 turned on the encounter
science, it would be too dangerous to pre-position over
DSIF 13 because of the possible adverse effects of hav-
ing the scan subsystem go to the track mode while the
command was in transit. If DC-25 were required to
turn on encounter science, a rapid DC-24 would not be
possible and would result in a situation the same as an
encounter-science turn-on before DSIF 13 rise.
Assuming that the 100-kw transmitted power were
sufficient to lock up the command loop, there would
always be the possibility of transferring the spacecraft
receiver to the high-gain antenna. Alternatives would
have been to transmit from DSIF 13 continually at the
expense of tracking data, to forego ground command
participation near the picture-taking sequence, or to
transmit only when needed for commands from DSIF 13
and to take the risk that conditions would not develop
which required immediate command action.
The receive-high mode, per se, had not been verified
in flight, but the reinforcement of the received signal
via the low-gain was due to signals coming from the
high-gain antenna. Also of concern in choosing a solu-
tion was the anticipated environment at the planet based
on data then available. The ability of the attitude con-
trol subsystem to maintain the proper orientation
was questionable because of the unknown Martian
environment.
Use of DSIF 13 as a command transmitter on an as-
needed basis only was highly favored. If the 10-kw sta-
tions were unable to lock up the spacecraft receiver to
acquire two-way doppler data, the continuous use of
DSIF 13 would be possible.
Inability to achieve command lock from any station
via low-gain antenna. Existence of this condition prob-
ably would be due to a degradation or failure of the
spacecraft receiver. Enough sensitivity possibly existed
within the receiver to permit command lockup using a
receive-high antenna configuration. Although receive-
high could not be commanded from the ground, the
design did provide for automatic switching of receiving
antennas ff two CC&S eyelics were permitted to occur
without locking up two-way between them.
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"The recommendation under this condition was to ter-
minate two-way lock before CC&S MT-9, with cyclic
No. 83 (1153 GMT, July 15), and resume two-way track-
ing after cyclic No. 84 (0634 GMT, July 18). By estab-
lishing two-way lock between cyclics, the receiver could
be maintained on the high-gain antenna.
It was recognized that the competing desire for two-
way tracking data for orbit determination purposes
would have to be evaluated against the recommended
approach should this situation arise. There was always
the possibility that if significant receiver degradation
had occurred, two-way doppler data via the low-gain
antenna receiving configuration would not be feasible
either.
b. Scan subsystem malfunction.
Search through lI6-deg primary limit switch. If the
scan platform searched through the primary limit switch
at 116.59 deg (DAS DN 492) and the backup limit switch
at approximately 115.1 deg, it would come to rest at the
mechanical stop at 106"31'. There were five possible
courses of action that could be taken to solve this
problem.
1. The most desirable course of action was to calculate
the time, taking into consideration the backlash,
for the scan to search from the mechanical stop to
the optimum pre-positioned clock angle. This could
be done to an accuracy of within a few degrees.
When the scan subsystem was turned off and then
back on, it would start searching in the direction of
increasing clock angle, i.e., away from the 106-deg
mechanical stop. The recycle sequence had to be
performed before the earliest possible WAA time 18
to preclude the scan going to track mode before
DC-24 arrived. The DC-25 of the recycle sequence _ 12
would then be followed with the DC-24 at the eal-
culated time. A second transmission time would be _ 6
supplied to the ground command operator in the tu
event of a momentary drop of lock while transmit- _-
0
ting the first DC-24 (the second time would be after -_
the scan had reversed at the other limit switch), o_(K
<_ -6
2. Another course of action was to wait until the prob- =
(.9
ability of a searching scan subsystem switching to z
<_ -12
track mode at WAA was above 0.90 before perform-
ing the recycle sequence. If the scan subsystem
were turned off and then back on, it would start -18
searching toward the higher clock angles, i.e., away
from this mechanical stop. For this plan, the scan
PIV logic had to work, switching the scan subsys-
tem to the track mode after searching until the
planet was within the wide-angle sensor field of
view.
3. The spacecraft could be rolled to point the tele-
vision camera at the planet. This was undesirable
because all data would be jeopardized from the
time the untried gyros-on command (DC-18)
reached the spacecraft, until the spacecraft was
again in the normal mode. This mode unnecessarily
jeopardized all orbit-determination, field-and-
particles, and occultation data for the television data
when there were better ways to solve the problem.
4. The spacecraft could be recycled per the recycle
sequence on the hope that the scan platform would
not search through these limits again. A failure that
would allow the scan subsystem to search through
the limit once and not the following times was con-
ceivable, but not likely.
5. A possible course of action was to send no com-
mands. The geometry of the scan field of view was
such that the planet would come into view on the
very edge of the sensor and track the planet back
out. The sensor was of fairly uniform sensitivity
across the field of view, but the angular semidiam-
eter of the planet at 1800 GMT was only approxi-
mately 1.7 deg, (Fig. 59). Figure 60 shows that the
Mars clock angle was 106 deg and the Mars cone
angle approximately 146 deg at 1800 GMT. The
edge of the sensor was at 145 deg so that, at most,
0.7 deg of the planet would be detected by the
sensor. It was marginal whether the sensor would
/
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Fig. 59. Mars angular semidiameter near encounter
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generate a scan planet-in-view signal and switch
the scan subsystem to the track mode. Figure 61
shows the spacecraft-Mars range vs time-near-
encounter.
The worst improper positioning was one in which the
television subsystem would not be able to see the planet
in the normal attitude control mode. There are three
alternatives that could be followed.
Recycle. The best plan was to recycle the encounter
science per the recycle sequence. Following the recycle,
the scan subsystem would be allowed to search until
WAA switched it to the track mode. In the event that
the scan subsystem did not go to the track mode, DC-24
would be sent during the next-to-the-last scan half cycle
before the planet intercepted. A backup DC-24 could
also be sent on the last half-cycle.
Roll the spacecraft. Another possibility was to roll the
spacecraft to allow the television to view the planet. This
would require use of the gyros-on inertial mode (DC-18)
and transmission of DC-21s or DC-18s, depending on the
roll direction needed. This was not a desirable plan
because the DC-18 mode had not been tried, and all
orbit-determination, field-and-particles, and occultation
data would be jeopardized by this maneuver. The RT
field-and-particles information would be lost because
the spacecraft would have to be rolled more than
6 deg to obtain television pictures and the spacecraft
_elemetry modulation could not be received after rolling
more than that number of degrees.
Send no commands. The third plan, also an undesir-
able one, was to send no commands and suffer loss
of the television pictures. The cruise science instruments
were the only possible tradeoff and there was very good
evidence to expect that they would be turned back on
1 rain after being turned off in the recycle sequence. The
DC-2 was used twice during the cover deployment exer-
cise on February 10 to turn on cruise science, and DC-25,
which actuates a redundant cruise science relay, was
verified at the beginning of the encounter sequence.
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Search through 296.59-deg primary limit switch. If the
scan platform searched through the primary limit switch
located at a dock angle of 296.59 deg and the backup
limit switch at approximately 298.5 deg it would search
up to the mechanical stop at 13"59'. For this failure
mode, recycling would not help because the scan plat-
form would search toward this mechanical stop when
recycling. The only course of action that would save the
television pictures would be to roll the spacecraft, but
this would jeopardize the orbit-determination, field-and-
particles, and occultation data and therefore would not
be done.
The logic and capability of the spacecraft made it pos-
sible to roll the spacecraft when near the planet such
that the planet would come into the scan-sensor field of
view and switch the scan to track mode. The spacecraft
would have to be rolled in the roll search direction,
DC-21s being sent either in the gyros-on inertial mode
(DC-18), or at each expected star acquisition time in
the DC-19 mode for the scan subsystem to track the
planet away from this mechanical stop. The spacecraft
could be rolled back and Canopus reacquired before the
NAA time. This maneuver was risky, but did allow a
tradeoff to be made. If the maneuver were successful,
all objectives would be met.
Scan platform improperly positioned. There are several
types of improper scan platform positioning. Figure 62
shows the relative television value vs scan platform clock
angle for Mariner 1V. Although the scan platform might
not be stopped at the optimum clock angle (improperly
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Fig. 62. Relative television values of various scan
platform positions at encounter
positioned) it still might provide a higher television value
than if the scan subsystem had been allowed to track
the planet. The tolerance upon the scan track mode
was ___1.75 deg worst-case pointing uncertainty. This was
made up of a worst-case medaanical tracking error of
___0.75 deg and ±1 deg to cover the uncertainty in planet
brightness distribution. This gave a worst-case television
value of approximately 0.45 for the scan track mode and
allowed any scan dock angle from 170.25 to 187.00 deg
to provide this value or higher. However, the 3-_ uncer-
tainty in # was about 3 deg, equivalent to 4 deg in dock
angle. The uncertainty in scan position was known to
±1 deg, giving a total equivalent-clock-angle uncer-
tainty of ±5 deg. This provided a range from 175.25
to 182.00 deg over whieh the scan pre-positioning was
equivalent to, or of greater relative value than, the scan
track mode.
The next area of improper positioning was one in
which the television camera would still be able to detect
the planet, but the relative television value was lower
than that of the scan track mode. Here a tradeoff had
to be made between the poor quality television pictures
that would result from this position and the risk asso-
ciated with recycling the encounter and cruise science.
c. Video storage subsystem malfunction. Actuation of
the video storage record motor at encounter-science
turn-on would be indicative of some anomaly aboard the
spacecraft. Several causes for this situation could be
postulated.
Continuous running of the tape. As long as the EaT
circuit was operative it would generate a pulse for data
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encoder Event Register 3. This event was the only indi-
cation that the tape was moving while in data Mode 2.
In Mode 3, the event register status was not indicated,
but the same indications could be obtained from the
EOT and television frame bit in the DAS format. If
the recorder were allowed to run it would cycle 11z/a
tape loops/hr. There were several courses of action pos-
sible for this failure mode.
. The best procedure would be to perform a partial
recycle sequence after MT-7 with a DC-24 added
before DC-26. The pre-positioned angle would
have to be 4 deg less than optimum in clock angle.
This would allow a complete checkout of each of
the other encounter subsystems before turning them
off and would allow the scan to search to the opti-
mum angle before being stopped by NAS when
science would be turned back on. The last com-
mand of the recycle sequence, DC-25, would not
be sent until just before the calculated normal NAA
time. If the video storage subsystem operated cor-
rectly during this cycle, the normal record sequence
would take place. If the video storage subsystem
had operated as in the first cycle, the DC-26 at the
end of the record sequence would save about
9 pictures; this was the maximum possible in this
failure mode.
. Another possible procedure would be to take no
command action. As long as the EOT gave an event
every 309 sec, the video storage was known to be
running. If the tape were allowed to run until the
DC-26 after NAA, there would be more than 110
additional tape loops, all wearing on the EOT loop
foil and degrading the tape and record heads in
general. If the EOT foil were worn off or became
inoperative, it would no longer be possible to know
the state of the record motor, which would make
this course of action seem ill-advised. Without the
EOT indications in this failure mode, it could not
be determined whether the count-two-and-stop cir-
cuitry had stopped the tape, making recording im-
possible, or if the tape were still running.
Tape stopped by DAS. If the tape ran until stopped
by the DAS stop command (generated periodically
whenever NRT DAS power was on), this situation
could not be determined until the first EOT in the
record mode came up early. However, after data Mode 3
has been established, the maximum length of time from
encounter-science turn-on to the first DAS stop com-
mand could be determined. This time could be any dura-
tion up to 96 see (a maximum of less than 4 pictures
could be lost). There was nothing that could be done
about this failure mode, and, after the predicted early
EOT had passed in the record sequence, it would be
known if this failure mode existed.
Tape stopped by video storage. The tape could run
continuously until the count-two-and-stop circuit had
received two counts and stopped the record motor.
There w_re two courses of action possible.
1. The best procedure was to perform a partial recycle
as described previously. This removed the depen-
dence upon the SCR which was to reset the count-
two-and-stop circuit at the first start-record
command from the DAS. One event in data encoder
Event Register 3, about 311 sec after turn-on (and
possibly a second event 309 see later) would indi-
cate this failure mode. In this failure mode, the
recorder would record the first 9 pictures and be
switched off by the eount-two-and-stop circuit of
video storage.
2. The other course of action was to take no command
action and depend upon the SCR to reset the count-
two-and-stop circuit on the first start-record com-
mand from the DAS per design.
d. High Martian radiation levels. The presence of
high radiation levels in the near-vicinity of the planet
would have been a significant scientific discovery. That
there were radiation flux levels that could be deleterious
to proper spacecraft performance was determined by
tests conducted on hardware during the mission. The
radiation levels required to cause malfunction of space-
craft hardware which could result in the loss of television
pictures were significantly higher than the Martian ra-
diation field predicted by leading authorities in the
United States.
Most equipment, even if susceptible to high radiation
fluxes, could not be prevented from experiencing the
environment and affecting the spacecraft as it might.
One notable exception was the Canopus sensor which
could be replaced functionally with the roll gyro in the
inertial mode. Studies of Canopus sensor performance
under severe laboratory radiation conditions had indi-
cated that a large margin existed between its level of
susceptibility and the highest anticipated radiation flux
level at Mars. On the basis of these tests it was felt that
to switch to the gyro inertial mode was unwarranted
because this action would subject the spacecraft to an
unknown risk for which sufficient justification did not
exist.
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Analysis of the conditions which had warranted the
turn-on of the gyro inertial mode showed that at least
one of the following criteria must be satisfied:
1. The magnetic dipole moment of Mars must be at
least an order of magnitude higher than that of
the Earth.
2. Significant deviations from the anticipated model of
a planetary trapped radiation belt must be observed
during the approach to the planet.
3. Roll control via the Canopus sensor would be lost.
Criteria 1 and 2 would be reported by the SSAC en-
counter analysis personnel. Criterion 3 would be most
readily noted by the analysis of the downlink RF signal
levels by the SPAC telecommunications personnel.
e. Enigmatic loss of radio signal during encounter.
The approach taken to regain the RF signal after an
enigmatic loss was based on a single subsystem failure.
After the Mariner Mars 1964 spacecraft had operated
successfully for approximately 5700 hr the probability
was very small that the exciter, power supply, or power
amplifier for the radio subsystem would fail at the same
time as the attitude control subsystem. Based on that
assumption the following procedure was developed.
The station that had been transmitting to the space-
craft would transmit DC-8, DC-7, and DC-8 in that
order at 2-min intervals. This procedure would take only
5 min to accomplish and would allow the determination
of whether it was a radio-induced problem. If it was a
radio subsystem failure associated with the exciter, the
first DC-8 would transfer the redundant exciter on line
in place of the failed one and the RF signal would re-
appear for 4 min until the second DC-8 switched the
failed exciter back on, If it was a power amplifier fail-
ure, the DC-7 would transfer to the redundant power
amplifier and the RF signal would be regained. The last
DC-8 would switch the first exciter back on line. If noth-
ing had been wrong with the first exciter, it would be
desirable to leave the first one on line, as a high degree
of confidence had been built up in this unit over the
duration of the mission.
If the enigmatic loss of RF signal was caused by an
attitude control loss of star reference instead of a radio
subsystem problem, the first three commands would
probably not have any effect on the state of the space-
craft. The spacecraft would be receiving on the low-gain
antenna with a boost of 8--10 db at encounter from the
interferometer effect 22 until roll control was lost. This
would be desirable since, ff it were a radio problem, the
first three commands should provide that information; ff
it were an attitude control problem, the 100-kw station
would be required to correct it. The 100-kw station pro-
vided the necessary increase in power to make the space-
craft capable of receiving commands in other than
Canopus-referenced roll control. The procedure allowed
the transmission of the first three commands followed by
a station transfer to DSIF 13 immediately. After trans-
fer, DSIF 13 would transmit for 10 min at the correct
frequency and then apply command modulation for
20 min before the next command exercise would take
place. During the last few minutes (two-way transmis-
sion time would be approximately 24 min) the results of
the radio commands would be determined before com-
mitting to the attitude control command sequence.
Several different plans were suggested for the next
sequence. The plan chosen appeared to be the most
reliable and required the shortest overall time to per-
form: transmit DC-26 three times at 2-rain intervals. This
would reduce the power demand upon the solar panels
to the point where the gyro turn-on transient would not
throw the spacecraft into the power sharing mode even
if the battery had failed. The Canopus sensor design
engineer and the Guidance and Control Cognizant Engi-
necr felt that the most likely loss of Canopus would be
the result of reflected light from a dust particle. Due
to the velocities with which these particles moved, the
sensor could stay locked onto this reflected light for a
short time before it moved out of the sensor's field-of-
view. At this stage, DC-15 (Canopus gate override)
would still be in effect so that the sensor would acquire
many times as many objects in the DC-15 configuration
as in the DC-19 configuration; therefore, the sensor
would lock on a star after a few degrees of search. The
Milky Way and the star Achernar are at 25-35, and
320-322 deg dock angle, respectively; each is acquirable
by the sensor in the DC-19 configuration. It was very
unlikely that the sensor would not acquire these stars.
Due to these considerations, a sector search of ___40 deg
promised a relatively high probability of regaining the
RF signal in the shortest time.
The command DC-18 would then be transmitted to
turn the gyros on and place the roll gyro in inertial
control. This would be followed every 30 see for 9 min
(18 commands plus the first one for a total of 19) by
another DC-18. Each of these commands would move
2_Near encounter, the bore sight of the high-gain antenna was along
the Earth-spacecraft vector.
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the spacecraft approximately 2.25 deg in the positive
clock angle direction. Then DC-21 would be transmitted
at 30-see intervals until the RF signal reappeared, or
124 commands maximum were sent. If this sequence
were used just before the picture record part of the
Mars encounter, the encounter science could be turned
back on with a DC-25 afte_ 71 of the last series of
DC-21s had been transmitted. This would allow the scan
search mode to deteot the planet without being forced
through a limit switch for the remaining DC-21s. When-
ever the RF signal was observed, the transmission of
DC-21s would be diseorrtinued at that time and the num-
ber of commands in transit calculated. Three would be
subtracted from that number, and using the difference
as the number of DC-18s required, the commands would
be sent at 30-sec intervals. Approximately 24 min after
the sequence was completed, the RF signal should be
back on the peak of the high-gain antenna pattern,
Fig. 63. If not, one DC-21 or DC-18 would be required,
depending on whether or not the peak had been reached.
The spacecraft would remain on inertial roll control
through the Earth occultation period and afterward,
until the appropriate group could evaluate the data asso-
ciated with the enigmatic loss and the new data of space-
craft performance after reacquiring the signal before
committing the spacecraft to any particular attitude con-
trol mode for the duration of the mission.
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Fig. 63. Mariner IV high-gain antenna pattern v$ clock
angle for 39.5-deg cone angle
The time from the end of the Mars picture recording
sequence to the beginning of the Earth occultation was
calculated to be 83 min. This period would be long
enough to transmit 118 DC-21s if needed, 2_ plus the two-
way transmission time and time to send the correcting
DC-18 if needed. 24 It could take nearly 10 rain in the
worst ease for the pre-positioned scan subsystem to find
the planet.
The time from NAS to the start of picture record-
ing would be 0-204 sec. The time required to record
the pictures would be approximately 25 min. Dur-
ing the recording period, it would be desirable to
discontinue the roll exercise. If the roll were not discon-
tinued, after the NAS had been given, the scan head
would stop its planet tracking and the television field-
of-view would be rotated off the planet. This condition
very possibly could produce from no pictures of Mars
to a-very-unlikely four pictures of Mars. To get the four
pictures, the spacecraft would have to be rolling in the
eorreet direction across the diameter of the planet, and
to start the recording sequence in the shortest time pos-
sible after NAS; the product of the three probabilities is
a very small number. Thus, if the reacquiring exercise
had progressed to the point where it could be completed
before occultation with this added 37 min, then DC-25
would be sent at that time to start the sequence, fol-
lowed 37 min later by the rest of the DC-21s. In the case
where there was not sufficient time to complete reac-
quisition before occultation, then DC-25 would be sent
at 0017 GMT and the DC-21s continued. This would
only cost 30 sec for the command and might record one
or more pictures of Mars which could be played back
after the RF signal was reacquired.
Another approach to the problem of reacquiring in the
shortest time would be to send a series of DC-21s or
DC-18s without doing the sector search. This would
require 160 commands or 80 min to send all the com-
mands on 30-see centers plus 24 rain for two-way trans-
mission time (total 104 min) to do a complete 360 deg
search. This was shorter than the complete sequence
time for the former plan; 25 however, it was felt that the
probability of finding the RF signal during sector search
was quite high and this only would take 46.5 min, a
much shorter time.
"Started so the first one arrived at 0049 GMT, the end of the pic-
ture recording, which was transmitted at 0087.
_'This is equivalent to 70 DC-21s and 48 DC-18s or any combina-
tion between the 118 to 70 and 0 to 49 as needed.
_A total of 132.5 rain compared with 104 min.
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Another approach studied was that of sending DC-19
and then using a series of DC-21s as roll override com-
mands. In this plan, the spacecraft could complete a
360 deg search in as little as 44.5 min or as much as
62 min if a command arrived exactly each time the
spacecraft tried to acquire a celestial object. One draw-
back of this plan was that because there was no telem-
etry being received on Earth, the roll rate would not be
known, and it could be at, or any place between, these
two values. This plan required observing the RF signal
and sending DC-18 30 min later. This should stop the
spacecraft between the extremes of where it could be.
After waiting for the two-way time, it would be known
which way to rotate the spacecraft. If the RF signal was
passed, the number of degrees to back up could be calcu-
lated fairly accurately. However, if the signal were not
reached it could be as much as 54 deg away. This would
require an iterative process to again get the RF signal
which over all probably would require more time than
the aceepted plan.
F. Post-encounter Planning
1. General
Planning for the post-encounter phase of the mission
consisted of determining, evaluating, and selecting those
activities which were to be attempted before the com-
munications threshold with the spacecraft was reached.
The activities under consideration were those which
were needed to prolong communications with the
spacecraft during 1965, to enhance the reacquisition
of the spacecraft in 1967, and to exploit the utility of the
Mariner IV as an engineering test instrument subsequent
to the achievement of the primary mission objectives.
The basic ground rules utilized to make decisions
relative to the post-encounter activities were that the
accepted activity had to: 1) provide enhancement of
the data already received; 2) protect the accumulation
of a maximum amount of deep space science data in
1965, or 3) enhance the possibility of reacquiring the
spacecraft in 1967. Special spacecraft tests which did not
jeopardize the successful achievement of the above ob-
jectives were also permissible. The final decisions as to
which activities were to be conducted rested with the
Mariner Project Manager.
2. Operations
a. Maneuver inhibit sequence. With the acceptance of
the ground rule that any operations performed on the
spacecraft should enhance the possibility of acquiring
the spacecraft in 1967, a maneuver inhibit sequence and
a switch of the transmitter to the low-gain antenna were
proposed. The maneuver inhibit sequence was designed
to protect the spacecraft against a possible but unlikely
failure in the CC&S that could, under normal spacecraft
conditions, start a maneuver sequence. The maneuver
inhibit sequence involved transmitting four commands
to the spacecraft. The transmission of one of the four
commands would disconnect the attitude control sub-
system from the CC&S subsystem, thereby disabling the
CC&S command capability to the attitude control sub-
system. The other three commands would load minimum
turns and motor-burn times into the CC&S maneuver
shift registers as an added precaution. In this manner,
even if a maneuver were somehow started by the CC&S
it would have a minimum effect on the spacecraft atti-
tude. In fact, the spacecraft could immediately reacquire
the Sun after a minimum duration pitch turn was exe-
cuted with no loss of solar power during the exercise.
In making the decision to execute the maneuver in-
hibit sequence, the advantages and risks taken in trans-
mitting the ,proposed commands had to be evaluated.
The risk involved in carrying out the maneuver sequence
was that of the very remote possibility that the com-
mands would be improperly interpreted by the space-
craft. The advantage was that the spacecraft would be
protected from a maneuver sequence pitching the space-
craft solar panels away from the Sun which would occur
if the maneuver dock were inadvertently enabled and
the command sequence had not been sent. The space-
craft was designed so that the battery supplied the
necessary power when the spacecraft was not Sun-
oriented, However, the telemetry indications were that
the battery voltage, which had been rising throughout
most of the flight, was excessively high, indicating a
possible battery failure. If the battery indeed had failed,
a maneuver sequence would then be catastrophic. It was
also anticipated that prior to reacquisition of the space-
craft in 1967, the capability of even a reasonably charged
battery would have degenerated to the point where a
disorientation from the Sun could not be tolerated.
Therefore, the maneuver inhibit sequence of erie direct
and three quantitative commands was approved and
successfully transmitted to the spacecraft on August 26,
1965.
b. Canopus cone-angle update. The second post-
encounter command activity consisted of updating the
Canopus sensor cone angle. With the spacecraft still
operating 44 days after encounter, the star Canopus was
about to move out of the Canopus sensor field-of-view.
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So that roll stabilization, necessary for the proper high-
gain antenna orientation, could be maintained and there-
by enable further communications with the spacecraft,
the Canopus sensor cone angle had to be updated. For,
as the celestial longitude of the spacecraft changed as
it orbited the Sun, the Canopus sensor field-of-view also
had to be changed to keep the star Canopus in view.
The required cone angle was available to the Canopus
sensor only by ground command. Because the cone angle
required to maintain Canopus acquisition 44 days after
encounter was not required to carry out the Mars
mission of Mariner IV, this cone angle was not included
in the automatic updating sequence of the sensor by
the CC&S. Therefore, on August 27, 1965, a DC-17
(change cone angle) command was transmitted to the
spacecraft. The DC-17 command stepped the Canopus
sensor cone angle to the next position, i.e., option num-
ber one. This allowed Canopus acquisition until March
of 1966.
A continuing Canopus sensor updating sequence was
proposed when an analysis of the communication require-
ments showed that the Mariner IV spacecraft could be
tracked around the Sun using the DSIF 13 100-kw
transmitter and the DSIF 14 210-ft parabolic antenna.
With the ability to track the spacecraft around the Sun,
the Mariner IV transmitter could be used as a planetary
beacon. With the spacecraft acting as a beacon as it
travelled around the Sun, periods of two-way doppler
data could be used to refine the estimates of the astro-
nomical unit (AU) and the ephemerides of Earth and
Mars. Also, a better understanding of the nature and
magnitude of the long term forces that act on a space
vehicle such as solar pressure, meteoroid impacts, aaad
attitude control forces could be gained by tracking the
Mariner IV around the Sun. Since the solar pressure and
attitude control forces act along the pitch, roll, and yaw
axes of the spacecraft, attitude must be known to make
a meaningful analysis of these forces. The forces acting
on the spacecraft also affect the orbit of the spacecraft;
therefore, knowledge of the spacecraft attitude is neces-
sary before a high degree of confidence can be placed
in the AU and ephemerides measurements made using
the Mariner IV. Sun orientation presents no operational
problem. But, the maintaining of Canopus acquisition
continually as the spacecraft orbits the Sun requires
updating the Canopus sensor cone angle. Therefore, a
continuing Canopus sensor updating sequence was pro-
posed that, if successful, would update the Canopus
sensor cone angle at the proper times so that the space-
craft could maintain Canopus acquisition. Because of
the knowledge that the spacecraft could be used to
increase the accuracy of certain astrodynamic parameters,
post-encounter planning was slanted not only toward
obtaining maximum science data and reaequiring the
spacecraft in 1967, but also toward using the spacecraft
as a planetary beacon.
The Canopus sensor update sequence required that
DC-17 (change cone angle) commands be transmitted to
the spacecraft at particular points in time. To determine
when the commands should be sent, a plot of Canopus
cone angle as a function of time was matched with the
available Canopus sensor cone angle increments, Fig. 64.
Using the information from the plots, it was then pos-
sible to select the times that the Canopus sensor cone
angle must be changed so that continuous lock could
be maintained on the star Canopus.
The Canopus sensor update sequence along with the
time schedule for the transmission of the DC-17 com-
mands through 1966 and 1967 were presented to the
Mariner Project Manager. The Project Manager ac-
cepted the Canopus sensor cone angle update plan and
approved the transmission of the required DC-17 com-
mands. Between August 1965 and December 1967 a total
of sixty DC-17 commands will be required to step the
sensor cone angle to the required values. These sixty
commands would be transmitted during sixteen dif-
ferent time periods, with as many as seven consecutive
DC-17 commands required during some updates to set
the cone angle at the required value.
Because the implementation of the Canopus sensor
update sequence would require the use of the experi-
mental DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter, the proposed plan
was accepted with the knowledge that conflicts could
develop between normal DSIF 13 activities and mainte-
nance and the transmission of the required DC-17 com-
mands. Because there are overlaps between each of the
Canopus sensor cone angle increments, on the order of
a month or longer, the time for the transmission of the
DC-17 commands earl be adjusted so there is minimum
haterference with the regular station schedule. It should,
therefore, be possible to fit the transmission of the re-
quired DC-17 commands into the DSIF schedule so that
the sensor cone angle can be updated as required dur-
hag the orbit of the spacecraft about the Sun.
Also of concern during Canopus sensor cone angle up-
dates was the availability of the 210-ft antenna. Use of
the 210-ft antenna made it possible to verify that twg-
way RF lock could be obtained with the spacecraft for
the DC-17 command exercises. With the knowledge that
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two-way lock could be established, there was greater
confidence in the ability of the spacecraft to receive the
cemmand messages.
c. Television haze calibration. In addition to the oper-
ational sequences proposed and carried out with the
Mariner IV during post-encounter, a second television
recording sequence was also proposed, in which would
be satisfied the ground rule of enhancing data already
received; it was therefore approved and carried out. The
purpose of the second television recording sequence was
to provide additional data on the dark response of the
camera subsystem. The response of the camera to dark
space and data gathered from laboratory tests was to
be used in interpreting the haze or fogging observed
in the Mariner pictures. The recording sequence required
the transmission of eleven commands. The command se-
quence used to perform the second television record
sequence, with a brief description of each command, is
presented in Table 37.
Initially, the second television recording sequence was
scheduled at a period in time when the television camera
ceuld be positioned to look at a first-magnitude star. The
first attempt to conduct a second television recording
sequence was scheduled when the star Altair (visual
Table 37. Television haze calibration
Command
DC-25
DC-3
DC-2,¢
DC-16
DC-2
DC-26
DC-22
DC-4
DC-28
DC-26
DC-2
Sequence
Turns on encounter science, the television camera, video
storage, and the scan platform motor.
Switches the data encoder to Mode 3, all science data.
Inhibits the scan drive motor.
Starts the record sequence.
Switches the data encoder to Mode 2 as a backup to the science
data automation subsystem command to Mode 2.
Turns off all science power and the 400-cps single-phase power
to the video storage record motor and the scan subsystem drive
motor.
Switches video storage tape tracks.
5witches the data encoder to Mode 4, the picture playback
mode.
Turns off the 2.4-kc power to the video storage playback
electronics end turns on the battery charger.
Turns off the battery charger at this time for science power
is already off.
Turns on cruise science and switches the data encoder to
Mode 2.
magnitude 0.80) was in the field-of-view of the camera.
However, DSIF station problems developed early in
the required command sequence and the operation had
to be terminated. When the operation was finally re-
scheduled, no stars of sufficient brightness were in the
field-of-view of the camera. Therefore, the second re-
cording sequence television pictures were taken of black
space.
The television recording sequence was initiated by a
DC-16 command timed, using the Mode 3 data, so that
each of the first five pictures would be taken at a differ-
ent camera gain setting. In this way, all five of the cam-
era gain levels could be checked by playing back just
the first five pictures recorded during this seoond record-
hag sequence. Because the video storage subsystem was
turned off just before the EOT foil, after the second
encounter data playback, only one track of data was
recorded on the second television recording sequence
before the second EOT was reached and the video
storage record motor inhibited. Recording black space
data on only one track of the recorder left encoun-
ter da_t available from the other track for some possible
future playback requirements. A DC-22 command was
required to transfer the video storage subsystem to the
track containing the black space data. The playback
sequence was initiated using a DC-4 command. After
the first five pictures taken during the second re(x_rd
sequence were played back, the video storage subsystem
was turned off and the spacecraft cruise configuration
re-established using DC-28, -26, and -2 commands.
d. Mission Phase I termination. The final act of post-
encour_ter was the transmission of a DC-12 (receive low.
gain antenna, transmit low-gain antenna) cemmand. The
transfer of the spacecraft to the omni-antenna had a dual
purpose: 1) it put the Mariner IV in the best condition
to act as a planetary beacon; 2) it put the Mariner IV in
the optimum condition for reacquisltion of telemetry
data in mid-1967. The transfer of the spacecraft from the
transmit high- to the transmit low-gain ar_terma occurred
on October 1, 1965 when the telemetry data bit-error
rate was such that reasonable data acquisition was no
longer feasible. The transmission of the DC-12 command
was defined as the end-of-mission. For with the Earth-
spacecraft distance and the high-gain antenna pointing
error causing the ground received signal level to exceed
the communication capability of the DSN, receipt of
telemetry data will not be feasible until mid-1967 when
the Earth-spacecraft distance is compatible with the
reception of telemetry information using the spacecraft
low-gain antenna.
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3. Testing
In addition to the operational sequences proposed and
carried out with the Mariner IV during post-encounter,
twelve tests were also proposed that would use the
Mariner IV as an engineering test instrument. Of
the twelve post-encounter tests proposed, six were ap-
proved. Of the six tests approved, none required the
transmission of commands to the spacecraft.
a. Approved spacecraft tests. Two of the approved
tests were to evaluate the radio subsystem and two were
to evaluate the command subsystem onboard the space-
craft. The primary reason these tests were approved,
other than the fact they generated valuable data, was
that they required no commanded change of state by the
spacecraft and therefore could not jeopardize the re-
maining objectives of the Mariner IV. A discussion con-
cerning the spacecraft radio and command tests follows.
Command threshold. This test was designed to mea-
sure, within the ability of the telemetry system of the
spacecraft, the command subsystem threshold level.
The information obtained would be used to determine
if there had been any significant degradation in the
spacecraft command subsystem since launch.
The test was performed by applying command modu-
lation and locking-up the command receiver of the
spacecraft. With the command receiver in lock, the RF
carrier was modulated with a 50-kc signal. The modula-
tion level of the signal was adiusted to give the desired
RF carrier signal level. The RF carrier was decreased
urLtil the command receiver dropped lock. The RF car-
rier level at which the command receiver dropped lock
was called the command threshold.
Command o_set. This test was designed to measure
the command subearrier frequency offset that gives the
minimum time to acquire command lock. The frequency
offset obtained from this test could then be compared
with the value obtained before launch. The comparison
of these two numbers could be used to determine
whether any changes had occurred in the command sub-
system since launch. Also as determined by this test, ff
any change had occurred in the minimum lock time fre-
quency offset the new value for the offset could be used
when locking up the command subsystem during future
command exercises.
This test was performed by offsetting the command
carrier frequency at some predetermined value. Then
command modulation was applied to the ground trans-
mitter and the time of application noted. The spacecraft
telemetry was monitored to determine when the space-
craft command subsystem obtained lock. Subtracting the
two-way transmission time from the time duration be-
tween the application of command modulation and the
telemetry indication of command lock gave a close ap-
proximation of the command subsystem lock time.
Spacecraft receiver threshold. This test was designed
to measure, within the ability of the spacecraft telem-
etry system, the radio subsystem threshold level. The
information obtained would be used to determine if
there had been any significant degradation during the
mission in the spacecraft radio subsystem.
The test was performed by modulating the RF carrier
with a 10-kc signal. The spacecraft radio was phase-
locked with the ground transmitter. The ground trans-
mitter signal level at the carrier frequency was then
varied by varying the modulation level of the 10-kc sig-
nal. The level of the signal at the carrier frequency was
decreased until the spacecraft receiver dropped lock.
The RF carrier signal level at which the spacecraft re-
ceiver drop_ lock was called the receiver threshold.
Spacecraft receiver SPE. This test was designed to
measure the static phase error over a wider range than
was obtained during normal operations. The information
obtained could be used to evaluate the operation of the
spacecraft receiver phase-lock-loop including the phase
detector and the VCO. The data obtained during this
test could be compared with similar data obtained in
the laboratory to determine if there had been any deg-
radation in the spacecraft receiver since launch.
This test was performed by offsetting the ground sta-
tion transmitter frequency, so that the desired value of
static phase error was developed. A plot of SPE vs fre-
quency could then be drawn and compared with the
similar plot obtained before launch.
b. Approved ground equipment tests. The spacecraft
radio and command tests were the only approved tests
that evaluated the spacecraft engineering subsystems, as
opposed to science subsystems. The other two approved
post-encounter tests evaluated ground equipment. To
perform these tests, all that was required was the re-
ceived signal from the Mariner IV. One of the tests used
the received signal to evaluate an operational technique
by which an increase in signal level was possible by
algebraically adding the same signal received by two
different systems. The low-level signal received from the
spacecraft during the post-encounter period was an ideal
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signal to use to study and verify certain techniques for
operating on signals near threshold. The other test used
the low-level signal from the Mariner IV to evaluate an
electronic signal-to-noise ratio estimator. Because the
proposed tests would contribute information useful to
the 1967 reacquisiti0n and were independent of space-
craft operations, except for DSIF station scheduling, the
proposed tests were approved by the Mariner Project
Manager. A brief discussion about each of the tests
follows.
Signal-to-noise ratio estimator (SNORE). The SNORE
is an electronic device that could be calibrated to give
direct readouts of the signal-to-noise ratio of a Mariner
Mars 1964 type modulated signal. With the received
signal from the Mariner IV as the input to the SNORE,
signal-to-noise measurements of the spacecraft-received
signal could be made. The information obtained from
monitoring the Mariner signal with the SNORE was
useful for determining operational procedures for the
projected 1967 reacquisition. For example, would it be
necessary to use the spacecraft high-gain antenna in 1967
to obtain useful telemetry data? If it were necessary to
use the high-gain antenna for telemetry acquisition in
1967, the gyro mode of spacecraft attitude stabilization
would be required so that the high-gain antenna could
be pointed toward Earth. Operating the spacecraft on
gyro control, the SNORE could be used to determine
when the peak point of the high-gain antenna pattern
was reached.
Diversity. The diversity test was designed to investi-
gate the requirements of equipment and the logic of the
technique whereby a twofold increase in signal level
was possible by algebraically adding the signal, from a
common source, received by two different receiver sys-
tems. The tests were conducted at the Goldstone,
California station using Stations DSIF 11 and DSIF 12.
Information obtained from the diversity tests could
have a significant effect on the operational requirements
of the Mariner IV 1967 reacquisition. The proposed
Mariner IV 1967 telemetry acquisition period could be
extended by proving the operational feasibility of the
diversity technique. Also, the success of the diversity
tests could eliminate any requirement for transferring
to the spacecraft high-gain antenna for telemetry data
acquisition in 1967.
c. Spacecraft tests not approved. In the early stages of
post-encounter planning, before the ground rules were
clearly established, the majority of the post-encounter
proposals involved exercising the redundant features of
the spacecraft. Also, proposals were made to activate
those elements on the spacecraft, such as the ranging
receiver and the receive-via-high-gain-antenna elements,
that had not been activated during the pre-encounter,
encounter activities.
All of the tests to check out redundancy or activate
equipment aboard the spacecraft not previously used
were disapproved by the Project Manager. One of the
reasons for the decision not to change the state of
the spacecraft, i.e., to cheek out redundancy or unused
subsystems, was a reluctance to transfer to a unit or sub-
system that had no flight history. There was the possi-
bility that an unused subsystem might have suffered a
component failure while in its standby condition, because
the redundant elements of the spacecraft had not been
activated previously during the mission. The possibility
of a transfer from a functioning unit to a failed standby
unit weighed heavily on the decision not to check out
the spacecraft redundancy. Another faoto_ to consider,
when changing the spacecraft operating state, was that
of power transients. The fact that power transients could
cause or contribute to component failures made it desir-
able to keep power transients aboard the spacecraft to a
minimum. Because any change of state required of the
spacecraft would result in power transients and the acti-
vation of previously unused components, the disadvan-
tages of spacecraft changes of state had to be weighed
against the advantages when making a decision to check
out the redundant and unused elements of the space-
craft. The decision was that a gain in knowledge suffi-
cient to counter the risks involved would not be obtained
by exercising previously unused elements of the space-
craft.
The six tests proposed to check out certain unused
elements of the Mariner IV spacecraft, with a brief dis-
cussion about each test, are listed below.
Second trajectory-correction maneuver. The purpose of
this test was to investigate the storage and restart capa-
bility of a liquid propellant propulsion system after long
term storage in a space environment. A second motor
burn using the Mariner IV would represent the only
opportunity to gain experience in firing a rocket engine
after it had been stored a long time in space, prior to
the Voyager missions. It was possible that for a slight
risk to the spacecraft, information about degradation of
components due to radiation, mierometeoroid penetra-
tions, 0-g, thermal gradients, and space vacuum could be
obtained by igniting the midcourse mote a second time
during post-encounter. Because monopropellant h_dra-
zinc propulsion systems similar to that on Mariner IV
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undoubtedly have future space applications, e.g.,
Voyager, the information obtained during a second tra-
jectory eorreetion could contribute to the design philos-
ophy of future space missions.
Another fact considered when disapproving this test
was that a second maneuver would disturb the space-
craft orbit. Although a second maneuver could reduce
the Earth-probe distance, at closest approach, by 5 mil-
lion km, and thereby could increase the communication
tolerance in 1967, the disturbance to the trajectory would
degrade the tracking data accumulated from launch to
the second maneuver. As mentioned earlier data gener-
ated by tracking the spacecraft around the Sun could be
used to improve the estimates of the ephemerides of
Earth and Mars and the AU; it was decided that this
possibility was more important to future missions sueh
as Voyager than the information gained by a second
maneuver.
Redundancy exercises. This test was to determine if
long term storage in a space environment affected the op-
erations of electronic components. By activating the re-
dundant elements of the spacecraft that had not been
activated during most of the flight, such as ADC/PNG B,
the RF cavity amplifier, and RF exciter B, some of the
effects, if any, of long term storage in deep space could
be detected.
The test involved transferring the spacecraft to those
redundant elements, listed above, that could be switched
by ground command. The plan was to transfer to a back-
up unit, evaluate the spacecraft operation, and then to
transfer back to the primary unit. By comparing the op-
erational characteristics of the unit before launch with
the characteristics determined during this test, changes
could be detected in the characteristics of the unit re-
suiting from long dormant periods in space.
Transfer of receiver to high-gain antenna. This test
was to verify the operational status of the spacecraft
when it was receiving by the high-gain antenna. Because
the spacecraft was never operated during the mission in
its receive high mode, those elements associated with
this mode were never activated. To perform this test
required the transmission of a command to the space-
craft that would transfer the radio receiver from the low-
gain antenna to the high-gain antenna. By transferring to
receive high, the antenna control circuitry and those
states of the circulator switches associated with receiving
by the high-gain antenna would be verified.
A point considered when making the decision concern-
ing this test was that the final operation to be performed
on the spacecraft was a transfer to receive low, transmit
low. Because the spacecraft was already in the
receive low mode as required to fulfill the remaining
mission objectives, the decision was not to transfer the
spacecraft to the receive high mode. Therefore, this test
was disapproved.
Ranging. Activation of the ranging receiver was pro-
posed so that ranging data could be accumulated and
used to refine the estimates of the AU. The ranging re-
ceiver was not used during the mission because of a
false-lock condition that could develop in the trans-
ponder when the ranging receiver was activated. This
anomaly was discovered late in the program. A possible
effect of the false-lock condition was that ground com-
mands could not be transmitted to the spacecraft. Oper-
ating under the assumption that the pest-encounter
activities represented the end of the mission, the risks
of a false-lock developing in the transponder were felt
to be countered by the accumulation of data that could
be used to refine the AU. However, in light of the
ground rules that were finally decided upon, this pro-
posal was disapproved.
High data rate. The proposal to switch the spacecraft
from 8½ to 33½ bps was prompted by a 1-db drop in
signal level when MT-6 (change bit rate) occurred. In-
vestigations into the reasons for the decrease in signal
level have been inconclusive. With the development of
the SNORE a more accurate evaluation of any changes
in signal level was possible.
This test would require the spacecraft to be switched
to the 33½-bps data rate by ground command. The
signal-to-noise ratio would then be evaluated using
the SNORE. Then the spacecraft would be switched
back to 8½ bps where any change in the signal-to-noise
level would be detected by the SNORE. Using the more
accurate measurements made by the SNORE, a better
evaluation of the nature and the magnitude of any
change in signal level that occurs with a change in bit
rate could be made.
Because the change to 33½ bps would increase the
bit error rate of the telemetry data and the 8½-bps rate
was required to fulfill the remaining mission require-
ments, this test was disapproved.
Inertial control mode. Initial studies concerning the
reacquisition of Mariner IV in 1967 determined that
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the Earth cone angle and the communications distance
would be compatible with an acquisition attempt in the
early part of that year. But, because of the communica-
tion distance, telemetry information could not be re-
ceived from the spacecraft unless it were transmitting
through its high-gain antenna. To use the high-gain
antenna in 1967 will require rolling the spacecraft so that
the antenna pattern will be pointed toward the Earth
for, although the spacecraft has an acceptable cone
angle, it does not have the required clock angle. To
change the spacecraft clock angle requires gyro control.
A DC-18 command could be used to turn on the gyros
and turn off the Canopus sensor. Succeeding DC-18s or
DC-21s could then be transmitted to roll the spacecraft
2.25 deg cw or ccw, respectively, and thereby position
the spacecraft to the required clock angle.
An inertial mode control test was proposed, to gain
operational experience in gyro control of the spacecraft
attitude. Performance of this test during post-encounter
before the communication tolerances were exceeded
would provide information and experience that could be
used during the 1967 acquisition attempt. The test
would consist primarily of transferring the spacecraft to
gyro control and then determining the spacecraft atti-
tude using the change in the ground-received signal
level. After the direction and magnitude of the gyro drift
rates were determined, the spacecraft attitude could be
controlled using DC-18 and DC-21 (2.25-deg roll turn)
commands.
Further investigation into the feasibility of the inertial
mode test determined that the Sun-probe distance in
early 1967 will be so great that the gyro turn-on transient
will, very probably, exceed the available solar panel
power. For not only will the power-producing capability
of the solar panels be reduced because of the large Sun-
probe distance, but also the solar panels will be exposed
to possible radiation damage between post-encounter
and a reaequisition attempt in early 1967 that will de-
crease the available solar panel power. Also, the battery
life expectancy will be exceeded by 1967 and, therefore,
no energy storage capability can be counted on from the
battery for any power transients that exceed the solar
panel capability. If the gyro turn-on transient exceeds
the available power, the spacecraft power subsystem will
be forced into a low-voltage state from which the space-
craft cannot recover. Therefore, inertial control in early
1967 will not be attempted. Thus, it was not necessary
to perform an inertial mode control test during post-
encounter in preparation for inertial control in early 1967.
The desirability of controlling the spacex_aft with the
gyros presents itself again in mid-1967. At this time
the spacecraft will be close enough to the Sun so that
sufficient solar panel power will be available to support
a gyro turn-on transient, if the panels have not suffered
extensive radiation damage. Controlling the spacecraft
roll attitude during the 1967 acquisition attempt, if sue-
cessful, can extend the acquisition period and also pro-
vide operational experience in controlling spacecraft
attitude using gyros and ground commands. The use of
gyro control, if the spacecraft is successfully acquired in
1967, will depend on the facts available and the evalua-
tion of the telemetry information received from the
spacecraft at that time.
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APPENDIX A
Chronology
Table A-I. Flight history
i
Date Time, GMT Event
November 28, 1964
i
i
I
14:22:01
14:24:15
14:24:17
14:27:00
14:27:18
14:27:21
14:27:23
14:28:14
14:30:39
15:02:53
15:04:28
15:07:09
15:07:10
15:10:10
15:15:00
15:17:35
15:19:00
15:30:57
16:59:00
17:00:28
17:00:40
17:00:53
17:04:00
17:04:i3
! 7:04:25
17:04:37
17:04:50
17:05:15
17:05:27
Liftoff
Mark 1
Mark 2
Mark 3
Mark 4
Mark 5
Mark 6
Mark 7
Mark 8
Mark 9
Mark 10
Mark 11: RF power up, cruise science on, plasma probe high voltage on, video storage launch mode
off, CC&S relay hold offj Channel F telemetry off.
Mark 12: pyrotechnics armed, separation.initiated timer started, isolation amplifier for Channel F
telemetry disabled, attitude control on.
Deploy solar panels and unlatch scan platform via separation-initiated timer.
CC&S L-1 command (deploy solar panels); observed in data at 15:15:06.
Spacecraft left Earth's shadow.
CC&S L-2 command (turn on attitude control subsystem): start Sun acquisition; observed in data at
15:19:05 GMT.
Sun acquisition complete, start of magnetometer calibrate roll.
Data encoder rate 3/4 skipped 409, 410, then reset and advanced one count. During the next few
minutes (until 1716) the plasma probe and cosmic dust detector also exhibited anomalous behavior.
Data encoder rate 1 skipped at word i19 which made science PN code start one word early.
Date encoder rate 2 reset from 208, skipping word 209.
Data encoder rate 3/4 skipped from word 411 to 400.
Data encoder rate 2 skipped position 206 from 207.
Data encoder rate 2 reset to 200 from 207, skipping 208 and 209.
Data encoder rate 3/4 reset to 400 from 401, skipping 402 through 419.
Data encoder rate 1 sync occurred one word early. Probably 100 deck reset at one of the two 8
positions in the science deck.
Data encoder rate 2 reset to 200 from 201, skipping 202 through 209.
Data encoder rate 3/4 reset to 410 from 400, skipping 401 through 409.
Data encoder rate 1 sync occurred one word eady. Again, probably 100 deck reset at 8 position.
Data encoder rate 2 reset to 200.
Data encoder rate 3/4 reset to 400q
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TableA.1. Flighthistory(cant'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
17:06:05November 28, 1964
i
I '
29
3O
17:06:17
17:06:42
17:07:06
17:07:18
17:07:43
17:07:55
17:09:28
17:11:21
17:15:33
17:16:36
17:18:29
17:19:20
17:19:33
17:i9:45
17:19:58
17:20:11
17:20:23
17:20:35
17:21:26
17:22:28
06:59:00
07:10:03
13:12:34
13:26:15
16:59:00
09:13:00
09:20:56
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
encoder rate 1 sync occurred one word early. Probably 100 deck reset at position 8.
encoder rate 2 reset to 200 from 202, skipping 203 through 209.
encoder rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
encoder rate 1 sync occurred one word early. Probably 100 deck reset at position 8.
encoder rate 2 reset to 200 from 202, skipping 203 through 209.
encoder rate 1 skipped 109 causing science PN code to occur one word early.
encoder rate 2; 200 sync not observed, but 220 occurred at 110.
encoder rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
encoder rate 1 sync occurred one word early. Probably 100 deck reset at position 8.
encoder rate 2 reset to 200 from 202, skipping 203 through 209.
encoder rate' 3/4 reset to 400 position.
encoder rate 2 skipped 208, going from 207 to 209.
encoder rate 3/4 reset to 410 position,
encoder rate 2 skipped 208, going from 207 to 209.
encoder rate 3/4 reset to 400 poslt_on.
encoder rate 2 reset to 200 from 208, skipping 209.
encoder rate 2 skipped 205, going from 204 to 206.
encoder rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
Data encoder rate 2 reset to 200 during first 9 words of engineering frame since 205 is correct but 220
occurred during 225 time indicating a reset from position 5 to 0 on rata 2.
Data encoder rate 3/4 reset to 400 position.
Data encoder rate 2 skipped position 204 but not 214 and 224. It read out 205, 214, 224. Indicates
three rate-2 decks out of step.
Data encoder rate 2 read out 206, 215, 224. Indicates three rate-2 decks out of step.
Data encoder rate 2 read out 207, 216, 226. Indicates three rate-2 decks out of step.
Data encoder rate 2 read out 208, 217, 227. Indicates three rate-2 decks out of step.
Data encoder rate 2 reset to 200, skipping 209.
Data encoder rate 2 reset to 200, i.e., 200 deck sync again.
Date encoder rate 3/4 reset to 410 position.
Data encoder rate 2 skipped position 205 and succeeding channels were incorrect until the deck
was reset at Channel 209. Channels 219 and 229 were skipped as a result of the reset.
Data encoder rate 3/4 reset, 410 skipped.
CC&5 L-3 command (transfer solar pressure vanes from erect to operate and turn on Canopus
sensor): spacecraft into roll search. Observed in data at 06:59:00 GMT.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acqulred in the vicinity of the star Markab.
Roll acquisition lost, gyros on.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acqulred the star Regulus.
CC&$ CY-1 No. I on schedule. Observed in data at 16:59:14 GMT.
DC-21 (roll override) transmiffed, gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acquired the star Naos.
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Table A-1. Flight history (cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
November 30, 1964
_r
December 1
2
_P
4
I
I
I
_f
10:45:00
10:46:00
10:57:09
10:59:38
13:41:00
02:04:41
10:09:00
11:39:05
11:45:42
13:05:00
13:10:00
13:15:00
13:45:00
14:05:00
14:35:00
14:36:31
14:47:31
14:55:52
15:22:00
15:26:32
15:32:00
15:35:08
15:36:12
15:39:19
15:57:08
16:02:00
16:06:39
16:11:20
i 6:19:08
16:19:29
16:25:08
17:54:08
22:40.-00
DC-21 transmitted. Gyros on but spacecraft telemetry did not show roll search.
Gyros off. Spacecraft had rolled slightly, acquiring star "yVelorum.
DC-21 transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acquired the star Canopus.
A sharp transient was noted in the roll position telemetry. Some cross-coupling into pitch and yaw
was observed. The transient was not severe enough to cause the loss of Canopus acquisition.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
Canopus acquisition lost, gyros on. Telemetry indicated a clockwise (cw) roll. 5ter intensity
increased to the high gate level, then dropped immediately to about 0.3 times Canopus. Reacquisition
of Canopus occurred and the gyros went off normally.
CC&S CY-1 No. 2 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:39:10 GMT.
Absorptivity standard pollshed-aluminum sample stepped as expected.
QC-I-1 (pitch turn duration and polarity) transmitted.
QC-1-2 (roll turn duration and polarity) transmitted.
QC-I-3 (motor burn duration) transmitted.
DC-29 (first maneuver arm) transmitted.
DC-14 (release maneuver inhibit) transmitted.
DC-27 (start rnidcourse maneuver) transmitted.
Approximately 52 sac after the execution of DC-27 by the spacecraft, roll acquisition was lost and
the spacecraft went into roll search. As a result, the maneuver attempt was aborted by ground
command.
DC-13 (inhibit maneuver) transmitted. Spacecraft in normal roll search.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acquired a non-Canopus star.
DC-21 (roll override) transmitted. Gyros on.
Gyros off, spacecraft acquired another non-Canopus star after an estimated 3-deg roll.
DC-21 transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
Aborted pitch-turn start indication. Observed in data at 15:35:11 GMT.
Gyros off, spacecraft acquired a third non-Canopus star. Virtually n9 position change.
Aborted pitch-turn stop indication. Observed in data at 15:39:24 GMT.
Aborted roll-turn start indication. Observed in data at 15:57:15 GMT.
DC-21 transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
Gyros off, spacecraft acquired another non-Canopus star after about 4-deg roll.
Aborted roll-turn stop indication. Observed in data at 16:11:32 GMT.
Aborted motor-bum start indication. Observed in data at 16:19:18 GMT.
Aborted motor-bum stop indication. Observed in data at 16:19:31 GMT.
CC&5 maneuver relay reset and Sun reacquisltion started. Observed in data at 16:25:11 GMT.
Midcourse counter overflow. Observed in data at 17:54:15 GMT.
DC-21 (roll override) transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
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Date Time, GMT
December 4, 1964
i
I
I P
6
_r
22:44:32
23:04:00
23:05:00
23:06:00
23:28:28
23:39
23:40:00
23:52:07
23:57:00
23:58:00
00:02:44
06:19:09
13:05:00
13:10:00
13:15:00
13:45:00
14:05:00
14:25:00
15:25:10
15:28:53
15:47:11
16:01:20
16:09:11
16:09:31
16:15:11
16:21:07
16:44:36
16:52:00
16:55:00
17:44:11
02:03:04
06:21:34
09:02:14
Table A-1. Flight history (cont'd)
Event
Gyros off. Non-Canopus star acquired after 2-deg ron.
DC-21 transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
DC-21 transmitted. 5pacecraft still in roll search.
DC-21 transmitted. Spacecraft still in roll search.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acquired to the star Regulus.
Roll transient found during nonreal-time date analysis.
DC-21 transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acquired to the star Naos.
DC-21 transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
DC-21 transmitted. Spacecraft still in roll search.
Gyros off. Spacecraft roll acquired the star Canopus.
CC&S CY-1 No. 3 on schedule. (Not observed in data.)
QC-I-1 (pitch turn duration and polarity) transmitted.
QC-1-2 (roll turn duration and polarity) transmitted.
QC-1-3 (motor burn duration) transmitted.
DC-29 (first maneuver arm) transmitted.
DC-14 (release maneuver inhibit) transmitted.
DC-27 (start maneuver) transmitted. Gyros on and data encoder to Mode 1.
All axes to inertial control, start of ccw pitch turn. Observed in data at 15:25:10 GMT.
End of ccw pitch turn. Observed in data at 15:28:54 GMT.
Start of cw roll turn. Observed in data at 15:47:12 GMT.
End of cw roll turn. Observed in data at 16:01:21 GMT.
Start of motor burn. Observed in data at 16:09:12 GMT.
End of motor burn. Observed in data at 16:09:34 GMT.
CC&S maneuver relay start of Sun reacquisition. Observed in data at 16:15:12 GMT.
Sun ecqulsition complete, spacecraft in roll search.
Gyros off. Spacecraft roll acquired the star "y Velorum.
DC-21 (roll override) transmitted. Gyros on end spacecraft in roll search.
Gyros off. Spacecraft roll acquired Canopus.
Midcourse counter overflow. Observed in data at 17:44:21 GMT.
Data encoder rate 2 reset, skipped 209; 400 deck not affected. The cosmic dust detector and the
plasma probe also showed anomalous behavior. Later analysis showed a degradation in the
performance of the plasma probe beginning approximately 2 hr before the first deck skip and
continuing until after the last skip observed on December 7, at 06:48:36 GMT. All engineering
measurements were normal.
Date encoder rite 3/4 reset, skipping from 416 to 401. Implied reset before 06:21:22 GMT.
Data encoder fate 2 skipped 207, read out 208, 217, 227; 400 deck reset. Next reading 201 = 90.
Skipped 418, 419, and 400.
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TableA-1.Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
December 6, 1964
Ir
8
9
_r
lO
13
i
I'
14
16
17
I
IW
19
21
24
26
13:29:46
13:42:10
03:41:08
06:48:36
12:29:41
00:59:13
10:43
05:35:36
22:14:36
05:13:10
19:39:17
14:09:00
14:10:38
14:i9:21
20:48:27
22:51
08:59:26
05:36:15
07:16:43
16:00:00
16:06:22
17:30:00
03:39:30
22:19:34
16:59:38
20:04:04
Data encoder rate 3/4 reset, skipped 408, 409, and 410.
Data encoder rate 3/4 and rate 2 reset, skipped 209.
Data encoder rate I reset, skipped 119 and 206.
Data encoder rate 3/4 reset.
Gyros on, spacecraft in roll search. Telemetry prior to the loss of Canopus indicated that the
brightness was increasing and the tracker was seeing a large ccw error slgnal. Automatic
reacquisition to the star _/Velorum was normal.
CC&S CY-1 No. 4 on schedule. Observed in data at 00:59:14 GMT.
Roll transient found during NRT data analysis.
Gyros on, spacecraft in roll search during one sample of the roll position channel. Reecquisition
to _' Velorum was normal. Apparent on.tlme of the gyros was 200 sec.
Acquisition of the star 1' Velorum lost, gyros on. The star intensity channel showed one sample of
8-times-Canopus intensity rather than the normal 0.12 times Canopus for 1' Velorum. Reacquisition
to 1' Velorum was immediate, but the total on-time of the gyros was far shorter than normal (165 se¢
compared with a normal 200 see). Later analysis showed this to be the case whenever reecquisition
occurred within 2 sec of the initiation of search.
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped ,as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 5 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:39:25 GMT.
DC-7 (switch power amplifiers) transmitted. TWT amplifier into wermup mode and DSIF receiver
out-of-lock.
DSIF receiver back in lock; TWT in standard mode at 40.2 dbm output.
CC&S CY-1 No. 6 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:19:33 GMT.
Acquisition of the star 1' Velorurn lost, gyros on. Reacquisition was immediate, and the total on-time
of the gyros was 75 ± 2 sec.
Roll transient found during nonreal-time data analysis.
CC&S CY-1 No. 7 on schedule. Observed in data at 08:59:30 GMT.
Brightness transient noted on the Canopus intensity channel. The transient was not severe enough
to produce a violation of the high intensity gate, hence no loss of acquisition occurred.
Acquisition of the star 1' Velorum lost, gyros on. Reacquisition of 1' Velorum was normal. Total
gyro on-time was 203 sec.
DC-21 (roll override) transmitted. Gyros on and spacecraft in roll search.
Gyros off, spacecraft roll acquired the star Canopus (the roll reference had been 1' Velorum as a
result of a loss of Canopus and an automatic star reacquisition sequence).
DC-15 (Canopus gate override) transmitted.
CC&S CY-1 No. 8 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:39:39 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 9 on schedule. Observed in date at 22:19:35 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 10 on schedule. Observed in data at 16:59:48 GMT.
Recovery transient observed in roll position telemetry. The star intensity channel was not sampled at
the appropriate time to observe a possible brightnesstransient, but all indications were that one
occurred.
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Date Time, GMT
December 26, 1964
27
30
31
January 1, 1965
2
3
4
_f
5
6
7
8
9
,l
10
11
,r
12
_t
13
Ir
11:39:42
06:19:46
00:53:46
15:32:55
00:59:51
16:59:54
08:00:11
18:49:14
19:39:56
06:31:46
1! :16:27
21:35:25
14:20:01
05:01:15
16:55:53
21:53:30 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
03:42:00
09..00:06
21:48:08 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
03:37:14
21:42:10 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
03:36:24
06:24:27
21:36:00 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
03:27:00
03:40:11
Table A-1. Flight history (cont'd)
Event
Changes in TWT helix current were noted throughout the day. In general the changes involved an
increase of 0.4 to 0.5 me. Discussion with the vendor and with the cognizant personnel for the
Telstar satellite indicated that this was a normal, though little understood, phenomenon of TWT
amplifiers.
CC&S CY-1 No. 11 on schedule. Observed in data at ! 1:39:53 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 12 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:19:50 GMT.
Recovery transient observed in roll position telemetry. No brightness transient observed. Recovery
was normal.
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 13 on schedule. Observed in data at 00:59:59 GMT.
CC&S MT-6 command (switch bit rates) transferred, telemetry rate to 81h bits/sec (bps).
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped as expected.
Recovery transient observed in roll position telemetry. No brightness transient was observable.
CC&S CY-1 No. 14 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:40:03 GMT,
Absorptivity standard alumlnum-sillcon sample stepped.
Recovery transient observed in roll position telemetry, hlo brightness transient was observable.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 Ho. 15 on schedule. Observed in date at 14:20:17 GMT.
Recovery transient observed in roll position telemetry. No brightness transient was observable.
Absorptivity standard aluminum-silicon sample stepped as expected.
Ho telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&S CY-1 No. 16 on schedule. Observed in date at 09:00:26 GMT.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped es expected.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&S CY-1 No. 17 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:40:56 GMT.
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Table A-1. Flight history (cont'd)
Dote Time, GMT Event
January 13, 1965 14:13:51
15
16
18
20
21
23
24
27
29
February 1
_r
4
r
7
I r
8
I
_p
22:20:16
05:44:55
17:00:21
23:46:00
05:59:24
11:40:27
00:00:45
05:45:09
06:20:32
01:00:38
07:44:28
19:40:44
14:20:51
16:24
02:01:10
12:00
18:22:19
09:00:57
13:55
04:16
07:21:39
18:00:00
03:41:04
05:35:00
18:24:05 to
24:00:00
00:0_.00 to
01:29:04
02:32:56
18:19:50 to
24:00:00
A large roll position transient was observed, time correlated with science activity. Minor transien_
were observed in pitch and yaw which appear to be cross-coupling effects. A change of 1 DN was
observed in the Canopus brightness channel.
CC&S CY-1 No. 18 on schedule. Observed in data at 22:20:46 GMT.
Absorptivity standard polished-aluminum sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 19 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:00:55 GMT.
Recovery transient observed in roll telemetry. No brightness transient was observable.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 20 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:41:07 GMT.
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped as expected,
Absorptivity standard polished-aluminum sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 21 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:21:16 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 22 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:01:28 GMT.
Absorptivity standard aluminum-silicon sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 23 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:40:48 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 24 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:21:00 GMT,
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped as expected.
Spacecraft commend loop locked up. No commands were transmitted to the spacecraft. The spacecraft
command subsystem operated normally throughout the exercise.
An increase was observed in the midcourse propellant pressure. It was believed that the pressure increase
was due to incompatibility of the bladder with the hydrazine propellant. All other indications were
normal.
CC&S CY-1 No. 25 on schedule. Observed in data at 09:01:11 GMT.
Roll transient found during NRT data analysis.
Roll transient found during NRT data analysis.
Absorptivity standard polished aluminum sample stepped as expected.
A Class 2 solar flare was detected by the science instruments on board the spacecraft. There was no
indication of any effect upon the engineering subsystems.
CC&S CY-1 No. 26 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:41:23 GMT.
A large transient was observed in roll position. Disturbances were also seen in pitch end yaw.
Recovery was normal.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Absorptivity standard aluminum-silicon sample stepped as expected.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
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TableA-1. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date
February 9, 1965
_r
10
r
11
_f
12
_r
Time, GMT Event
00:00:00 to
01 :16:46
03:37:25
18:15:40 to
24:00:00
22:21:12
00:00:00 to
03:18:00
18:11:15 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
01:08:41
02:54:15
03:29:29
03:36:,13
03:53:15
03:53:15
04:15:51
04:32:39
06:54:43
06:54:43
08:59:23
09:13:51
09:30:56
10:21:20
10:27.'08
10:27:08
10:49:35
18:07:30 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
01:04:20
02:53:22
17:01:18
18:02:49 to
24:00:00
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped as expected.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 27 during DSlF 51 pass. Not observed in data.
No telemetry data; DSlF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
After an apparently normal command-loop Iockup before the start of the science cover drop exercise,
the command subsystem dropped lock. Command came back in lock at 03:00:08 GMT and performed
normally for the balance of the exercise.
DC-3 (switch to Mode 3) transmitted. Spacecraft telemetry to Mode 3.
DC-2 (switch to Mode 2) transmitted. Spacecraft telemetry to Mode 2,
DC-26 (encounter science off) transmitted. Spacecraft cruise science off, battery charger off, boost
mode enabled.
Data encoder rate 2 reset to 200 from 206 end rate 3/4 reset to 400 from 416.
DC-2 transmitted. Spacecraft cruise science on.
DC-28 (battery charger on) transmitted. Spacecraft battery charger on, boost mode disabled.
DC-25 (encounter science on) transmitted. Spacecraft encounter science on, science cover deployed,
scan platform started, battery charger off, boost mode enabled.
Data encoder rate i reset, rate 2 reset from 203 to 200, and rate 3/4 reset from 407 to 410.
DC-24 (inhibit scan) transmitted. Spacecraft scan platform stopped at 177.94 deg clock angle.
DC-28 transmitted. Spacecraft video storage 2.4-kc power off, battery charger on.
DC-3 transmitted. Spacecraft telemetry to Mode 3. Television camera shutter normal.
DC-2 transmitted. Spacecraft telemetry to Mode 2.
DC-26 transmitted. Spacecraft encounter science off, television shutter positioned, battery charger
off, boost mode enabled, cruise science off.
Data encoder rates I, 2, and 3/4 reset.
DC-2 transmitted. Spacecraft cruise science on.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Recovery transient observed in roll telemetry. No brightness transient was observable.
CC&S CY-1 No. 28 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:01:47.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
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TableA-1. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
February 13, 1965
q
14
I r
15
_P
16
If
17
_P
18
1 p
20
1 r
21
00:00:00 to
01:00:55
13:12:54
17:58:00 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:57:20
17:45:00 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:55:40
10:00:57
11:41:27
17:50:31 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:48:38
13:47:24
17:46:48 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:44:58
17:38:00 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
01:41:53
06:21:35
17:39:43 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:37:42
17:35:47 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:07:00
02:10:27
17:35:47 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:30:17
01:01:44
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
The absorptivity standard black sample stepped unexpectedly. This step was not anticipated for
about 4 wk.
No telemetry data; D$1F 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 29 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:41:59.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51. assigned to Ranger Project.
Roll transient; spacecraft recovery normal.
No telemetry data; DSlF ,51 assigned to Ranger Proiect.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 30 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:22:13.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Absorptivity standard polished-aluminum sample stepped as expected.
No telemetry data; DS|F 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project,
CC&5 CY-1 No. 31 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:02:25.
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TableA-1. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
February 21, 1965
22
23
26
27
6
7
9
10
11
'It
12
13
14
15
17:28:30 to
24:00:00
00:00:00 to
00:29:26
11:13:25
11:41:53
14:21:02
13:56
17:02:05
17:02:19
09:02:13
02:49:46
03:42:23
13:02:25
22:22:34
20:02:58
17:02:44
01:06:41
16:34:00 to
23:3 i :50
02:17:56
04:47
16:30:38 to
23:39:21
11:42:55
16:29:22 to
23:23:41
16:25:39 to
23:24:26
02:!7
16:23:07 to
23:20:00
06:23:06
16:19:36 to
23:15:30
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 converting from L-band to S-band.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 converting from L-band to S-band.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
CC&5 CY-I No. 32. Exad time of event not known because of DSIF 51 problem.
CC&S CY-1 No. 33 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:22:54.
Attitude control roll transient observed.
CC&S command MT-1 (Canopus sensor cone-angle update) on schedule. Canopus sensor cone-angle
updated from 100.2 to 95.7 deg. Observed in data at 17:02:19.
Data encoder skipped Channels 300, 400, and 420 coincident with MT-1.
CC&S CY-1 No. 34 on schedule. Apparent momentary loss of signal strength observed simultaneously
at DSIF 42 (later found to be the result of a frequency shift caused by spacecraft radio design
characteristic). Observed in data at 09:02:18.
Absorptivity standard aluminum-silicon sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 35 on schedule. Apparent 2-db, 5-sac loss-of-ground received signal observed
simultaneously (later found to be due to frequency shift caused by spacecraft radio subsystem design
characteristic). Observed in data at 03:42:32.
CC&5 MT-5 transfer spacecraft transmitter to high-gain antenna on schedule. Observed in data at
13:02:37.
CC&S CY-1 No. 36 on schedule. Observed in data at 22:22:47.
Absorptivity standard polished-aluminum sample stepped as expected.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 37 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:03:03.
Absorptivity standard black sample stepped as expected.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
Affitude control roll transient observed.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&S CY-1 No. 38 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:43:18.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Attitude control roll transient observed.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&S CY-I No. 39 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:23:34.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
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Table A-1. Flight history (cant'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
March 16, 1965
17
18
_P
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
26
29
30
31
April 2
3
4
6
7
9
11
16:16:48 to
23:26:46
16:14:59 to
23:08:58
01:03:18
01:03:50
16:11:23 to
23:07:26
00:42:28
16:09:02 to
23:03:30
16:06:00 to
23:01:25
19:43:29
16:03:00 to
22:58:20
16:01:13 to
22:55:40
14:23:41
15:58:26 to
22:51:30
15:55:00 to
22:50:19
15:53:00 to
22:48:00
09:03:54
09:16:14
03:44:06
14:03:42
22:24:19
14:24:25
17:04:32
17:07:42
11:44:45
11:10
06:24:58
06:18
08:00
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Ion chamber and associated GM 10311 tube failed during DSIF 51 pass.
CC&S CY-1 No. 40 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:03:58.
Attitude control roll transient observed.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 41 during DSIF 51 pass. Not observed in data.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&5 CY-I No. 42 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:24:24.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
No telemetry data; DSIF 51 assigned to Ranger Project.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 43 on schedule. Observed in data at 09:04:40.
Absorptivity standard polished-aluminum sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-I No. 44 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:44:07,
Absorptivity standard aluminum-silicon sample stepped 21/2days later than expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 45 on schedule. Observed in data at 22:24:25.
CC&S command MT-2 (Canopus sensor cone-angle update) on schedule. Canopus sensor cone angle
updated from 95.7 to 91.1 deg. Observed in data at 14:25:15.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 46 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:04:42.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 47 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:45:01.
Small roll transient observed.
CC&S CY-1 No. 48 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:25:19.
Small roll transient observed.
Class 2 flare detected on east limb of Sun by AGIWARN _ network.
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TableA-I. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
April 12, 1965
13
14
15
16
17
20
23
24
25
28
30
May 1
3
9
11
12
15
17
18
19
2O
01:05:12
22:21:18
19:45:26
09:55
16:20:35
09:47
13:00
14:25:40
09:05:54
03:46:09
23:47
22:26:23
17:06:38
11:46:54
06:27:09
01:07:24
17:27:25
19:47:39
05:43:15
14:27:55
09:08:09
15:44:41
03:48:24
22:53:40
21:42:57
CC&S CY-1 No. 49 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:05:38.
Absorptivity standard black sample final step observed as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 50 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:45:55.
Extremeley small roll transient observed.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped as expected.
Class 2 flare observed on east llmb of Sun by AGIWARN network.
Increased magnetic and plasma activity detected by spacecraft instruments. Possibly due to solar
storm resulting from Class 2 flare observed on Sun on April 11.
CC&S CY-1 No. 51 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:26:14.
CC&S CY-1 No. 52 on schedule. Observed in data at 09:06:33.
CC&S CY-I No. 53 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:46:53.
Roll transient observed.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 54 on schedule. Observed in data at 22:27:11.
CC&S CY-1 No. 55 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:06:41.
DSIF 51 performed blind command detector Iockup.
DSlF 11 performed blind command detector Iockup.
DSIF 41 performed blind command detector Iockup.
CC&S CY-I No. 56 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:47:02.
Spacecraft received carrier power with command modulation applied decreased below --139 dbm,
the command llnk sum of the negative tolerances.
Decreasing temperature, in conjunction with the component failure incurred on December 6, 1964,
caused plasma probe data to be declared uninterpretable. Formerly they were considered partially
recoverable.
CC&S CY-1 No. 57 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:27:21.
CC&S CY-1 No. 58 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:07:41.
CC&S command MT-3 (Canopus sensor cone-angle update) on schedule. Canopus sensor cone angle
updated from 91.1 to 86.5 deg. Observed in data at 17:28:15.
CC&S CY-1 No. 59 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:48:01.
Absorptivity standard aluminum-silicon sample stepped as expected.
CC&S CY-1 No. 60 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:2B:20.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter established command lock with spacecraft.
CC&S CY-1 No. 61 on schedule. Observed in data at 09:08:41.
Absorptivity standard polished-aluminum sample stepped earlier than expected.
CC&5 CY-I No. 62 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:49:01.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 23:33:09 GMT. The modulation index was apparently set incorrectly. Lockup
time: 12 mln. Modulation loss: 2.2 db.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:04:47 GMT. Lookup time: 6 mln. Modulation loss: 1.7 db.
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TableA-1. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Dote Time, GMT Event
May 20, 1965
23
25
26
29
June 1
2
Ir
10
11
12
14
Ir
15
16
16
17
19
20
23
22:28:40
22:52:40
17:08:55
23:00
11:49:11
06:29:27
01:09:43
22:07:06
19:49:59
18:07
19:30
14:30:15
08:00
09:10:31
11:41:05
19:54
15:40
03:50:47
18:49
15:50:57
15:53
22:31:02
07:36
10:40
11:38
21:29:47
17:11:18
04:50
11:51:34
06:31:49
21:34
CC&5 CY-1 No. 63 on schedule. Observed in data at 22:27:22.
DSIF-13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 23:38:53 GMT. Lockup time: 6 rain. Modulation loss: 3.5 db.
CC&S CY-1 No. 64 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:09:42.
A solar flare was detected by spacecraft instruments.
CC&S CY-1 No. 65 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:49:12.
CC&S CY-1 No. 66 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:29:33.
CC&S CY-1 No. 67 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:09:53.
DSIF-13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:54:59 GMT. The modulation index was apparently adiusted incorrectly.
Lockup time: 4 rain. Modulation loss: --4.7 db.
CC&S CY-1 No. 68 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:50:14.
An unusual type of solar flare was optically observed by the AGIWARN network.
The unusual solar flare was detected by the spacecraft trapped radiation detector.
CC&S CY-1 No. 69 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:30:35.
Increased magnetic activity detected by the magnetometer, probably caused by the unusual solar
flare on June 5, 1965.
CC&S CY-I. No. 70 on schedule. Observed in data at 09:10:56.
A vigorous roll transient was observed coincident with a large change in Canopus brightness and a
visible impulse on the spacecraft yaw axis.
A small roll transient was observed.
A roll transient was observed coincident with slight impulses in the pitch and yaw axes.
CC&S CY-I No. 71 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:51:16.
Small roll transient found during nonreal-tlme data analysis.
CC&S command MT-4 (Canopus sensor cone-angle update) on schedule. Canopus sensor cone angle
updated from 86.5 deg to 82 deg. Observed in data at 15:51:45.
A roll transient was observed.
CC&S CY-1 No. 72 on schedule. Observed in data at 22:31:36.
Class 2 solar flare detected by AGIWARN network.
Class 2 solar flare detected by the pn junction detectors of the spacecraft trapped radiation detector.
A small roll transient was observed.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:26:25 GMT. Lockup time: 4 rain. Modulation loss: --3.8 db.
CC&S-CY-1 No. 73 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:11:57.
A small roll transient was observed.
CC&S CY-1 No. 74 on schedule. Observed in data at 11:52:17.
CC&S CY-1 No. 75 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:31:49.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:08 GMT. Lockup time: 2 rain. Carrier suppression: 3.2 db.
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TableA-1. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Dote Time, GMT Event
June 26,1965
27
28
i
_r
3O
July 1
3
4
5
6
8
9
12
' t
13
, p
14
!
!
01:12:05
07:14
18:47
15:28
19:52:21
22:20
18:32
14:32:36
09:56
09:12:52
09:27
03:10
23:05
03:32
03:53:08
08:05
22:33:23
05:40:56
06:23:46
17:13:07
22:11
22:38
00:27
18:06
21:28
13:34
14:27:55
14:40:32.8
14:40:32.8
15:41:49
CC&S CY-1 No. 76 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:12:09.
Roll transient observed.
Roll transient observed.
DSIF 51 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 17:45 GMT. Lockup time: 10 man.
CC&S CY-I No. 77 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:52:29.
DSIF il 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 23:05 GMT. Lockup time: 16 man.
DSIF 51 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 19:55 GMT. Lockup time: 16 man.
CC&S CY-! No. 78 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:32:49.
A minor roll transient was observed.
CC&S CY-1 No. 79 on schedule. Observed in data at 09:13:10.
A minor roll transient was observed.
A minor roll transient was observed.
Class 1 4" solar flare detected by AGIWARN network.
Class 1 solar flare detected by AGIWARN network.
CC&S CY-1 No. 80 on schedule. Observed in data at 03:53:30.
Class 1"t- solar flare detected by AGIWARN network.
Not observed in data.
Minor roll transient observed.
Small roll transient observed.
CC&S CY-1 No. 82 on schedule. Observed in data at 17:13:39.
DSIF 11 lO-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:45 GMT. Lockup time: 10 man.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 00:09 GMT on July 13. Lockup time: 3 man.
DSII" 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 00:59 GMT. Lockup time: 7 man.
DSIF 11 lO-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 18:45 GMT. Lookup time: 3 man.
DSIF 51 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:43 GMT. Lookup time: 3 mln.
DSIF 51 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 19:40 GMT. Lockup time: 4 min.
DC-25 (encounter science on) transmitted.
DC-25 received at spacecraft. Encounter science turned on and scan platform in search mode.
Data encoder rate 3/4 skipped from 409 to 401.
CC&S command MT-7 (encounter science on) issued at spacecraft. No effect because encounter
science already turned on by DC-25 at 14:40:32 GMT.
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TableA-I. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
July 14, 1965
If
15
I r
14:52
15:53:40
17:10:18
17:22:55
17:34:55
21:54:19
22:10:29
22:23:07
22:35:08
23:24:12
23:42:00.3
23:55:45
00:11:57
00:16:50.1
00:17:21.1
00:18:29.6
00:22:30.3
00:24:36
00:28:23.1
00:29:22.5
00:30:31
00:30:54.3
00:31:42
00:32:40
DC-25 observed on Earth.
CC&S command MT-7 observed on Earth. Observed in data at 15:54:05.
DC-24 (inhibit scan) transmitted.
DC-24 received at spacecraft. Scan platform stopped with television camera at 178.45-deg clock angle.
DC-24 observed on Earth.
DSIF 11 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 02:19 GMT an July 15. Lockup time: 30 min.
DC-3 (transfer data encoder to Mode 3) transmitted.
DC-3 received at spacecraft. Data encoder transferred to Mode 3.
DC-3 initiated Mode 3 data observed on Earth.
Earliest possible 3-_ WAA.
WAA (scan planet-in-vlew) signal initiated at spacecraft (± 10.8 sec) when Mars
moved into the scan platform wide-angle sensor field of view. No effect because scan platform
pre-positioned by DC-24 at 17:22:55 GMT and data encoder transferred to Mode 3 by DC-3 at
22:23:07 GMT.
Probability of WAA by spacecraft equals 0.7.
DC-16 (NAA) transmitted.
Narrow-angle sensor first detected Mars' presence (___12.6 sec).
NAA at spacecraft when Mars moved into fleld-of-view of NAMG. Television
picture recording sequence started.
First DAS start tape command sent to video storage subsystem at spacecraft.
No. I Shutter 00:18:31.1
No. 2 Shutter 00:19:21.1
No. 3 Shutter 00:20:57.1
No. 4 Shuffer 00:21:45.1
No. 5 Shutter 00:23:21.1
No. 6 Shutter 00:24:09.1
False shutters or EOT signal initiated at spacecraft (±25.2 sec).
DC-16 received at spacecraft. No effect because NAA already initiated by NAMG at 00:17:58 GMT.
No. 7Shutter 00:25:45.1
No. 8 Shutter 00:26:33.1
No. 9 Shutter 00:28:09.1
No. 10 Shutter 00:28:57.1
False shutter or EOT signal initiated at spacecraft (----+-25.2sec).
NAA observed on Earth.
First DAS start tape command observed on Earth.
No. I1 Shutter 00:30:33.1
First EOT signal issued by video storage subsystem at spacecraft (±25.2 sec).
No. 12 Shutter 00:31:21.1
DC-26 (all science off) transmitted.
DC-2 No. 1 (transfer data encader to Mode 2 and turn on cruise science) transmitted.
No. 13 Shutter 00:32:57.1
No. 14 Shutter 00:33:45.1
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TableA-1. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
00:34:31.7July 15, 1965
I
I
!
!
00:36:37
00:37:00
00:40:24.5
00:42:00
00:42:55.7
00:43:45.1
00:44:21.5
00:45:19.6
00:47:00
00:49:39
00:52:00
00:54:39
00:55:46.6
00:56:23.0
00:57:00
00:57:20
00:59:39
01:00:57
01:01:40
01:04:39
01:06:40
01 .'09:39
01:11:40
01:16:40
01:21:40
02:19:11
02:31:12
03:13:04
03:25:06
False shutter or EOT signal observed on Earth.
No. 15 Shutter 00:35:21.1
No. 16 Shutter 00:36:09.1
DC-16 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 2 transmitted.
No. 17 Shutter 00:37:45.1
No. 18 Shutter 00:38:33.1
No. 19 Shutter 00:40:09.1
False shutter or EOT signal observed on Earth.
No. 20 Shutter 00:40:57.1
DC-2 No. 3 transmitted.
No. 21 Shutter 00:42:33.1
First video storage EOT signal observed on Earth.
No. 22 Shutter 00:43:21.1
Tape recorder stopped and data encoder transferred to Mode 2 by Picture 22 stop command from DAS.
DC-26 received at spacecraft. All science turned off.
DC-2 No. 1 received at spacecraft. Cruise science turned on. Data encoder already transferred to
Mode 2 by DAS Picture 22 stop command at 00:43:45 GMT.
DC-2 No. 4 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 2 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 5 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 3 received at spacecraft. No effect.
Transfer of the data encoder to Mode 2 by Picture 22 stop command observed on Earth.
DC-26 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 6 transmitted.
DC-2 No. ! observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 4 received at spacecraft. No effect.
Closest approach of spacecraft to Mars: 6118 mi.
DC-2 No. 2 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 5 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 3 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 6 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 4 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 5 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 6 observed on Earth.
Spacecraft entered Earth occultation region.
Spacecraft RF signal lost on Earth.
Spacecraft emerged from Earth occultation region.
Spacecraft RF signal reacquired on Earth.
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TableA-I. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
05:01:49July 15, 1965
I
p
16
I
i
'r
17
I
_r
18
_V
19
05:13:52
11:41:49.8
11:53:53.3
13:01:58
21:38:07
23:32:27
08:08:00
10:04:28
18:39:54
20:35:12
05:10:12
06:18
07:07:45
15:43:18
17:40:32
02:16:10
04:13:25
06:34:08
12:49:03
14:46:13
23:21:51
00:30
01:19:32
09:55:35
10:55
11:52:52
20:28:29
22:25:33
CC&S command MT-8 (encounter science off) issued at spacecraft. No effect because encounter
science already turned off by DC-26 at 00:44:21 GMT.
CC&S command MT-8 observed on schedule on Earth. Observed in data at 05:14:39.
CC&S command MT-9 and CC&S CY-I No. 83 issued on schedule at spacecraft. Data encoder
transferred to Mode 4/1, cruise science turned off, and video storage in playback mode.
Mode 1 engineering data initiated by MT-9 command observed on Earth; CC&S CY-1 No. 83
observed simultaneously. Two events were observed in data encoder event Register 2 instead of the
single event normally associated with MT-9. Observed in data at 11:53:53.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 1 data observed on Earth.
Picture 1 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 2 data observed on Earth.
Picture 2 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 3 data observed on Earth.
Picture 3 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 4 data observed on Earth.
Picture 4 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
DSIF 42 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 07:09 GMT. Lockup time: 18 min.
Mode I engineering data ended and Picture 5 data observed on Earth.
Picture 5 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 6 data observed on Earth.
Picture 6 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 7 data observed on Earth.
Predicted time for observation of CC&S command CY-1 No. 84 on Earth. The data encoder event
normally associated with CY-1 could not be observed because television picture data (Mode 4) was
being transmitted by the spacecraft; however, the frequency shift associated with CY-I when the
spacecraft is in one-way lock was reported by the DSIF station.
Picture 7 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode I engineering data ended and Picture 8 data observed on Earth.
Picture 8 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
DSIF 11 lO-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 01:19 GMT. Lockup time: 23 min.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 9 data observed on Earth.
Picture 9 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
DSIF 51 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 11:03 GMT. Lockup time: 17 min.
Mode i engineering data ended and Picture 10 data observed on Earth.
Picture 10 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering dafa ended and Picture 11 data observed on Earth.
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TableA-1. Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
July 20, 1965
i p
21
22
I
r
23
I
I
_v
24
_f
25
_r
26
03:15:32
07:01:26
08:57:42
17:33:15
19:28:51
01:14:23
04:04:32
06:01:22
14:37:00
16:34:43
01:10:21
03:07:13
11:42:53
13:40:59
22:16:37
00:15:04
08:50:41
10:48:08
19:23:48
19:35:05
19:54:38
21:21:10
05:56:50
07:55:01
16:30:40
18:28:33
19:26:33
21:21:53
05:57:54
07:53:36
16:29:15
18:24:31
03:00:09
04:56:24
First EOT signal end normal tape recorder track change occurred at Line 111 of Picture 11.
Picture 11 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 12 data observed on Earth.
Picture 12 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 13 data observed on Earth.
Predicted time for observation of CC&5 commend CY-1 No. 85 on Earth. The data encoder event
normally associated with CY-1 could not be observed because television picture data (Mode 4) was
being transmitted by the spacecraft; however, the frequency shift associated with CY-1 when the
spacecraft is in one-way lock was reported by the DSIF station.
Picture 13 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering date ended and Picture 14 data observed on Earth.
Picture 14 date ended end Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 15 data observed on Earth.
Picture 15 data ended end Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 16 data observed on Earth.
Picture 16 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 17 data observed on Earth.
Picture 17 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode i engineering data ended and Picture 18 data observed on Earth.
Picture 18 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 19 data observed on Earth.
Picture 19 data ended end Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Absorptivity standard white sample stepped.
CC&S CY-1 No. 86 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:54:40.
Mode I engineering data ended and Picture 20 data observed on Earth.
Picture 20 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 21 date observed on Earth.
Picture 21 data ended and Mode 1 engineering date observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering date ended and Picture 22 data observed on Earth.
Picture 22 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 1 date observed on Earth.
Picture 1 date ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 2 data observed on Earth.
Picture 2 data ended end Mode 1 engineering date observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering date ended and Picture 3 data observed on Earth.
Picture 3 data ended end Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode I engineering data ended and Picture 4 date observed on Earth.
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TableA-1.Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
July 26, 1965
_r
27
Ir
28
_r
29
1 r
3O
'r
31
_r
August 1
_F
13:32:03
14:34:52
15:27:47
00:03:39
02:00:57
10:36:39
12:33:01
21:08:41
23:04:57
07:40:41
09:37
18:12
20:09:57
04:45:32
06:43:10
09:15:06
11:33:27
15:19:13
17:16:43
01:51
03:46:24
12:21
14:20
22:55:28
00:52
09:27
11:24
20:02:15
21:59:57
03:55:21
06:31
08:28
17:09:00
19:07:10
Picture 4 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 87 on schedule. Observed in data at 14:34:59.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 5 data observed on Earth.
Picture 5 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 6 data observed on Earth.
Picture 6 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 7 data observed on Earth.
Picture 7 data ended and Mode I engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode I engineering data ended and Picture 8 data observed on Earth.
Pidure 8 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 9 data observed on Earth.
Picture 9 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 10 data observed on Earth.
Picture 10 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 11 data observed on Earth.
Predicted time for observation of CC&S command CY-1 No. 88. The data encoder event normally
associated with CY-1 was observed when Mode 1 data appeared at 15:19:13 GMT.
First EOT signal of second playback and normal track change observed. Extra date encoder event
was observed that was probably due to "dirty" tape foil.
Picture 11 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 12 data observed on Earth.
Picture 12 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 13 data observed on Earth.
Picture 13 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 14 data observed on Earth.
Picture 14 data ended and Mode I engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 15 data observed on Earth.
Picture 15 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 16 data observed on Earth.
Picture 16 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 17 data observed on Earth.
Predicted time for observation of CC&S command CY-1 No. 89. The data encoder event normally
associated with CY-1 was observed when Mode 1 data appeared at 06:31 GMT.
Picture 17 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode I engineering data ended and Picture 18 data observed on Earth.
Picture 18 data ended and Mode I engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 19 data observed on Earth.
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TableA-1. Flight history (cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
August 2,1965
I
Ir
3
_v
4
6
9
12
15
17
20
21
_P
03:42:33
05:40:00
14:15:27
16:14:48
00:39
02:18
02:36
03:08:33
03:14:33
03:20:33
03:22:37
03:28:37
03:28:37
03:34:37
03:36:02
03:42:02
03:48:02
22:35:36
03:32
03:42
16:17
17:16:15
11:56:04
06:36:53
22:01
01:16:32
19:56:46
14:36:08
20:04:13
22:16:00
22:22:00
22:37:21
Picture 19 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 20 data observed on Earth.
Picture 20 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 21 data observed on Earth.
Picture 21 data ended and Mode 1 engineering data observed on Earth.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmiffer locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 04:37 GMT. Lockup time: 21 rain.
Mode 1 engineering data ended and Picture 22 data observed on Earth.
DC-28 (turn off video storage 2.4-kc power and turn on battery charger) transmitted.
DC-26 (turn off battery charger) transmitted.
DC-2 (transfer data encoder to Mode 2 and turn on cruise science) transmitted.
DC-28 received at spacecraft. Video storage 2.4-kc power turned off and battery charger turned on.
Data encoder transferred to Mode 1.
DC-26 received at spacecraft. Battery charger turned off.
Data encoder rate 2 skipped from 209 to 200, then reset to 201. Rate 3/4 skipped from 408 to 410
and 308 to 300.
DC-2 received at spacecraft. Data encoder transferred to Mode 2 and cruise science turned on.
DC.28 observed on Earth.
DC-26 observed on Earth.
DC-2 observed on Earth.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 90 on schedule. Observed in data at 22:35:57.
Minor roll transient observed.
Minor roll transient observed.
Minor roll transient observed.
CC&S CY-1 No. 91 on schedule.
CC&S CY-1 No. 92 on schedule.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 93 on schedule.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter lbcked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 23:35 GMT. Lockup time: 2 rain.
CC&S CY-I No. 94 on schedule. Observed in data at 01:1_7:12 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 95 on schedule. Observed in data at 19:57:30 GMT.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 96 on schedule.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock intermittently until 21:21 GMT.
DSIF 12 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 00:15:00 GMT, August 22. Lockup time: 6 rain.
DC-25 (turn on encounter science) transmitted.
DC-25 received at spacecraft. Encounter science turned on and scan platform in search mode.
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Date Time, GMT
August 21, 1965
_r
22
r
22:37:21
22:52:04
23:20:00
23:22:00
23:28:13
23:30:13
23:32:13
23:34:13
23:35:21
23:37:21
23:39:00
23:43:34
23:44:00
23:45:34
23:47:34
23:49:00
23:49:34
23:50:05
23:52:05
23:54:00
23:54:21
23:58:18
23:59:00
23:59:21
00:00:18
00:02:18
00:04:18
00:04:21
00:09:05
00:09:21
00:14:05
00:14.:21
00:19:05
00:24:05
Table A-1. Right history (cont'd)
EYellt
Data encoder deck reset from 413 to 400.
DC-25 observed on Earth.
Shortly after DC-25 was transmitted, the spacecraft AGC began to fluctuate more widely than
normal and several out-of-lock indications were observed in the data. The cause of the anomalous
behavior was a malfunction of the DSIF 12 transmitter frequency synthesizer.
DC-28 No. 1 (turn off video storage 2.4-kc power and turn on battery charger) transmitted.
DC-26 No. 2 transmitted.
DC-26 No. 1 (turn off battery charger and all science) transmitted.
DC-26 No. 2 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 1 (turn on cruise science) transmitted.
DC-2 transmitted.
DC-28 No. 1 received at spacecraft. Video storage 2.4-kc power turned off and battery charger
turned on.
DC-28 No. 2 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 3 transmitted.
DC-26 No. I received at spacecraft. Battery charger and all science turned off.
DC-2 No. 4 transmitted.
DC-26 No. 2 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 1 received at spacecraft. Cruise science turned on.
DC-2 No. 5 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 2 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-28 No. 1 observed on Earth.
DC-28 No. 2 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 6 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 3 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-26 No. 1 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 7 transmitted.
DC-2 No. 4 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-26 No. 2 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 1 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 2 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 5 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 3 observed on Earth.
DC-2 No. 6 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 4 observed on Earth.
DC.2 No. 7 received at spacecraft. No effect.
DC-2 No. 5 observed on Earth.
DC-2"No. 6 observed on Earth.
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TableA-1. Righthistory(cont'd)
Time, GMT EventDate
August 22, 1965
23
25
26
ir
27
_P
28
30
_r
00:29:05
09:17:12
21:41:01
03:57:26
20:32:49
21:06:52
21:15:16
21:22:32
21:23:40
21:30:56
21:32:04
21:37:42
21:39:20
21:46:06
21:47:44
21:54:32
22:02:54
19:21:19
19:40:00
20:11:01
22:37:39
20._2
20:30:00
20:45:56
21:01:33
21:10:24
21:26:20
21:41:53
22:48:33
23:04:29
23:21
23:35:26
23:51:22
DC-2 No. 7 observed on Earth.
CC&S CY-1 No. 97 on schedule. Observed in data at 09:17:15 GMT.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:11:05 GMT. Lockup time: 7 rain.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 98 on schedule.
DSlF 12 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:08 GMT. Lockup time: 2 mln.
DC-13 (inhibit mldcourse maneuver) transmitted.
QC-I-I (cw 0.18-deg pitch turn) transmitted.
DC-13 received at spacecraft.
QC-1-2 (cw 0.18-deg roll turn) transmitted.
QC.I-1 received at spacecraft.
QC-1-3 (0.08-sec motor burn duration) transmitted.
DC-13 observed on Earth.
QC-1-2 received at spacecraft.
QC-I-1 observed on Earth.
QC-1-3 received at spacecraft.
QC-1-2 observed on Earth.
QC-I-3 observed on Earth,
DSIF 12 lO-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock unt;I 20:28 GMT. Lockup time: 1 rain.
DC-17 (update Canopus sensor cone angle) transmitted.
DC-17 observed on Earth.
CC&5 CY-1 No. 99 observed on schedule. Observed in data at 22:37:52 GMT.
DSIF 12 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 02:25 GMT on August 31. Lookup time: 4 mln.
DC-25 (encounter science on) transmitted.
DC-25 received at spacecraft (encounter science and scan platform power on).
DC-25 observed on Earth.
DC-3 (transfer data encoder to Mode 3) transmitted.
DC-3 received at spacecraft (data encoder transferred to Mode 3).
DC-3 observed on Earth (Mode 3 data).
DC-24 (inhibit scan) transmitted.
DC-24 received at the spacecraft (scan platform motion inhibited).
DC-24 observed on Earth (scan platform inhibited at DN 406 -----148.43 deg).
DC-16 (NAA) transmitted.
DC-16 received at the spacecraft (NAA logic actuated).
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TableA-1.Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date Time, GMT Event
August 31, 1965
q r
September 1
1 r
2
,r
00:05:00
00:06:52
00:08:19
00:20:15
00:33:05
00:36:50
00:44:00
00:49:00
00:59:56
01:04:56
01:15:14
01:20:14
01:25:00
01:40:57
01:56:16
02:00:46
10:36:38
12:30:40
17:17:52
21:06:30
23:01:03
07:37:10
09:31:40
18:07:30
20:03:20
04:39:23
05:39:49
06:17:00
06:23:00
06:29:00
06:33:05
06:34:46
06:39:05
06:45:05
DC-2 (transfer data encoder to Mode 2)) transmitted.
DC-16 observed on Earth.
First EOT observed in data.
Second EOT observed in data.
Mode 2 data observed on Earth. Data encoder transferred to Mode 2 by DAS after Picture 22.
DC-2 observed in data.
DC-26 transmiffed.
DC-22 transmitted.
DC-26 received at the spacecraft. (All science power and scan platform and video storage 400-cps
power off.)
DC-22 received at the spacecraft (video storage change tracks).
DC-26 observed on Earth.
DC-22 observed on Earth.
DC4 transmitted.
DC-4 received at the spacecraft (data encoder to Mode 4/1).
DC-4 observed on Earth (Mode 1 data).
Mode 4 data observed on Earth (Picture I).
End of Picture 1; start of Mode 1 data.
Start of Picture 2.
Predicted time for observation of CC&S command CY-1 No. 100. The data encoder event normally
associated with CY-1 was observed when Mode 1 data appeared at 21:06:30 GMT.
End of Picture 2; start of Mode 1 data.
Start of Picture 3.
End of Picture 3; start ()f Mode I data.
Start of Picture 4.
End of Picture 4; start of Mode 1 data.
Start of Picture 5.
End of Picture 5; start of Mode 1 data.
DSIF 41 10-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 07:12:00 GMT. Lockup time: 4 mln.
DC-28 transmitted.
DC-26 transmitted.
0(:-2 transmitted.
DC-28 received at the spacecraft (video storage 2.4-kc power off, battery charger on).
Start of Picture 6.
DC-26 received at the spacecraft (battery charger off).
DC-2 received at the spacecraft (cruise science power on, data encoder to Mode 2).
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TableA-1.Flighthistory(cont'd)
Date
September 2, 1965
3
6
9
11
14
17
20
22
25
28
October 1
Time, GMT
06:48:32
06:54:32
07:00:32
11:58:03
06:38:16
01:18:28
19:58:40
14:38:51
09:18:58
03:58:24
22:38:40
17:19:37
06:39:58
21:17:42
21:30:17
21:48:01
22:05:07
Event
DC-28 observed on Earth; Mode I data observed on Earth.
DC-26 observed on Earth; data encoder hlgh-rate deck skip and medium- and low-rate deck reset
observed on Earth.
DC-2 observed on Earth; Mode 2
CC&S CY-1 No. 101 on schedule;
CC&S CY-1 No. 102 on schedule;
CC&S CY-1 No. 103 on schedule;
CC&S CY-1 No. 104 on schedule;
CC&S CY-1 No. 105 on schedule;
CC&5 CY-1 No. 106 on schedule;
CC&5 CY-I No. 107 on schedule;
data observed on Earth.
observed in data at 11:58:25 GMT.
observed in data at 06:38:16 GMT.
observed in data at 01:18:59 GMT.
observed in data at 19:59:16 GMT.
observed in data at 14:38:54 GMT.
observed in data at 09:19:49 GMT.
observed in data at 03:59:15 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 108 on schedule; observed in data at 22:39:31 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 109 on schedule; observed in data at 17:19:47 GMT.
CC&S CY-1 No. 110. No data during this time because DSIF 61 was not operating. Signal would
have been observed at 11:59:47 GMT.
CC&S CY-I No. 111 on schedule. Observed in data at 06:40:17 GMT.
DSIF 13 100-kw transmitter locked up with the spacecraft command detector and maintained
command lock until 22:23 GMT. Lockup time: 1 rain.
DC-12 transmitted.
DC-12 received at the spacecraft (switch transmitter to low-gain antenna).
DC-12 observed at Earth; loss of RF signal as expected.
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APPENDIX B
Telemetry Data
Figures B-1 and B-2 illustrate the engineering and
real-time science telemetry data commutation schemes.
Figures B-3-B-79 show 77 of the 100 individual engi-
neering telemetry channels. Table B-1 lists the 23
engineering channels shown in Fig. B-1 that are not
shown as individual channel graphs in Fig. B-3-B-79.
Table B-1. Engineering channels not plotted
Channel Reason not shown in Fig. B-3--B-79
100
101
102
105
106
I10
114
115
116
118
119
200
202
206
211
212
228
400
4O3
415
416
417
427
Data encoder Deck 100 synchronization channel
Data encoder Deck 100 subcommutation channel for Deck 200
Data encoder Deck 100 subcommutation channel for Deck 210
Typical sample of pitch Sun sensor output shown in body of
Report as part of Fig. 8
Typical sample of yaw Sun sensor output shown in body of
Report as part of Fig. 8
Data encoder Deck 110 subcommutation channel for Deck 220
Typical sample of roll position output shown in body of
Report as part of Fig. 8
Sources of events in data encoder Registers 1 and 2 shown in
Fig. B-1
Sources of events in data encoder Registers 3 and 4 shown in
Fig. B-i
Shown in body of Report as Fig. 36
Shown in body of Report as Fig. 37
Data encoder Deck 200 synchronization channel
Data encoder Deck 200 subcommutation channel for Deck 300
Shown in body of Report as Fig. 27
Data encoder Deck 210 subcommutation channel for Deck 400
Data encoder Deck 210 subcommutation channel for Deck 420
Shown in body of Report as Fig. 38
Data encoder Deck 400 synchronization channel
Unused telemetry channel
Shown in body of Report as Fig. 24
Shown in body of Report as Fig. 25
Shown in body of Report as Fig. 23
Unused telemetry channel
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Fig. B-11. Channel 117, PiPS thrust chamber pressure
during trajectory-correction maneuver
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Fig. B-13. Channel 203, dual booster-regulator input current
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Fig. B-! 5. Channel 205, main booster-regulator
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Fig. B-17. Channel 208, attitude control +X/-Y
gas assembly nitrogen pressure
OE
UJ
85
80
75
Z 70
<[
60
55_ L L , .. i
1964 196,5
Fig. B-18. Channel 209, attitude control -X/+Y
gas assembly nitrogen pressure
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Fig. B-21. Channel 214, low-gain antenna power
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Fig. B-22. Channel 215, radio receiver fine AG¢
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Fig. B-24. Channel 217, PIPS fuel temperature Fig. B-25. Channel 218, attitude control +X/-Y gas
assembly nitrogen temperature
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Fig. B-26. Channel 219, attitude control -X/-t-Y gas
assembly nitrogen temperature
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Fig. B-27. Channel 220, CC&S event timing during traiectory-correction maneuver
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Fig. B-29. Channel 222, solar panel 4A1 output current
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Fig. B-30. Channel 223, solar panel 4A5 output current
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Fig. B-31. Channel 224, solar panel 4A3 output current
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Fig. B-34. Channel 227, 2.4-kc inverter output currant
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Fig. B-35. Channel 229, radio exciter output power
233
JPL TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 32-882
I-"
==
o
x
I-
8,40
7.7C
7.0c
I
--SWITCH
TO TWT
AMPLIFIER
J
I
1964
<
1965
43,82
,3
o
Fig. B-36. Channel 300, radio cavity amplifier bias or
TWT helix current
---- ,52.59
48.21 _
-2'°'F-_- F
> -2544 l
J
o>-28_,L I
II
-7
I
J 1
! J
,., ,3
o
1964 1965
Fig. B-37. Channel 301, radio exciter voltage No. 1
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Fig. B-38. Channel 302, radio exciter voltage No. 2
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Fig. B-41. Channel 305, -I-X solar pressure vane position
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Fig. B-43. Channel 307, +Y solar pressure vane position
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Fig. B-44. Channel 308, --Y solar pressure vane position
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Fig. B-45. Channel 309, CC&S 28-v monitor
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Fig. B-47. Channel 402, Bay IH temperature
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Fig. B-49. Channel 405, Bay Vl temperature
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Fig. B-51. Channel 407, power regulator temperature
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Fig. B-52. Channel 408, PIPS nitrogen temperature
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Fig. B-53. Channel 409, solar panel 4A1 front temperature
8O
7O
r,, 60
l-
n-
UJ
_ _o
w
F-
4O
I
_PREDICTED
o ACTUAL
I
_o o_ oo o _oo o o
tjo
3O I
1964 1965
Fig. B-54. Channel 410, Canopus sensor temperature
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Fig. B-55; Channel 411, scan actuator temperature
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Fig. B-56. Channel 412, absorptivity standard white
sample temperature
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Fig. B-60. Channel 419, ionization chamber temperature
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Fig. B-62. Channel 421, Bay II temperature
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Fig. B-63. Channel 422, Bay III temperature control
louver position
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Fig. B-64. Channel 423, Bay IV temperature
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Fig. B-65. Channel 424, radio crystal oscillator temperature
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Fig. B-66. Channel 425, Bay I temperature control
louver position
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Fig. B.67. Channel 426, Bay VII temperature
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Fig. 6-68. Channel 428, battery temperature
t60
" 120
0_
::3
80--
n*
UJ
O.
uJ 40
I-
\
\
0 1
1964 1965
Fig. B-69. Channel 429, solar panel 4A5 front temperature
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Fig. B-70. Channel 430, lower ring temperature above
Canopus sensor
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Fig. B-71. Channel 431, upper ring temperature below
Sun sensor
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Fig. B-72. Channel 432, absorptivity standard black
sample temperature
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Fig. B-74. Channel 434, upper thermal shield temperature
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Fig. B-73. Channel 433, absorptivity standard polished
aluminum sample temperature
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Fig. B-75. Channel 435, lower thermal shield temperature
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Fig. B-76. Channel 436, video storage tape recorder
temperature
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Fig. B-77. Channel 437, scan platform inertial and
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Fig. B-78. Channel 438, trapped-radiation detector
temperature
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Fig. B-79. Channel 439, magnetometer sensor temperature
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APPENDIX C
Flight Problems and Failures
A total of 73 flight Problem/Failure Reports (P/FRs)
were written during the 307 days of the Mariner IV
mission. Three of these were concerned with verifiable
failures: solar vane electrical lockup, plasma probe deg-
radation, and ion chamber failure. Several others re-
ported possible or suspected failures such as the battery
voltage rise. The majority _6 of the Problem/Failure Re-
ports written, however, involved only minor departures
:_Sixty-three of the total of 73 Reports.
from the nominal flight sequence or observed phenom-
ena not known previously to be normal spacecraft char-
aeteristics. Many of these were written to document
spacecraft behavior known to be probable, but not con-
sidered normal. A total of 24 were written to document
roll disturbances, and 7 to document data encoder deck
skips and resets.
A summary of the problems and failures reported dur-
ing the Mariner IV mission is presented in Table C-1.
SPAC log P/FR
number number Subsystem
001 10133 008
002 10134 007
003 10135 006
004 10136 011
005 10137 007
006 10138 007
007 10139 007
008 10140 006
009 10141 006
010 10142 007
011 10143 007
012 10144 007
013 10145 007
014 10146 007
015 10147 007
016 10113 002
017 10112 011
018 10115 002
019 10150 002
Table C-1. Problem/Failure Reports
Nature of
problem
Extra pyro events
at I.-1
Solar vane
deployment
Data encoder
deck skips
Temperatures
low
Roll transient
Canopus loss
Canopus loss
after DC-27
Data encoder
deck skips
Date encoder
deck skips
Canopus loss
Lossof
_' Velorum
Loss of
Velorum
Loss of
1' Velorum
Loss of
1' Velorum
Roll transient
TWT helix
current rise
Black absorptivity
standard no
switch
MT-6 RF power
drop observed at
DSIF 41
Interferometer
effect
Problem date
November 28, i 964
30
December 2
9
9
13
17
26
26
28
January 3,1965
February22
SPAC log
number
020
021
022
023
024
025
026
027
028
029
030
031
032
033
034
035
036
037
O38
P/FR
number Subsystem
10158 002 CY-1 RF
dropouts
10159 003 Command drop
of lock
10160 007 Roll transient
10122 007 Roll transient
10155 026 GM 10311 tube
failure
10156 011 Black absorptivity
standard early
switch
10149 007 Roll transient
10117 004 Battery voltage
increase
10157 006 Data encoder
deck skip at
MT-1
10111 024 Cosmic dust
detector film
indicators
10161 002 Spacecraft AGC
change at MT-5
10162 002 DSIF 11 failure
to lock up
10163 002 DSlF 42 failure
to lock up
10165 007 Roll transient
10166 002 tDSIF 11 failure
to lock up
10103 026 Ion chamber
10167 007 Roll transient
10174 004 PS&L voltage
drop
10173 002 Circulator
isolation
Nature of
problem Problem date
March i,1965
February11
March 11
February17
9
13
16
22
27
March 5
5
11
12
14
15
17
18
April 1
March 26
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SPAC log P/FR Subsystem Nature of
number number problem
039 10171 007 Solar pressure
vane activity
040 10170 007 Gas valve
excessive torques
041 10175 007 Minor roll
transient
042 10116 007 Solar pressure
vane Iockup
043 10121 197 Ground
command OSE
dumped lock
during DC-15
044 10176 002 1-db drop at
MT-2
045 10101 024 Cosmic dust
detector
transients
November
28, 1964
046 10102 032 Plasma transients
November
28, 1964
047 10132 032 Plasma probe
failure
048 10177 007 Minor roll
transient
049 10119 005 Change in CC&S
clock frequency
incorrectly
calculated
050 10178 007 Minor roll
transient
051 15654 011 Aluminum
sample did not
step
052 10184 002 DSIF 11 and 42
dropout
053 10183 002 DSIF 51 could
not lock up in
2 rain
Table C-1. Problem/Failure Reports (cont'd)
Problem date
Long term
Long term
April 7, 1965
January 11
January 4
April 2
December 3
p
3
21
April 10
21
_f
25
15
May 9
13
SPAC log P/FR Subsystem
number number
054 10182 002
055 10181 002
056 10187 007
058 10188 002
059
060
061
062
O63
064
065
O66
067
O68
069
070
071
072
073
074
10190
10191
10192
10193
10195
10196
10199
10401
10402
10403
10404
10405
10407
10408
10409
10088
007
007
007
007
O07
016/020
N
O06
016
020
OO6
OO7
024
OO6
021
010
Nature of
problem
DSIF 41 lost lock
Multiple ground
receiver losses
Minor roll
transient
i Telemetry signal
decrease in 2-way
lock
Roll transient
Roll transient
Roll trenslent
Roll transient
Roll transient
Extra EOTs
Extra event at
MT-7
Date encoder
deck skip at
DC-25
Extra track
change event
Cyclic noise every
16 rain
Date encoder
dock reset at
3C-26
10 roll transients
Cosmic dust
penetrations
Date encoder
deck skips
Cosmic ray
telescope shift
PIPS fuel tenk
bledder
incompetibility
Problem date
May 13, 1965
14
25
25
June 9
22
'r
15
_p
August 11
July 14
August 3
NA
September 15
15
21
February 3
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APPENDIX D
Command Description
Commond
DC-1
DC-2
DC-3
DC-4
DC-5
DC-6
DC-7
DC-8
DC-9
DC-10
DC-11
DC-12
DC-13
Table D-1. Mariner Mars 1964 commands
Effect
Transfers the data encoder to Mode 1 operation (all
engineering words) as soon as the transfer is acceptable to the
data encoder transfer logic.
Transfers the data encoder to Mode 2 operation (20
engineering words, 40 science words) as soon as the transfer
is acceptable to the data encoder transfer logic; applies
2.4-kc power to the cruise science instruments.
Transfers the data encoder to Mode 3 operation (all science
words) as soon as the transfer is acceptable to the data encoder
transfer logic.
Transfers the data encoder to Mode 4/1 operation (television
picture data or engineering data) as soon as the transfer is
acceptable to the data encoder transfer logic. If television
picture data is available from the video storage tape recorder,
television data is telemetered; if no television data is present
(as between television pictures), then engineering data is
telemetered; removes 2.4-kc power from the cruise science
instruments.
Transfers the data encoder from one bit rate to the other. The
data encoder can operate at either 8_h or 331,,_ bps.
Transfers the data encoder from one analog-to-digital
converter/pseudonoise generator (ADC/PNG) to the other.
The data encoder has two ADC/PNGs, A and B.
Transfers the radio from one power amplifier to the other.
The radio subsystem has two power amplifiers, A (TWT)
and B (cavity).
Changes the radio from one exciter to the other. The radio
subsystem has two exciters, A end B.
Turns the spacecraft radio ranging-receiver either on or off.
Causes the radio subsystem circulator switches to be
conditioned so that the spacecraft transmits via the high-gain
antenna and receives vla the low-gain antenna.
Causes the radio subsystem circulator switches to be
conditioned so that the spacecraft transmits and receives via
the hlgh-gain antenna.
Causes the radio subsystem circulator switches to be
conditioned so that the spacecraft transmits and receives via
the low-gain antenna.
Removes the affitude control excitation power from the
CC&S control lines so that the affitude control functions
that are controlled by the CC&$ are disabled. DC-13 also
prevents the pyrotechnics control circuitry from firing the
motor start and stop squibs.
Command
DC-14
DC-15
DC-16
DC-17
DC-18
DC-19
DC-20
DC_I
DC-22
DC-23
DC-24
Effect
Reverses the state of all the relays acted upon by DC-13.
DC-14, therefore, is a reset for DC-13 and reverts the attitude
control and pyrotechnics subsystems back to CC&S control.
Causes the Canopus sensor roll error signal to be applied to
the roll gas jet electronics at all times, regardless of whether
or not the roll acquisition logic is satisfied and also prevents
the roll search signal from being applied to the roll channel,
and roll acquisition logic violations from turning on the
gyros.
Initiates a narrow-angle acquisition signal and thereby
conditions the data automation subsystem (DA5) logic to
begin the television picture taking sequence and to transfer
the data encoder to Mode 3.
Causes a step change in the Canopus sensor cone angle by
changing the voltage on the deflection plates of the Canopus
trecker's image dissector.
Turns on the gyros (in the inertial mode) and the Canopus
sensor Sun shutter, and turns off the Canopus sensor. DC-18
also turns on the turn command generator and conditions the
attitude control circuitry for commanded roll turns.
Succeeding DC-18s cause cw 2.25-deg roll turns.
Serves as the reset for DC-15, DC-18, and DC-20.
Turns off the Canopus sensor and turns on the Canopus
sensor Sen shutter; also inhibits the roll acquisition logic
from turning on the gyros.
Simulates a Canopus acquisition logic violation, turns on the
gyros, and applies a negative roll search signal to the roll gas
jet electronics; thereby causing the spacecraft to cow roll
search to acquire a new target. DC-21 will also cause the
spacecraft to roll turn 2.25-deg ccw if preceded by a DC-18.
Changes video storage tape tracks by applying power to a
record head and gating the output of the playback amplifiers.
Sets relays in the pyrotechnics subsystem so that CC&5
commands M-6 and M-7 are routed to the squibs allotted to
the second motor burn.
Removes 400-cps single-phase power from the scan platform
drive motor.
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Command Effect
DC-25
DC-26
DC-27
DC-28
Table D-1. Mariner Mars 1964 commands (cont'd)
Causes 2.4-kc power to be applied to encounter science loads,
the video storage subsystem, and also the cruise science loads
if 2.4-kc power was off to cruise science; while at the same
time applying 52 vdc from the booster-regulator to the
400-cps single-phase inverter which in turn supplies power
to the scan subsystem drive motor and the video storage
subsystem record motor. DC-25 also enables the battery
charger boost mode and causes the pyrotechnics subsystem
to energize the solenoid that releases the scan platform
science cover.
Removes 2.4-kc power from all of the science loads (video
storage 2.4-kc power remains on) and 52-vdc power from
the 400-cps single-phase inverter; also enables the baffery
charger boost mode.
Starts the maneuver sequence by issuing the CC&S command
M-| (turn on gyros), by applying power to the maneuver
clock, and by removing the maneuver clamp and a flip-flop
reset signal from the CC&S maneuver circuitry.
Removes 2.4-kc power from the video storage subsystem and
enab|es the charge mode of the battery charger.
Command Effect
DC-29
QC-I-1
QC-1-2
QC-1-3
Sets relays in the pyrotechnics subsystem so that the CC&S
commands M-6 and M-7 are routed to the squibs allotted to
the first motor burn.
Sets pitch turn polarity and preloads the CC&S pitch shift
register so that at a counting rate of 1 pulse/sec (pps) the
register will fill in the required time interval for the attitude
control subsystem to pitch turn the spacecraft the amount
required for a given midcourse maneuver.
Sets roll turn polarity and preloads the CC&S roll shift
register so that at a counting rate of 1 pps the register will
fill in the required time interval for the attitude control
subsystem to roll turn the spacecraft the amount required for
a given mldcourse maneuver.
Preloads the CC&S velocity shift register so that at a
counting rate of 20 pps the register will fill in the time
interval necessary for the mldcourse motor to burn so that
the spacecraft obtains the required velocity change for a
given midcourse maneuver.
APPENDIX E
Mariner SPAC Group Encounter Test Plan
h INTRODUCTION
During the preparation leading to the planetary en-
counter phase of the Mariner IV mission, it was recog-
nized that the Mariner SPAC would have some special
test requirements in order to adequately support the
encounter. These requirements were enumerated, and a
special SPAC Test Plan specifically designed to satisfy
them was generated.
A. Purpose
The SPAC group test plan was prepared by the
Mariner Mars 1964 SPAC Director and his staff, and was
intended to serve as the basis for all future testing and
test planning directly associated with the participation
of the Mariner SPAC in Mariner IV flight operations. It
was intended to be the current, basic description of the
test philosophies, objectives, procedures, acceptance cri-
teria, and methods of evaluation to be used in all SPAC
tests.
B. Scope
The SPAC Test Plan described all Space Flight
Operations Facility (SFOF) tests which required direct
participation of the Mariner SPAC personnel or function,
starting with the planetary encounter tests scheduled for
April 1965 and ending with the termination of the
Mariner IV mission.
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C." Summary of Mariner SPAC Test Operations
1. General
The SPAC test operations were intended to exercise
the engineering and science performance analysis per-
sonnel in the performance of their duties with the ob-
jective of developing and maintaining the proficiency
required to partieipate properly in such critical and
complex spaceflight operations as the planetary encoun-
ter and post-encounter phases of the Mariner IV mission.
Inasmuch as the personnel involved had been actively
engaged in the interpretation of spacecraft telemetry
data in order to determine the state of the Mariner IV
from the time of launch, it was not intended to test
toward the objective of orientation and familiarization
with spacecraft operations, but rather toward the objec-
tive of exercising all of the interfaces within the DSN
which directly affect SPAC, of providing a thorough
understanding of the spacecraft logic which had hereto-
fore been unexercised during the flight, and of develop-
ing in detail the procedures that would be used during
the actual flight operations.
2. SPAC Encounter Tests
The following summary outlines the SPAC tests that
were to be performed in support of the planetary en-
counter activities.
a. Encounter sequence plan (ESP) tests. The objective
of the ESP tests was to exercise SPAC in a nominal en-
counter sequence in order to allow the generation of
ESP procedures in sufficient detail to permit their use
in flight operations.
b. Backup mode tests. The backup mode tests were
basically nominal encounters with induced failures or
variations that required corrective action or the adoption
of some alternate encounter mode.
c. Logic flow verification tests. The objective of logic
flow verification tests was to establish and verify the te-
lemetry criteria required to properly determine the
logical state of the spacecraft and to aid in operational
decisions.
d. Scan position test. The scan position test was a pro-
ficiency test for the science operations personnel in-
volved in positioning the scan platform via ground
command.
e. Scan search-to-planet tests. The objective of scan
search-to-planet tests was to verify the procedures for
determining the intersection of a searching scan plat-
form with the limb of the planet.
f. Special tests. A number of special tests were to be
conducted to test various phases of the encounter under
special conditions. One test would involve pre-positioning
the scan platform using data from Johannesburg to
test both the procedure and the ability to use operational-
quality data.
g. Readiness tests. Readiness tests were real-time en-
counter tests of the encounter phase procedures involv-
ing the bulk of the SFO organization with the objective
of achieving and confirming a full operational readiness
state prior to actual encounter.
II. TEST DESCRIPTION
A. ESP Tests
1. Objective
The objective of the ESP tests was to exercise SPAC
and the operations areas with which it interfaces in the
execution of the ESP encounter sequence to confirm
the feasibility of the ESP as an operations plan, to aid
in the development of any special equipment or tech-
niques required to support SPAC and the operations
personnel from SSAC, and to allow the generation of
detailed ESP procedures for the actual flight operation.
2. General
The ESP tests were designed to exercise the analysis
area operations personnel in all of the activities required
in the standard ESP. In order to provide an adequately
realistic and flexible data source, the Mariner Mars 1964
PTM spacecraft was to be used. Participation in the test
operations was to include the PTM test team [located at
the Spacecraft Assembly Facility (SAF)], SPAC, SSAC
operations personnel, such SFO personnel as normally
complete the operations link with the DSIF, and such
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data processing personnel as would be required to pro-
vide the projected ESP processing capability in SPAC
and SSAC. The MMSA was to be maintained as closely
as possible in the encounter configuration with all special
equipment and display or output devices installed and
operational.
3. Procedure
The ESP tests were to be controlled by the SPAC
Director and to consist of a nominal encounter sequence
including all ground commands scheduled as primary,
or, if applicable, backup per the ESP. Since the ESP
allowed for alternate modes in the event of nonstandard
occurrences, it was permissible for SPAC to deviate per
the ESP from the nominal sequence; however, there was
no intention of scheduling induced failures or anomalies
in the data source.
The tests could be performed in collapsed time in
order to allow the completion of all test events within a
standard 8-hr working day. The test events to be in-
eluded would nominally be those in the ESP occurring
between CC&S command MT-7 and the state of video
playback after CC&S command MT-9, although the test
might be scheduled to terminate as early as the end
of the record sequence at the discretion of the test
conductor.
4. Acceptance Criteria
The acceptance criteria for the ESP test were to be
threefold:
1. The SPAC and SSAC personnel were to have at-
tained a demonstrable proficiency in performing
standard events required in the ESP.
2. The detailed procedure used was to have been
verified to be adequate for use in nominal flight
operations.
3. All equipment associated with the test was to have
operated within tolerance and to have furnished
adequate support to its respective users.
B. Backup Mode Tests
1. Objective
The backup mode tests were to test the capability of
SPAC and the SSAC operations personnel to respond
adequately to failures and/or anomalies occurring dur-
ing the encounter phase of the Mariner mission.
2. General
The general framework of the backup mode tests was
to be the same as for the ESP tests, with the exception
that during the backup mode tests the PTM test team,
at their discretion, might induce failures or anomalies
during the performance of the ESP. It was SPAC's re-
sponsibility to determine the nature of these induced
problems and to recommend the corrective action re-
quire&
3. Procedure
The backup mode tests were to be scheduled and con-
trolled in the same manner as the ESP tests, and were to
differ from them only insofar as the introduction of non-
standard conditions was concerned.
4. Acceptance Criteria
1. SPAC was to have shown itself to be proficient in
recognizing spacecraft failures and in taking im-
mediate, proper corrective action.
2. The emergency procedures generated for the en-
counter phase of the Mariner mission were to have
been verified as being both correct and sufficient.
C. Logic Diagram Verification Tests
1. Objective
The logic diagram verification tests were to be used
to establish and verify a set of telemetry criteria which
determined the logical state of the spacecraft and
which served as a basis for decision which concerned
nonstandard ground command action and deviations
from the nominal ESP.
2. General
The logic diagram verification tests were designed as
a calibration rather than a simulation. The Mariner Mars
1964 PTM spacecraft was configured into one of the
many logical states possible during the encounter and
the telemetry indications were recorded. A change of
state would then be induced, and the telemetry indica-
tions would again be noted. The change in telemetry
should enable the SPAC personnel monitoring the test
data to formulate a set of telemetry criteria which would
determine as uniquely as possible the state of the space-
craft.
Participation in these tests would extend only to the
data analysis and the SFO support necessary to operate
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_e communications to SAF and the data output devices
in the MMSA.
3. Procedure
All logic diagram verification tests were to be run in
collapsed time without the simulated transmission lag
normally employed in the SPAC testing program. No
formal procedure would be generated for these tests;
instead the PTM Test Director would respond directly
to the test conductor (SPAC Director). The tests, in gen-
eral, would be performed using the Mariner Mars 1964
flight sequence flow diagrams. The tests would be
planned for 8 hr, and as many decision points on the
diagrams as possible would be investigated.
4. Acceptance Criteria
A sufficiently detailed and accurate set of telemetry
criteria was to have been generated and verified to allow
the publication of a formal set of encounter telemetry
criteria for use during the actual Mariner IV encounter.
D. Scan Position Test
1. Objective
The objective of the scan position test was to establish
and maintain the proficiency of the SSAC operations
personnel in properly positioning the scan platform
under simulated encounter condition by means of ground
command.
2. General
The scan position tests would be conducted jointly by
the SPAC Director and the SSAC Operations Director.
Participation would be required only from the SSAC
operations personnel, the PTM test team, and such SFO
personnel as would be required to furnish communica-
tions and data processing. There would be no SPAC par-
ticipation in the scan position tests other than the SPAC
Director function.
3. Procedure
The data source was to be the Mariner Mars 1964
PTM spacecraft, and encounter conditions were to be
simulated as closely as possible. Encounter science
should be turned on with CC&S command MT-7, and
the scan platform should begin operating in the search
mode. The SSAC operations personnel were responsible
for determining the proper time for command action in
order to stop the platform from searching at a predeter-
mined position.
4. Acceptance Criterion
The SSAC operations personnel should have demon-
strated their proficiency in positioning the scan platform
with sufficient accuracy to assure a high degree of con-
fidence in any possible scan positioning operation to be
undertaken during the Mariner IV planetary encounter.
E. Scan Search-to-Planet Tests
1. Objective
The objective of this test was to develop and verify
the procedures for determining the intersection of a
searching scan platform with the limb of the planet dur-
ing the Mariner IV encounter.
2. General
The scan search-to-planet tests were conducted by the
SSAC Operations Director. Participation was the same
as in the scan position test, except that trajectory infor-
mation supplied by FPAC was required.
3. Procedttre
The test procedure was to be the same as in the scan
position test, with the exception that the simulated time
scale of the test would extend to the acquisition of the
planet by the television subsystem.
4. Acceptance Criterion
The SSAC operations personnel were to have dem-
onstrated the capability to determine accurately the
position and time of intersection of a searching scan
platform with the limb of the planet.
F. Special Tests
1. Objective
The special tests were a series of tests which, for the
most part, were generally designed to provide a more
adequate simulation of the encounter conditions in the
areas where sufficient confidence in the ability of SPAC
and SSAC to perform reliably did not exist.
2. General
One special test which had been defined was a scan
position test using a data tape played over the normal
communications lines from DSIF 51. These communica-
tions channels had proved the weakest during the
Mariner mission before encounter, yet they had to be
relied upon for so critical a function as positioning the
scan platform.
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3. Procedure
The test was to be conducted per standard scan posi-
tioning procedures.
4. Acceptance Criterion
SSAC was to have demonstrated the ability to position
the scan platform accurately using DSIF 51 as a data
source.
G. Readiness Tests
1. Objective
The objective of the readiness tests was to provide
verification of the operational readiness of the combined
DSN prior to Mariner IV planetary encounter.
a. Preliminary readiness test. The objective of this
test was to be to verify the adequacy of encounter pro-
cedures and to verify the smooth operation of all of the
interfaces among the various components of the DSN.
b. Second readiness test. The objective of this test
was to v_ify the operational status of all equipments,
procedures, techniques, and programs required during
the Mariner IV encounter.
c. Final readiness test. The objective of this test was
to verify that the analysis areas and the DSN were fully
prepared to commit to support the Mariner IV en-
counter.
2. General
The readiness tests were real time simulated encoun-
ter tests using the Mariner Mars 1964 PTM as a data
source. The test conductor for the readiness tests should
be the Space Flight Operations Director, and participa-
tion in the test should be required of all analysis areas
and all operations areas and facilities. The test was to
encompass all of the events from an arbitrary time prior
to CC&S command MT-7 until approximately 20 lines of
the second TV picture had been played back.
3. Procedure
The readiness tests were to be conducted per the ESP.
4. Acceptance Criterion
All of the participating areas and facilities should have
demonstrated their complete operational readiness to
such a degree that the Mariner Project Manager was
prepared to accept their commitment to support the
Mariner IV encounter.
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APPENDIX F
Table F-1. Day conversion chart
November 1964 December 1964
Date 28 29 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
DAY OF YEAR 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354
DAY OF MISSION 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17_ 18 19 20 21
December 1964 January 1965
Date 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
DAY OF YEAR 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010
DAY OF MISSION 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
January 1965
Date 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
Feb. r
1 I
032 I
65 I
DAY OF YEAR 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031
DAY OF MISSION 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64
February 1965
Date 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
DAY OF YEAR 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050 051 052 053 054
DAY OF MISSION 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
February 1965 March 1965
Date
DAY OF YEAR
DAY OF MISSION
24 25 26 27 28
055 056 057 058 059
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
060 061 062 063 064 065 066 067 068 069 070 071 072 073 074 075 076
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109
March 1965 April1965
Date 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
DAY OF YEAR 077 078 079 080 081 082 083 084 085 086 087 088 089 090 091 092 093 094 095 096 097 098
DAY OF MISSION 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131
April 1965
Date 9 10 I1 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
DAY OF YEAR 099 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120
DAY OF MISSION 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 15Q 151 152 153
May1965
Date 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
DAY OF YEAR 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142
DAY OF MISSION 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175
May 1965 June1965
Date 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
DAY OF YEAR
DAY OF MISSION
143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164
176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197
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TableF-1.Dayconversionchart(cont'd)
June 1965 July 1965
Date
DAY OF YEAR
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 I 2 3 4 S
165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186
DAY OF MISSION 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219
July 1965
Date 6 7 8 9 I0 1| 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
DAY OF YEAR 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208
DAY OF MISSION 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241
Date
DAY OF YEAR
DAY OF MISSION
July 1965 August 1965
28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230
242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263
August 1965 September 1965
Date 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DAY OF YEAR 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252
DAY OF MISSION 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285
September 1965
Date 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
DAY OF YEAR 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273
DAY OF MISSION 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306
October 1965
Date 2 3 4 5 6 7
DAY OF YEAR 275 276 277 278 279 280
DAY OF MISSION 308 309 310 311 312 313
Oct.
i
274
307
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APPENDIX G
Personnel
People who supported SPAC activities during its lifetime are listed by Division and function, in the hope that
future SPAC groups may benefit from the knowledge and experience which each contributed individually to the
Mariner IV mission.
I. DIVISION 29,
A. G. Conrad, Mariner SPAC Director
SPAC Direction Team
R. K. Case
R. F. Draper
R. F. Miles, Jr.
R. A. Neilson
SPAC Support
R. E. Enfeld
L. Holmes
J. B. Ingles
D. M. Neumann
F. C. Smith
P. H. Steinbrook
II. DIVISION
J. A. Hunter, SPAC Division Representative
Telecommunications Analysis
S. A. Aranyi
E. N. Gordon
J. A. Hunter
L. Nalaboff
J. S. Omahen
V. Z. Viskanta
J. Votaw
Data Encoder Subsystem
W. Allen
W. Apel
C. Carl
W. Johnson
W. D. Sheldon
PROJECT ENGINEERING
SAF Test Team
G. W. Earle
L. J. Fullmer
G. Ostheller
T. W. Shain
H. H. Weaver
V. A. Wirth, Jr.
W. R. Teagne (Comprehensive Designers, Inc.)
H. W. Clary (Northrop Space Laboratories: NSL)
W. Davidson (NSL)
T. L. Edwards (NSL)
T. J. Laney (NSL)
K. V. Laverty (NSL)
R. T. Miller (NSL)
33, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Command Subsystem
L. Chandler
M. Crawford
R. De Santis
R. Duvall
D. Olsen
R. Rakunus
T. Spear
Radio Subsystem
T. Cocoa
D. D. Dahms
c.Hill
M. Holmes
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Video Storage Subsystem
D. Appleton
H. Bell
R. Grumm
]. ]urisich
W. Trester
Ground Telemetry Subsystem
R. Balluff
L. A. Couvillon
R, David
D. Drogosz
M. Graus
M. Kameya
R. P. King
R. Merritt
W. J. Rousey
P. Sandidge
IIh DIVISION 34, GUIDANCE AND CONTROL
D. R. Thomas, SPAC Division Representative
Power
S. Abramowitz
D. Bowen
G. C. Cleven
K. M. Dawson
C. L. Edwards
C. D. Fredrickson
]. V. Goldsmith
A. Krug
D. R. Lancaster
W. L. Long
L. A. Packard
H. C. Primus
D. Prisbrey
W. K. Shubert
R. L. Toomath
R. C. Moy (Space Technology Labs, Inc: STL)
T. Rigas (STL)
A. M. Youngren (STL)
CC&S
P. Fogg
E. Greenberg
N. Herman
M. Hoppe
P. Lecoq
S. Lingon
D. D. Lord
C. Newman
R. Otamura
D. Ross
R. Smith
G. Wardwell
G. Murphy (STL)
Attitude Control
H. K. Bouvier
L. ]. Brimmer
D. Carpenter
T. A. Casad
W. D. Charlan
W. E. Crawford
E. S. Davis
T. J. Don[in
P. ]. Hand
G. E. Hooper
E. S. Ivie
B. Johnson
J. M. Kent
T. Kerner
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_vV.K. Moore
]. F. Petralia
L. C. Pless
L. F. Sehmidt
G. Shima
R. Cooper (Northrop Nortronics: NTX)
G. Gupta (NTX)
Division and General
J. D. Aeord
R. Bardwell
R. P. Castro
R. E. Curry
R. V. Morris
D. H. Newell
G. Pace
L. D. Runkle
J, L, Savino
E. E. Suggs
S. Szirmay
IV. DIVISION 35, ENGINEERING MECHANICS
D, W, Lewis )
Sehmuecker __SPAC Division RepresentativesJ. D.
Thermal Control
L. N. Dumas
D. C. Miller
T. O. Thostesen
Structures and Actuators
G. G. Coyle
E. L. Floyd
P. T. Lyman
R. P. Thompson
H. D. von Delden
J. N. Wilson
Ve DIVISION 37, ENGINEERING FACILITIES
SFO / SAF Ope rations
L. S. Paul
Vh DIVISION 38,
T. A. Groudle (
B. W. Schmitz_ SPAC Division Representatives
Propulsion
H. G. Hartung
J. H. Kelley
R. F. Mattson
PROPULSION
T. R. Metz
Pyrotechnics
J. E. Earnest
M. L. Moore
SFO / SAF Operations
M. E. Maine
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VII. DIVISION 32,
W. G. Fawcett, SPAC Division Representative
Operations
W. G. Hodges
W. L. Momsen alternate SPAC representatives
L. G. Parker
R. K. Sloan, Mariner SSAC Director
The following Division 32 personnel were SSAC
members who were called upon for direct support to the
EPWG and to the SPAC operations.
Data Automation Subsystem
W. Baumer
A. P. Calabrese
D. L. Nay
W. J. Schneider
Cosmic Ray Telescope
R. J. Holman
Trapped Radiation Detectors
R. Lockhart
D. K. Schofield
Cosmic Dust Detector
B. V. Connor
D. K. Schofield
SPACE SCIENCES
Ion Chamber
H. R. Anderson
L. G. Despain
Scan Subsystem
R. F. Denning
R. Y. Wong
Plasma Probe
C. W. Snyder
Magnetometer
D. D. Norris
E. J. Smith
Television Subsystem
J. D. Allen
D. E. Bell
A. G. Herriman
C. C. LaBaw
Science Data
S. Foster
S. Gunter
L. Jahr
M. Sander
A. Snyman
SFO/SAF Operations
J. H. Lucks
F. A. Tomey
SPAC Operations Assistants
D. Backofen
M. D. Johnson
L. Morgan
VIII. DIVISION 31, SYSTEMS
T. M. Taylor
D. Tustin
SPAC Data Handling
J. K. Hickey
F. House
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FPAC Liaison
N. R. Haynes, Mariner FPAC Director
H. J. Gordon
D. A. Tito
Programmer Support
H. W. Alcorn
D. Casperson
T. Cox
D. Jacobs
E. Oliver
W. Paul
L. Pyle
J. Witt
NOMENCLATURE
ac
A/D
ADC
AFETR
AGC
APC
A/PW
AU
bps
CC&S
eg
ocw
cw
CY-1
DAS
DAP
DC
de
DIS
DN
DPS
DSIF
DSN
ev
EOT
EPWG
FPAC
F/PR
G1
GM
GTA
alternating current
analog-to-digital
analog-to-digital converter
Air Force Eastern Test Range
automatic gain control
automatic phase control
analog-to-pulse width converter
astronomic unit
bits per second
central computer and sequencer
center of gravity
counterclockwise
clockwise
CC&S cycle command
data automation subsystem
SFO computer program
direct command
direct currem
data input system
data number
data processing system
Deep Space Instrumentation Facility
Deep Space Network
eleotron volts
end of tape
Encounter Planning Working Group
Flight Path Analysis and Command Group
Failure/Problem Report
television subsystem grid number 1 voltage
Geiger-Mueller (tube)
Ground Telemetry Analyst
GTS
IR
LCE
L-1 to -3
MDL
MMSA
MT-1 to -9
NAA
NAMG
NASA
NRT
OSE
PAM
PAS
PCA
PCM
P/FR
PHA
PIPS
PLL
PN
PNG
PS&L
PSK
PTM
QC
RF
RFP
RT
RTDT
ground telemetry subsystem
infrared
launch complex equipment
CC&S launch counter commands
Master Data Librm3,
Mariner Mission Support Area
CC&S master-timer commands
narrow-angle acquisition
narrow-angle Mars gate
National Aeronautics _a_d Space
Adminis: tration
nonreal time
operational support equipment
pulse-amplitude modulation
pyroteehnies arming switch
pyrotechnics control assembly
pulse code modulation
Problem/Failure Report
pulse-height analysis
postinjeetion propulsion subsystem
phase-lock loop
pseudonoise
pseudonoise generator
power switching and logic
phase-shift keyed
proof ,test model
quantitative command
radio frequency
Request for Programming
real time
real time data translator
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NOMENCLATURE (Cont'd)
SCR
SFO
SFOD
SFOF
SIT
SNORE
SPAA
SPAC
SPE
silicon-controlled rectifier
Space Flight Operations
Space Flight Operations Director
Space Flight Operations Facility
separation-initiated timer
signal4o-noise ratio estimator
Spacecraft Performance Analysis Area
Spaeeeraft Performance Analysis and
Command Group
static phase error
SSAC
SSDM
STC
TDA
TTY
TWT
UV
VCO
VSWR
WAA
Space Science Analysis Commar_d Group
SFO computer program
system test ,complex
Tracking Data Analyst
teletype
traveling-wave ,tube
ultraviolet
voltage-controlled oscillator
voltage standing-wave ratio
wide-angle acquisition
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